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Director of the Institute for Balkan Studies
NIKOLA TASIĆ

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Das Problem der Ethnogenese im antiken Griechenland

Auszug: Sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen lassen darauf schließen, dass die historischen Dialekte der alten Hellenen erst auf griechischem Boden um und nach 1000 v. Chr. entstanden sind. Bei den frühen Zuwanderern kann es sich nur um kleinere Verbände gehandelt haben, so daß zweifellos keine großen „Stämme“ nach Griechenland vorgedrungen sind, wie man in der älteren Forschung angenommen hat. In Griechenland haben die Zuwanderer die Suffixe –ss und –nth oder –nd nicht erst kennengelernt, sondern zumindest zum Teil schon mitgebracht und vermutlich im 3. Jahrtausend v. Chr. die allmähliche Entwicklung des späteren Griechischen eingeleitet. Impulse für die Entwicklung der materiellen Kultur gingen um 1700 v. Chr. von Kreta aus und beeinflussten in starkem Maße die mykenische Zeit mit ihren Palastsystemen, deren Zusammenbruch um 1200 v. Chr. aber nicht schon zum Ende der mykenischen Kultur führte, wenn auch die Linear B-Schrift nicht mehr benutzt wurde und die Infrastrukturen der Machtzentren zusammenbrachen. Dies war zugleich die Voraussetzung für die Bildung kleinerer Siedlungen mit neuen Führungssystemen und Sozialstrukturen sowie mit einem jeweils eigenen Identitätsbewußtsein.

Stichwörter: Zuwanderer, kleine Verbände, keine großen Stämme, Suffixe im Griechischen, Einflüsse aus Kreta, mykenische Palastsysteme, kleinere Siedlungen nach Zerstörung der Paläste, neue Führungssysteme, Identitätsbewußtsein

In der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion über die Ethnogenese der Hellenen wurde in der älteren Forschung überwiegend die Auffassung vertreten, dass die wichtigsten Dialekte im antiken Griechenland auf drei große Einwanderungswellen zurückzuführen seien. Hiernach wurde die Entstehung des ionischen Dialektes mit einer Zuwanderung größerer Scharen um 2000 oder 1900 v. Chr. erklärt. Als Träger einer weiteren großen Einwanderungswelle um 1600 v. Chr. wurden Aioler bzw. Achaier vermutet, und als dritte Wanderungsbewegung wurde ein Zustrom von Doriern um oder kurz nach 1200 v. Chr. angenommen. Es wurde freilich auch darauf verwiesen, dass genau genommen bei den „Ioniern“ und Aiolern es sich um Vorfahren dieser „Völkerscharen“ handelte und die sogenannte Dorische Wanderung sich über mehrere Jahrzehnte oder sogar über ein Jahrhundert erstreckte.¹ Jedenfalls seien die Völkerscharen ursprünglich in „Stämme“ (*phylai*) ge-

¹ Vgl. etwa Ulrich Wilcken, *Griechische Geschichte im Rahmen der Altertumsgeschichte*, 9. Auflage hrsg. von Günther Klaffenbach (München 1962), 22–27; Hermann Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die Römische Kaiserzeit*, 5. Auflage (München 1977), 28–35.

gliedert gewesen, bevor eine „Zersplitterung“ in zahlreiche kleine Gemeinschaften erfolgt sei.

Detaillierte sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen haben indes ergeben, dass die historischen hellenischen Dialekte sich erst später auf griechischem Boden herausgebildet haben.² Die genannten Daten der vermuteten Einwanderungen größerer Verbände schienen zwar durch gewisse Veränderungen in der materiellen Kultur bestätigt zu werden. Es kann sich aber bei Zuwanderungen wohl kaum um massive Invasionen gehandelt haben, da für umfangreiche Wanderungsgruppen nicht die notwendigen logistischen Voraussetzungen bestanden. Eine Gleichsetzung damaliger Zuwanderer mit „Stämmen“ ist jedenfalls nicht möglich. Zudem vollzog sich in den erwähnten Zeiten nicht schlagartig ein Wandel. Um 1600 v. Chr. erfolgten im Übergang vom Mittel- zum Späthelladikum insgesamt gesehen keine schweren Siedlungskatastrophen. Um 1200 v. Chr. wurden zwar mehrere mykenische Machtzentren zerstört, doch bedeutete dies noch nicht das Ende der mykenischen Kultur. Auch die Veränderungen um 2000 v. Chr. waren nicht derart gravierend, dass eindeutig auf eine große Invasion geschlossen werden kann. Eher schien der Befund in Lerna (in der Argolis) auf eine Wende um 2300/2200 v. Chr. in der Zeit des Übergangs vom Frühelladikum II zum Frühelladikum III hinzudeuten. Die befestigte Siedlung „Lerna III“, in der sich ein größeres „Herrenhaus“ (*House of Tiles*) befand, wurde damals zerstört, und die neue Siedlung „Lerna IV“ bietet ein anderes Bild. Der Ort war nicht mehr befestigt, und es wurden Apsidenhäuser errichtet, die bautechnisch einen Rückschritt darstellten. Andererseits wurde dort nunmehr die Töpferscheibe verwendet, während Siegelabdrücke, wie sie in „Lerna III“ sehr zahlreich waren, nicht mehr gefunden wurden. Auch wurden in „Lerna IV“ als neue Elemente kleine Tonanker, Steinäxte und graue minyische Keramik gefunden, die in der älteren Forschung als typisch mittelhelladisch galt. Daher wurde die Zuwanderung einer neuen Bevölkerung vermutet,³ zumal auch Zerstörungen in Tiryns, Asine, Zygurys und

² Vgl. die grundlegenden Abhandlungen von W. Porzig, „Sprachgeographische Untersuchungen zu den altgriechischen Dialekten“, *Indogermanische Forschungen* 61 (1954), 147–169, und von E. Risch, „Die Gliederung der griechischen Dialekte in neuer Sicht“, *Museum Helveticum* 12 (1955), 61–76. Vgl. auch den Überblick von Rüdiger Schmitt, *Einführung in die griechischen Dialekte* (Darmstadt 1977), 124–133, sowie von Berit Hildebrandt, *Damos und Basileus. Überlegungen zu Sozialstrukturen in den Dunklen Jahrhunderten Griechenlands* (München 2007), 145–155.

³ Vgl. J. L. Caskey, „The Early Helladic Period in the Argolis“, *Hesperia* 29 (1960), 285–303; J. L. Caskey/E. T. Blackburn, *Lerna in the Argolid. A Short Guide* (Athen 1977); D. Pullen, „The Early Bronze Age in Greece“, in C. W. Shelmerdine (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Aegean Bronze Age* (Cambridge 2008), 19–46.

Hagios Kosmas in die gleiche Zeit (Ende Frühhelladikum II) datiert wurden.

Der Befund wurde unterschiedlich interpretiert. Einerseits wurden die Zerstörungen mit Vorstößen kleinerer Gruppen von der See her nach der attischen Ostküste und nach der Argolis vermutet.⁴ Andererseits wurden eine Vordatierung der vermuteten Einwanderung der eigentlichen Vorfahren der Griechen um 200 bis 300 Jahren an das Ende der Periode Frühhelladikum II vorgenommen sowie auch zeitweise eine Ausbreitung der Kurgan-Kulturen zur Diskussion gestellt. Die Invasionen sollen sich hier nach in mehreren großen Wellen ausgebreitet haben.⁵ Daher wurde vermutet, dass Kurgan-Völker über Westanatolien nach Griechenland vorstießen oder von Makedonien aus nach Süden expandierten, indem sie zunächst um 2300 v. Chr. zur See in die Argolis gelangten, aber auch am Ende der Periode Frühhelladikum III von Norden aus Albanien und Epirus sowie Thessalien, Boiotien und das gesamte südliche Griechenland „eroberten“.⁶ Als Beweise für Einwanderungen aus dem Bereich der Kurgan-Kulturen nördlich und nordöstlich des Schwarzen Meeres galten Hügelgräber aus dem Mittelhelladikum, die aber nur die äußere Form mit den nord-pontischen Kurganen gemeinsam haben, während die Elemente der materiellen Kultur aufgrund der gefundenen Grabbeigaben verschieden sind.⁷ Andere Thesen gingen davon aus, dass Apsidenhaus, Schafflochaxt und Tonanker auf den Einbruch eines indoeuropäischen Volkes von Norden aus nach Makedonien und Thessalien gegen Ende des Neolithikums schließen lassen und Teile dieser Bevölkerung um 2500 v. Chr. etwa gleichzeitig mit Zuwanderern aus Anatolien, denen bestimmte Keramikformen (z. B. einhenkelige

⁴ E. Hanschmann/V. Miložić, *Die deutschen Ausgrabungen auf der Argissa-Magula in Thessalien*, III 1. *Die Frühe und beginnende Mittlere Bronzezeit* (Bonn 1976), 229; Fritz Schachermeyr, *Die Ägäische Frühzeit. Forschungsbericht über die Ausgrabungen im letzten Jahrzehnt und über ihre Ergebnisse für unser Geschichtsbild*, 1. Band: *Die vormykenischen Perioden des griechischen Festlandes und der Kykladen* (Wien 1976), 241 ff.; E. J. Holmberg, „Some Notes on the Imigration of Indo-Europeans into Greece during the Early Bronze Age“, *Opuscula Atheniensi* 12 (1973), 1–9.

⁵ Dazu generell M. Gimbutas, „The Beginning of the Bronze Age in Europe and the Indo-Europeans: 3500–2500 B. C.“, *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 1 (1973), 163–214, die sich aber sehr vorsichtig zu der These äußert, dass möglicherweise „Kurgan-Leute“ an Zerstörungen in Griechenland Ende der Periode Frühhelladikum II beteiligt waren. Sie hat auch mehrfach ihre These modifiziert; vgl. dieselbe, „The Destruction of Aegean and East Mediterranean Urban Civilization around 2300 BC“, in R. A. Crossland & A. Birchall (Eds.), *Bronze Age Migrations in the Aegean* (London 1973), 129–139.

⁶ Vgl. Holmberg, „Some Notes“.

⁷ Vgl. A. Häusler, „Die Indoeuropäisierung Griechenlands nach Aussage der Grab- und Bestattungssitten“, *Slovenska Archeologia* 29: 1 (1981), 59–65.

Kännchen mit Trichterrand) zuzuordnen seien, in Boiotien erschienen. Um 2300 v. Chr. seien dann die Träger einer im Frühhelladikum in Boiotien entstandenen „Mischkultur“ in die Peloponnes und nach Attika gelangt, wo sie als jetzt schon griechische Bevölkerung die Dominanz gewonnen hätten.⁸ Andererseits wird als Herkunftsgebiet der zuletzt genannten Kulturelemente aber auch Anatolien angenommen und dementsprechend vermutet, dass von dort aus stärkere Einwanderungswellen als von Norden her Griechenland erreichten.⁹

Die Ethnogenese der Hellenen ist zunächst in einen großen sprachgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang einzuordnen. Hierbei sind langfristige Entwicklungen zu berücksichtigen. Nach dem linguistischen Befund zählt das Griechische bekanntlich zu der großen indoeuropäischen „Sprachfamilie“, zu der über 400 Sprachen gehören.¹⁰ Genannt seien hier neben dem Griechischen vor allem Latein sowie die keltischen, romanischen, germanischen, slawischen und indo-iranischen Sprachen. Ein schwieriges Problem ist freilich eine Lokalisierung der Ausgangsgebiete. Mehrere Regionen wurden in Erwägung gezogen. In Frage kamen vor allem die Gebiete zwischen dem Kaspischen und Schwarzen Meer und das mittlere Tal der Wolga mit ihren Nebenflüssen. Aus diesem Großraum sollen nach älteren Forschungsthesen im 5. Jahrtausend v. Chr. regelrechte Stammesverbände nach Südosteuropa aufgebrochen sowie im 4. Jahrtausend weitere Wande-

⁸ Stefan Hiller, „Zur Frage der griechischen Einwanderung“, *Mitteilungen der Österreichischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Ur- und Frühgeschichte* 32 (1982), 41–48 (erschienen 1984), und derselbe, „Die Ethnogenese der Griechen aus der Sicht der Vor- und Frühgeschichte“, in W. Bernhard & A. Kandler-Pålsson (Hrsg.), *Ethnogenese europäischer Völker* (Stuttgart & New York 1986), 21–37, der vermutet, dass die eigentlichen „Ahnen der späteren Griechen“ sogenannte Bevölkerungselemente aus dem makedonischen Raum waren. W. F. Wyatt, „The Prehistory of the Greek Dialects“, *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 101 (1970), 628 ff., nimmt an, dass die „proto-griechische Sprache“ in Teilen Thessaliens entstanden ist. Vgl. auch R. Drews, *The Coming of the Greeks. Indo-European Conquest in the Aegean and the Near East* (Princeton 1988), 193 f.

⁹ S. Hood, „Northern Penetration of Greece at the End of the Early Helladic Period and Contemporary Balkan Chronology“, in Crossland & Birchall (Eds.), *Bronze Age Migrations*, 59–71; derselbe, „Evidence for Invasion in the Aegean Area at the End of the Early Bronze Age“, in G. Cadogan (Ed.), *The End of the Bronze Age in the Aegean* (Leiden 1986), 31–88. Zur Frage der Indoeuropäer in Kleinasien vgl. auch J. Mel-laart, „Anatolia and the Indo-Europeans“, *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 9 (1981), 135–149.

¹⁰ Harald Haarmann, *Kleines Lexikon der Sprachen. Von Albanisch bis Zulu*, 2. Auflage (München 2002), 171–174.

rungseinheiten nach Zentralasien und ins iranische Hochland vorgedrungen sein.¹¹

Eine überraschende Lösung dieses Problems hat vor etwa zwei Jahrzehnten Colin Renfrew vorgeschlagen, der vermutet, dass ein frühgriechisches Idiom letztlich auf Träger einer ersten Ackerbaukultur zurückgeht, die sich vom südöstlichen Kleinasien aus verbreitete.¹² Neuere Untersuchungen deuten in der Tat darauf hin, dass eine Übermittlung des Ackerbaus und der Tierhaltung „vom Orient an den Okzident“ erfolgte und die Transferwege bei der Verbreitung von landwirtschaftlich kultiviertem Ackerbau und domestizierten Tieren sowie von verschiedenen Arten des Handwerks (wie z. B. Keramik und Metallurgie) „quer durch Anatolien über die Meerengen hinweg nach Südosteuropa“ geführt haben müsse.¹³ Sesshafte Kulturen sind offenbar etwa zwischen 8300 und 7600 v. Chr. in Kleinasien entstanden. Eine Verbreitung von Kulturelementen ist aber nicht in jedem Fall mit Wanderungsbewegungen großer Personengruppen oder mit Landnahmen zuwandernder Völker zu erklären. Selbstverständlich sind auch mannigfache Formen gegenseitiger kultureller Beeinflussung möglich und in Verbindung hiermit Neuerungen im Sprachgebrauch entstanden. Im griechischen Mutterland haben zweifellos frühe Zuwanderer auch Sprachgut der schon länger dort ansässigen Bewohner übernommen. Die Diskussionen hierüber sind in letzter Zeit freilich zu neuen Ergebnissen gelangt.

Nach älteren Thesen haben in Griechenland Zuwanderer vor allem Ortsnamen sowie Bezeichnungen für mediterrane Tiere und Pflanzen aus dem Sprachgut von Vorbewohnern übernommen. Ältere Sprachelemente sind im Griechischen nach dieser These in Wörtern enthalten, die auf –ss und –nth oder –nd enden. In der neueren Forschung wird aber darauf verwiesen, dass die genannten Suffixe auch in indoeuropäischen Sprachen zu finden sind, die zum anatolischen Sprachzweig gehören.¹⁴ Es handelt sich vor allem um Luwisch, Palaisch, Hethitisch, Lydisch und Lykisch. Die Wörter mit den erwähnten Suffixen sind daher im Griechischen zumindest nicht ausschließlich ein Sprachgut, das zuwandernde Gruppen erst im späteren hellenischen Mutterland kennengelernt haben. Dies bedeutet, dass die Ethnogenese und dementsprechend auch die Identitätsfindung der antiken Hellenen lange Prozesse waren. Zuwandernde Gruppen mit indoeuropäischen Idiomen können demnach die fraglichen Suffixe

¹¹ Ibid., 171 f.

¹² Colin Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language. The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins* (London 1987), 9–41; 263–289.

¹³ Christian Marek, *Geschichte Kleinasiens in der Antike* (München 2010), 77.

¹⁴ Margit Finkelberg, *Greeks and Pre-Greeks. Aegean History and Greek Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge 2005, reprinted 2007), 41–64.

gekannt haben, bevor sie Griechenland erreicht hatten. Entsprechende Zuwanderungen dürften bereits im dritten Jahrtausend, wenn nicht schon vor 3000 v. Chr. sukzessiv erfolgt sein. Neue Bevölkerungsgruppen sind in dieser Zeit wohl kaum in Form von geschlossenen Stammesverbänden oder in großen Scharen nach Griechenland gelangt, da die logistischen Voraussetzungen hierfür nicht gegeben waren. Daher ist anzunehmen, dass Zuwanderer und bereits ansässige Siedler sich vielfach arrangierten. Die Zuwanderer haben sicherlich nicht stets weite Entfernungen im Verlauf ihrer Züge zurückgelegt, sondern zumeist wohl erst nach einer Phase der Sesshaftigkeit einen Ortswechsel vorgenommen und eine Reihe von bereits länger ansässigen Indigenen oder zumindest einen Teil der Vorbevölkerung bei einem erneuten Aufbruch mitgenommen, wie dies in der späteren Zeit der sogenannten germanischen Völkerwanderung oft der Fall war. Ähnlich sind insgesamt gesehen wohl auch schon im Frühhelladikum „multi-ethnische“ neue Siedlungen entstanden. Hiergegen sprechen nicht die Ergebnisse von Skelettuntersuchungen, die gezeigt haben, dass eine gewisse Homogenität der Individuen aus den drei Kulturstufen des Früh-, Mittel- und Späthelladikums bestanden haben könnte.¹⁵ Die Zahl der zur Verfügung stehenden Skelettfunde ist allerdings begrenzt, so dass eine ethnische Zuordnung der betreffenden Funde problematisch erscheint.

Zuwandernde Gruppen mögen im Neolithikum und Frühhelladikum unterschiedliche Idiome gesprochen haben. Langfristig wurde aber die sprachliche Entwicklung durch eine mehr oder weniger kontinuierliche Zuwanderung geprägt, auch wenn es sich – wie gesagt – nicht um massive Invasionen, sondern eher um eine Art „Einsickern“ gehandelt hat. Allem Anschein nach vollzog sich vielfach eine Überlagerung älterer Gemeinschaften durch neue Siedler, die vielleicht schon proto-griechische Idiome sprachen, aber wohl auch Wörter der längst ansässigen Bewohner übernahmen und zudem bereits Namen und Begriffe mit den Suffixen -th, -nd und -ss aus einem proto-indoeuropäischen Wortschatz verwendet haben, der auch – wie gesagt – in einigen frühen indoeuropäischen Sprachen in Anatolien zu finden ist.

Die meisten Zuwanderer gelangten wohl von Norden her allmählich nach Griechenland. Auf den Wanderungszügen sind zweifellos auch Gruppen in Makedonien und Thessalien zurückgeblieben, da die Sprache der antiken Makedonen, die nicht mit der südslawischen Sprache der heutigen Makedonen zu verwechseln ist, mit dem Altgriechischen verwandt ist. Wahrscheinlich hat das Sprachgut von Zuwanderern, die der indoeuro-

¹⁵ Vgl. M. I. Xirotiris, „Die Ethnogenese der Griechen aus der Sicht der Anthropologie“, in Bernhard & Kandler-Pálsson (Hrsg.), *Ethnogenese europäischer Völker*, 39–53.

päischen Sprachfamilie angehörten, schon im Verlauf des dritten Jahrtausends v. Chr. oder noch früher die allmähliche Entwicklung des späteren Griechischen mehr und mehr beeinflusst.

Die einzelnen Phasen dieses Prozesses sind unbekannt. Zu beachten ist aber in jedem Fall, dass im dritten Jahrtausend v. Chr. in Griechenland zahlreiche Kleingesellschaften existierten. Dies war auch für das sprachliche Erscheinungsbild zweifellos von Bedeutung, da zwischen einfach strukturierten Gemeinschaften über einen regionalen Rahmen hinaus ein Austausch von Kulturgütern stattfand und hierfür auch sprachliche Verständigungsmöglichkeiten erforderlich waren. Wenn auch im Frühhelladikum kein sprunghafter Anstieg der Bevölkerungszahlen zu erkennen ist, dürften durch eine allmähliche Zuwanderung mit indoeuropäischen Idiomen die Sprachbarrieren mehr und mehr überwunden worden sein und letztlich auch eine gewisse sprachliche Annäherung im Sprachgebrauch stattgefunden haben, wie dies im Späthelladikum in der Diktion der „Verwaltungssprache“ der mykenischen Palastsysteme der Fall war.

Archäologische Funde aus dem Mittelhelladikum lassen aber bereits auf eine recht beachtliche Interaktion zwischen einer Reihe von Siedlungen schließen, in denen einzelne Repräsentanten personengebundener Macht eine herausragende Stellung einnahmen. Ein mittelhelladisches „Herrenhaus“ in Plasi bei Marathon ist beispielsweise ein Beleg für einen relativ hohen Rang des Besitzers.¹⁶ Ein weiteres größeres mittelhelladisches Gebäude wurde in Brauron nachgewiesen.¹⁷ In Attika bildete sich ähnlich wie in Malthi (Messenien) eine stärkere soziale Differenzierung heraus, die eine rege Kommunikation zwischen Siedlungen und ihren Führungspersonen bestätigt. Mit der Entstehung vergleichbarer Sozial- und Machtstrukturen war zweifellos nicht nur ein Kulturtransfer, sondern im Mittelhelladikum auch eine weitere Angleichung von Idiomen verbunden.

Entscheidende Impulse für ein steigendes Niveau in der materiellen Kultur gingen im 17. Jahrhundert v. Chr. von Kreta aus. Eine starke Position gewannen offensichtlich die „Herren“ von Mykene in der Zeit des Übergangs vom Mittel- zum Späthelladikum. Die „Herrschaft“ der sogenannten mykenischen Schachtgräberdynastie ist sicherlich indigen entstanden, wie die Funde einiger mittelhelladischer Gräber unter dem Steinkreis B au-

¹⁶ Sp. Marinatos, „Further News from Marathon“, *Archaiologika analekta ex Athenon* 3 (1970), 154; vgl. auch Sp. Marinatos, „Further Discoveries at Marathon“, ebd. 3 (1970), 351–375, zu einem Grabhügel im Vranatal bei Marathon, wo Personen bestattet waren, die zweifellos in ihrem lokalen Bereich einen hohen Rang eingenommen hatten.

¹⁷ R. Hope Simpson, *Mycenaean Greece* (Park Ridge 1981), 49.

ßerhalb des Löwentores zeigen.¹⁸ Spätestens um 1650 v. Chr. dürfte es den Herren Mykenes gelungen sein, ihren Einflussbereich zu erweitern, wenn es auch fraglich erscheint, ob es ihnen gelungen ist, die gesamte Argolis zu beherrschen.

Ähnliche Herrschaftsformen entstanden im Späthelladikum in Messenien, Boiotien und Attika. In Messenien wurden sogar relativ früh Tholosgräber angelegt.¹⁹ In der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. wurden bei Peristeria in der Nähe von Kyparissa (etwa 20 Kilometer nördlich von Pylos) drei Tholosgräber erbaut. Aus den dortigen Grabbeigaben ist zu schließen, dass Verbindungen mit Handwerkern in Mykene bestanden. Auch ein bei Koryphasion (nahe Pylos) entdecktes Kuppelgrab ist ins frühe Späthelladikum zu datieren.²⁰ Ferner sind einige Kuppelgräber bei Kakovatos einer Siedlung zuzuordnen, die bereits im Mittelhelladikum einige Bedeutung gewonnen hatte. In Boiotien entwickelte sich Orchomenos zu einem lokalen Zentrum. Immerhin wurde dort ein großes Tholosgrab gefunden. In Theben existierte bereits im Mittelhelladikum eine größere Siedlung, die in späthelladischer Zeit ihre Blütezeit hatte.

Eine große Überraschung war die Entdeckung einer frühmykenischen „Burg“ auf dem Kiapha Thiti bei Vari in Südattika durch Hans Lauter und seine Mitarbeiter.²¹ Kürzlich hat Hans Lohmann darauf hingewiesen, dass in diesem Zusammenhang auch andere bedeutende Plätze wie Aphidna, Brauron, Hagios Nikolaos, Anavyssou, Koropi, Thorikos und Vrana zu sehen sind.²² Lohmann und Florian Ruppenstein deuten derar-

¹⁸ Zu möglichen Kontakten zwischen Knossos und Mykene vgl. jetzt Christoph Ulf, „Von Knossos nach Mykene – die memoria der Mauern“, in E. Stein-Hölkeskamp & H.-J. Hölkeskamp (Hrsg.), *Die griechische Welt. Erinnerungen der Antike* (München 2010), 18–38. Zum chronologischen Problem des Beginns der Stufe Späthelladikum I vgl. Florian Ruppenstein, „Das Verhältnis zwischen Attika und Athen in mykenischer Zeit“, in Hans Lohmann & Torsten Mattern (Hrsg.), *Attika. Archäologie einer „zentralen“ Kulturlandschaft*, Akten der internationalen Tagung vom 18. – 20. Mai 2007 in Marburg (Wiesbaden 2010), 23.

¹⁹ Vgl. Drews, *Coming of the Greeks*, 186.

²⁰ Vgl. Y. G. Lolos, „The Tholos Tomb at Koryphasion: Evidence for the Transition from Middle to Late Helladic in Messenia“, in R. Laffineur (Ed.), *Transition. Le monde égéen du bronze moyen au bronze récent*, Actes de la deuxième rencontre égéenne internationale de l'Université de Liège (18–20 avril 1988) (Lüttich 1989), 171–175.

²¹ D. Hagel & H. Lauter, *Die frühmykenische Burg von Kiapha Thiti/Attika. Erster Vorbericht* (Marburger Winckelmannprogramm, 1987), 3–13; H. Lauter, *Kiapha Thiti, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen*, II 1. *Die bronzezeitliche Architektur*, Marburger Winckelmannprogramm 1995 (Marburg 1996).

²² H. Lohmann, „Kiapha Thiti und der Synoikismos des Theseus“, in Lohmann & Mattern (Hrsg.), *Attika*, 34–46.

tige „Herrensitze“ als „Kleinkönigtümer“ oder „Kleinfürstentümer“. ²³ Dies sind freilich anspruchsvolle Termini. Unabhängig von der Klassifizierung der Organisationsformen an den genannten Orten kann man aber davon ausgehen, dass es in Attika eine „Koexistenz“ einer Reihe von kleineren Machtzentren gab, deren Führungspersonen in einer Art von Interaktion durch Anpassung an Systeme in ihrer Nachbarschaft die Grundlagen ihrer Macht geschaffen haben und ihre Herrschaft eine Zeitlang zu behaupten vermochten. Dies setzt beachtliche Kommunikation und ausreichende Verständigungsmöglichkeiten voraus.

Die Lagerung der Macht änderte sich freilich durch den Niedergang lokaler Dynasten und infolge des Aufstiegs größerer Herrschaftszentren mit schriftlicher Verwaltung, die durch die vielbesprochenen Linear B-Täfelchen belegt ist. Diese Schrift ist offensichtlich in Anlehnung an die noch nicht entzifferte Linear A-Schrift für griechische (bzw. mykenische) Herren auf Kreta entwickelt worden. ²⁴ Die wichtigsten Fundstätten neben Knossos auf Kreta sind im griechischen Mutterland Pylos, Theben, Mykene und Tiryns. Weitere Belege für Linear B wurden auf Tontäfelchen und beschrifteten Gefäßen an verschiedenen Orten in Griechenland und auf Kreta gefunden. Es sind nur geringe dialektale Differenzen in den aus den großen Residenzen stammenden Texten erkennbar. Zu beachten ist, dass die Fundstellen zum Teil weit auseinander liegen und etwa Pylos oder Theben vermutlich von Mykene unabhängig waren. In dem mykenischen Herrschaftszentrum war demnach ein recht einheitliches frühes Griechisch bekannt, das für Verwaltungsnotizen verwendet wurde.

Dies besagt freilich nicht, dass die gesamte Bevölkerung auf dem griechischen Festland dieses Idiom sprach. Jedenfalls ist eine lange Entwicklung anzunehmen, die den Linear B-Texten zugrunde lag.

Wahrscheinlich vollzog sich auch die Entstehung und Konsolidierung der mykenischen Palastsysteme im Zuge einer weiträumigen Interaktion im Ägäisbereich. Auch im Übergang vom Früh- zum Mittelhelladikum und etwa drei bis vier Jahrhunderte später zu Beginn des Späthelladikums

²³ Lohmann, „Kiapha Thiti“, 46; Ruppenstein, „Das Verhältnis zwischen Attika“, 23–24.

²⁴ St. Hiller, „Die Mykenen auf Kreta. Ein Beitrag zum Knossos-Problem“, in H.-G. Buchholz (Hrsg.), *Ägäische Bronzezeit* (Darmstadt 1987), 388–405, vermutet, dass mykenische Heerführer auf Kreta, die als Söldner dienten um 1400 v. Chr. die Macht in Knossos an sich gerissen haben. Vgl. aber auch Laura Preston, „Late Minoan II to III B Crete“, in Shelmerdine, (Ed.), *Cambridge Companion*, 310–326, hier 311, die eine pauschale Wertung der damaligen Kultur in Kreta als „mykenisch“ für irreführend hält. Die Kontinuität im damaligen Kreta betonen auch S. B. Pomeroy *et al.*, *A Brief History of Ancient Greece. Politics, Society and Culture*, 2. Auflage (New York & Oxford 2009), 28, die den Herrschaftswchsel in Knossos um 1450 datieren.

sind keine schweren Katastrophen im Großraum der ägäischen Zivilisation nachzuweisen, so dass in diesen Zeiten des Wandels insgesamt gesehen der Austausch von Ideen und Gütern nicht langfristig unterbrochen wurde.

Verheerende Zerstörungen ereigneten sich aber in mehreren mykenischen Residenzen um 1200 v. Chr. Zu beachten ist freilich auch, dass die Anlagen auf der Akropolis von Athen nicht niederbrannten und in Mykene und Tiryns nach den Palastkatastrophen beachtliche Reparaturen vorgenommen wurden.²⁵ Die Aufzeichnungen in Linear B – Schrift wurden aber nicht fortgesetzt. Dementsprechend waren auch die Strukturen der Palastsysteme nicht erneuert worden. Es war offensichtlich nicht möglich, eine monarchische Herrschaft in den Machtzentren der mykenischen Welt zu restaurieren und fortzusetzen. Allerdings wurde in der neueren Forschung die These vertreten, dass die auf Linear B – Täfelchen als wa-na-ka bezeichnete Person entgegen der bisherigen Interpretation kein monarchischer Herrscher, sondern ein Gott gewesen sei, den man in allen Residenzen verehrt habe.²⁶ Diese Annahme läßt sich indes nicht stringent verifizieren, doch bestätigt die in den mykenischen Zentren üblich gewordene Bezeichnung der wohl wichtigsten Figur in den betreffenden Systemen, dass eine intensive Kommunikation zwischen den dominierenden Kreisen in der mykenischen Welt bestanden. Wichtig sind in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Übereinstimmungen in der sozialen Struktur und in der Organisation von Herrschaft in den bedeutendsten Palastsystemen. Hinzu kommen die vergleichbaren künstlerischen Ausdrucksformen in der Gestaltung der Säle der „Paläste“ in Pylos, Mykene und Tiryns mit Kampf-, Jagd- und Kultszenen. Die weiträumigen Verbindungen zwischen den mykenischen Zentren erlauben freilich nicht den Schluß, dass ein Großreich der sogenannten Achaier unter einem in Mykene residierenden Herrscher existierte. Umstritten ist auch, ob in den Phasen Späthelladikum III A und III B in der Argolis neben Mykene noch ein weiteres Machtzentrum in Tiryns bestand oder dieselbe Dynastie in beiden Palastburgen herrschte.²⁷ Eine gewisse Bedeutung hatte aber auch die Festung Midea in der genannten Zeit in der Argolis.

²⁵ In Mykene wurden auf dem Burgberg Ausbesserungen und eine gewisse bauliche Neuorientierung vorgenommen. Das Areal auf der Südwestseite der Burg diente wieder als Wohngebiet. – In Tiryns entstand eine neue, nach Plan errichtete Siedlung außerhalb der Burg; vgl. bereits K. Kilian, „Ausgrabungen in Tiryns 1976. Bericht zu den Grabungen“, *Archäologischer Anzeiger* (1978), 449 ff.

²⁶ Dazu jetzt ausführlich Tassilo Schmitt, „Kein König im Palast. Heterodoxe Überlegungen zur politischen und sozialen Ordnung in der mykenischen Zeit“, *Historische Zeitschrift* 288 (2009), 281–346.

²⁷ Vgl. Lohmann, „Kiapha Thiti“, 46.

Nach den Katastrophen um 1200 waren die Infrastrukturen der Machtzentren entscheidend gestört. Es bestand aber an vielen Plätzen noch Siedlungskontinuität, wenn auch die bisherigen Herrscher ihre Machtansprüche nicht mehr in der gewohnten Form durchsetzen konnten. Es folgt nach 1200 v. Chr. eine Zeit des Übergangs zu neuen Lebensformen. Die mykenische Kultur ging aber mit den Palastkatastrophen nicht plötzlich unter. Es ist bezeichnend, dass um 1100 v. Chr. die Vasenmalerei in die submykenische Phase übergeht, sich indes noch teilweise mit der Phase Spät-helladikum III C überschneidet. Es gab auch keine massiven Invasionen größerer Völkerschaften. Allerdings haben bestimmte Siedlungsgemeinschaften oder kleinere Gruppen gegebenenfalls aus Sicherheitsgründen sich neue Wohnsitze gesucht oder auch mit anderen Verbänden zusammengeschlossen. Es war von großer Bedeutung für die weitere Entwicklung in Griechenland, dass nach dem Zerfall der „Palastsysteme“ durchweg keine wesentlichen Unterschiede in den Führungs- und Sozialstrukturen bestanden. Der große Wandel nach dem Ende der Palastsysteme verlief freilich in den einzelnen Regionen in unterschiedlichem Tempo. Als Beispiel für die Veränderungen sei zunächst Nichoria in Messenien genannt, wo zu Beginn der Phase „Dark Ages I“ (ca. 1075-975 v. Chr.) etwa 13 oder 14 Familien sich ansiedelten, während in der Phase „Dark Ages II“ (ca. 975-800 v. Chr.) etwa 40 Familien mit über 200 Personen dort lebten. Auffällig sind zwei größere Häuser, von denen das ältere ursprünglich 10,50 Meter lang war und im 9. Jahrhundert v. Chr. eine Apsis erhielt. Es wurde bei dem Umbau in drei Räume aufgeteilt. Hierdurch wurden in dem Gebäude auch Beratungen möglich. Zweifellos handelte es sich um das Haus des damaligen ersten Mannes in Nichoria, dessen Position als Siedlungsführer gleichsam eine Vorstufe zur Stellung eines sogenannten *basileus* war, wie sie in den homerischen Epen (im späten 8. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bzw. um 700) dargestellt wurde.²⁸ Der „Vorsteher“ in Nichoria besaß aber zweifellos nicht derartige Ressourcen, wie sie den fiktiven „Königen“ (*basileis*) in den Epen zugeschrieben wurden. Ebenso wenig können seine Mittel mit dem Besitz eines ehemaligen Kriegers in Lefkandi (Euboia) verglichen werden, der etwa 1000-950 v. Chr. in einem monumentalen Bau von ca. 45 Metern Länge prunkvoll bestattet wurde.²⁹ Die Grabbeigaben lassen vermuten, dass er Kontakte mit der Levante hatte, doch verfügte er andererseits

²⁸ Vgl. hierzu K.-J. Hölkeskamp & E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, „Die Dark Ages und das archaische Griechenland“, in H.-J. Gehrke & H. Schneider (Hrsg.), *Geschichte der Antike*, 2. Auflage (Stuttgart & Weimar 2006), 62 f.

²⁹ Vgl. Keith G. Walker, *Archaic Eretria. A Political and Social History from the Earliest Times to 490 BC* (London & New York 2004), 81-83; Hildebrandt, *Damos und Basileus*, 384-388; Hölkeskamp & Stein-Hölkeskamp, „Die Dark Ages“, 63-65.

wahrscheinlich über eine geringere Macht als der damalige erste Mann in Athen, der wohl ranghöchster Oikosherr in einem weiteren Umkreis seiner Siedlung war.

Eine andere Entwicklung vollzog sich in Sparta, wo sich etwa Mitte des 10. Jahrhunderts im Raum der späteren vier spartanischen Dörfer Zuwanderer niederließen, die einen frühen dorischen Dialekt sprachen. Dort bewährten sich offenbar einzelne Krieger als Führungskräfte, die eine Oberschicht bildeten. Allem Anschein nach gelang es zwei Familien, ihre Führungspositionen zu festigen, so dass sich hier das spartanische Doppelkönigtum bildete. In den Anfängen Spartas war die Zahl der Dorier in Sparta aber zweifellos sehr gering. Survey-Untersuchungen haben ergeben, dass Sparta und seine nähere und weitere Umgebung längere Zeit sehr dünn besiedelt waren.³⁰

Generell vollzog sich freilich in manchen griechischen Siedlungsgebieten eine allmähliche Zunahme der Bevölkerung. Dies war eine bedeutende Voraussetzung für die Entstehung eines institutionellen Gefüges in zahlreichen Wehr- und Siedlungsverbänden, in denen sich nach heutigen Kriterien gleichsam staatliche Strukturen herausbildeten. Ferner bestätigen archäologische Funde die Aussagen der homerischen Epen über eine stärkere soziale Differenzierung, so dass durch unterschiedliche Quellengattungen die Vorstufen der Polisbildung und der später als Ethne bezeichneten Zusammenschlüsse auf regionaler Basis bezeugt sind. Wichtig ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Bedeutung des Kultes. In Zagora auf der Insel Andros entstand im 8. Jahrhundert ein größerer Gebäudekomplex, in dem vermutlich Beratungen eines bestimmten Kreises der Mitglieder der Siedlungsgemeinschaft stattfanden.³¹ Südöstlich des Gebäudes befand sich ein kleiner Tempel, der wohl erst nach Verlassen der Siedlung erbaut wurde. Zuvor existierte dort ein älterer Altar, an dem kultische Handlungen unter freiem Himmel vollzogen worden waren. Es ist anzunehmen, dass hieran alle oder zumindest viele freie männliche Erwachsene der Siedlungsgemeinschaft teilnehmen konnten. Dies trifft auch in Bezug auf „politische Versammlungen“ in der Vorstellungswelt der epischen Dichter zu, die in der Schilderung der vermeintlichen Verhältnisse auf Ithaka voraussetzen, dass zwischen den Personen, die gewissermaßen an einer Polis oder an einem Ethnos teilhaben, keine Verständigungsschwierigkeiten bestehen. Die Dichter beziehen sich aber hierbei nicht nur auf Boten aus entfernten Gemeinschaften (Odyssee

³⁰ R. W. V. Catling, „The Survey Area from the Early Iron Age to Classical Period (ca. 1050 – c. 300 BC)“, in W. G. Cavanagh *et al.*, *Continuity and Change in a Greek Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey*, Vol. I: *Methodology and Interpretation* (London 2002), 151–256.

³¹ Vgl. Hölkeskamp & Stein-Hölkeskamp „Die dark Ages“, 83–84.

1, 120 ff.), sondern auch auf Großgruppen eines fiktiven Heeres, in dem die Kombattanten aus einer Vielzahl von Regionen stammen (Ilias 2,194 ff.). Zur Bezeichnung der gesamten Heerscharen dienen auch die Namen der *Achaier*, *Argeioi* (Argiver) oder *Danaoi* (Danaer)³² sowie auch der *Panhellenes* („die Hellenen insgesamt“) oder *Panachaioi* („alle Achaier“).³³ Ursprünglich verstanden sich als Hellenes primär die Bewohner des „Landes“ Hellas in Südthessalien in der Nähe der Landschaft Phthia, die den epischen Dichtern als Gebiet der Myrmidonen unter Peleus und Achilleus galt.³⁴ Die Vermutung, dass die *Hellenes* in Nord- und Mittelgriechenland „zeitweise eine führende Stellung“ eingenommen haben,³⁵ läßt sich indes nicht verifizieren. Die Gründe für die Ausweitung des Hellenennamens bleiben ein offenes Problem. Immerhin gewannen aber Gemeinsamkeiten einer weit verbreiteten Bevölkerung, die aus der Sicht der epischen Dichter jedenfalls eine Kampfgemeinschaft bildeten, schärfere Konturen, die sich deutlicher abzeichneten, als die epischen Dichter um 700 v. Chr. in einer Art „Kunstsprache“ Ereignisse eines angeblichen zehnjährigen Krieges um Troia fixierten, der niemals stattgefunden hat.³⁶ Die Dichter fingieren einen Zusammenschluß, den es in dieser Form überhaupt nicht geben konnte. Sie gehen aber davon aus, dass es ethnische Verbindungen gab, die es ermöglichten, eine Aktionsgemeinschaft zu bilden und faktisch auch gemeinsam zu agieren. Somit wurden die Epen ein zentrales Thema kollektiver Erinnerung und ein wirkungsvolles Medium einer neuen polisübergreifenden Identitätsfindung.

In einer bereits im dritten Jahrtausend v. Chr. beginnenden Entwicklung waren somit zuwandernde Gruppen und ansässige Bevölkerungen zusammengewachsen oder besser: in immer wieder sich vollziehenden Prozessen hatten Integrationen und kontinuierliche Kommunikation zu einer gewissen Identitätsfindung geführt. In der mykenischen Zeit waren gegebenenfalls herrschende Dynastien durch gemeinsame Interessen der Ressourcenbildung und der Machterhaltung verbunden, so dass ein ziemlich einheitliches Idiom zur Registrierung von Einkünften und sonstigen Vorgängen und Maßnahmen in einer noch rudimentären „Verwaltung“ entstanden war. Daneben dürften sich aber auch Unterschiede in den Idiomen der Bevölkerungen in den einzelnen Regionen ergeben haben. Nach dem

³² Vgl. Hans-Joachim Gehrke, „Vergangenheitspräsentation bei den Griechen“, *Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik* 7 (2008), 6–7.

³³ Ilias 2,683 f.; 9,395; 9,447; 16,595; Odyssee 11,496.

³⁴ Panachaioi: Odyssee 1,239; 14,369; 24,32. Panhellenes: Ilias 2,530.

³⁵ Fritz Gschnitzer, in *Der Neue Pauly* 5 (1996), 297.

³⁶ Zu dieser umstrittenen Frage vgl. jetzt vor allem Dieter Hertel, *Das frühe Ilion. Die Besiedlung Troias durch die Griechen (1020 – 650/35 v. Chr.)* (München 2008), und Frank Kolb, *Tatort „Troia“. Geschichte, Mythen, Politik* (Paderborn 2010).

Untergang der Palastssysteme wurde die „gemeinsame Kanzleisprache“ nicht mehr verwendet. Sie ging hierdurch verloren, während sich dialektgeographische Besonderheiten im Laufe der Zeit verstärkten und sich – ebenfalls in einem langen Prozeß – die historischen griechischen Dialekte herausbildeten, die sich nicht zuletzt aus den unterschiedlichen Herausforderungen für die Bewohner der zum Teil weit auseinanderliegenden Landschaften und der *apoikiai* in kolonialen Gebieten ergaben.

Die schriftliche Fixierung der homerischen Dichtung wurde nicht nur ein Spiegel „des adligen Lebensstils“ der Gesellschaft.³⁷ Die Dichtung läßt auch die wachsende Bedeutung breiterer Schichten des Demos erkennen.³⁸ Die epische „Kunstsprache“, die weitgehend auf Idiomen ionischer und auch aiolischer Zuwanderer im nordwestlichen anatolischen Küstengebiet basierte, hat im Zuge ihrer Verbreitung durch Dichter und Sänger die Identitätsfindung der Hellenen in erheblichem Maße beeinflusst. Zu beachten ist in diesem Kontext auch eine „panhellenische Festkultur“.³⁹ Andererseits entwickelten aber auch griechische Gemeinwesen, die generell aus „face-to-face-societies“ entstanden waren,⁴⁰ im Laufe der Jahrhunderte ein eigenes Identitätsbewußtsein, das letztlich ein Hindernis für eine Einordnung der einzelnen Bürgerschaften in einen größeren gemeinsamen Bund war. Die spezifische Form der Ethnogenese erwies sich insofern als ein schweres Erbe.

Korrekturzusatz: Während der Drucklegung dieser Abhandlung erschien das Buch von Harald Haarmann, *Das Rätsel der Donauzivilisation. Die Entdeckung der ältesten Hochkultur Europas*, München 2011, der aus neuen Funden geschlossen hat, dass es auf dem Balkan zwischen dem 6. und 4. Jahrtausend eine Hochkultur gab, in der Schriftzeichen bekannt waren. Dies eröffnet möglicherweise neue Aspekte der Geschichte der frühen Hochkulturen.

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³⁷ Albrecht Dihle, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte, Von Homer bis zum Hellenismus*, 2. Auflage (München 1991), 26.

³⁸ In der Odyssee (2,6–7) wird die Volksversammlung nicht als Neuerung dargestellt, und in der Vorstellungswelt der Dichter kann der Demos sogar den Basileus zu einer Heerfahrt zwingen (Odyssee 14, 236–238).

³⁹ Vgl. Gehrke, „Vergangenheitspräsentation bei den Griechen“, 7.

⁴⁰ Der Begriff „face-to-face-society“ wurde ursprünglich von I. Laslett, *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (Oxford 1956), 157 ff., zur Charakterisierung des Dorflebens im vorindustriellen England verwendet und seither auch auf die griechische Polis übertragen. Vgl. M. I. Finley, *Democracy Ancient and Modern* (London 1973), 17.

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The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition A Fourteenth-century Serbian Version of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia*

Abstract: Early translations of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* into Old Church Slavonic appear in several versions incorporated into miscellanies of the *zbornik* (collection) type. These texts belong to various genres of religious prose and are usually assembled in apocryphal collections about journeys to the other world. The earliest known Serbian version of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* is the fourteenth-century manuscript dated to about 1380 (MS 29). The present paper gives an analysis of this narrative.

Keywords: apocalyptic literature, visions, “journeys of the soul” genre

The study of medieval apocalyptic and visionary literature has a long and well-developed tradition. Whether looked at in the context of the relationship between learned and popular cultures, which has been attracting scholarly attention¹ ever since the surge of anthropological studies in the 1970s, or as part of literary traditions,² the genre of stories of the travellers to the other world has been analyzed in medieval studies in an attempt to decipher the cultural milieus in which they originated and for which they were intended. The literary genre itself had long been known to the medieval public in East and West alike, given that one of the earliest accounts of a visionary experience dates from the seventh century.³ The attempts to de-

¹ J.-C. Schmitt, “Les traditions folkloriques dans la culture médiévale. Quelques réflexions de méthode”, *Archives des Sciences sociales de religions* 52/1 (1981), 5–20.

² M. Aubrun, “Caractère et portée religieuse et sociale des ‘visions’ en occident du VI^e au XI^e siècle”, *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 23 (1980), 109–130; J. Baun, *Tales from another Byzantium. Celestial Journey and Local Community in the Medieval Greek Apocrypha* (Cambridge 2007); A. Timotin, *Visions, prophéties et pouvoir à Byzance. Étude sur l’hagiographie méso-byzantine (IX^e–XI^e siècles)* (Paris 2010); cf. Lj. Maksimović, Το τέλος του Μεσαίωνα στα Βαλκάνια ως ιδεολογική αντιμετώπιση της καταστροφής: η περίπτωση των Σέρβων, in *The Balkans and the East Mediterranean (12–17 s.)* (Athens 1998), 141–149.

³ According to some analyses, the *Visio Baronti* is an early forerunner of the new literary genre, starting in the late sixth and early seventh centuries in the West: Y. Hen, “The structure and aims of the *Visio Baronti*”, *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 47 (October 1996), 477–497. For the text of the *Visio Baronti*, see *Visio Baronti monachi Longoretensis*, in W. Levison, ed., *MGH SRM V* (Hanover 1910), 368–394. See also C. Carozzi, *Le voyage de l’âme dans l’au-delà d’après la littérature latine (V^e–XIII^e siècle)*, Collection de l’Ecole française de Rome 189 (Rome 1994), 139–186. The genre itself draws its origin

lineate a typology of medieval visionary literature offer various examples of the *tour of heaven and hell* model which influenced nearly all types of other-world visions, apocalyptic included. Also, a feature common to almost the entire production is its close association with monastic circles, regardless of the rusticity (*sermo humilis*), appealing to a broad audience and “popular culture” in general, or the sophistication of its language. Modern scholars have stressed the importance of a proper understanding of the wider biblical context of moral apocalypses. Based on the already developed Christian tradition, especially the one related to the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic narratives written between the second century BC and the third century AD, these texts mainly belong to the genre of Old and New Testament apocrypha.⁴ That is why some of their late medieval copies occur in the *florilegia* assembling different apocrypha, nearly all inspired by eschatological prophecy.

The source analyzed in this paper, the narrative known as the *Apocalypse of Anastasia*, belongs to the “journeys of the soul” genre. Composed in Greek for a broad audience around the turn of the tenth century, it relates a visionary journey to the other world. In a broader sense, the text belongs to the corpus of Byzantine apocalyptic tradition (*BHG* 1868–1870b). The distinctive feature of this compilation, based on Old Testament apocrypha such as the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, the *Book of Enoch*, and on the New Testament *Apocalypse of Paul*, the *Letter that Fell from the Sky*, the *Didaskalia of our Lord Jesus Christ*, and *Theotokos*, resides above all in the fact that it is an extraordinary apocryphal narrative of a nun chosen to be lifted into heaven and taken on a tour. Concerned with the moral behaviour and eschatology of the individual soul, the narratives of this group were meant to provide immediate moral guidance; as “normative fictions”, such stories, intended to uphold moral norms, coincided with the flourishing of fantastic fictional hagiography marking the tenth-century hagiographic revival under the Macedonian dynasty and represented by the hagiographies of holy men, notably Basil the Younger and Andrew the Fool.

The *Apocalypse of Anastasia*, relating the adventures of a fictitious character, is far more ambitious than merely being a hagiographical account intended to support an already existing and quite popular cult.⁵ As a classical medieval vision of the other world, it has distinctive moral and

from the biblical and patristic traditions, especially from the other-world visions described in the *Dialogues* of Gregory the Great.

⁴ On related issues, see Jacques Le Goff, “Aspects savants et populaires des voyages dans l’Au-delà au Moyen Age”, *L’imaginaire médiéval* (Paris 1985), 103–119.

⁵ E. Patlagean, “Byzance et son autre monde: observations sur quelques récits”, in *Faire croire: modalités de la diffusion et de la réception des messages religieux du XII^e au XV^e siècle*, Collection de l’Ecole française de Rome 51 (Rome 1981), 201–221, was the first to

canonical value, including the standard elements of conventional apocalyptic *topoi*. The same goes for the political and historical frame of the narrative, i.e. prophetic visions of an eschatological nature, typical of the genre. According to most scholars, the visionary in the *Apocalypse of Anastasia*, quite contrary to that of the *Theotokos*, is a fictional, typological character known by the name of Anastasia. If, however, the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* was a literary echo of the already popular cult of Saint Anastasia, it remains insufficiently clear which saint is referred to as a “black-habited nun Anastasia”. There were at least four saints named Anastasia, two of them Roman martyrs from the 250s, one martyr from Sirmium (late third or early fourth century), and a patrician from the Justinianic era.⁶ If it was a real rather than fictional heroine, it perhaps most likely was Anastasia Pharmakolytria, a widow from Sirmium famed for her skill to cure from poison, martyred between 290 and 304 along with her fellow martyrs — the priest Chrysogonus and three (or four) virgins. It was her who appeared to St Andrew the Fool in a vision, and her recognizable iconography with a medicinal vial in hand was widespread across the Byzantine world. In the fifth century, under the emperor Leo I, her relics were translated from Sirmium to Constantinople and enshrined in the Anastasis church next to the forum of Constantine, and in the sixth century some of her relics were transferred to Rome. Her cult became increasingly popular in the tenth century, when a new hagiographic version of her martyrdom (*passio*) was penned by Theodore Krithinos, the *oikonomos* of the Great Church.⁷ It is interesting that all surviving versions of *Anastasia* attach great importance to the church of St Anastasia in Constantinople, which is depicted as a place of great spiritual power, especially when it comes to healing those afflicted by demons, sorcerers and mental illness in general.⁸ The surge of the popularity of Pharmakolytria’s cult coincided with the emergence of our text. Perhaps the effort to spread the cult among different social strata and thus ensure its wider popularity may account for the emergence of a “popular” read which, apart from touching upon universal Christian themes typical of the genre, additionally insisted on social aspects, sin, atonement and injustice, with the sting of criticism being directed at elite sinners. An especially interesting fact is that the social aspect of the narrative is emphasized in the Slavonic translations

draw the attention of a broader scholarly public to the *Apocalypse of Anastasia*; Baun, *Tales*, 22–27, offers a very informative discussion on the subject.

⁶ Baun, *Tales*, 117.

⁷ Theodore found the text of the Latin version of Anastasia’s *passio* while on an embassy to the Pope in Rome in 824. For more detail, see Baun, *Tales*, 118 (with bibliography).

⁸ Baun, *Tales*, 115.

done in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, which was the period of the expansion of Pharmakolytria's cult in the peripheral regions of the Empire. It is my contention, however, that whatever scholarly speculations may be as to which particular Anastasia this one was, the analysis of the fictionality or historicity of the main character ought to take into account the symbolism of the etymology of the name Anastasia — resurrection, and bring it into relation with the main feature of the genre — the journey of the soul. In that sense, the fact that the expansion of Anastasia Pharmakolytria's cult gained momentum in the tenth century does not seem decisive for attributing the text to her. What seems more important is to focus on the narrative content itself.

A hagiographical prologue and a biblical conclusion provide the frame for a peculiar narrative. The supplication for blessing is followed by the story about the pious life and deeds, the death and resurrection of a nun called Anastasia. The introductory lines of *Anastasia* suggest that it was initially intended for monastic circles, by a writer addressing the monastic community. The element that draws attention is the appeal to “Christian people”, regardless of social status and wealth, to proceed to confession as instructed by the moral of the popular story they are about to hear. Gregorios, the spiritual father of her monastery, invites the heroine to relate her tale of the other world, where her guide was the archangel Michael. The fact that, during the journey of her soul, she saw the emperors John I Tzimiskes and his victim, Nikephoros II Phokas, among “elite sinners”, provides the clue to the date of the tale, which cannot be earlier than the late tenth century.

The four preserved Greek versions of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* are rather late, copied or compiled between the mid-fourteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries.⁹ All are incorporated into *florilegia* composed of different kinds of popular religious prose texts — apocryphal, ascetic, biblical, hagiographical, magical, legendary, devotional and homiletic. It seems that *Anastasia* mostly circulated within the Byzantine Empire and in its immediate cultural orbit, namely in south Italy, and among South Slavs, in Bulgaria and Serbia. Early translations of the *Anastasia* narrative into Old Church Slavonic appear in several versions, incorporated into miscellanies

⁹ For a very detailed overview of the editions of the text see Baun, *Tales*, 61, Table 2.2: Oxford Bodleian Selden Supra, 1340, unpublished (BHG 1870b); Paris Bibliothèque Nationale Graecus 1631, 15th century (ed. Radermacher 1893; ed. Homburg 1903); Palermo Biblioteca Nazionale, Panormitanus III.B.25 (ed. Homburg 1903); Milan Ambrosianus A 56 sup.1542 (ed. Homburg 1903).

of the *zbornik* (collection) type.¹⁰ These texts, titled *slovo* (*logos*), belong to various genres of religious prose and are usually assembled in apocryphal collections about journeys to the other world. Apart from the *Slovo on Anastasia Chernorizitsya*, the collections as a rule contain the *Apocalypse of Paul*, which is considered to have been the main source for *Anastasia*, *Theotokos* and a number of other apocrypha whose subject is the future of the world. The Slavonic manuscripts have preserved an earlier version of the Greek original; although copied later than the Greek manuscripts, they actually reveal an earlier stage in the existence of *Anastasia*.¹¹ One of them, now in the National Library in Sofia,¹² is a sixteenth-century copy of the original translation made sometime between the twelfth and fourteenth century. The now lost Serbian manuscript, believed to be the earliest Serbian version of the translation, was a similar but independent translation from the same Greek original.¹³ The Serbian translations titled *Slovo Svete Anastasije* were, as a visionary apocalyptic text, incorporated into four manuscripts, the seventeenth, eighteenth (1750 and 1752) and early nineteenth century versions (1812) of the text.¹⁴ As mentioned before, all these versions are now lost, and we know of them only from Speranski's edition of 1931. Speranski published the version kept in Sofia and recorded all differences between it and the now gone versions of the manuscript from Belgrade. Also, Speranski's edition of the Slavonic *Anastasia Apocalypse* registers a number of correspondences between *Anastasia* and the *Life of Basil the Younger*.¹⁵ Taken as a whole, the manuscripts of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia*, both Greek and Slavonic, preserve different versions of the text, each representing a distinct textual tradition. As for

¹⁰ For the published Slavonic versions of *Anastasia* see M. N. Speranski, "Malo izvestnoe vizantiiskoe 'videnie' i ego slavianskie teksty", *Byzantinoslavica* 3 (1931), 110–133. Speranski's text was reprinted in D. Petkanova's anthology of medieval Bulgarian apocrypha, *Stara bulgarska literatura*, vol. 1, *Apokrifi* (Sofia 1981). Speranski was aware of four Slavonic versions of *Anastasia*: one which is still kept in the National Library in Sofia, and three which used to be in the National Library in Belgrade. In April 1941, however, Belgrade was heavily bombed and the Library was hit and burnt down, and with it, all three manuscripts published by Speranski. However, he was not aware of two other and considerably earlier Serbian translations of *Anastasia* and neither is J. Baun, whose analysis is based solely on the text published by Speranski.

¹¹ Baun, *Tales*, 67.

¹² Sofia (National Library) Narodnata Biblioteka MS 629, 16th century, ed. Speranski (1931).

¹³ Belgrade (National Library) Narodna Biblioteka MS 738, 17th century, ed. Speranski (1931).

¹⁴ See note 17 herein. Cf. Speranski, "Malo izvestnoe", 125.

¹⁵ Speranski, "Malo izvestnoe", 121–123.

the Serbian manuscripts, they belong to a different cultural and textual setting, maintaining complex interrelations with the contemporary literary and cultural tradition.

Both Speranski and Jane Baun are unaware of two earlier Serbian translations of *Anastasia*, which obviously served as a model for the later translations that they analyze.¹⁶ These two are later copies of entire collections with either the unchanged or very similar selection of texts. That this is so may be easily seen from the descriptions of the now-lost *florilegia*.¹⁷ This contribution will analyze the earliest surviving translation, the one in the collection of apocrypha created about 1380, now kept in the Monastery of Savina (MS 29).¹⁸ The other one, created in the fifteenth century, has been preserved in the A. I. Khludov Collection, now kept in the State Historical Museum in Moscow (Hludov, no. 241).¹⁹

As things stand now, the earliest known Serbian copy of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* is the fourteenth-century manuscript in a Serbian recension (MS 29). Even this one contains a number of misinterpretations of the original text, all of them apparently due to the translator's linguistic inadequacies. Also, this version differs from the Greek original in a number of ways, namely in its emphasis on the descriptions of other-world torments and its urgent call to repentance. The Slavonic versions of *Anas-*

¹⁶ The list of the manuscripts is available in T. Jovanović, "L'étude des apocryphes dans la tradition manuscrite serbe médiévale", *Etudes balkaniques. Cahiers Pierre Belon* 4 (1997), 127. Cf. T. Jovanović, *Apokrifi novožavetni* (Belgrade 2005), 456–475, where he brings the translation of *Anastasia* according to the manuscript from the Khludov Collection as published by A. Miltenova, with commentaries (pp. 472–475) concerning the differences between this version and MS 29 (see also his commentary on pp. 543–544). Comparison of the differences between the two manuscripts suggests the same prototype, i.e. that the Khludov one might have been a transcription of the 1380 manuscript.

¹⁷ They are also published by Lj. Stojanović, in *Rukopisi i stare štampane knjige*, vol. IV of the Catalogue of the National Library of Serbia in Belgrade, compiled by Lj. Stojanović (Belgrade 1903; phototypic ed., vol. 3, Belgrade 1982): cf. therein the descriptions for manuscripts no. 470 (p. 308), 17th century; no. 503 (p. 369), ca 1750; no. 505 (p. 447), 1812; and no. 506 (p. 558), 1752. All these manuscripts are of a Serbian recension and belong to similarly compiled collections. In all of them the text of *Anastasia* is preceded by the *Story of Heaven and Earth*. A translation of 1784 has also survived, and is kept in the University Library in Zagreb (no. 3380).

¹⁸ MS 29, 185a – 196b (with the concluding part omitted); cf. the inventory of the manuscripts in the possession of the Monastery of Savina made by D. Bogdanović and published in D. Medaković, *Manastir Savina. Velika crkva, riznica, rukopisi* (Belgrade 1978), 95, with the description of the manuscript.

¹⁹ Hludov, no. 241, 1361 – 153b, after the edition by A. Miltenova, "Neizvesten prevod na vizantiiskoto videnie na Anastasiya chernorizitsa v starobŭlgarskata literature", in *Medievistika i kulturna antropologiya* (Sofia: Mnemozina 1998), 237–257.

tasia generally omit the pseudo-hagiographical prologue and begin with a brief account of (A)Nastasia and her mission, to proceed directly to the description of the punishment of elite sinners. The conclusion of the Slavonic translations contain some interesting departures from the original, similar in tone to the famous *Letter that Fell from the Sky*, the text considered to be an integral part of the original, tenth-century *Apocalypse of Anastasia*.²⁰

Considering the abovementioned departures from the original, or the additions to the Slavonic versions, it appears that the Slavonic versions of the narrative, shorter than the Greek original, tended to offer instant and explicit moral lessons to the audience, visible even in its title (*poučenie*). Very close to the broad and developed tradition of homiletic and moralizing prose popular among Slavs, the earliest known Serbian translation elaborates the imagined dialogue between the emperors (Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes). The motif of the “good emperor” and the moralizing point of the passage, especially the emphasis laid on the imagined virtues of Nikephoros Phokas, whose cult had a well-established and widely popular tradition among the Serbs, deserve further analysis.

The key role in the devotional practices observed in the Serbian lands, which, as we have seen, outlived the medieval period and continued into the one in which the first known Serbian translation originated, was played by the cult of the sainted rulers of the Nemanjić dynasty. The traditions of vital relevance to understanding how the cult of the holy rulers was contrived and instituted were formed under the powerful influence of Byzantine models, at first in the eleventh century, which is approximately the time when the original Greek *Anastasia Apocalypse* was written. As shown by the well-studied Byzantine examples, it was then that a link between the cult of saints and power became obvious, and publicly proclaimed in contemporary hagiography.²¹ We can observe holy men’s increasing repute and importance, their way up on the social ladder, the influence they began to exert in the field of active politics.²² Holy men acted as spiritual fathers of the leading figures of the secular hierarchy, and their prophetic visions and advice had an effect on the actions of the political elite. The popularity

²⁰ Baun, *Tales*, 70.

²¹ Highly useful for the Byzantine examples is S. Hackel, ed., *The Byzantine Saint*, University of Birmingham Fourteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies (Birmingham 1981), and therein esp. E. Patlagean, “Sainteté et Pouvoir”, 95–97, and R. Morris, “The Political Saint of the Eleventh Century”, 43–50.

²² On the concept of the holy man, see A. Cameron, “On defining the holy men”, in *The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown*, eds. J. Howard-Johnson and P. A. Hayward (Oxford 1999), 27–43.

of a monastic vocation in the Eastern Christian world led to the monastic ideal being embraced by representatives of the highest political circles as early as the tenth century, and it even left its mark on the development of the emperor cult.²³

These models undoubtedly influenced the cult of emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969), increasingly popular in the Slavic world from the thirteenth century.²⁴ Owing mostly to the widely-read “Eulogy on emperor Nikephoros II Phokas and his spouse Theophano”,²⁵ the emperor became the preferred prototype of the ruler-monk. As a result of the spread and immense popularity of neo-martyr cults among the Serbs in the late middle ages, it clearly had a sequel in post-Byzantine times as well. Contemporary western *lives* of martyr-rulers meeting their end while praying, at the church door, or performing ascetical practices as emperor Phokas did by sleeping on jagged stones, as a rule contrast the hero of the *Life* with his murderer who profits from the crime and takes power. In the eleventh century Phokas receives an office, honouring him as a martyr, ascetic, and bringer of victory. The celebration of the emperor’s sanctity is accommodated to the frame of current piety and popularity of the cult of ascetics and martyrs.²⁶ Subsequent Serbian hagiography and especially the fashioning of the popular ruler-monk pattern undoubtedly drew upon the related literary genre cultivated in the Byzantine cultural orbit. It is no accident that the popularity of the *Eulogy* and *Office* to the emperor, composed at the Great Laura and honouring him as an ascetically inclined ruler close to the Athonite monastic circles, coincides with the growing popularity of royal monkhood which becomes an accepted model in medieval Serbia.²⁷ During the eleventh century, cults of royal martyrs arise across the Slavic world, receiving a

²³ P. Magdalino, “The Byzantine holy man in the twelfth century”, in Hackel, ed., *Byzantine Saint*, 51–66.

²⁴ Patlagean, “Sainteté et Pouvoir”, 99.

²⁵ For a critical edition of the text, see E. Turdeanu, *Le dit de l'empereur Nicéphore II Phocas et de son épouse Théophano* (Thessaloniki 1976).

²⁶ E. Patlagean, “Le Basileus assassiné et la sainteté imperiale”, in *Media in Francia, Recueil de mélanges offert à Karl Ferdinand Werner* (Paris: Institut historique allemand, 1989), 345–359; P. Schreiner, “Aspekte der politischen Heiligenverehrung in Byzanz”, in *Politik und Heiligenverehrung im Hochmittelalter*, ed. J. Peterson (Sigmaringen 1994), 365–383.

²⁷ P. Magdalino, “The emperor and his image”, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180* (Cambridge 1993), 413–488. On the use of the said model in medieval Serbia, see S. Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija Nemanjića* (L’idéologie monarchique de la dynastie des Némanides) (Belgrade 1997), 274–286. Cf. S. Marjanović-Dušanić, “Patterns of Martyrial Sanctity in the Royal Ideology of Medieval Serbia. Continuity and Change”, *Balcanica XXXVII* (2006), 71–72.

most enthusiastic response connected with the spread of the martyrial and monastic ideals in Byzantium.²⁸

Coincidentally with the spreading of Phokas' cult, the Greek original of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* found its readers in Slavic areas. Of course, it was no accident that it was Phokas, "wearing raiment all golden", and his murderer Tzimiskes that Anastasia meets on her journey to the other world. The fact that the *Slovo*, written to elicit widespread response, introduces a very famous ascetic saint such as the late emperor was undoubtedly a deliberate choice. The more so as none of the four surviving Greek texts contains the moralizing passage about good emperors in general and Phokas in particular,²⁹ with its elaborated dialogue between the victim and his murderer.³⁰ In his analysis of the text and its dependence upon the *Life of Basil the Younger*, Speranski suggests that the dialogue between Phokas and Tzimiskes was inspired by the words, recounted in *Basil*, which the dying Michael III addressed to his murderer, the usurper Basil I.³¹ The question, therefore, is what effect the author sought to achieve. This passage does not rely for its moralizing effect solely on references, not so rare in the literature of the type, to the punishment awaiting the murderers of legitimate rulers. Considering the general popularity of St Nikephoros' cult among the South Slavs, it had yet another goal — to give an additional boost to his cult. At the same time, the attention paid to the already popular saint added to the popularity of the new narrative and gained a broader audience for the moral lessons of the *Slovo*.

There is another point of interest concerning the Slavonic translation. In Anastasia's story about her visionary journey, before the passage about her encounter with St Nikephoros and Tzimiskes, she meets yet another "popular" imperial pair: St Constantine and his mother Helen, "who found the Holy Cross of the Lord". As they were the objects of extraordinary popular devotion in Slavic lands, it is understandable why they found their way into the Serbian and Bulgarian versions of the narrative, even though they did not figure in the Greek version of the text. Commenting on the passage, Jane Baun proposes the explanation that "the special attention given to the archetypal good kings in the Slavonic version may speak to a local, contemporary Slav concern with promoting ideals of Christian kingship."³² The introduction into the narrative of a second pair of saints, together with

²⁸ Patlagean, "Basileus assassiné", 348–349, and 372.

²⁹ *Nastasya*, lines 22–27 (Speranski, "Malo izvestnoe", 127).

³⁰ Baun, *Tales*, 222–223.

³¹ Speranski, "Malo izvestnoe", 121–123. For further analysis, see Baun, *Tales*, 115.

³² Baun, *Tales*, 72–73.

the mention of the famous relic of the Passion associated with Helen, highlighted the “martyrial character” of the selected other-world encounters. It suits the intended purpose of the whole text, and reveals a distinctly moralizing effect of the *Apocalypse of Anastasia*. Those who suffered for, or decisively helped the introduction of, Christianity, especially by inventing the relics of the Passion, are celebrated as ideal kings (*tsars*). That the proposed interpretation of the motive for adding this particular selection of “good emperors” to the Slavonic translation is not groundless may be strengthened by another characteristic addition to the text.

The Slavonic translation of the passage containing the description of the punishment zone (*The punishment of sinners*) adds pilgrimage to the list of virtues. This addition certainly reflected the great popularity of pilgrimage among the South Slavs.³³ During the seventeenth century, when the Belgrade manuscript of *Anastasia* was copied, pilgrimage was gaining importance in everyday life.³⁴ The Greek and Slavonic versions also differ from one another in their depictions of the torments of hell, especially torture, as well as in the increased interest of both the Sofia and the Belgrade manuscripts in sorcery, black magic and arcane knowledge in general.³⁵ This might be explained by the persistence of pagan beliefs in the popular piety of South Slavs.

What appears to be the most striking difference between the Greek original (in all four surviving versions) and its Slavonic translations is the portrayal and development of the main character. Not only do the Slavonic versions bring a more direct dialogue between the heroine and her guide to the other world, the archangel Michael, but the portrayal of the nun and future saint is livelier and more dynamic, thus evoking for its audience a clearly shaped personality instead of a model, typical of the hagiographical portrayal of saints. This most certainly is the result of the translator’s literary gift, but it also raises a very interesting question as to how to define the religious culture and needs of the milieu in which the apocalyptic text circulated. Therefore, in order to be able to define the individual features of

³³ G. P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Washington DC 1984), 1–9.

³⁴ On pilgrimage in the Serbian environment in the 17th and 18th centuries, see M. Pavić, *Barok*, vol. 2 of *Istorija srpske književnosti* (Belgrade 1991), 87–91; B. Unbegaun, *Počeci književnog jezika kod Srba* (Belgrade–Novi Sad 1995), 29–32; N. Radosavljević, “Vera i crkva u svakodnevnom životu u 18. veku”, in *Privatni život u srpskim zemljama u osvjet modernog doba*, ed. A. Fotić (Belgrade 2005), 90.

³⁵ Baun, *Tales*, 73.

the text, it must be examined, as we have tried to show, against the political, social and religious background which led to its creation.³⁶

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³⁶ For the methodological premises of the approach, see Hen, "Structure and aims", 478.

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Caspar Luyken's Illustrated Bible among the Serbs and Bulgarians in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Abstract: The engraving of the *Finding of Moses* from Caspar Luyken's Amsterdam (1694) and Nuremberg (1708) bibles served as a model for Teodor Kračun's painting for the small iconostasis of the Orthodox cathedral in Sremski Karlovci (1780), for the Viennese printer J. G. Mansfeld's frontispiece of Dositej Obradović's *Poem of the Deliverance of Serbia* (1789) and for Dimitar Zograf's fresco in the vault of the exonarthex of the Rila Monastery (1843). Three different versions of the original copper engraving reveal how Luyken's Bible was used in support of the cause of religious revival and national liberation of the Serbs and Bulgarians in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires respectively in the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth.

Keywords: Caspar Luyken's illustrated Bible, *Finding of Moses*, Vienna, Teodor Kračun, Sremski Karlovci, Joseph Georg Mansfeld, Belgrade, Dositej Obradović, Rila Monastery, Dimitar Zograf

What we know of the engraver and book illustrator Caspar Luyken or Luikeny (Amsterdam, 1671–1708) is little other than basic biographical facts.¹ He was the son of a well-known and distinguished engraver and printer, Jan Luyken (Amsterdam, 1649–1712). The father outlived the son by a few years and was twice his age when he died. Jan, also known to have been a poet, was described as *holländische Callot*, which best reflects the popularity of his prolific graphic work.² Caspar was occasionally referred to as Gaspar, and mistakenly as Jan's younger brother.

At first Luyken the Younger worked for his father. In 1698, an already accomplished master of his trade, he moved to Nuremberg to join an even more famous engraver and publisher, Christoph Weigel. In 1703 he moved to Vienna, and in 1707 returned to Amsterdam, where he died a few years later. That his death was not only premature but also unexpected seems obvious from the fact that he got married in 1705.

What has earned Caspar Luyken a place in all lexicons of the painters and engravers of any significance is the fact that he independently engraved

¹ J. Landwehr, *Emblem Books in the Low Countries 1554–1949: A Bibliography* (Utrecht 1970), xlv–xlv, 371.

² H. A. Müller, *Allgemeines Künstler-Lexikon: Leben und Werke berühmtesten Bildenden Künstler* (Frankfurt am Main 1922), vol. III (Lhérie–Quittry), 64.

and signed 1,187 folio-format prints for the Amsterdam edition of the illustrated bible *Historiae celeb. Veteris et Novi Testamenti* (1694),³ known as the painters' manual of the Luykens, father and son, and that he cut another thirty-six together with his father.⁴ Unlike Luyken the Elder's recognizable slender figures, modelled after the works of contemporary painters, Luyken the Younger uses a more vigorous burin work, making his figures stand out prominently against the background. In 1698 in Regensburg, Christoph Weigel printed Luyken's most popular seventy-two engravings from the Amsterdam Bible. To the second and enlarged Nuremberg edition (1708), Caspar contributed 1,700 folio-format prints.⁵ In keeping with common practice, there is at the bottom of each print the reference, in capital letters, to the corresponding biblical text, as well as the biblical text in Latin and German.

Although Caspar Luyken's lavish Dutch-German bible is known in Serbia from the prints kept in Vienna (a private collection and the Albertina),⁶ it has not received too much scholarly attention. Its great popularity in Austrian artistic circles has been noted,⁷ and as far as its influence on Serbian baroque painters is concerned, a dozen more Luyken's prints have been identified as having been used in the last decades of the eighteenth century as models⁸ for icons painted by the best Serbian baroque painters, to mention but *Dimitrije Bačević* and his iconostasis in the monastery of Jazak (1769), *Teodor Kračun* and the iconostasis in the choir loft in the Serbian Orthodox cathedral of Sremski Karlovci (1780), *Jakov Orfelin* at Obrež (1778), *Stapar* (1790) and *Kupinovo* (1792), or *Teodor Ilić Češljarić* at Mokrin (1782) and *Bačko Petrovo Selo* (1793). Luyken's Old Testament scenes used as models were *Abraham's Sacrifice*, *The Meeting of Abraham and Melchizedek*, *The Burning Bush* and *The Finding of Moses*, while the New Testament scenes were *The Beheading of St John the Baptist*, *The Annunciation*, *The Parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man*, and *Christ and Nicodemus*.

³ A. von Wurzbach, *Niederländisches Künstler-Lexikon auf grund archivalischer forschungen bearbeitet* (Vienna & Leipzig 1910), vol. 2 (L-Z), 73-74.

⁴ E. Bénézit, *Dictionnaire critique et documentaire des peintres, dessinateurs et graveurs* (Paris 1956), vol. 5, 669.

⁵ H. Vollmer, *Allgemeines Lexikon der Bildenden Künstler von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart begründet von Ulrich Thieme und Felix Becker* (Leipzig 1929), 488.

⁶ Ibid.; see also M. Jovanović, "Ilustrovane Biblije iz biblioteka u Beču i Minhenu", *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta X-1* (Belgrade 1968), 300, fig. 3.

⁷ Jovanović, "Ilustrovane Biblije", n. 3.

⁸ Lj. Stošić, *Zapadnoevropska grafika kao predložak u srpskom slikarstvu XVIII veka* (Belgrade 1992), 66-68, 95-102, and figs. 67-70, 73-74 (with a French summary: *La gravure occidentale comme modèle dans la peinture serbe du XVIII^e siècle*).

Unlike the other Serbian painters of the epoch, Teodor Kračun cannot be said to have literally reiterated or copied graphic models, especially when it comes to his best work, the icons for the iconostasis of the Metropolitan's Court Chapel of St George painted in 1780, now in Sremski Karlovci Cathedral. Yet, his use of drawing and glazes has led art historians to conclude that these icons "followed their possible graphic models more strictly" than his other works.⁹ Trained at the Imperial and Royal Academy in Vienna, Kračun's icon of the Finding of Moses — the most frequently reproduced religious painting of Serbian baroque¹⁰ — reveals the extent to which he was influenced by the concept of Caspar Luyken's print.

All figures in the composition, except for the girl with folded arms in the background — Miriam, Moses' elder sister — matches Luyken's engraving both in terms of postures and gestures and in details of clothing, jewellery and hairstyle, even in the staged setting of a royal garden.¹¹ Major modifications made by Kračun amount to placing the baby Moses into a wooden chest with the open lid instead of a bulrush basket, and to introducing two black figures — a lady-in-waiting and a page with a parasol, and a hazy silhouette of Sremski Karlovci overlooking the Danube with the Serbian Orthodox cathedral in the background. If he paid most attention to the two girls from the princess's retinue surrounding the child on the bank of the Nile by denuding and inspiriting them in the style *galant* of French rococo (the girl with the spread-out towel looks like a figure from a painting of Watteau's), two exotic black figures¹² offer some other emblematic features typical of the age of baroque, such as the open parasol. It is a solar and royal attribute of Far Eastern origin which, if placed in the hands of or around black servants, enhances the symbolism of binary relationships. The assumption that Kračun was well-aware of the parasol as an allegorical substitute for the Oriental baldachin is corroborated by the fact that the parasol, rather than providing shade for the person holding it, is pointed in the direction of the pharaoh's daughter. The rod of a parasol, especially of a

⁹ O. Mikić, *Teodor Kračun (? – 1781)* (Novi Sad 1972), 14.

¹⁰ M. Jovanović, *100 dela srpske umetnosti* (Belgrade 2004), 80–81.

¹¹ Stošić, *Zapadnoevropska grafika*, 67.

¹² A. Maubert, *L'exotisme dans la peinture française du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris 1943); Lj. Stošić, "The Black Arab in Serbian Literature and Art", in *The Black Arab as a Figure of Memory, Interpretations* vol. 3, *European Research Project for Poetics & Hermeneutics* (Skopje 2009), 269, 275 and 280, where special attention is paid to dichotomies directly contrasting the "Black Arab" or the chimney sweep to white snow, white parasol, blazing fire, pure gold or the sun. In Kračun's painting, the white parasol in the hands of the little page is shadowed by the cape of the dark-skinned court lady, which produces the favourite baroque effect of chiaroscuro.

Caspar Luyken, *The Finding of Moses*, copperplate engraving (Nuremberg, 1708)



white parasol, symbolized the cosmic axis associated with the God-chosen ruler. Thus, the bearer of imperial or royal dignity was always surrounded by slaves holding raised parasols to protect him from the destructive effects of the sun, discretely suggesting to those in attendance that the true sun was not above but under the parasols.¹³ The replacement of the oval basket with a rectangular wooden chest was also to redirect attention from the symbol of the mother's womb to the symbol of future renewal and knowledge under divine protection — the literal finding of the Ark of the Covenant or Salvation.¹⁴

Compared to Luyken's engraving, Kračun's *Finding of Moses* repeats its composition pattern, while introducing slight modifications dependent on the different painting technique and his knowledge of baroque symbolism. The relocation of the biblical scene from the Nile to the Danube should be understood as an allegorical transfer of the prerogatives of dignity,

¹³ A. Gerbran & Z. Ševalije, *Rečnik simbola*, s.v. "Suncobran" (Novi Sad 2004), 904–905.

¹⁴ Ibid. s.v. "Kovčeg", 411–414.



Teodor Kračun, *The Finding of Moses*, icon, Sremski Karlovci
Orthodox cathedral (1780)

power and fate from the chosen people of Israel led by Moses to the Serbian people in the Habsburg Monarchy under the guidance of the Metropolitan of Karlovci, Mojsije (Moses) Putnik (1728–90). As God-chosen protector of the Orthodox faith in a Roman Catholic empire, he was supposed to emulate his Old Testament predecessor and namesake.¹⁵ With these clear political and religious intentions, Serbian Metropolitan Mojsije played an important, if not decisive, role in the selection and use of the graphic model, probably procured in Vienna. Bishop Mojsije had been appointed administrator of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci after the death of Metropolitan Vikentije (Vicentius) Jovanović Vidak (d. Dalj, 18 Feb. 1780), but was not elected metropolitan until the Assembly held in Sremski Karlovci on 10 June 1781. Considering that Kračun had died in April that year, the *Founding of Moses* and the entire iconostasis for the Metropolitan's Court Chapel must have been painted in the last year of Kračun's life, between the Feb-

¹⁵ J. Todorović, *Entitet u senci: mapiranje moći i državni spektakl u Karlovačkoj mitropoliji* (Novi Sad 2010), 61.

ruary of 1780 and the April of 1781, when Putnik still held the office of administrator.

Less than a decade after Kračun, the Viennese engraver Joseph Georg Mansfeld (1764–1817)¹⁶ cut an allegorical copperplate, *The Liberation of Serbia*, for the frontispiece of Dositej Obradović's little book titled *The Poem of the Deliverance of Serbia (Pesna o izbavljenju Srbije, 1789)*. Mansfeld belonged to the second generation of yet another family of engravers and printers. Together with their father, he and his brothers were among Vienna's most distinguished printmakers. From 1770, Mansfeld the Elder (Johann Ernst), in partnership with the printer Joseph Lorenz von Kurzbök (1736–92), was privileged for printing Serbian books. He was a skilled type designer, and the history of Viennese book printing remembers him for the beauty of the so-called Mansfeld-Kurzbök typeface.¹⁷ His son Joseph Georg, or Mansfeld the Younger, was a renowned Austrian painter and engraver. He never left Vienna, where he started a school of lithography in 1815.¹⁸

The Liberation of Serbia, signed Jos. G. Mansfeld, is a typical example of the rococo-baroque style tempered with elements of classicism. This solemn war composition was printed by Kurzbök as the frontispiece of Dositej Obradović's abovementioned twenty-strophe patriotic poem published as a separate six-page booklet. Referring to the ongoing Austro-Ottoman war (1788–90), the scene shows mythological personifications (Serbia, Minerva and Fama) and historical figures (Emperor Joseph II and Field Marshal G. E. Laudon).¹⁹ Initially, the war started by Austria in alliance with Russia in order to seize the Ottoman European possessions was successful and in 1789 Belgrade was taken from the Ottomans. Before long, however, the fortunes of war changed and Austria suffered defeat (Treaty of Sistova, 1791).²⁰ The campaign ended with the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II (1790). Considering that the engraving was intended for Dositej's panegyric written in Belgrade in 1789, it should be read as an expression of wishful thinking rather than reality.

¹⁶ D. Davidov, *Srpska grafika XVIII veka* (Novi Sad 1978), 233, fig. 391 (with a German summary: *Serbische Graphik des XVIII. Jahrhunderts*); V. Konjikušić, "Marginalije uz srpsku grafiku XVIII i XIX veka", *Sveske Društva istoričara umetnosti SR Srbije* 18 (1987), 70–71.

¹⁷ A. Mayer, *Wien Buckdrucker Geschichte* (Vienna 1887), vol. II, 43.

¹⁸ V. Kraut, *Grafika u doba klasicizma*, vol. VIII of *Klasicizam kod Srba* (Belgrade 1966), 10–11.

¹⁹ Davidov, *Srpska grafika*, 408–409.

²⁰ Lj. Čubrčić, *Od kaludjera do prosvetitelja* (Belgrade 2004), 27.



Joseph George Mansfeld, *The Liberation of Serbia*,
copperplate engraving, frontispiece of Dositej Obradović's
Poem of the Deliverance of Serbia (Vienna, 1789)

As the beginnings of Serbian book illustration are marked by the use of imported clichés for vignettes and prints, it comes as no surprise that the already mentioned *Finding of Moses* from Luyken's illustrated Bible was used as a model for Dositej Obradović's booklet. Mansfeld the Younger probably found it in the stock of prints available in Kurzbök's well-supplied printing house. It is the illustration of the well-known story from the Book of Exodus (2:1–10), an account of how the pharaoh's daughter, in company with her attendants, went to the Nile to take a bath and came across a beautiful foundling baby left in a basket. She took him in and named him Moses. Later on, by the will of God, he became the rescuer of the Jewish people, leading them out of Egypt and taking them to the Promised Land. He is considered an Old Testament prefiguration of Christ.²¹

Instead of the Egyptian princess shown with one foot striding forward, Mansfeld the Younger shows a feminized figure of the Emperor Joseph II in a wig, but cuirassed and cloaked as an ancient Roman general. On his right is Field Marshal Laudon, commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, shown in military uniform with a ribbon across his chest and the long boots typical of the period. Like the angel rescuing St Peter from prison, he is taking the shackles off the arms of the woman kneeling in front of him, the heroine of the allegorical narrative. It is the personification of Serbia in the figure of a girl clad in Roman dress, with the shield bearing the imagined coat of arms of Triballia²² or Serbia (boar's head pierced with an arrow) resting against her thighs. The figure fully matches Luyken's handmaiden of the pharaoh's daughter who, her sleeves rolled up, supports the oval basket with the baby on the bank of the river. The engraving of Mansfeld the Younger shows two more allegorical figures, Minerva (Wisdom) and Fama (Fame), one standing with a spear in her hand, the other hovering above next to a tall palm tree and blowing dark clouds back to Turkey with a trumpet. Next to the personification of Serbia, in the foreground suggesting the river bank, are symbols of the defeated Ottoman Empire washed ashore: a turban, a flag, a broken spear with the crescent and a cannon barrel. As the silhouette of the Belgrade fortress, with its outlying settlement and the victorious Austrian flag with a double-headed eagle,²³ is clearly recognizable in the background, the whole scene is a fairly accurate depiction of late eighteenth-century Belgrade viewed from the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers. That Mansfeld's engraving faithfully accompanied Dositej's

²¹ L. Réau, *Iconographie de l'art chrétienne* (Nendeln-Lichtenstein, 1974), vol. II, 201.

²² H. Žefarović & T. Mesmer, *Stematografija. Izobraženije oružij iliričeskib* (Novi Sad 1972, 1st ed. Vienna 1741), 38b.

²³ *Pesme, pisma, dokumenti*, vol. 6 of *Sabrana dela Dositeja Obradovića*, ed. M. Stefanović (Belgrade 2008), 151.



Dimitar Zograf, *The Finding of Moses*, fresco, Rila Monastery (1843)

verses may be seen from the references to and illustrations of the Danube and Sava rivers, the glorious Belgrade, the notorious Turkish shackles, cannons, turbans and other emblems now lying in dirt, as opposed to the praiseworthy double-headed eagle, brave Laudon and the salute *Vivat Josif Vtori* to the wished-for ruler of Serbia.²⁴ Stating at the beginning of his ode that the liberation of Serbia was his “desire ever since his youth”, and interspersing it with autobiographical details, Dositej disappointedly finds that under the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade²⁵ the Austrians ceded Serbia to the Turks. In a paroxysm of enthusiasm, he almost likens his favourite enlightened ruler, Joseph II, for his wise statesmanship and enlightened reform, to God rescuing his people from a cultural dark age.²⁶

A prominent centre of Slavic literacy, spiritual and cultural life, the Rila monastery in Bulgaria, ravaged and restored several times, played an important role during the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The

²⁴ Ibid. 10–12.

²⁵ Dositej Obradović was born in present-day Ciacova in the Romanian Banat in 1739, and died in Belgrade in 1811.

²⁶ J. Deretić, *Dositej i njegovo doba* (Belgrade 1969), 169–170.

decoration of the monastery church dedicated to the Nativity of the Virgin was entrusted to the painters of the schools of Samokov and Bansko, the Hristov brothers (better known as Dimitar Zograf and Zahari Zograf), Dimitar Molerov, and their many assistants.²⁷ Most of the frescoes in the exonarthex were painted in the national revival style by Dimitar Zograf in 1840–47.²⁸ While Molerov's father Toma Vitanov (Vishanov) was trained at the Academy in Vienna, where he absorbed baroque trends which he then introduced into Bulgarian traditional religious painting, Dimitar Zograf's son Stanislav Dospevski, and Hristo Tsonev received their training in Russia.

One section of the vault of the open narthex of the Rila monastery church shows eight scenes from the life of Moses radially arranged around God the Saviour, painted in 1843 by Dimitar Zograf. One of the scenes, the *Finding of Moses*, followed the model of Caspar Luyken's print. Relying on the chosen model, Dimitar Zograf placed recognizable structures from the Rila Monastery enclosure in the background, such as Hrelyu Tower on one side of the Rilska River, and three smaller domed structures on the other. The latter were built on the model of the similar structures in the Athonite Monastery of Hilandar.²⁹ All seven female figures have a deeply tanned countenance, and the one of the princess's three handmaidens who holds the end of her dress is shown as a young girl, not as a young woman. All figures are stumpy as a result of the limited available surface for the painting. Compared to Luyken's engraving, the landscape is a very realistic rendition of the lush vegetation of Rila Mountain, on the slopes of which the monastery was founded in the tenth century. The insistence on the episodes from the life of the Old Testament prophet Moses, including his rescue from the river, must have had something to do with the popularity of miraculous cures³⁰ with water in the Rila Monastery and the healing powers of the relics of its patron saint, St John (Ivan) of Rila. As a centre of manuscript copying and religious painting, the Rila Monastery was one of the strongest regional spiritual beacons for the Orthodox Christians during the centuries of Ottoman rule.

Luyken's engraving of the *Finding of Moses* was used as a model not only by the best Serbian and Bulgarian religious painters of the eighteenth

²⁷ I. Bozhilov & L. Prashkov, *Bŭlgarski manastiri*, 4th ed. (Sofia 2004), 63–64.

²⁸ L. Vlahova & E. Genova, *24 stenopisa ot Rilsia Manastir* (Sofia 1983), 14; M. Koeva, *Rila Monastery* (Sofia 2006), 62–79.

²⁹ I. Gouérgova, "Le monastère de Rila et Hilandar", in *Huit siècles du monastère de Chilandar*, ed. V. Korać (Belgrade 2000), 467–475.

³⁰ E. Bakalova, "The Life Cycle of St. Sava in Rila Monastery", in *Huit siècles du monastère de Chilandar*, 492.

and nineteenth centuries, in their respective cultural centres, Sremski Karlovci and Rila Monastery, but also by the Viennese engraver J. G. Mansfeld in his print of the *Liberation of Serbia* glorifying the war achievements of the Emperor Joseph II. These seemingly different themes were based on the Old Testament symbol of the Ark of Salvation or the Covenant as an attribute of the God-chosen leader of Israel, Moses, who delivered his people from enslavement in Egypt and took them to the Promised Land. In the struggle for religious and national liberation of the Serbs and Bulgarians in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, Luyken's print of the Rescue or Finding of Moses was a rare graphic model equally usable in the religious and profane art of the Balkan peoples.

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Les buts de guerre alliés et leur soutien aux nationalités opprimées novembre 1917 – mai 1918

Résumé : La défaite italienne à Caporetto et la révolution bolchevique ont obligés les Alliés à modifier leurs buts de guerre, voire de tenter d'affaiblir le camp adverse par une paix séparée avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. Les Alliés anglo-saxons notamment voulaient ainsi prévenir la prolongation de la guerre, mais les différents pourparlers avec les représentants de la Double Monarchie n'ont pas aboutis car les Alliés voulaient une paix séparée et l'empereur Charles une paix générale. La France était résolument contre toute solution autre celle qui se soldera par une défaite de l'Allemagne et le retour de l'Alsace-Lorraine au sein de la République. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement Clemenceau voulait affaiblir le camp adverse en y provoquant des troubles intérieurs en apportant le soutien allié aux nationalités vivants dans l'Autriche-Hongrie. Les revendications nationales des Tchécoslovaques, des Polonais, et jusqu'à un certain point, même des Yougoslaves ont été à partir du mai 1918 officiellement reconnues.

Mots-clés : les buts de guerre alliés, la paix séparée, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la France, Clemenceau, la Serbie, les nationalités opprimées

L'automne 1917 apporte aux Alliés son lot de déceptions et d'échecs, dont l'effondrement du front italien en octobre n'est pas le moindre. La défaite italienne à Caporetto a une importance considérable sur l'avenir de la question yougoslave. L'échec militaire va de pair avec un échec diplomatique, car les Alliés ne sont plus disposés à tenir compte des buts de guerre italiens, exprimés avec vigueur dans le traité de Londres. Le Royaume de Savoie, aux yeux des Alliés, mène une guerre à part, carrément égoïste, avec pour seul objectif de réaliser ses revendications territoriales aux dépens de la Double Monarchie, unique raison de son entrée en guerre. L'incapacité de son armée à les accomplir, libère pratiquement les Alliés des obligations prises en mai 1915, car comme le disait Lloyd George avec sa candeur typiquement britannique : « On ne peut pas attendre de nos soldats qu'ils se battent pour réaliser le projet d'une grande Italie. » En conséquence, toute idée de démembrement de l'Autriche-Hongrie est abandonnée. De cette façon, paradoxalement, la défaite italienne sonne le glas de l'unité yougoslave. Désormais, Londres et Paris, toujours favorables à la survie de la Double Monarchie, exercent une influence accrue sur l'issue de la guerre avec cette dernière. Après la défaite, la participation italienne dans la guerre devient conditionnée à l'aide économique et militaire des Alliés. La diplomatie italienne, aussi bien officielle qu'officieuse, se voit contrainte de lutter conjoint-

ement avec les Serbes et les Yougoslaves pour mettre de nouveau le sort de la Double Monarchie à l'ordre du jour des réunions alliées.¹

Un autre échec, la révolution bolchevique, d'une ampleur encore plus importante, secoue les Alliés en novembre. Malgré les tergiversations qui perdurent encore quelques semaines, les intentions des « maximalistes » comme on les appelle alors, sont claires dès la publication, le 9 novembre, du fameux décret de la Paix. La menace d'une paix séparée à l'Est, et l'éroulement du front italien, poussent le président Poincaré à rappeler son vieil adversaire politique, Georges Clemenceau à la rescousse d'une guerre française qui vacille dans ses fondements. Dès sa première allocution devant la Chambre le 20 novembre, dans sa déclaration de politique générale, Clemenceau avertit laconiquement ses concitoyens et l'ennemi : « Ni trahison, ni demie-trahison, la guerre. Rien que la guerre. [...] Le pays connaîtra qu'il est défendu ». ² Dans sa volonté de défendre à tout prix la République, Clemenceau n'hésitera pas, le moment venu, de susciter les troubles intérieures dans le camp adverse, notamment en apportant son soutien à des nationalités vivant dans la l'Autriche-Hongrie, y compris les yougoslaves.

Georges Clemenceau et la politique orientale de la France

Dès son arrivée au pouvoir, le nouveau président du Conseil, obligé de mener la guerre sans l'aide de l'alliée traditionnelle russe, se lance à une chasse effrénée aux effectifs en France, cherchant en même temps à soutenir et à consolider l'effort des petits Alliés, y compris ceux des Balkans. La défection russe impose un bouleversement profond à la politique orientale de la France. Dans un premier temps Clemenceau cherche à inciter l'armée russe à continuer la lutte commune. Il envoie le 21 novembre un message au Commandant en chef des armées russes, le général Dukhonin, l'avertissant que la France n'a pas l'intention de reconnaître le gouvernement bolchevique. Il se dit confiant que l'armée russe, fidèle à son sens du devoir et son patriotisme, n'abandonnera pas ses alliés.³ Le sort tragique, que connaît peu après le général russe, force le gouvernement français à accepter la prédomi-

¹ Piero Melograni, *Storia politica della Grande Guerra 1915-1918*, 2^e éd. (Milan : Mondadori, 1998), 420-424; Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia della Italia Moderna*, vol. VIII, *La Prima guerra mondiale, il dopoguerra, l'avvento del fascismo*, 3^e éd. (Milan : Feltrinelli, 1989), 198-202.

² Edouard Bonnefous, *Histoire politique de la Troisième République*, vol. II, *La Grande guerre*, 2^e éd. (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 346.

³ Kalevo Horvi, *Cordon sanitaire or barrière de l'Est : The Emergence of the New French Eastern European Alliance Policy* (Turku : Turun Yliopisto, 1975), 67.

nance bolchevique dans le Nord, tout en essayant de former un centre de résistance armée au Sud, en Ukraine et sur les confins de la Roumanie. L'objectif de cette tentative est d'abord de priver les Puissances centrales des vivres et des matières premières de l'Ukraine, permettant du même coup à la Roumanie de continuer la lutte au côté des Alliés.⁴

Un autre volet de la nouvelle politique orientale de la France aura des conséquences considérables pour l'avenir de l'espace yougoslave. Voulant aider à la constitution d'une force opposée aux bolcheviques, Clemenceau décide de soutenir les nationalités vivant dans les provinces orientales et désirant se détacher du pouvoir central. L'instruction dans ce sens avait été envoyée à l'ambassadeur français Niessel dès le 25 novembre.⁵ De cette façon, le gouvernement français, contraint par la défection russe, utilise pour la première fois les mouvements nationaux comme une arme dans la guerre. Les partisans de cette politique au sein du Quai d'Orsay, présentent, sans tarder, les projets conçus depuis longtemps, visant à remplacer l'alliance russe par une barrière formée des états créés selon le principe des nationalités. Cette barrière constituée, en premier lieu d'une Pologne rétablie dans ses frontières historiques et de la Roumanie, est censée contenir la percée allemande vers l'Est. Pierre de Margerie, Directeur des Affaires politiques au Quai d'Orsay, auteur de ce projet datant du 26 novembre 1917, en faisait la pierre angulaire de la politique française.⁶ De Rome, Camille Barrère, ambassadeur français, le premier décembre, propose lui aussi à Pichon de faire appel aux nationalités, mais cette fois en élargissant le champ d'application de ce projet à la Double Monarchie.⁷

Ainsi la réponse française aux revers subis dans la vallée d'Isonzo et sur les rives de la mer Baltique se compose de deux volets. D'abord le renforcement du camp allié, et, pour la première fois, tentative d'utiliser les nationalités pour déstabiliser le camp adverse. Faut-il souligner, encore une fois, qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une décision préméditée, mais d'une nécessité imposée par la tournure que la guerre avait prise. D'ailleurs, la mise en pratique de ces deux volets de la politique étrangère française démontrera à quel point ils étaient liés par une seule volonté et un seul objectif : sortir de l'impasse et gagner la guerre.

⁴ Michel Jabara Carley, *Revolution and Intervention. The French Government and the Russian Civil War* (Kingston & Montréal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 26-27.

⁵ Horvo, *Cordon sanitaire*, 68.

⁶ Ibid. 72-73.

⁷ François Charles-Roux, *Souvenirs diplomatiques : Rome-Quirinal, février 1916 - février 1919* (Paris : Fayard, 1956), 293.

Leur interdépendance se voit démontrée lors de la première séance du Conseil Supérieur de la guerre allié, du 29 novembre au 3 décembre à Paris. Les Alliés souhaitent arrêter une stratégie commune leur permettant de trouver une réponse adéquate à l'évidente défection russe. Malgré la présence, pour la première fois, du représentant personnel du président américain, le Colonel House, le débat est animé par les hommes d'État français, britanniques et italiens. Les Français, Clemenceau et son Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Stéphane Pichon, proposent d'abord la reconnaissance de la Pologne dans les termes envisagés par Marguerie. Ils veulent même en faire un des buts de guerre alliés.⁸

Leur projet se voit repoussé pour des raisons n'ayant rien à voir avec la situation en Russie. Les Alliés avaient refusé de reconnaître le gouvernement bolchévique, mais ils n'étaient pas prêts à reconnaître pour autant un état polonais. Le Baron Sidney Sonnino, Ministre italien des Affaires étrangères, le principal architecte du traité de Londres, arrive à Paris avec un autre agenda. Il veut d'abord pousser les Américains à déclarer la guerre aux alliés de l'Allemagne tels que l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Turquie et la Bulgarie. De cette manière il souhaite lier davantage les États-Unis aux Alliés. D'autre part, les Italiens estiment un débat sur la stratégie générale des Alliés peu utile, craignant une tentative de révision de leurs buts de guerre au moment où, affaiblis par la défaite de Caporetto, ils ne seraient plus en mesure de les défendre. Ainsi Sonnino considère la proposition française comme un précédent dangereux, permettant par la suite l'application du principe des nationalités dans les régions convoitées par l'Italie, notamment en Dalmatie.⁹

La position britannique apparaît même plus tranchée. Lloyd George, après la défection russe, croit le projet impossible. Selon le président du Conseil britannique, désormais, l'issue à la guerre ne pourrait être trouvée que dans des négociations menant à la défection de l'un des alliés allemands.¹⁰ Le gouvernement britannique estimait déjà après l'échec sur le front français de l'offensive Nivelle, avril-mai 1917, la victoire alliée impossible, au cas où l'Entente ne réussirait pas à détacher de l'Allemagne un des ses alliés. Dès qu'il a connaissance, en avril 1917, de la tentative de médiation du prince Sixte de Bourbon-Parma entre les Alliées et l'Autriche-Hongrie,

⁸ David Stevenson, *French War Aims against Germany 1914-1918* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1982), 98.

⁹ Sidney Sonnino, *Diario*, vol. III (Bari : Laterza, 1972), 217.

¹⁰ Pichon à Barrère, Paris le 3 décembre 1917, Archives de Ministère des Affaires étrangères (par la suite AMAE), Série A-Paix, vol. 102, 2,3.

Lloyd George, devient le plus farouche partisan d'une paix séparée avec la Double Monarchie.¹¹

Or la diplomatie britannique ne partageait pas l'analyse de son président du Conseil. Déjà en février 1917, Éric Drummond, chef du cabinet d'Arthur Balfour, secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères, considère la Double Monarchie, transformée en fédération démocratique, seule capable de constituer une barrière à l'avancée allemande vers l'Est et le Sud-est. Les petites nations slaves, ne se voient pas créditées de telles capacités, car sans le soutien russe elles deviendraient la proie facile d'une Allemagne agrandie probablement de l'Autriche germanophone.¹² Balfour, non plus, n'était pas favorable à une paix séparée avec l'Autriche-Hongrie parce qu'il craignait d'aliéner l'Italie et la Roumanie, à qui les Alliés avaient promis, par des traités secrets, un agrandissement considérable au profit de celle-ci.¹³ Même si, la défaite italienne de Caporetto enlève même ce dernier obstacle, car les Alliés ont dorénavant tendance à négliger les revendications italiennes, la diplomatie britannique n'approuve pas les pourparlers avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. Cependant, son opposition n'est pas motivée par le soutien aux nationalités opprimées.

Lord Robert Cecil, Secrétaire Adjoint du Foreign Office, croit que l'application du principe de l'autodétermination n'aurait pas que de bonnes conséquences pour les intérêts britanniques. L'essor inévitable des revendications nationalistes provoquerait le chaos dans l'Europe du Sud-est, et il donnerait aussi des ailes aux nationalistes italiens. En conséquence, une paix basée sur ce principe ne serait ni stable ni durable. Qui plus est, la diplomatie britannique croyait la Double Monarchie si inextricablement liée à l'Allemagne, qu'il serait impossible de l'en détacher. En conséquence, en novembre 1917 elle conseille de refuser les ouvertures faites par Skrzynskiy, conseiller de l'ambassade austro-hongroise à Berne.¹⁴

En revanche, le président du Conseil britannique arrive à Paris avec un seul projet sur son agenda, obtenir l'accord des Alliés lui permettant de passer outre aux réserves de sa diplomatie. La question est débattue lors de la première séance du Conseil Supérieur interallié, le 29 novembre. Lloyd

¹¹ V. H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1971), 85.

¹² Ibid. 81.

¹³ Ibid. 83.

¹⁴ Ibid. 159-160. Sur l'avis de la diplomatie britannique envers la Serbie et le mouvement yougoslave voir : Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *Nadmeni saveznik i zanemareno srpstvo : britansko-srpski odnosi (1875-1941)* (Belgrade : Albatros plus, 2011).

George estime les pourparlers avec l'Autriche-Hongrie indispensables, croyant, après la défection russe, les Alliés incapables de gagner la guerre.¹⁵

Ses collègues italiens ne partagent nullement son analyse. Une paix séparée avec l'Autriche-Hongrie en ce moment précis signifierait une cinglante défaite de la tendance interventionniste de la classe politique italienne, dont Sonnino et Orlando étaient les figures de proue. Non seulement ils n'ont pas réalisé le programme d'expansion maximale, résumé par le traité de Londres, mais ils auraient à assumer la responsabilité de la défaite militaire et diplomatique subie, puisque la Double Monarchie ne serait plus prête à concéder à l'Italie les territoires promis avant le déclenchement de la guerre. Une guerre terminée selon le principe du *status quo ante*, aurait été la preuve évidente de l'inutilité de la participation italienne au conflit mondial. La réaction de l'opinion italienne à une pareille issue de la guerre, après tant de morts et d'énormes sacrifices et privations, ne faisait guère de doute. Pour toutes ces raisons, les hommes d'États italiens s'opposent vivement aux négociations avec la Double Monarchie.¹⁶

L'analyse française est bien plus proche de l'italienne que de l'analyse britannique. L'équilibre européen est d'une importance vitale pour la France. Si les Britanniques, appuyés sur un vaste empire colonial, d'ailleurs largement agrandi aux dépens de l'Allemagne, peuvent accepter la création d'une Mitteleuropa allemande dont les limites orientales aboutiraient en Ukraine, les Français y voient la réalisation de leurs pires cauchemars. N'ayant pas réalisé le minimum des buts de guerre (Alsace-Lorraine), Clemenceau voit se profiler à l'horizon la possibilité de l'effritement de son camp. Toute négociation avec la Monarchie des Habsbourg signifierait le retrait immédiat de la guerre de l'Italie et des alliés balkaniques, dont notamment la Roumanie. Évidemment, une fois toute possibilité de récupérer *la terra irredenta* évanouie, l'Italie n'aurait plus d'intérêt à continuer la guerre avec l'Allemagne. De cette façon, la France se retrouverait face à l'armée allemande au grand complet, -ayant en sus accès aux ressources économiques de l'Europe centrale et orientale- avec comme seul allié l'Empire britannique, dont la volonté de conclure la paix est manifeste. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que les gouvernements français et italiens insistent sur l'adoption de la conclusion suivante : « Les Alliés restent libres, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de recourir à tous les moyens pour chercher à connaître ce que les alliés de l'Allemagne ont dans leur cœur ».¹⁷

¹⁵ Rothwell, *British War Aims*, 147.

¹⁶ Luca Riccardi, *Alleati non amici* (Brescia : Morcelliana, 1992), 565.

¹⁷ Raymond Poincaré, *Au Service de la France*, vol. IX (Paris : Plon, 1932), 394.

Ainsi, le gouvernement Clemenceau se voit obligé non seulement de consolider l'effort de guerre chez soi et d'aider les alliés récalcitrants, mais il est contraint aussi de répondre aux initiatives anglo-saxonnes souhaitant une paix de compromis. Le mot d'ordre français étant : gagner la guerre, le gouvernement français s'oppose à toute initiative susceptible de semer le trouble dans l'Alliance. Ainsi il juge néfaste l'initiative de Lloyd George. En revanche, fidèle à ses convictions, l'homme d'État britannique interprété la résolution citée comme lui laissant la liberté de procéder aux négociations directes avec des représentants de la Maison de Habsbourg.

Le général Smuts se voit désigné comme représentant britannique à ces pourparlers. Il croit la survie de l'Autriche-Hongrie indispensable, car elle est, selon lui, seule capable d'empêcher la mainmise allemande sur l'Europe centrale. Afin de l'aider, il est prêt à renoncer à la majorité des buts de guerres proclamés par l'Italie et les petits alliés balkaniques. Sa rencontre avec le comte Mensdorf, le 18 décembre en Suisse, est malgré tout un échec, car l'ancien ambassadeur austro-hongrois à Londres déclare la Double Monarchie prête à discuter uniquement des conditions d'une paix générale.¹⁸

N'étant pas en mesure d'empêcher l'initiative britannique, la diplomatie française avertit les capitales alliées qu'elle la désapprouve. Pichon souligne dès le 15 décembre 1917 que Lloyd George avait outrepassé les consignes établies à Paris, les Alliés n'ayant jamais approuvé les négociations directes entre les diplomates britanniques et autrichiens.¹⁹ Les divergences de vue avec le gouvernement britannique, le caractère plus que réservé du discours du président Wilson du 4 décembre (pas un mot sur l'Alsace Lorraine),²⁰ et surtout l'offensive pacifiste des bolcheviques, dont les représentants venaient de commencer à Brest-Litovsk les négociations sur les termes d'une paix séparée, imposent au gouvernement Clemenceau de devoir faire une déclaration compréhensive de politique étrangère, singulièrement absente depuis son arrivée au pouvoir. A l'issue d'intenses consultations avec Clemenceau, Pichon tient le 27 décembre un long discours à la Chambre des Députés, suivi d'un débat.²¹

¹⁸ David French, « Tous ses vagues discours ne nous mènent à rien. La politique britannique et la paix avec l'Autriche-Hongrie », *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits contemporains* 170 (avril 1993), 126.

¹⁹ Pichon à Paul Cambon, Paris le 15 décembre 1917, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol 104, p. 31.

²⁰ Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1957), 160.

²¹ Général Mordacq, *Le Ministère Clemenceau. Journal d'un témoin*, vol. I, *Novembre 1917 – avril 1918* (Paris : Plon, 1930), 106.

Faisant un large tour d'horizon, Pichon commence en proclamant le refus du gouvernement français de reconnaître les bolcheviques dans les termes suivants :

Le gouvernement, qui à Petrograd s'est substitué par l'émeute au pouvoir issu de la révolution, nous a mis, qu'on le veuille ou non, dans l'impossibilité de le reconnaître et d'avoir des rapports officiels avec lui.²²

Il ne renonce pas pour autant aux contacts avec la Russie, soulignant que :

Nous avons, dans ces circonstances si difficiles le devoir de ne pas perdre le contact avec nos Alliés d'hier, que nous espérons, malgré tout, revoir nos alliés de demain ; nous avons le devoir de rester en rapport avec tous les éléments sains en Russie ; avec tous les groupements ethniques où demeurent les sentiments d'indépendance et de loyauté, l'instinct de légitime défense, le besoin d'ordre et de liberté.²³

Ainsi introduit le principe des nationalités à propos de la Russie, il est évoqué aussi par la suite lorsqu'il exprime l'attitude du gouvernement français envers l'Europe centrale et orientale :

Mais il n'est pas moins certain que nous avons des devoirs étroits à l'égard des nationalités opprimées, non seulement de la Belgique, de la Serbie, de la Roumanie, dont le sort tragique commande plus que notre sollicitude notre dévouement absolu, mais aussi de la Pologne... Nous la voulons une, indépendante, indivisible, avec toutes les garanties de son libre développement politique, économique, militaire et toutes les conséquences qui pourraient en résulter. [...] Cette politique du droit des nationalités est l'honneur de nos traditions et de notre histoire... Tous ces peuples ont droit à nos sympathies, à notre appui, tous doivent avoir la possibilité de fixer eux-mêmes leur propre sort.²⁴

De cette façon le principe des nationalités devient un des buts de guerre de la France, dont le champ d'application, alors, se limite pratiquement à la Pologne. Au-delà de ses innovations, le gouvernement Clemenceau répète son credo dans les termes les plus clairs :

Vaincre d'abord, parce que c'est la condition nécessaire de salut pour notre pays ; ... Pour assurer au monde une paix de justice et de fraternité ; Libération de nos territoires, l'établissement du droit de reprise du bien qui nous a été arraché par la force et par conséquent, réintégration de l'Alsace

²² *Journal Officiel, Chambre des députés, Comptes-rendus intégrales, séance du 27 décembre 1917, 3626-3631.*

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

Lorraine à la France... Justes réparations des dommages, aucune idée d'asservissement des populations étrangères.²⁵

Le programme de politique étrangère, conçu de cette manière, ne pouvait se résumer autrement que par le désir d'une victoire absolue et indiscutable. Ainsi le gouvernement Clemenceau, même s'il restait bien réservé sur l'avenir des peuples opprimés autres que la Pologne, affiche sa volonté de ne pas accepter le fait accompli à l'Est. Tandis que la France proclame sa détermination de mener une guerre à outrance, ses Alliés anglo-saxons se préparent à faire des discours bien plus modérés.

Les Déclarations de Lloyd George, les Quatorze points du président Wilson et les buts de guerre français

L'effet de la propagande pacifiste des bolcheviques ne fut négligeable ni outre-manche ni aux États-Unis. La nécessité d'expliquer, voire de justifier, l'effort économique, les privations quotidiennes, et les pertes humaines, obligèrent le président Wilson et le Premier ministre britannique à songer à de nouvelles proclamations des buts de guerre alliés. Il fallait présenter les buts de guerre de manière qu'ils puissent être souscrits par toutes les parties des sociétés anglo-saxonnes, y compris par les organisations ouvrières, largement secouées par la propagande bolchevique. L'occasion, des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, se présente à propos de l'ultime appel des bolcheviques, datant du 31 décembre, invitant les Alliés à se joindre aux négociations en cours à Brest-Litovsk pour la conclusion d'une paix juste sans annexion ni réparations.

À Paris, on croit toujours qu'une déclaration des buts de guerre à ce moment-là serait nocive pour l'unité des Alliés. Le gouvernement Clemenceau n'est pas favorable à la dernière initiative pacifiste des bolcheviques. En novembre, déjà, le gouvernement français avait refusé l'initiative bolchevique de participer à une réunion dont l'objectif aurait dû être de fixer les termes de la paix.²⁶ En décembre, lors du Conseil Supérieur interallié tenu à Paris, les Alliés avaient rédigé une réponse commune aux initiatives bolcheviques dans les termes suivants :

Les représentants des grandes puissances, signataires de l'acte de Londres du 5 septembre 1914, ou y ayant adhéré depuis, déclarent qu'ils sont prêts à procéder à l'examen des buts de guerre et des conditions possibles d'une

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Pichon à Noulens, Paris le 23 novembre 1917, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, p. 106.

paix juste et durable, de concert avec la Russie, dès qu'elle se sera donné un gouvernement reconnu par la Nation.²⁷

Néanmoins, après l'appel de Trotsky du 31 décembre, Pichon crut nécessaire de sonder de nouveau, le 2 janvier, l'opinion des Alliés. Il voulait savoir si les gouvernements américain, italien et britannique, estimaient nécessaire une réponse concertée aux bolcheviques.²⁸ Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, la réponse la plus tranchée et la plus rapide est celle de Sonnino. Il croit une telle démarche inopportune, partageant d'ailleurs la crainte de Paris, qu'elle serait impossible, étant donné les différences de vue des Alliés. Selon le Ministre italien, les États-Unis occupaient une position particulière, bien différente des autres Alliés, alors qu'il estimait, à titre personnel, la position de Londres trop favorable aux bolcheviques. Parlant des petites puissances il exprime leurs craintes dans des termes révélant ses propres angoisses :

Il faut considérer aussi que les petites puissances alliées ont aussi leurs buts de guerre particuliers, qu'elles peuvent se formaliser de ce qu'on n'en tienne pas compte suffisamment dans une déclaration collective, et qu'il serait fâcheux de les mécontenter.²⁹

Les discussions en cours, au sein du gouvernement britannique, justifient toutes ces craintes. Le « War Cabinet » décide le 31 décembre 1917 de limiter les buts de guerre alliés seulement à la restitution de l'Alsace Lorraine, et à la restauration de la Belgique, de la Serbie et de la Roumanie. En ce qui concerne l'Italie, le gouvernement britannique était prêt à appuyer ses buts de guerre dans la mesure où ils correspondraient au principe ethnique. Les hommes d'État britanniques étaient convaincus qu'une année supplémentaire de guerre détruirait le tissu économique de la Grande Bretagne à tel point, que la victoire serait celle de Pyrrhus. Ainsi, ils refusent de continuer la guerre pour satisfaire des buts de guerre particuliers et exagérés, tels ceux des Italiens.³⁰ Lloyd George, cherchant à convaincre les Français, invite Clemenceau à Londres afin de rédiger ensemble une nouvelle déclaration des buts de guerre alliés. Le président de Conseil français repousse cette invitation, redoutant, étant donné l'attitude britannique à Paris et les pourparlers de Smuts en Suisse, que le vrai sujet de discussion ne soit une

²⁷ Pichon à Noulens, Paris le 3 décembre 1917, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, p. 107. Sur les délibérations du Conseil Supérieur interallié sur les affaires de la Serbie et la question yougoslave voir Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *Nevoljni ratnici : velike sile i Solunski front : 1914-1918* (Belgrade : Zavod za udžbenike, 2010).

²⁸ Pichon à Barrère, copies à Paul Cambon et à Jusserand, Paris le 3 janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, p. 4.

²⁹ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 3 janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, p. 5.

³⁰ Rothwell, *British War Aims*, 148.

paix séparée.³¹ La position française est présentée officieusement à l'homme d'état britannique par Albert Thomas.³²

Après le refus français, Lloyd George ajoute aux projets du « War Cabinet » de nouveaux éléments, reprenant un certain nombre des revendications contenues dans le discours de Pichon, telles que : l'indépendance de la Pologne, l'expression de sympathie pour les nations opprimées de l'Autriche Hongrie, ainsi qu'une demande purement dans l'intérêt britannique, l'autodétermination des colonies allemandes.³³

Le discours du Premier ministre britannique devant les syndicats (Trade Union Congress) le 5 janvier, n'est donc pas une véritable surprise pour le gouvernement français. Sa teneur satisfait le principal but de guerre français. En grand politicien, Lloyd George, après avoir exigé que les revendications françaises sur l'Alsace et la Lorraine soient seulement « prises en compte », se tourne vers Albert Thomas, - assis à côté de lui à la tribune - et lui dit que la Grande Bretagne resterait aux côtés de la France jusqu'à la mort.³⁴ Cette bravoure, digne d'un homme de théâtre, est appréciée par l'opinion publique française. D'ailleurs, Clemenceau lui envoie un bref message de félicitations.³⁵ C'est plutôt l'opportunité d'un tel discours, et surtout ses conséquences pour l'unité du camp allié, qui préoccupent le gouvernement de la République.

A la même occasion, le Premier ministre britannique déclare clairement que la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie ne fait pas partie de ses buts de guerre, ajoutant qu'il considère légitime le désir des Italiens de s'unir à leurs co-nationaux.³⁶ De cette façon, le gouvernement britannique affirme qu'il ne considère légitimes que les revendications italiennes sur les provinces italophones de la Double Monarchie. Le discours de Lloyd George reçut un accueil défavorable à Rome. Barrère soulignait les effets négatifs des passages sur les conditions d'une paix générale, pour la situation intérieure en Italie en disant :

Mais il est un côté par lequel ce genre d'ouverture pacifique aux Empires Centraux présente un côté extrêmement dangereux et qui cause aux Italiens patriotes de justes alarmes. Les Allemands recherchent opiniâtement un commencement de négociations parce qu'ils comprennent l'effet qu'il peut avoir dans l'esprit public de notre coalition et qu'ils espèrent qu'une fois

³¹ Stevenson, *French War Aims*, 100, 101.

³² Paul Cambon, *Correspondance 1870-1924*, vol. III, *Les guerres balkaniques, la Grande Guerre, l'organisation de la paix* (Paris : B. Grasset, 1946), 205.

³³ Rothwell, *British War Aims*, 149.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Stevenson, *French War Aims*, 101.

³⁶ Mamatey, *United States*, 176.

les négociations engagées, les nations de l'Entente et leurs soldats seraient portés à abandonner la partie. Ce danger est un des plus grands auxquels le gouvernement italien aurait à faire face.³⁷

Le danger pour la cohésion alliée ne se voit donc pas limité au mécontentement italien à cause de la renonciation au traité de Londres, mais le spectre d'un triomphe des tendances pacifistes, giolittiennes, en Italie apparaît comme la conséquence directe du discours de Lloyd George. Ce danger est même accentué après le fameux discours des « 14 points » du président américain, Woodrow Wilson. Ses préparatifs provoquent de vives mises en garde de l'ambassadeur français à Washington, Jean-Jules Jusserand. Ses remarques expriment avec une nette clarté toutes les réserves françaises envers une déclaration de buts de guerre en ce moment difficile pour la coalition alliée. Dès qu'il apprend, le 1 janvier, que le président américain songe à faire une allocution en guise de réponse à la dernière initiative pacifique des bolcheviques, Jusserand le met en garde de la manière suivante :

Il m'a paru nécessaire de mettre le Président en garde contre de telles hypothèses, le moment étant selon moi des moins favorables. Jamais nous n'avons eu tant besoin de ne pas mettre à l'aventure la moindre parcelle des forces et bon vouloir dont nous disposons. Après quelques grands succès avant-coureurs de la victoire finale on pourrait peut-être courir certains risques ; aussi le moment viendra-t-il nécessairement où il faudra les courir. Mais nous n'en sommes pas là, et à aucun moment nous n'avons eu un plus supérieur devoir de ménager toutes nos chances.

Comment, par exemple pourrions-nous préciser nos vues relatives à l'Adriatique sans décourager ou même indigner, soit les Serbes soit les Italiens ? Le Président incline vers le maintien d'une Autriche qui, dans sa pensée, pourrait être anti-allemande. Mais tout ce qui est tchèque, slovaque, jougo-slave, etc. se refuse absolument à envisager une telle hypothèse. Tout précisément ce qu'on pourrait produire ainsi se traduirait en perte de force. Nos déclarations antérieures suffisent ; elles sont infiniment plus précises que celles de nos ennemis et pour ce qui est spécialement de l'Amérique ce pays ne saurait mieux faire que de s'en tenir au principe énoncé par son Président et d'après lequel la guerre ne cessera pas avant que le monde soit devenu pour la démocratie un lieu de juste. Nos buts actuels à tous ne sont pas multiples nous n'en avons qu'un : abattre le prussianisme. Pour voir plus loin il faut d'abord être venu jusque là.³⁸

Malgré les mises en garde répétées de Jusserand, et les réserves de la diplomatie américaine, y compris celle du Secrétaire d'État, Robert Lansing, le président américain prononce le 8 janvier son discours au Congrès,

³⁷ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 8 janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, p. 29.

³⁸ Jusserand à Pichon, Washington le 1^{er} janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, pp. 1-3.

délaissant à son tour les aspirations des Italiens et des nations de la Double Monarchie. Wilson, prévoit l'établissement de la future frontière italienne exclusivement selon le principe des nationalités, et la survie de la Double Monarchie, accordant seulement l'autonomie à ses diverses nations.³⁹ Barrère, se faisant encore une fois l'interprète de l'opinion italienne, souligne tous les dangers ouverts par cette attitude conciliante envers la Double Monarchie en avertissant son ministre de la manière suivante :

Si l'on persiste dans cette voie, à rendre à l'Italie la poursuite de la guerre très difficile, pour ne par dire impossible, car aucun gouvernement ne fera accepter au peuple italien les sacrifices croissants de cette guerre sans autre espoir que de libérer son territoire envahi, et qu'il sait très bien être en mesure d'obtenir sans coup férir. Faute de lui faire espérer la réalisation des aspirations pour lesquelles il a pris les armes ; sauf réductions des buts de guerre des autres alliés, nous aboutissons simplement à détacher l'Italie de l'Entente, à casser les bras de M. Sonnino et des hommes qui poursuivent courageusement la guerre malgré les revers qui ont frappé l'Italie, à convaincre que M. Giollitti avait raison et que ce fut une folie que de ne pas accepter les concessions territoriales que l'Autriche et l'Allemagne offraient à ce pays comme prix de sa neutralité et peut-être de son entrée en guerre ultérieure contre nous aux côtés des Empires Centraux.⁴⁰

Confronté à ces déclarations provenant du monde anglo-saxon, conscient à quel point elles sont nuisibles pour l'effort de guerre allié, Clemenceau choisit de ne pas les commenter et de les accepter telles quelles. Depuis le début il voulait précisément éviter d'ouvrir une polémique sur les buts de guerre entre les Alliés. Ainsi, suivant ses conseils, Pichon le 11 janvier dans sa deuxième déclaration devant la Chambre des députés déclare les diverses allocutions alliées en complet accord, sinon en forme, du moins en substance⁴¹. D'ailleurs, président Wilson avait inséré dans son discours le point 8, où il avait clairement dit que les provinces françaises envahies devaient être restaurées, et le tort fait à la France en 1871 en ce qui concerne l'Alsace Lorraine, réparé. Même si l'on aurait préféré à Paris une prise de position plus explicite, Clemenceau croit bon de s'en tenir à la déclaration de Wilson, car, comme il l'explique à général Henri Mordacq, son chef du cabinet militaire :

³⁹ Jusserand à Pichon, Washington le 3 janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, p. 7.

⁴⁰ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 10 janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, pp. 82-85.

⁴¹ *Journal Officiel, Chambre des députés, Comptes-rendues intégrales, séance de 11 janvier 1918*, 39-44.

Évidemment, ce n'est pas idéal. [...] mais en tout cas la France pouvait très bien, d'une manière générale, s'accommoder de l'ensemble, qui lui donnait d'ailleurs satisfaction sur toutes les questions d'ordre vital le concernant.⁴²

Au reste, Jusserand explique à Pichon, encore mécontent du caractère imprécis de la déclaration présidentielle, qu'il aurait été bien difficile d'inciter Wilson à changer quoi qu'il se soit dans son discours :

Mais, par ailleurs, il y a lieu de remarquer ce qui semble perdu de vue dans ces télégrammes. 1° que le Président Wilson, par tempérament, réserve toujours sa liberté de parole ; 2° qu'hostile à la diplomatie secrète, on ne peut être certain en avance qu'il en usera publiquement, 3° qu'il lui est loisible de rappeler qu'aucun engagement ne le lie, que bien qu'agissant en allié, il n'est, par traité, celui de personne, que l'aide fournie par son pays est gratuite, qu'elle n'a pas été précédée d'aucune convention ni marchandage, qu'il n'attend rien en retour, et qu'en pareil cas on reconnaît volontiers d'ordinaire à ceux qui vous assistent le droit de dire ce qu'ils pensent.⁴³

Le gouvernement français, soucieux de faire parler les Alliés d'une seule voix, au lieu de commenter les déclarations faites, essaie, lors de la réunion du Conseil Supérieur allié à Paris à la fin de janvier, de persuader ses alliés italien et britannique de rédiger ensemble une déclaration en guise de réponse aux bolcheviques et aux déclarations récentes de l'ennemi. Les discours du comte Czernin, le Ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Autriche-Hongrie et du chancelier allemand Georg von Hertling durant le mois de janvier, nécessitaient une réponse collective des Alliés, et le gouvernement français propose une déclaration, résumant sa vision des buts de guerre. Des deux rédactions de la déclaration française, celle de Clemenceau est bien plus précise et agressive que celle du Quai d'Orsay. Le Président du Conseil exige, en des termes clairs, la restauration de la Belgique et le respect de son indépendance politique et économique, l'évacuation des provinces françaises envahies et il propose la solution du problème de l'Alsace-Lorraine dans les termes catégoriques suivants :

que la question posée devant le monde par le démembrement de la France en 1871 contre la volonté des Alsaciens-Lorrains soit réglée par la réintégration de ces Français dans leur patrie.⁴⁴

⁴² Mordacq, *Le Ministère Clemenceau*, vol. I, 123.

⁴³ Jusserand à Pichon, Washington le 23 janvier 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 56, p. 200.

⁴⁴ Projet de Clemenceau de la déclaration alliée, Paris le 27 janvier, AMAE, Série-Guerre, vol. 999, p. 266.

Après avoir exigé la restauration de la Serbie, de la Roumanie et de la Grèce, Clemenceau ajoute la phrase suivante, censée satisfaire explicitement les exigences italiennes :

que l'unité de l'Italie soit complétée, conformément aux légitimes aspirations que nous avons reconnues.⁴⁵

Ayant donc reconnu la validité du traité de Londres, il croit avoir suffisamment rassuré les Italiens pour pouvoir par la suite exiger :

que la Pologne, une et indivisible, retrouve sa pleine indépendance avec les garanties de son essor économique...
que les Tchèques et les Yougoslaves aient le droit de se prononcer sur leur sort.⁴⁶

Cette tentative française de faire adopter une déclaration alliée qui serait une réponse aussi bien aux 14 points de président Wilson qu'aux déclarations de l'ennemi et des bolcheviques échoue à cause des réserves des gouvernements britannique et italien. Les Britanniques, fidèles à leur politique de négociations avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, ne pouvaient souscrire à une déclaration exigeant explicitement son démembrement. Les Italiens proposent un contre-projet, dont ils avaient exclu les passages concernant non seulement les nationalités opprimées, mais aussi toute référence à une nation autre que l'Italie et la France. Le commentaire le plus juste de ce projet est fait par de Marguerie :

Le projet du baron Sonnino nécessitait une critique très sérieuse. Il supprime tout le passage du projet de M. Clemenceau qui faisait mention précise des conditions concernant : la Serbie, la Roumanie, la Grèce, la Pologne, les Tchèques, les Yougoslaves, la liberté des Détroits. Il ne retient que le passage relatif aux aspirations de l'Italie. Le baron Sonnino fait là de l'égoïsme sacré féroce et manque d'autre part complètement d'esprit politique.

Comment peut-il proposer un texte d'où il exclut la Serbie, première et héroïque victime de l'agression de nos ennemis, la Roumanie, solitairement entrée en guerre aux côtés des alliés, ensanglantée, ruinée, détruite peut être totalement aux mains de l'ennemi, la Grèce qui a su secouer l'empire allemand et agacer son souverain, et aussi risquer la rancune personnelle de l'empereur Guillaume pour se ranger dans le camp des Alliés.

Comment ne pas donner à la Pologne la déclaration à laquelle les Polonais ententistes n'ont cessé d'aspirer, et ne pas faire cesser un silence qui a tant forcé les plans de nos ennemis, décourager les Polonais, actuellement

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 242. Il est intéressant de noter que dans la copie de la déclaration rédigée au Quai d'Orsay dans l'extrait en question seulement les Tchèques étaient mentionnée : « que les Tchèques et les autres nationalités qui entrent dans la composition de l'Autriche-Hongrie aient le droit de se prononcer sur leur sort. »

soumis au joug allemand et autrichien, et compromettre la survie d'une question qui intéresse à si haut point le futur équilibre de l'Europe par l'établissement d'une barrière entre le germanisme et l'Orient.

Comment oublier les Tchèques dont l'indépendance doit compléter la ceinture des États protecteurs contre l'expansion du germanisme, les Yougoslaves, barrière de l'austro-germanisme avec les Serbes sur la Méditerranée.

Comment le baron Sonnino qui voit avec persistance dans l'Autriche-Hongrie le principal ennemi de l'Italie, ne comprend-il pas que, pour la réduire il n'y ait qu'un moyen, c'était de s'associer aux Yougoslaves, aux Tchèques aux Polonais, à tous les ennemis intérieurs de la Double Monarchie au lieu de les tenir en suspicion de jalouser leurs aspirations, de lutter sourdement contre eux et de reprocher sans cesse aux autres Alliés les sympathies témoignées à ces petites nationalités.

Il y a là un aveuglement et un particularisme que les autres Alliés intéressés à la défaite de l'Autriche, et que l'Italie a bien su appeler quand cette dernière menaçait de l'écraser, ne pensent partager plus longtemps sans encourir une grave responsabilité...

Ce projet est inacceptable. Il ne peut se comprendre que si le baron Sonnino, convaincu de son inacceptabilité lui-même, ne l'ait proposé que pour le faire échouer, ce qui vaudrait aisément mieux si le texte de M. Clemenceau soulève des objections de la part de notre alliée italienne.⁴⁷

Le baron Sonnino, avec sa ténacité habituelle, continue à défendre le traité de Londres, aussi bien contre les offensives pacifistes anglo-saxonnes, que contre la politique française favorable aux nationalités. D'autre part, il est clair que cette politique favorable aux nationalités avait gagné du terrain au sein du gouvernement français. Pour la première fois la liberté du choix, pour ne pas dire le principe d'autodétermination, est considéré par la France digne d'être inscrite comme un des buts de guerre alliés. Le principe des nationalités est utilisé désormais comme une arme de guerre non seulement contre les Allemands (Pologne) mais aussi contre la Double Monarchie. Marguerie, fidèle à sa grande idée d'une alliance de revers, dessine la place de toutes les nationalités dans cette grande barrière contre le germanisme de la Baltique à l'Adriatique. De Rome, comme déjà en décembre, Barrère lui emboîte le pas. Réagissant à la paix conclue entre les Empires centraux et l'Ukraine le 9 février, il propose de nouveau (la première fois il avait proposé cette déclaration à Pichon le 13 décembre)⁴⁸ à Pichon le texte d'une éventuelle déclaration commune des Alliés, dont la teneur est la suivante :

Les gouvernements de France, des États-Unis, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, résolus à ne reconnaître en Europe qu'un état de choses suscep-

⁴⁷ Note de Pierre de Marguerie, Paris le 1^{er} février 1918, AMAE, Série Guerre, vol. 1000, p. 49.

⁴⁸ Charles-Roux, *Souvenirs diplomatiques*, 295.

tibles d'assurer une paix durable par le respect des principes de justice, de droit, pour lesquels ils combattent ;

Déclarent tenir pour nulle et non avenue la paix conclue avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Turquie et la Bulgarie par le gouvernement de l'Ukraine ;

Forment les plus expresses réserves au sujet des remaniements territoriaux qui résultent de cette paix, comme pouvant être viciés dans leurs principes par les arbitraires et par l'abus de la force, et réservent spécialement les droits des populations dont les intérêts propres peuvent être lésés ou même sacrifiés à un intérêt germanique.

Protestent pour les mêmes raisons contre l'état de paix proclamé avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Bulgarie, par le gouvernement dictatorial de Petrograd et contre les conséquences que cette mesure peut entraîner pour les populations des territoires livrés à l'arbitraire de l'occupant. Rappelent leurs déclarations antérieures relatives au caractère international de la question de Pologne, et favorables à la reconstitution intégrale de ces États se déclarant disposés à admettre ses représentants au futur Congrès de la paix.

Prennent en considération les légitimes préoccupations des nationalités actuellement soumises, soit à la couronne d'Allemagne soit à celle d'Autriche-Hongrie et dont les intérêts peuvent être affectés par des remaniements arbitraires en Europe Centrale ou Orientale.

Et proclament leur résolution de continuer la lutte pour le triomphe de la cause de la liberté ainsi que pour la liberté des peuples et des nationalités opprimées.⁴⁹

Vu l'échec de leur tentative de faire accepter par Rome et Londres une déclaration de buts de guerre alliés, Clemenceau et Pichon repoussent la proposition de Barrère. Ils estiment qu'elle provoquerait des discussions, retardant, sinon empêchant complètement sa publication.⁵⁰ Barrère insiste sur son projet, d'autant plus qu'il croit un peu hâtivement avoir obtenu l'accord de Sonnino. Il lui avait soumis son projet, le chef de la diplomatie italienne lui conseillant d'exclure le passage concernant la Pologne, qui aurait dû faire objet d'une déclaration spéciale.⁵¹ Estimant le consentement de la Consulta comme acquis, il revient à la charge, arguant qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une déclaration, mais d'une nouvelle politique, dont l'objectif est d'empêcher la réorganisation allemande de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale :

Dès le moment où la révolution russe est entrée dans la phase maximaliste je me suis convaincu que c'était en s'adressant aux nationalités dissidentes

⁴⁹ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 12 février 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, pp. 125-127.

⁵⁰ Pichon à Barrère, Paris le 13 février 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, p. 132.

⁵¹ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 12 février 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, pp. 125-127.

d'Autriche-Hongrie et d'Allemagne que les Alliés pouvaient riposter au coup qui leur avait été porté par les Empires Centraux, et retourner contre ceux-ci le chaos créé par les Allemands en Europe Orientale. Je reste persuadé que s'ils avaient recouru à ce moyen les alliés auraient pu entraver très sérieusement les négociations qui viennent d'aboutir à une paix séparée expresse de la part de l'Ukraine et à une capitulation de fait de la part de Petrograd. Je ne conçois pas qu'en présence de ces événements le silence et l'abstention constituent une attitude conforme aux intérêts des Alliés. Les émotions qui se manifestent à Varsovie, à Prague et à Agram me paraissent prouver qu'il y a encore, en l'occurrence, une partie à tirer pour la coalition de ces mouvements d'opinion.⁵²

Comme Marguerie avant lui, il exprime le fond de sa pensée en dressant les contours d'une barrière à l'est face à l'avancée allemande.

Mais, je me permets de vous signaler encore que concurremment avec les moyens tentés par vous, il y en aurait un autre à mettre en œuvre : ce serait la constitution, en Europe centrale et orientale, d'une ceinture d'États susceptibles de former barrière entre les populations germaniques et la Russie. Ces États existent déjà sous forme de groupements nationaux polonais, slaves d'Autriche, qui aspirent à l'indépendance. Il dépend des Alliés de les aider à réaliser leurs aspirations nationales, en les encourageant officiellement dans la mesure assez large où ils le pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, sans éveiller ici (à Rome) de susceptibilités.⁵³

Finalement il évoque les antécédents de la diplomatie traditionnelle française du temps de l'Ancien Régime :

Le concours de ces nationalités nous serait précieux contre nos ennemis dont il aggraverait les difficultés intérieures et affaiblirait l'action militaire notamment par des désertions. Elles trouveraient dans une reconnaissance explicite de leurs revendications de la part des alliés l'encouragement le plus efficace à intensifier leur opposition.

Après la guerre nous n'aurons pas moins besoin de ces nationalités intermédiaires entre les populations allemandes et slaves russes ; elles pourront servir de barrage et par la suite d'obstacle à la germanisation de la Russie. Elles remplaceront pour nous dans une certaine mesure le contrepoids que représente pour nous l'allié russe et que nous ne retrouverons de sitôt. Notre politique à venir doit nous faire rechercher en Pologne, en Bohême et chez les Yougo-Slaves un système d'alliances analogues à celui que l'ancienne monarchie française possédait en Suède, Pologne et Turquie.⁵⁴

⁵² Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 14 février 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, pp. 134 et 135.

⁵³ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 15 février 1918, AMAE, Série-Guerre 1914-1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 161, p. 130.

⁵⁴ Barrère à Pichon, Rome le 2 mars 1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 55, pp. 138 et 139.

Malgré la conviction et l'énergie avec laquelle ils défendent une politique en faveur des nationalités, Marguerie et Barrère sont d'accord sur la nécessité d'obtenir d'abord l'accord du gouvernement italien. Donc, comme Marguerie l'avait déjà constaté, le refus italien, pour le moment, rendait la politique voulue par Barrère impossible, car l'importance de l'allié italien dépassait largement celle des bénéfices escomptés d'une politique favorable aux nationalités opprimées. Les Alliés se mettent donc d'accord à Paris sur une déclaration commune, dépourvue de toute référence aux nationalités, mais où ils exigent que la guerre soit continuée avec la plus grande vigueur, ce qui avait été l'objectif principal du gouvernement Clemenceau.⁵⁵

Néanmoins, il faut constater que la politique favorable aux nationalités a connu des avancées aussi bien à Rome qu'à Londres. Le président du Conseil italien soutenait officieusement une politique favorable aux nationalités. A son tour, Lloyd George avait parlé de la nécessité de créer une Pologne libre devant les syndicats, même si son gouvernement excluait la possibilité d'y inclure les provinces allemandes. La crainte d'une offensive massive de l'ennemi, renforcé par les divisions libérées du front oriental par la défection russe, pousse les Alliés à utiliser tous les moyens. Dans cette perspective, la propagande destinée aux unités austro-hongroises composées de nationalités opprimées eut une importance toute particulière. Les nationalités opprimées de l'Autriche-Hongrie ne pouvaient pas encore bénéficier de la même attitude alliée que la Pologne puisque d'une part les Britanniques espéraient encore détacher les Habsbourg de l'Allemagne, et que d'autre part les Italiens y voyaient un danger pour leurs revendications territoriales.

Le revirement de la politique alliée envers l'Autriche-Hongrie

Le dernier obstacle pour une politique favorable aux nationalités vivant en Double Monarchie étaient les tentatives de détacher cette dernière de l'Allemagne par une paix séparée. Les derniers contacts entre les représentants alliés et ceux de la Double Monarchie eurent lieu en mars 1918 en Suisse. Le gouvernement britannique avait décidé en janvier, malgré l'échec de la tentative de Smuts, de continuer les pourparlers avec la Double Monarchie. Au sein du War Cabinet, seul Balfour avait émis des réserves. Le chef de la diplomatie britannique ne croyait pas à la sincérité de la démarche autrichienne, craignant, comme le gouvernement français d'ailleurs, les réactions de l'Italie et des alliés balkaniques.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Stevenson, *French War Aims*, 102.

⁵⁶ Rothwell, *British War Aims*, 166, 167.

Le Cabinet britannique se décide à reprendre les négociations directes avec la Double Monarchie le 1 mars, après qu'il fut connu que le contact direct avait été établi entre le président Wilson et l'empereur Charles.⁵⁷ Le conseiller du premier ministre britannique, Philippe Kerr, est envoyé en Suisse afin de rencontrer le conseiller de l'ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, le comte Skrzynski. Leur rencontre a lieu le 14 mars et se solde par un échec complet. Kerr voulait discuter les termes d'une paix séparée, tandis que son interlocuteur n'était prêt qu'à envisager une paix générale.⁵⁸ La faillite de cette dernière reprise des négociations fut la conséquence directe du regain de confiance au sein des cercles dirigeants de la Double Monarchie. A Vienne, après la signature définitive de la paix séparée avec la Russie le 5 mars, et quelques jours avant la grande offensive sur le front français, on ne voyait pas la nécessité d'une paix séparée à tout prix. Les diplomates et les généraux commencèrent à croire de nouveau à la victoire.⁵⁹

Pour les mêmes raisons, les contacts entre la Double Monarchie et les autres alliés s'essouffèrent aussi. Dans son discours du 24 janvier, le comte Czernin accepte les principes généraux énoncés par Wilson, tout en refusant les demandes explicites d'accorder l'autonomie aux nationalités et de restaurer la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Roumanie. Néanmoins, la diplomatie austro-hongroise cherche à nouer des contacts avec les Américains, arguant que les 14 points pourraient être une bonne base aux négociations directes. Le contact est établi lors de la rencontre des 3 et 4 février 1918 entre l'envoyé de Wilson, le professeur Herron, et le professeur Lammasch, arrivé en Suisse avec l'accord de l'empereur. L'envoyé autrichien propose, au nom de l'empereur, la réorganisation de la Double Monarchie en unités nationales autonomes, comme un premier pas vers une paix générale. Il évite soigneusement d'évoquer les questions territoriales. Lammasch exige une réponse formelle au discours de Czernin, contenant une nouvelle demande adressée par Wilson à Charles d'accorder l'autonomie aux nationalités. Accordant une crédibilité complète aux demandes de Lammasch, Wilson, dans son discours devant le Congrès du 11 février, renouvelle sa demande de réorganisation de la Double Monarchie selon le principe national. La teneur de son discours est cette fois bien plus générale, évitant de ce fait les critiques provoquées par les solutions explicites contenues dans ses 14 points. Néanmoins, il affirme avec fermeté la nécessité de respecter les aspirations nationales et leur droit à l'autodétermination.⁶⁰ Ces pensées sont résumées dans les quatre principes suivants : 1) chaque partie de la paix

⁵⁷ Ibid. 148.

⁵⁸ French, « Tous ses vagues discours », 127.

⁵⁹ Leo Valiani, *The End of the Austria-Hungary* (New York : Knopf, 1973), 220.

⁶⁰ Mamatey, *United States*, 219-225.

future doit être basée sur la justice essentielle ; 2) on ne peut pas trafiquer avec des peuples et des provinces pour les faire passer d'une souveraineté à l'autre ; 3) tout règlement territorial que la guerre implique doit être effectué dans l'intérêt et pour le bénéfice de la population intéressée ; 4) toutes les aspirations nationales bien définies seront satisfaites aussi complètement qu'elles pourraient l'être.⁶¹

La réponse impériale prend la forme d'une lettre, envoyée le 18 février à Wilson par l'intermédiaire du roi d'Espagne. Cette lettre est interceptée et lue par les services secrets alliés, et elle arrive à Washington bien avant qu'elle ne soit remise officiellement à Wilson par la diplomatie espagnole. L'empereur propose une paix sur le principe du *status quo ante*, donc sans conquêtes ni annexions. Si le président pouvait persuader ses alliés de l'accepter, l'empereur en ferait autant. Outre ce principe général, Charles réfute les revendications territoriales italiennes. Il prévoit aussi que la Serbie devrait céder la Macédoine à la Bulgarie et que la Pologne devrait être créée. A propos des nations autrichiennes il ajoute que, selon lui, en satisfaisant leurs exigences, les risques d'une nouvelle guerre seraient diminués. Ainsi, Charles avance des propositions différentes de celles du professeur Lammasch.

Le président, même avant de recevoir officiellement la lettre le 26 février, consulte le gouvernement britannique. Balfour lui conseille de ne pas accepter les propositions de l'empereur, car elles provoqueraient le vif mécontentement des Italiens et des nations opprimées. Cependant, il considère nécessaire de savoir laquelle des deux propositions exprime le véritable état d'esprit de l'empereur. La réponse de Wilson est remise le 28 février à l'ambassadeur espagnol et arrive à Vienne le 8 mars. Elle contient une série de questions dont l'objectif est de préciser la position impériale sur un nombre de points litigieux, tels que le sort des nationalités, les concessions à l'Italie, etc.

La réponse est préparée par comte Czernin. En s'efforçant de satisfaire les exigences de la nouvelle diplomatie wilsonienne, par la forme sinon par le contenu, le chef de la diplomatie impériale confirme que la création d'un état Yougoslave est impossible, tandis que la reconstruction de la Serbie est envisageable à condition que les moyens en soient fournis par les États Unis, et la Macédoine cédée à la Bulgarie. Les demandes italiennes sont repoussées aussi. Avec une malice particulière, Czernin soutient qu'elles sont contraires au droit des nations de disposer d'elles-mêmes, car les Italiens exigent les territoires habités par des Slaves et des Allemands. La possibilité de leur rendre les provinces austro-hongroises peuplées exclusivement par leurs co-nationaux n'est même pas évoquée. Cette réponse ne sera jamais re-

⁶¹ Mordacq, *Le Ministère Clemenceau*, vol. I, 122 et 123.

mise, car le roi d'Espagne décide de ne plus faciliter cette correspondance.⁶² Ainsi, pour des raisons diverses, les contacts entre la Double Monarchie et les démocraties anglo-saxonnes cessent en mars 1918.

Les deux autres Alliés « latins », sont bien moins intéressés par des négociations secrètes, car ils estiment une victoire indispensable à la réalisation de leurs buts de guerre. Néanmoins, des tentatives de sonder l'état d'esprit de Vienne, considérée comme le maillon faible de l'alliance ennemie, se manifestèrent et à Rome et à Paris. L'idée de contacter l'ennemi au travers du Vatican est avancée par le secrétaire général de Consulta, Giacomo De Martino, dès novembre 1917. Le ministre de trésor dans le gouvernement Orlando, Francesco Nitti, entretient tout au long de l'hiver 1917/1918 une série de discussions avec le Secrétaire d'État du Saint Siège, le cardinal Gaspari. Ce haut dignitaire de l'église, propose à Nitti, en mars 1918, l'aide du Vatican, afin d'arriver à un accord entre Rome et Vienne. Gaspari, en effet, reprenait une initiative d'Orlando.

Le président du Conseil italien apprend, en janvier à Londres de son homologue britannique, que le comte Mensdorf avait indiqué à Smuts, lors de leur rencontre en Suisse, que la Double Monarchie était prête à céder certains territoires à l'Italie. N'ayant pas eu de précisions sur la teneur de la proposition autrichienne, il cherche en février à en savoir davantage à travers le Vatican. Orlando avertit immédiatement que les concessions territoriales devraient être bien supérieures à celles faites par Vienne avant le commencement de la guerre. Ainsi le 14 février, Gaspari se plaint à Nitti que le Saint Siège avait été sollicité afin de chercher à Vienne des renseignements dont on pouvait trouver la réponse plus facilement à Londres. Profitant de l'occasion, il ajoute que, selon lui, vu les dernières défaites, l'Italie n'était plus en mesure de repousser d'avance les offres initiales de la Double Monarchie.⁶³

Suivant cette logique, Gaspari fait en mars une offre de médiation formelle, dont le but est d'arriver à un accord entre l'Italie et l'Autriche-Hongrie en prélude à une paix générale. L'initiative est acceptée, et Nitti, avec l'accord d'Orlando, lui expose les demandes italiennes. L'Italie est prête à céder la Somalie ou la Tripolitaine à l'Autriche-Hongrie, mais elle exige en échange, 1) des rectifications de frontières afin de satisfaire les exigences défensives des deux pays ; 2) le port et la ville de Valona ; 3) certaines îles de Dalmatie ; 4) la ville de Trieste. Au cas où les deux dernières demandes seraient inacceptables, l'Italie exige la ville de Gorizia.

Au bout de quelques jours, Orlando fait savoir à Gaspari que la proposition italienne n'est plus d'actualité.⁶⁴ L'offensive allemande sur le front

⁶² Mamatey, *United States*, 226–232.

⁶³ Alberto Monticone, *Nitti e la Grande Guerra* (Milan : Giuffrè, 1961), 393.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 260–262, 395–397.

ouest, et l'attitude du gouvernement britannique, incitent Orlando à mettre un terme à toute négociation avec Vienne. Lloyd George l'informe que son gouvernement avait abandonné toute tentative de conclure une paix séparée avec la Double Monarchie. En même temps, l'armée italienne reprend confiance dès qu'il apparaît que l'attaque principale de l'ennemi ne serait pas dirigée sur le front italien.⁶⁵ La volonté manifeste d'une partie du gouvernement italien de diminuer ses buts de guerre n'est pas de longue durée. D'ailleurs, la décision n'avait été prise que sous l'influence de l'attitude pacifique de l'alliée britannique. Une fois assuré de la volonté de ses Alliés de continuer la guerre, le gouvernement italien retrouve toute sa détermination à défendre l'intégralité de ses revendications territoriales.

Le gouvernement Clemenceau avait beaucoup moins cru que ses alliés anglo-saxons à la possibilité d'une paix séparée. Néanmoins, Clemenceau permet à commandant Armand de rencontrer de nouveau son interlocuteur autrichien, le comte Revertera.⁶⁶ Leur rencontre de février n'ayant rien donné, le gouvernement français est convaincu de l'impossibilité de détacher l'Autriche-Hongrie de l'Allemagne. En conséquence, réagissant à la correspondance Wilson-Charles, Poincaré en avertit le président américain, profitant de l'occasion pour exprimer avec vigueur la position française :

En présence des démarches tentées aujourd'hui par l'Empereur de l'Autriche et afin de vous renseigner sur un point qui me paraît offrir pour vous un grand intérêt, je crois nécessaire de vous faire connaître à titre secret que l'Empereur Charles a fait l'an dernier une tentative analogue auprès de moi. Il s'agissait alors comme aujourd'hui, d'une correspondance privée. Après examen approfondi de la question et une opposition très vive de l'Italie pressentie, le gouvernement décida de laisser tomber la proposition. A cette époque, l'Empereur d'Autriche se disait disposé à appuyer la revendication française touchant l'Alsace et Lorraine, tandis qu'aujourd'hui, d'après des renseignements qui nous sont tout récemment parvenus, ses dispositions sur ce point se seraient totalement modifiées, et il ferait désormais entièrement cause commune avec l'Allemagne.⁶⁷

L'imprudence du comte Czernin permit à Clemenceau de mettre un terme à toutes les tentatives de négociations avec Vienne. Le chef de

⁶⁵ Melograni, *Storia politica*, 424 et 425.

⁶⁶ Les négociations entre commandant français Abel Armand et comte autrichien Nikolaus Revetera ont eu lieu à deux reprises en août et en novembre 1917, sans qu'il ait eu des résultats, car l'idée française d'une paix séparée ne fut pas acceptée par l'Autriche-Hongrie. G. Pedroncini, *Les négociations secrètes pendant la Grande Guerre* (Paris : Flammarion, 1969) ; G. H. Soutou, « Paul Painlevé et la possibilité d'une paix négociée en 1917 », *Cahiers du Centre d'études d'histoire de la Défense*, Histoire des rapports diplomatico-stratégiques, 22 (2004), 27-43.

⁶⁷ Poincaré à Jusserand pour Wilson, Paris le 4 mars, AMAE, Série A-Paix, vol. 104, p. 93.

la diplomatie impériale déclare le 2 avril, devant la délégation du conseil municipal de Vienne, qu'à la demande de Clemenceau, des négociations secrètes en vue d'une paix générale avaient été entamées avec la France. Il ajoute qu'elles étaient interrompues depuis, car la France avait exigé la restitution de l'Alsace-Lorraine, ce que la Monarchie ne pouvait pas accepter.⁶⁸ Clemenceau, se trouvant au milieu de la grande offensive allemande, répond laconiquement : « le comte Czernin a menti ».⁶⁹ Il s'ensuit une véritable polémique sur la place publique, dont l'enjeu d'une part est la crédibilité de la politique gouvernementale en France, et de l'autre, l'intégrité personnelle d'un haut aristocrate autrichien. Après avoir combattu avec force, toute tentative pacifiste, utilisant même les mesures extrêmes, Clemenceau ne pouvait pas permettre que son soutien à l'armée soit mis en cause lorsque celle-ci subissait les attaques répétées d'un ennemi supérieur en nombre. Sa détermination fut renforcée par sa conviction d'avoir raison, vu qu'il se référerait à l'entier processus de négociation, commencé depuis plus d'une année à l'initiative autrichienne. Le Comte Czernin, de son côté, se référant aux dernières rencontres Armand-Revertera, crut utile de démontrer la duplicité du président de conseil français. Ainsi, dans la réponse formelle aux accusations de Czernin, Clemenceau dévoile l'historique des rencontres Armand-Revertera, et y ajoute un avertissement éloquent :

M. le comte Czernin ne pouvait-il pas retrouver dans sa mémoire le souvenir d'une autre tentative faite à Paris et à Londres, deux mois seulement avant l'entreprise Revertera, par un personnage d'un rang fort au-dessus du sien.⁷⁰

Clemenceau, avec son imprécision habituelle, faisait référence à une lettre écrite par l'empereur à son beau-frère, prince Sixte de Bourbon-Parme, où il avait soutenu la restitution de l'Alsace-Lorraine à la France. Czernin ignorait complètement son existence, et surtout qu'elle se trouvait entre les mains de son adversaire. D'ailleurs, lorsqu'il demanda à l'empereur s'il avait envoyé des lettres à son beau-frère, dont le contenu pourrait être compromettant, Charles lui répondit catégoriquement :

Dans mes lettres au prince du Bourbon-Parme, il n'y avait jamais rien de politique.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Wolfdieter Bihl, « La mission de la médiation des princes Sixte et Xavier de Bourbon-Parme en faveur de la paix », *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 170 (avril 1993), 60.

⁶⁹ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Clemenceau* (Paris : Fayard, 1998), 703.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 704.

⁷¹ Bihl, « La mission de la médiation », 64.

Ainsi, Czernin continue à nourrir la polémique en divulguant de nouveaux détails sur les négociations Armand-Revertera. La réponse de Clemenceau est concluante. Il révèle le 9 avril l'existence de la lettre de Charles à Sixte de Bourbon-Parme, dont il publie le contenu le 12 avril. Le passage clé de cette lettre du 24 mars 1917 est le suivant :

C'est dans ce but et pour exprimer les sentiments réels que je te prie de porter secrètement et officieusement à la connaissance de M. Poincaré président de la République française, que j'emploierai tous les moyens dont je dispose et en utilisant toute mon influence personnelle auprès de mes alliés pour leur faire comprendre la justesse des revendications françaises en ce qui concerne l'Alsace-Lorraine.⁷²

Les effets de la publication de cette lettre sont énormes. Toute chance d'une paix séparée, ou même d'une quelconque action diplomatique indépendante autrichienne disparaissent d'un seul coup. L'empereur prend le chemin du repentir, et le 12 mai conclut à Spa plusieurs traités économiques et militaires liant inextricablement le sort de la Double Monarchie à celui de l'Allemagne. Les derniers jalons d'une Mitteleuropa allemande sont posés. En conséquence, la France se décide ouvertement à soutenir les nations opprimées de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Devant la commission parlementaire, enquêtant sur l'affaire Czernin-Clemenceau, le président du Conseil et son Ministre des Affaires étrangères déclarent début mai 1918 que la France devrait désormais apporter toute son aide aux nations vivant dans l'Autriche-Hongrie.⁷³

Du même coup les autres alliés abandonnent également toute espérance de voir la Double Monarchie mener une politique indépendante. A Londres et à Washington aussi on prend la décision de soutenir la lutte des nations opprimées. Le président Wilson avertit le 18 mai qu'il n'accordera désormais aucun crédit aux offres de paix en provenance de Vienne, car elles se sont avérées les moyens de continuer une politique oppressive à l'Est de l'Europe.⁷⁴ La nouvelle orientation de la politique américaine est confirmée par le Secrétaire d'État. Lansing dans sa déclaration du 29 mai évoquant les sympathies de l'administration américaine pour les aspirations nationales des Tchécoslovaques et des Yougoslaves.⁷⁵

Londres à son tour décide le 21 mai d'abandonner formellement toute tentative de conclure une paix séparée avec la Double Monarchie.

⁷² Ibid. 47.

⁷³ David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 217.

⁷⁴ Mamatey, *United States*, 258.

⁷⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, Lansing Papers*, vol. I (Washington : USGPO, 1939-1940), 808.

Désormais le gouvernement de Sa Majesté se dit prêt à soutenir les nations opprimées, pour « ramener les Habsbourg à la raison », selon l'expression de Lloyd George.⁷⁶

La politique de soutien aux nationalités opprimées fait son chemin dans les capitales alliées dès la révolution bolchevique, pour être enfin acceptée, à l'exception de Rome, seulement en mai. Ses promoteurs se trouvent surtout à Paris, car c'est une des manières de continuer la guerre jusqu'à la victoire finale. Le soutien de la Double Monarchie à l'offensive allemande du printemps 1918 décourage même les partisans les plus convaincus à Londres et à Washington d'une paix de compromis. Le seul obstacle reste l'attitude du gouvernement italien. Néanmoins, il faut souligner que le soutien aux nations opprimées ne signifie nullement la volonté de voir l'Autriche-Hongrie disparaître au profit de nouveaux états nationaux. C'est seulement un moyen de gagner la guerre où, comme les Britanniques le disent, d'amener les Autrichiens à un état d'esprit raisonnable.⁷⁷ Néanmoins, le soutien aux nationalités opprimées, aussi limité qu'il soit, ouvre la voie pour l'acceptation graduelle du programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe, soutenu dans sa démarche par le Comité yougoslave. Cependant, son réalisation dépendait des projets alliés sur l'avenir de la Double Monarchie, dont la pérennité ne fut mise en cause qu'en été 1918.

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⁷⁶ Kenneth Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: University Press, 1976), 182.

⁷⁷ "Austria may thus be reduced to a reasonable state of mind" (Rothwell, *British War Aims*, 222).

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Hungarian Views of the Bunjevci in Habsburg Times and the Inter-war Period*

Abstract: The status and image of minorities often depends not on their self-perceptions, but on the official stance taken by the state in which they live. While identity is commonly recognized as malleable and personal, the official status of minorities is couched in stiff scientific language claiming to be authoritative. But as politics change, these supposedly scientific categorizations of minorities also change. Based on academic reports and parliamentary decisions, in Hungary today the Catholic South Slavs known as Bunjevci are officially regarded as an obscure branch of the Croatian nation. This has not always been the case. Early records of the Bunjevci categorized them in a variety of ways, most commonly as Catholic Serbs, Dalmatians, and Illyrians. In the nineteenth century Bunjevac elites were able to project to the Hungarian public a mythological positive historical image of the Bunjevci, delineating them from the negative stereotypes of other South Slavs. This positive image, fixed in encyclopaedias and maintained until the Second World War, represented the Bunjevci as Catholic Serbs who (unlike Croats or Orthodox Serbs) were constantly faithful to the Hungarian state and eager to assimilate. In the 1920s and 1930s traditional Hungarian stereotypes of Bunjevci protected them from abuses suffered by other South Slavs. As political relations transformed, official views of the Bunjevci also changed. With the massive upheaval during and after the Second World War, there was a change in accounts of who the Bunjevci were. The transformation from communism and the break-up of Yugoslavia have also evoked demands for changes in identity from some Bunjevci, and brought new impositions of identity upon them.

Keywords: Bunjevci, Croats, Serbs, South Slavs in Hungary, minorities, encyclopaedic knowledge, imagery, ethnic categorization, imposition of identity, stereotyping, inter-war period.

Not long ago, Tara Zahra laid down a challenge to other historians. While acknowledging that scholars have been remarkably good at highlighting moments of ethnic mobilization, Zahra suggested that most of the time people live in a state of indifference to national or ethnic identity, and that historians should find ways to make this state of indifference visible.¹

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Zahra's ideas echo the work of social scientists examining the fluid nature of identity, such as Glenn Bowman who claims that even seemingly intractable ethnic, national and religious identities are "unfixed and contingent with certain circumstances bringing one element of the field of identifications which constitute the social self to dominion and other circumstances overturning and reshaping that hierarchy."²

In contrast to the view of fluidity, identity has also been described as constricting and permanent; a sort of cement straightjacket which can be poured over the otherwise indifferent individual. In this interpretation indifference is all well and good, but is irrelevant when identity is demanded or imposed by others such as neighbours, strangers, or the state.³ In other words, no matter how you hope to shape your own identity, people around you perceive who you are in ethnic and national terms regardless of your wishes, and many "know," in encyclopaedic terms, what it means to be a member of your ethnicity or nationality. There is little you can do to alter such encyclopaedic knowledge. Like it or not, you are caught under a lexicographical entry, pasted to an identity. If you are a member of a small minority this situation is extreme indeed. Historical records of your existence will generally be made by census takers, ethnographers, government officials, historians, and encyclopaedists from the majority, who will file you, box you, label and store you with descriptions you may not like, but can hardly alter.

my title suggests, I concentrate here solely on Bunjevci in lands that are now or once were part of Hungary. Nothing I say should be taken as applicable to the identities of Bunjevci in lands outside old Hungary, nor to Hungarian views of the Šokci — topics that require separate treatment.

¹ Tara Zahra, "Imagining Noncommunities: National indifference as a category of analysis", *Slavic Review*, 69: 1 (2010), 93–119.

² Glenn Bowman, "Comments", *Current Anthropology* 43: 2 (2002), 219–220; and on how solidarities are mobilized in certain situations, id., "The Two Deaths of Basem Rishawi: Identity constructions and reconstructions in a Muslim-Christian Palestinian community", *Identities: Global studies in culture and power* 8: 1 (2001), 47–81. In a similar vein, but showing how and where ethnicity tends to matter within a matrix of indifference, Rogers Brubaker et al., *National Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton 2008); the research agenda for which was set by Brubaker in his *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe* (Cambridge 1996), esp. 67.

³ On the demand for, and imposition of identity, see Gerald Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good intentions, evil consequences", *From Vienna to Chicago and Back* (Chicago 2007), 157–176; Robert Hayden, "Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive sharing of religious sites in South Asia and the Balkans", *Current Anthropology* 43: 2 (2002), 205–219, and his "Reply", *ibid.* 227–231, esp. 228 in resp. to Bowman.

Social scientists and psychologists can demonstrate that identity is indeed malleable, but the problem for historians is that we are forced to look at our subjects' identities (or indifference to identity) through the lenses of majorities who recorded them in the past. To borrow an observation from a Swedish historian: "Even cross-cutting issues such as demography and economics" (and identity, we might add) "are dependent on data collections made on the basis of national legislation and in national categories."⁴ The external gaze provided by such collections, however, is also intrinsic to collective identities.

This challenge of sources, however, also offers an opportunity, if we accept part of the postmodernist critique and give up on the idea of authenticity of voices from the past on group-identity (while not giving up on our rigorous historical research standards). Instead of assuming a claim made in the past about identity is cement-like proof, we might instead allow the voices to say what they say and how they say it, and simultaneously reveal the limits within which fluid identities were forced, and the way in which majorities viewed them. Thus, we can come to an understanding of minorities, as well as the identities of dominant majorities. In this way, acknowledging that much of the record was affected by the majority and stored by the state provides a point of analytical strength. For just as histories of the conditions of the working classes and stories of gender relations have improved our understanding of the bigger picture, of how society works, so too can a study of a particular minority help us understand how states functioned, and how dominant majorities saw and see themselves, and what this tells us about identity in a larger sense.

In what follows, I hope to bridge two layers of analysis, identity as chosen and imposed, as malleable and fixed, fluid and solid, and demonstrate that there is some justice to both views and that they are indeed contingent on externalities and yet can be reanimated from the files into which individuals have been fixed. Some of the most salient of these externalities are brought from historical interpretations — whether advanced by elites of a community or imposed on the community by outsiders.

Even the most hallowed ethnic and national identity was created in the past, and goes through changes as time passes. In the case examined below, I will show how a certain minority identity — that of the Bunjevci — has been created and re-created over time.

Prologue: Official views of who the Bunjevci are today

A diplomatic spat has been going on in South-eastern Europe for nearly two decades now. Hardly noticed by outsiders because of the conflicts that

⁴ Rolf Torstendahl, *Historisk tidskrift* (Sweden), 129: 3 (2009), 534.

enveloped the former Yugoslavia, the disagreement is between Croatia and Serbia, and laterally involves Hungary. The disagreement is over the identity of a Catholic, South Slav group, the Bunjevci as they call themselves (*Bunjewatzen* in German, *bunjevácok* in Hungarian). In brief, since the break-up of Yugoslavia, Serbia has recognized the Bunjevci as a national minority, and in every census since 1991 a significant number of Serbian citizens have declared themselves to be Bunjevci. By contrast, Croatia insists the Bunjevci are a branch of the Croatian nation, and that in counting them separately from other Croats, Serbia is reducing the number of Croats living in Serbia and thereby reducing its obligations to its Croatian minority. Others have suggested that, in Serbia, Bunjevci identity has offered a safer haven than Croatian nationality, especially during the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s as the rise in Bunjevci numbers in the 1991 census mirrors the fall of the number of Croats.⁵

The debate between Serbia and Croatia has also been played out in Hungary where, in August 1991, Bunjevci from the Hungarian town Baja urged the Hungarian government to recognize the newly formed state of Croatia. Since 1993, in Hungary state funding for minority institutions is dependent on official recognition of minority status. To gain that status, demand for it must be proven by a petition to parliament, with at least 1,000 signatures from members of the minority. Furthermore, the minority must be able to demonstrate that it has lived in Hungary for at least 100 years. Finally, Parliament can ask the Hungarian Academy for an official opinion on the minority. On three occasions Hungary's Bunjevci have indicated that they want official recognition as a national minority. In 1993 a Bunjevci cultural group, *Neven*, protested to the Hungarian Parliament against the non-inclusion of the Bunjevci amongst Hungary's national minorities. By 2006, Bunjevci activists from Baja had fulfilled all the requirements to

⁵ This point is made by Miroslav Samardžić, *Položaj manjina u Vojvodini*, 2nd ed. (Belgrade 1999), 36. Cf. Jean-François Gossiaux, "Yougoslavie: quand la démocratie n'est plus un jeu", *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 51: 4 (1996), 837–848 (842). Items from the debate are: Milana Černelić, "Attempts to Deny the Bunjevci of Bačka (Vojvodina), the Right to Belong to the Croat Nation", *Acta Ethnographica Hungarica*, 41: 1–2 (1997), 233–259; Vladimir Ilić, "Attitudes of the Ethnic Elites Members in Vojvodina to Minority Rights and to Inter-Ethnic Relations", *Sociologija* 44: 1 (2002), 25–40 (29); Bojan Todosijević, "Why Bunjevci did not Become a Nation: A case study", *East Central Europe* 29: 1–2 (2002), 59–72; Mato Matarić, "Bunjevci Croats are Getting Together Again", *The South Slav Journal* 24: 3–4 (2003), 53–55; Mladena Prelić, "Bački Bunjevci: problem identiteta u istorijskoj i savremenoj perspektivi", in V. Stanovčić, ed., *Položaj nacionalnih manjina u Srbiji* (Belgrade 2007), 597–605; Suzana Kujundžić-Ostojić, "Bački Bunjevci na svom putu od naroda do nacionalne manjine", *ibid.* 607–617; and Zlatko Šram, "Socijalna alijencija bunjevačkih Hrvata u Vojvodini", *Sociologija i prosto* 47: 1 (2009), 3–25.

petition parliament for recognition, but the Hungarian Academy's official opinion was that the Bunjevci were Croats and the request was rejected. Finally, in 2010, after a second parliamentary petition, the academy published a decision noting that although the Bunjevci had been recognized as a minority in Hungary prior to the Second World War, ever since they had been considered a sub-group of Croats. The academy further declared that although the "scientific [sic] and political debate on the question of the Bunjevci's origin, name, belonging, and relevant forms of identity cannot be considered closed," there was no reason to define them separately from Croats. Accordingly, parliament again rejected the Bunjevci's claim to minority status.⁶ In outrage, the Hungarian Bunjevci activist Mijo (Mihály) Mujity began publishing a blog in Hungarian entitled *The Bunjevci Holocaust: The Calvary of the Bunjevci People*.⁷

It is not the "scientific" nature of this debate that interests us here, but primarily what it once said about Hungarian identity in the inter-war period, and secondarily what the disappearance of the Bunjevci in the post-war period, and the debate on their identity in the post-communist period may suggest today. We will begin with a summary of views of Bunjevci prior to the First World War. Despite the seeming obscurity of the issue, there are plenty of sources on the Bunjevci, especially from the critical period of South-Slav nation-building, the nineteenth century, when there was an explosion of publishing activity by, for and about Bunjevci, in their own tongue as well as in Hungarian.

The appearance of the Bunjevci in the Hungarian historical record

In this period, Bunjevci elites played an active role in the creation of the Hungarian narrative about them. The leaders of what was then a Bunjevci town, Szabadka (now Subotica, in Serbia), commissioned a Hungarian historian named Iván Iványi to write an account of their forefathers and the settling of their town.⁸ According to the heroic tale Iványi published in 1896, the Bunjevci first appeared in the historical record at the end of the seventeenth century during the Habsburg campaigns to re-conquer Hungary from Ottoman forces. In 1687 a group of Catholic South Slavs, led by Franciscan monks from Bosnia, presented themselves to Habsburg com-

⁶ The academy's opinion was drafted by Balázs Dobos and Ágnes Tóth, published online as "A magyarországi bunyevácokról (Szakértői összefoglaló)", available online at http://www.mtaki.hu/hirek/pdf/110113_osszefoglalo_bunyevac.pdf, quote p. 2.

⁷ <http://bunyevac.blog.hu/>

⁸ See Iványi's memoirs, István Iványi, *Visszaemlékezéseim életem folyására*, ed. Z. Dér et al. (Subotica 1974).

manders requesting permission to settle on the depopulated lands of Southern Hungary, in return for which they offered military service.⁹ Austrian officials called these people Catholic Rascians (that is, people from Rascia — a synonym for Serbs). Thus, the forefathers of the Bunjevci of Szabadka entered service in what was to become the extended military frontier zone, manned by Southern Slavs, who were given special freedoms not afforded to other commoners — freedom from taxation or the imposition of labour service by nobility and towns nearby. Moreover, civil authorities were enjoined not to “punish, interrogate or bother them,” in return for which they were expected to serve the Crown in Vienna, first as a line of primary defence against Ottoman incursions.¹⁰ They were also to protect the Crown, even in case of domestic uprisings by the Croatian or Hungarian nobility. Serbs, in particular, were granted special rights, which were periodically renewed by the crown. For the Orthodox, in particular, these rights were associated with their church, and came with a promise not to interfere with their religion. For the Bunjevci, who were Catholic as were the Habsburgs, no such promise was needed.¹¹

⁹ On Franciscans and migration to Hungary see Stjepan Sršan, “A horvát bevándorlás és a boszniai ferencesek szerepe Baranyában a 18. század elejéig”, *Baranya* 1–2 (1991), 152–164; Jovan Radonić, “O seobi Bunjevaca u Subotici 1687 godine”, *Glas Srpske akademije nauka*, Odeljenje društvene nauke, 214: new ser. 3 (1954), 119–127; Konstantin Kostić, *Bunjevci u Somboru pod vodstvom Franjevaca do 1787. godine* (Sombor 1934); Bernárdin Unyi, *Sokácok–Bunyevácok és a bosnyák ferencesek története* (Budapest 1947); Robert Skenderović, “Sudjelovanje slavonskih franjevaca u nacionalnom pokretu podunavskih Hrvata tijekom 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća”, *Scrinia Slavonia* 6 (2006), 194–216; Tamás Faragó, “Vándormozgalmak Magyarországon a 18. század utolsó harmadában”, *Demográfia* 41: 1 (1998), 7–38; id. “Spontaneous Population Movements in the Hungarian Kingdom during the Early Eighteenth Century with Special Attention to the Croatian and Serbian Immigration”, in D. Roksandić and N. Štefanec, eds., *Constructing Border Societies on the Triplex Confinium* (Budapest 2000), 187–203; István György Tóth, “Bosnyák ferencesek a hódoltsági misszióban”, *Misszionáriusok a kora újkori Magyarországon* (Budapest 2007), 257–309; Srećko M. Džaja, *Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina. Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463–1804* (Munich 1984), 181–185; Antal Molnár, *Le Saint-Siège, Raguse et les missions catholiques de la Hongrie Ottomane, 1572–1647* (Rome 2007), 67–70; and Arthur J. Evans, *Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August and September 1875*, 2nd ed. (London 1877), 222.

¹⁰ István Iványi, *Szabadka szabad királyi város története*, 2 vols. (Szabadka 1886), vol. II, 148–149.

¹¹ Docs. in Jovan Radonić, ed., *Srpske privilegije od 1690 do 1792* (Belgrade 1954); summary László Szalay, *Magyarországi szerb telepek jogviszonya az államhoz* (Pest 1861); and the royal patents in János Hornyik, “A rácok ellenforradalma 1703–1711”, *Századok*, 1868, 530–552, 608–632, 693–719 (535–538).

There were almost immediately frictions with local Hungarian authorities who tried to disarm the Bunjevci and Serbs, and collect taxes, from which these militiamen repeatedly received exemption from Vienna. At one point, Hungarian authorities from one county told the crown that 37,691 florins were lost annually in taxes because of these exemptions.¹² And authorities compared the Rascians' customs with those of "beasts of the forest."¹³ For their part, the attitude of border guards might be summarized in the words of Captain Novak Petrovics who (c. 1687) declared that they would "not bear the Hungarians, because up to now the Hungarian nation had treated the Rascians badly."¹⁴

These tensions evoked outrage, amongst Hungarian nobles that ancestral lands had been handed to foreigners (particularly Orthodox Serbs), and amongst peasants that these foreigners had been given, moreover, rights that no native Hungarian serf was afforded at the time. Worse, Hungarian peasants who had enjoyed certain liberties as border guards in the past saw those liberties steadily eliminated by Vienna and local landlords. Not surprisingly then, when major uprisings against the Habsburgs occurred in Hungary, such as the insurrection led by Prince Francis Rákóczi II in 1703–1711, and later the revolution of 1848–1849, they contained an edge of ethnic conflict based precisely on resentments of Southern Slavs' rights.¹⁵ In these uprisings, South Slav border regiments served the crown loyally against the Hungarian rebels.¹⁶

But with the reduction of the Turkish threat and the consolidation of Habsburg rule under Empress Maria Theresa (r. 1740–1780), many border-guard districts lost their privileges, including the one containing most Bunjevci. Fortunately for the Bunjevci of Szabadka, in 1743 the Empress granted the town tax privileges as a Royal City, and the Catholic inhabitants were given special rights. The loss of their privileges in this hinterland

¹² Estimate from 1701, in Iványi, *Szabadka*, vol. II, 156–157.

¹³ István Iványi, "A tiszai határőrvidék", *Hazánk történelmi közlöny*, 2 vols. (Budapest 1884), vol. I, 337–338.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 271; and J. H. Schwicker, *Die Serben in Ungarn* (Budapest 1879), 4.

¹⁵ Perhaps equally unsurprisingly given the unpleasant relations with local Hungarian authorities, a prominent Serb known as Pero of Szeged (Segedinac) also joined a Hungarian peasant uprising against local landlords in 1735. See László Hadrovics and Imre Wellmann, *Parasztmozgalmak a 18. században* (Budapest 1961), 13–51.

¹⁶ In detail, on the development of the border guard, see J. H. Schwicker, *Geschichte der Österreichischer Militärgrenze* (Vienna 1883); and Gunther Erich Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1747* (Urbana, IL 1960).

so outraged Orthodox Serbs, that some moved to Russia in protest.¹⁷ But Szabadka, and some Bunjevci in it, became wealthy.¹⁸

And who were these Southern Slavs? We have some record of them from the military survey of 1700, in part to settle just who the border guards were, and thereby to stop outsiders from claiming of border guards' rights. So, we know of one Lukacs Szucsics, born in Albana, Bosnia, where his father had also been a soldier. Szucsics had ten years of military experience as a "raider" in Bosnia. He had lived in Szabadka for twelve years, serving as a captain. He had taken part in twelve military campaigns, being captured once and subsequently ransomed for 1,000 thalers. Szucsics had one son, ten oxen, four year-old calves, eight horses, two colts, a hundred sheep, twenty pigs, nineteen cadastral acres (hold) in barley and thirty in oats, as well as twenty "day's worth" of grapevines, half of which were not yet bearing fruit.¹⁹ Szucsics was, then, relatively well-to-do, with a heroic past and, in Hungarian histories, what was to be a prosperous future.

His story was also the story of the Bunjevci in Hungary. These people were often called "Catholic Serbs" by Hungarian encyclopaedias and ethnographical accounts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²⁰ In more detailed accounts, they were described as an attractive people who were a pillar of Hungarian society. Indeed, scions of ennobled Bunjevci families, such as the Antunovics, Kuluncsics, Rudits and Vonits families, served as county sheriffs and bishops. They also, incidentally, developed family my-

¹⁷ József Antunovics, "Magyar népélet. A szabadkai dalmata népszokások, rövid történeti ismertetéssel", *Hazánk, időszaki folyóirat*, ed. János Török, vol. 1 (Pest, 1858), 205; Iványi, *Szabadka*, vol. II, 1 ff. Cf. Ivan Antunovich, *Razprava o podunavskih i potisanskib Bunjevcih i Sokcih* (Vienna 1882). One estimate is that 1,000 Orthodox Serbian guardsmen took their families, totalling 100,000 people, to Russia. See Schwicker, *Geschichte der Österreichischer Militärgrenze*, 74–76.

¹⁸ On the enrichment of royal cities, incl. Szabadka, under Maria Theresa, see István Kállay, *Szabad királyi városok gazdálkodása Mária Terézia korában* (Budapest 1972).

¹⁹ Iványi, *A tiszai határőrvidék* (Budapest 1885), 33; and id. *Szabadka*, vol. II, 152. I do not know what a "day's worth" of vines meant, though it seems likely to have been a yoke.

²⁰ For Bunjevci as "Catholic Serbs" (sometimes "Rascians"), see Elek Fényes, *Magyarország statisztikája*, vol. 1 (Pest 1842), 71–2; Ignác Acsády, ed., *Az Athenaeum kézikönyve: A tudományok enciklopédiája, különös tekintettel Magyarországra*, 2 vols. (Budapest 1868); Pál Hunfalvy, *Magyarország ethnographiája* (Budapest 1876), 474; Aladár György, ed., *A föld és népei: Magyarország* (Budapest 1905), 228; Velimir Juga, *A magyar szent korona országában élő szerbek* (Budapest 1913), 27–28; and *A Napkelet lexikona*, 2 vols. (Budapest 1927), vol. I, 187. For an entry Bunjevci speaking the "Serbo-Croatian language," see Béla Bangha, ed., *Katolikus Lexikon*, vol. 1 (Budapest 1931). For Bunjevci as "South Slavs," see *A Pallas Nagy Lexikona*, 16 vols., vol. III (Budapest 1893).

thologies of ancient noble Dalmatian ancestry, though the documents proving this were inevitably “lost” over the turbulent course of history.²¹

The narrative of the Bunjevci’s heroic arrival to Hungary and subsequent prosperity was supported by documents and presented by Iványi, a Hungarian historian backed by wealthy Bunjevci at the end of the nineteenth century. The story is, even today, engaging and seductive. The problem is that the historical record is not so clear. As noted above, the first Habsburg record cited by Iványi, does indeed describe “Catholic Rascians.”²² But Habsburg sources from the time, indeed all sources until much later, were vague and inconsistent in their description of South Slavs, often using toponyms, such as Illyrians (people from Illyria), Rascians, Dalmatians, etc.²³ For centuries, German and Hungarian sources certainly did describe the Bunjevci as Catholic Serbs (alternately Rascians), but also called them Illyrians and Dalmatians. Thus, in 1879, an author called them “Katholische Serben (Bunjevaczén)” in his book on the Serbs of Hungary.²⁴

²¹ E.g., the history of the Rudits and Vojnits families in Gyula Lelbach, *Romba dölt világ*, 3rd ed. (Budapest 2009), 14–16.

²² “Raizen”, thus: “Churfürst zu Bayern recommandirt, die kathol. Raizen, damit ihren 3 Palanken zu erbauen u. zu bewohnen eingeräumt werden möge.” 9 July 1687, Protoc. Exped. Folio 570, no. 22, Hofkriegsrat Archiv, Vienna, cited by Iványi, *Szabadka*, vol. I, 92. Terms used include “Raizen” (see above), “Rascien,” “Razin,” “Räisiche,” and “Räzische.” See letters of 1689 from the Margrave to Emperor Leopold I, in Philipp Röder von Diersburg, ed., *Des Margrafen Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden Feldzüge wider die Türken grössentheils nach bis jetzt unbenützten Handschriften*, 2 vols. (Karlsruhe 1842), vol. II, 35, 68, 94–95.

²³ For example, one Hungarian author wrote that Illyrians were “Orthodox Rascians, Vends, Roman Catholic and Orthodox Dalmatians, the Roman Catholic Šokci and Bunjevci of Hungary, Serbs, and Bosnians.” Gyula Kereskényi, *Érd (Hamzsabég) és Batta (Százhalom) községek történeti vázlatja* (Székesfejérvár 1874), 36 n. On the unset nature of ethnic identity among South Slavs, see John V.A. Fine, Jr., *When Ethnicity did not Matter in the Balkans: A study of identity in pre-nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern periods* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2006). On Illyrian identity, see Zrinka Blažević, “Indetermination: Narrative identity and symbolic politics in early modern Illyrism”, in B. Trencsényi and M. Zászkaliczky, eds., *Which Love of Whose Country? Composite states, national histories and patriotic discourses in early modern East Central Europe* (Leiden 2010), 203–223; and Micaele S. Iovine, “The ‘Illyrian Language’ and the Language Question among the Southern Slavs in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in R. Picchio and H. Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, vol. 1 (New Haven 1984), 101–156. For an example of Bunjevci known as Dalmatians, see László Heka, “A bunyevácok (dalmaták) Szeged életében”, in L. Blazovich, ed., *Tanulmányok Csongrád megye történetéből*, vol. 26 (Szeged 1998), 63–183.

²⁴ Schwicker, *Die Serben in Ungarn*, 4. Other sources in German listing Bunjevci as Serbs: Julian Chownitz, *Handbuch zur Kenntniss Ungarns* (etc.) (Hamburg 1851), 140; *Mittheilungen über Handel, Gewerbe und Verkehrsmittel so wie aus dem Gebiete der Statistik*

But were the people identified by Iványi actually the forefathers of people who later called themselves Bunjevci? In the confusing period during the wars with the Turks at the end of the seventeenth and start of the eighteenth centuries, when authorities were scarcely interested in ethnic identity, this is impossible to judge. First of all, South Slavs of all faiths had entered Hungary en masse before and during the Ottoman occupation of Hungary. Despite the terrible destruction and population loss caused by the wars, some of these people were surely still around after the Turks left.²⁵ Indeed, it seems most likely that many Bunjevci, and almost certainly the Bunjevci of Érd (a small town near Budapest, far from the one-time military border), were descendants of immigrants who came to Hungary in the Ottoman period or before.²⁶ These people, along with other South Slavs who moved north at the time, were clearly not fleeing Muslim oppression to enjoy life under a Christian monarch when they arrived in Hungary, for they stayed in Ottoman-occupied lands instead of travelling farther north and west.²⁷

The category of Catholic Serbs is also problematic, though not in the sense of today. It did not cause confusion in the seventeenth century. A Je-

überhaupt, nach Berichten an das K.K. Handels-Ministerium (Vienna 1851), vol. 2, 162; Joseph Hain, *Handbuch der Statistik des Österreichischen Kaiserstaates* (Vienna 1852), vol. 1, 209, s.v. Das serbische Gebiet; *Allgemeine deutsche Real-Encyclopädie für die gebildeten Stände, Conversations-Lexicon*, 10th ed., vol. 15 (Leipzig 1855), 324, s.v. Wojwodschafft Serbien; *Die Gegenwart: ein encyclopädische Darstellung der neuesten Zeitgeschichte für alle Stände*, vol. 1 (Leipzig 1855), 881; Wilhelm Hoffmann, *Encyclopädie der Erd- Völker- und Staatenkunde: ein geographisch-statistische Darstellung*, vol. 2 (Leipzig 1866), 1765, s.v. Österreich; J. H. Schwicker, *Das Königreich Ungarn* (Vienna 1886), 16; Philipp Franz Bresnitz von Sydačoff, *Die panslawistische Agitation und die südslawische Bewegung in Oesterreich-Ungarn* (1900), 508.

²⁵ For the argument that some Bunjevci came to Hungary in the 15th or 16th c., see Ante Sekulić, *Bački Hrvati* (Zagreb 1991), 47. On immigration to Hungary, see Ferenc Szakály, “Serbische Einwanderung nach Ungarn in der Türkenzeit”, in F. Glatz, ed., *Ethnicity and Society in Hungary*, vol. 2 of *Études Historiques Hongroises 1990* (Budapest 1990), 20–39. Some Ottoman censuses from Hungary include family names, and from these it is often clear that people mentioned are South Slavs. See, e.g., Gyula Káldy-Nagy, ed. *A Csanádi Szandzsák 1567. és 1579. évi összeírása* (Szeged 2000), *passim*.

²⁶ On immigration to Érd and nearby towns before and during the Ottoman period, see Kereskényi, *Érd*, 35–37. On Catholic S. Slavs in nearby Tököl, see István György Tóth, “Sarajevói dokumentum a pesti bosnyák ferencesekről (1664)”. *Történelmi Szemle* XLIV: 1–2 (2002), 115–133 (125).

²⁷ Some authors claim some Bunjevci came to Hungary before the Ottoman invasion — see Ante Sekulić, *Bački Bunjevci i Šokci* (Zagreb 1990), 331. Cf. Djuro Šarošac, “Slaveni u Madžarskoj”, in I. Balassa, ed., *A magyarországi délszlávok néprajza*, vol. 2 (Budapest 1977), 7–36 (32).

suit priest writing from Belgrade in 1617 was disturbed because there were scarcely any priests to serve the scarcely literate Catholics in the region, who were being “infected” by Orthodox priests who spoke their language.²⁸ Further examination of church records shows what might seem to modern-day nationalists a disturbing conversion of some Orthodox Serbs (as well as Muslims and Protestants) to Catholicism.²⁹ The Orthodox who converted clearly did not stop being Serbs, but merely became Catholic ones, for at the time the concern was not with ethnicity but with faith, and there was (and theoretically still is) no contradiction between Catholicism and any ethnicity whatsoever. Leaving aside the delicate question of whether a Serb who today converts to Catholicism (or Buddhism) becomes a Croat (or Bunjevac, or just Buddhist), it is clear that the dividing line between various South Slav nationalities had not yet been set, and religion did not as yet serve as the definitive marker between Southern Slavs when the Bunjevci were first described.

Indeed, even with the growth of nationalist ideologies, the case was increasingly made for the unity of Southern Slavs. The great Serbian ethnographer Vuk Karadžić argued that all South Slavs were a single people, whether called Serbs, Bunjevci, Croats, or Yugoslavs.³⁰ Just as one could speak of Bunjevci as Catholic Serbs, so it was once possible to publish a patriotic book in Belgrade about *Famous Muslim Serbs*.³¹ When Bunjevci first entered Hungarian public discourse in the nineteenth century, the idea that they were Serbs who happened to be Catholic was unremarkable.

²⁸ See doc. in Mihály Balázs et al., eds., *Erdélyi és bodoltsági jezsuita missziók I/2, 1617–1625* (Szeged 1990), 285–297.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 411–413.

³⁰ See Karadžić's description in “Srbi svi i svuda” (1836), repr. in *Sabrana dela Vuka Karadžića* vol. 17. *Etnografski spisi* (Belgrade 1972), 31–48 (Bunjevci, 32).

³¹ Milenko M. Vukićević, *Znameniti Srbi Muslimani* (Belgrade 1906). Cf. J. Hadži-Vasiljević, “Muslimani naše krvi u Južnoj Srbiji”, *Bratvo* XIX (Belgrade 1925), 21–94; and *Natalija: Life in the Balkan powder keg*, ed. J. A. Irvine and C. S. Tilly, transl. J. Pavetić-Dickey (Budapest 2008), entry of 14 Jan. 1919 (St. Sava's Day), 366. This view was not isolated to believers in South Slav unity — see ref. to “Mohamedanische Serben” in Ferenc Fodor, *Osteuropäisches Jahrbuch 1922* (Budapest 1922), 131. On competing ideas, see Dominic J. Mandić, “The Croatian Character of the Medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in A. F. Bonifačić and C.S. Mihanovich, eds., *The Croatian Nation in its Struggle for Freedom and Independence* (Chicago 1955), 105–139; memoirs by Jakov Ignjatović, *Szerb rapszódia*, transl. Z. Csuka (Budapest 1973), 53–55, and 78–79; Ivo Banac, “The Confessional ‘Rule’ and the Dubrovnik Exception: The origins of the ‘Serb-Catholic’ circle in Nineteenth Century Dalmatia”, *Slavic Review* 42: 3 (Autumn 1983), 448–474, 450–451; and Dennison Rusinow, “The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia”, in D. Djokić, ed., *Yugoslavism: Histories of a failed idea 1918–1922* (London 2003), 11–26.

Views of the Bunjevci in Hungary to 1918

In addition to being the period when the Bunjevci's ethnic history was set in Hungary, the nineteenth century was when the image of Bunjevci was established by Hungarian ethnographers, some of Slavic origin. The first to mention Bunjevci did so in this rather muddled description: "Slavonians, separated into Bunjevci and Šokci, and who are all Roman Catholics."³² But the description of Bunjevci as Catholic Serbs was the most prevalent. Indeed, the idea that the Bunjevci were Catholic Serbs was so widespread in the Habsburg Monarchy, that even Czech encyclopaedias repeated it.³³

With the spread of nationalism, Hungarians became concerned about the potential threat the growth of Slavic identity and ideals of Slavic unity posed to the Hungarian state.³⁴ As if to mollify these fears, Bunjevac authors described their people in overwhelmingly flattering terms, and claimed that the Bunjevci were faithful to the Hungarian state. In 1842, the Hungarian public was introduced to the Bunjevci in an article series published by a Bunjevac author in the most important cultural journal of the time. This was a most thorough description of the Bunjevci and, in an age in which the immutability national character was taken seriously, it set the tone for all subsequent works. The article described the Bunjevci as a serious, handsome, patriotic and well-to-do people, who raised excellent horses.³⁵

In a famous discussion of the nationality question published in 1886, a Hungarian author declared that, unlike Orthodox Serbs, the Bunjevci were quick to assimilate to Hungarians, but added that their perfect mastery of Hungarian (for them a foreign language) did not mean that they would stop being Bunjevci.³⁶ This idea of the Bunjevci's willingness to assimilate to Hungarians also took deep root. Search as one might, there are virtually no negative mentions of Bunjevci in Hungarian works. Even neutral and seemingly scientific articles, such as those on folklore, repeated themes found earlier on the patriotism of the Bunjevci. A Hungarian geographical and ethnological lexicon from 1881 called Bunjevci: "Roman Catholic Serbs, who otherwise scarcely differ from their racial brethren ... they show much

³² János Csaplovics, *Etnographiai értekezés Magyar Országról* (1822, repr. Budapest 1990), 26.

³³ See *Ottův Slovník Naučný*, vol. IV (Prague 1891), s.v. Bunjevci.

³⁴ See István Gorove, *Nemzetiség* (Pest 1842), 86–87, and 92–97; Casimir Grafen Battyáni von Németh-Ujvás, etc., *Geschichte des Illyrismus oder des süd-slavischen Antagonismus gegen die Magyaren* (Leipzig 1849); and Jenő Szentkláray, *A társadalom nemzeti feladatai Délmagyarországon* (Temesvár 1897), 17; cf. a refutation, coupled with a call for tolerance and a mention of Illyrians, Lajos Mocsáry, *Nemzetiség* (Pest 1858), 191–204.

³⁵ Jenő Szárics, "A Bunyevácok", *Regélő Pesti Divatlap*, 2–13 Oct. 1842.

³⁶ Lajos Mocsáry, *Néhány szó a nemzeti kérdéstről* (Budapest 1886), 20–21.

more sympathy towards the Hungarian race than Rascians.”³⁷ In a later study of Christmas Bethlehem play customs amongst the Bunjevci of Baja, the author claimed the Bunjevci had become so assimilated to Hungarians that he could scarcely find anyone who could give him the text of the play in the original Bunjevac tongue.³⁸ But nowhere was the representation of Bunjevci more positive than in Hungarian encyclopaedias, regardless of the fact that some placed Bunjevci as a sub-category of Serbs. Some examples will suffice — the following, which calls the Bunjevci “Catholic Serbs,” is from an encyclopaedic description of Bács-Bodrog County in Southern Hungary, where many Bunjevci lived:

After Hungarians, the most handsome... are the Bunjevci...

The Bunjevci are happy to educate their children and take care that they learn Hungarian...

The Bunjevci are a beautiful people, a good people: they work hard, and like to work: and so they are wealthy, and well deserve their place amongst us [Hungarians]. They embrace Hungarians with brotherly love; they faithfully stick to the Hungarian state, and do not find its institutions to be foreign.³⁹

The claim that the Bunjevci were faithful to Hungary in the Revolution of 1848–49, as doubtless many were, is also frequently mentioned, and was made as early as 1871.⁴⁰ And the claim that Bunjevci supported Hungarian rebels during the Rákóczi Uprising (1703–1711) was made by a Bunjevac author writing in Hungarian as early as 1858.⁴¹ Both claims served Hungarian national propaganda, and the interests of Bunjevci who wished to avoid discrimination. And both claims, in as much as they are made about all Bunjevci, are ridiculous. Even some Hungarians supported the Habsburgs

³⁷ György Aladár, *Európa földrajzi és népismei leírása*, vol. 3 of *A föld és népei* (Budapest 1881), 429.

³⁸ Antal Kovács, “Karácsonyi népszokások Baján”, *Néprajzi Értesítő* 7 (1906), 47–55.

³⁹ István Frankl, “Bunyevácok”, in Gyula Dudás, ed., *Bács-Bodrogh vármegye egyetemes monográfiája* (Zombor 1896), 395–407; and the entry by a Bunjevac from Baja, Bálint Bellosics, “Bunyevácok”, in Samu Borovszky, ed., *Bács-Bodrog Vármegye* (Budapest 1909), 395–411. In support of Bunjevci fidelity in 1848, see docs. on Szabadka in István and László Magyar, eds., *Szabadka és vidéke 1848/49-ben (Levéltári dokumentumok)* (Subotica 1998).

⁴⁰ Mihály Horváth, *Magyarország függetlenségi harczának története 1848 és 1849-ben*, vol. 1 (n.p.: Ráth Mór, 1871), 138; Margit Balogh and Aladár György, *Magyarország* (Budapest 1905), 334; *Révai Nagy Lexikona* (Budapest 1912), s.v. Bunyevácok. Cf. Alba M. Kuntić, *Počeci borbe za prepород bačkih Bunjevaca: Jedan uspeh akcije kneza Mihaila i Ilije Garašanina za nacionalno oslobođenje i ujedinjenje* (Belgrade 1969).

⁴¹ Antunovics, “Magyar népelet”, 203–205.

in both the Rákóczi and 1848 struggles — indeed Rákóczi fought his first battle against a band of Hungarian nobles.

The lack of contradictory sources describing Bunjevci support for the Habsburgs against Hungarians is most striking when compared with the treatment given by Hungarian histories to Serbs and Croats. No less a figure than Iványi describes the Serbs who entered Hungary on the tail of Turkish conquest in overwhelmingly negative terms. He said that this “wild” people committed the most beastly criminal acts against Hungarians.⁴² This theme was repeated in the period running up to and during the First World War, notably in a work on the Ottoman period calling Serbs the premier henchmen of the Turks in Hungary.⁴³ A Hungarian history translated into English for the edification of the British called the Serbs “the most dangerous adversary of the Hungarians,” while claiming that the Bunjevci “were and still are alienated from their Servian kinsmen by religious differences... the Catholic Church succeeded in winning them over to the side of the Hungarians.”⁴⁴ Similarly, most histories of the Rákóczi insurrection and the revolution of 1848–49 mention atrocities committed by Serbs, and Croatian perfidy, but neglect the Bunjevci altogether.

It should be stressed that many Hungarian historians describe not only Serbian barbarity, but Hungarian atrocities committed against Serbs during the Rákóczi uprising and in 1848–49. Thus a patriotic history of the Rákóczi uprising written in 1868, which describes Serbs committing terrible atrocities against Hungarians, mentions the brutal slaughter of Serbs by Prince Rákóczi’s troops.⁴⁵ For 1848, an example of the admission of Hungarian crimes in standard histories is provided by the diaries of a Hungarian officer, Count Leiningen-Westerburg, who witnessed the slaughter of the “Rascians of Becse” and was disgusted by the “cruelty and rapaciousness” of his own troops who killed Serbs, despite his attempts to stop them.⁴⁶ As a result of the brutality of both sides, the count wrote that the region had been reduced to “a mere wilderness” in what was “a real war of extermination.”⁴⁷ In addition to balanced discussions of Hungarian atrocities, there is widespread acknowl-

⁴² Iványi, *Szabadka*, vol. I, 3–4; and id., “A tiszai határőrvidék”, 337–338.

⁴³ Sándor Takáts, *Rajzok a török világból*, 3 vols. (Budapest 1915), vol. I, 319.

⁴⁴ Henry Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge 1910), 210 and 225.

⁴⁵ Hornyik, “A rácok ellenforradalma”.

⁴⁶ Letters of 22 Oct. 1848 and 22 Feb. 1849, *The Letters and Journal of Count Charles Leiningen-Westerberg*, ed. H. Marczali (London 1911), 92–96 and 137–144 (141).

⁴⁷ Ibid., 95; also descriptions of hatred between Serbs and Hungarians (amongst whom, General Damjanich), letters from Czibakháza of 23, 24, and 25 Feb. 1848, *ibid.*, 144–151. This is seconded by a traveller who visited the region a year after the fighting had ended: Anon. [S. Kapper], *Südslavische Wanderungen im Sommer 1850*, 2 vols. (Leipzig

edgement that some Hungarians stood on the Habsburgs' side, and there are descriptions of Serbs who fought on the Hungarian side in 1848–49.⁴⁸ Indeed, there is a street named in Budapest after the greatest of them all, General Damjanich, executed by Austrian military authorities in 1849.⁴⁹

Thus, even amongst heroic Hungarian histories, the view is not advanced that Serbs fought only on one side, against Hungarians. Yet even today, no such nuanced histories have been written in Hungarian about Bunjevci. Instead, Bunjevci who struggled against Hungary disappear altogether amongst Croats or Serbs. It beggars belief that during the Rákóczi rebellion the Bunjevci, who had not long before entered Hungary and enjoyed the protection of the crown against rapacious Hungarian lords, would have taken the side of the rebels. Yet there is scarcely mention of the Bunjevci in Hungarian historical accounts, just accounts of struggles between Hungarians and Rascians, whom later historians have assumed to be Orthodox Serbs. For example, in a description of the destruction of Baja by Rákóczi's forces in which some 12,000 cattle were taken, there is no mention of Bunjevci, although the town was largely populated by them.⁵⁰ In 1848 surely some Bunjevci joined Croatian and Serbian forces backing the Emperor against the Hungarian rebels, in a foretaste of later South Slav unity.⁵¹ When Bunjevci are recorded, they are described as faithful to

1851), summarized as “Rambles in Southern Sclavonia”, *Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine*, Mar. 1853, 311–328.

⁴⁸ On Serbs who served in the Hungarian forces, see Gábor Bona, “Szerb katonák az 1848–1849-es honvédseregben”, in id., ed., *Szerbek és magyarok a Duna mentén 1848–1849-ben: Tanulmányok a szerb–magyar kapcsolatok köréből* (Budapest 1983), 153–165; and for a vignette, see Károly Eötvös, *A nagy év apró emlékei* (1905, repr. Veszprém 2009), 222–223. In detail, on the fighting between Serbs and Hungarians, see Ö. Olchváry, *A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken* (Budapest 1901).

⁴⁹ The following, heroic biography, gives a fairly standard description of Damjanich's fidelity to Hungary, and strong Serbian identity: Emil Gaudernak, *Damjanich János tábornok élete története* (Budapest 1931).

⁵⁰ Hornyik, “A rácok ellenforradalma”, 547–558. An exception to this general rule, which mentions attacks on Bunjevci by Rákóczi's forces is Ferencz Badics, “A Bácska”, in *Magyarország, Az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia írásban és képen*, 20 vols. (Budapest 1888), vol. 1, 573–618 (585 and 594–598).

⁵¹ The Bunjevci were directly asked to join the Serbs. See the address “To the Slavs of the Roman Catholic Church in Bačka, Banat, Srem and Baranja who are of one tongue with the Serbs”, 10 May 1848, in Radoslav Perović, ed., *Gradja za istoriju srpskog pokreta u Vojvodini 1848–1849*, ser. 1, vol. 1, March–June 1848 (Belgrade 1952), 311–312. On Slav unity against Hungary in 1848, see the letter from the govt. of Hungary to László Szaray in Frankfurt, 24 May 1848, in Ștefan Pascu, ed., *Documente privind revoluția de la 1848 în țările române. C. Transilvania*, vol. 4, 14–25 May 1848 (Bucharest 1988), 461–462. Cf. József Thim, *A magyarországi 1848–49-iki szerbfölkelés története*, 3 vols.

Hungary. "Oh, God, just give my homeland many such good friends as the Bunjevci" declaims a character in a pseudo-biography from 1938.⁵²

It is easy to demonstrate that those who have claimed Bunjevci allegiance to the Hungarian state have ignored contradictory evidence. Hungary had its share of troubles with Bunjevci, for instance in the village Bikity, in March 1862, where "exclusively the poorer Bunjevci people... took part" in an assault on state representatives, and eventually the military had to be called out to suppress them.⁵³ As time passed, and the direction that the modern Hungarian state was taking (after 1867) became clear, prominent Bunjevci can be found who complained about Hungarian domination. In 1878 a town councillor from Szabadka wrote bitterly about changes in the education law which denied children education in "the Bunjevac language." He warned that Hungarians who assumed Bunjevci were assimilating because they spoke Hungarian in public were unaware that when no Hungarians were about, Bunjevci reverted to their native South Slav tongue.⁵⁴ Another Bunjevac, who wrote anonymously under the name X.Y., said Bunjevci were clubbing together because of Hungarian chauvinism. X.Y. also took the position that the South Slav peoples were all one people, whether called "Serbs, Bunjevci, Šokci, Dalmatians, Illyrians, or Bosnians." In addition to denouncing Hungarian attempts to assimilate the Bunjevci, X.Y. railed against Bunjevci who afraid to stand up for their own people. "Many", X.Y. complained,

don't even like to talk about this, or say there is no Bunjevac question, while others would like to solve the problem but are embarrassed to study the Bunjevac tongue or deal with the Bunjevci's family issues and other affairs, and would rather study French, English, Turkish, Chinese, Gypsy, etc. languages than the South Slav one.⁵⁵

(1930–1940), vol. I, 56, 131; vol. II, 194–196, and 506–509. For a background on ideals of South Slav unity, see Dimitrije Djordjevic, "The idea of Yugoslav unity in the nineteenth century", in id., ed., *The creation of Yugoslavia, 1914–1918* (Santa Barbara, CA 1980), 1–17; Gabor P. Vermes, "South Slav Aspirations and Magyar Nationalism in the Dual Monarchy", in I. Banac, J. G. Ackerman, and R. Szporluk, eds., *Nation and Ideology: Essays in honor of Wayne S. Vucinich* (Boulder, CO 1981), 177–200; and Ana S. Trbovich, "Nation-building under the Austro-Hungarian Sceptre: Croato-Serb antagonism and cooperation", *Balcanica XXXVII/2006* (Belgrade 2007), 195–222.

⁵² Dezsőné Kosztolányi, *Kosztolányi Dezső* (Budapest 1938), 80.

⁵³ See letters from Almás and Baja of 5 and 9 Mar. 1862 in Nikola Petrović, ed., *Svetozar Miletić i Narodna stranka, gradnja 1860–1885*, vol. I, 1860–1869 (Sremski Karlovci 1968), 165–169.

⁵⁴ Lázár Mamusich, *A „Bácskai Híradó” és a Bunjevac elemi tanúgy* (Szabadka 1876).

⁵⁵ X.Y., *Bunjevac kérdés és az 1868–iki XXXVIII. és XLIV. törvénycikkek végrehajtása* (Szabadka 1896), 5.

This anonymous Bunjevac author also said that whenever anyone called for education in the Bunjevac language, they were called “pan-Slavic traitors” to Hungary.⁵⁶ That was no exaggeration. State control of the Bunjevci was indeed tight, and the Interior Minister was kept informed about the “pan-Slav” agitation amongst the Bunjevci. In 1902 the minister was informed by the county sheriff about developments in the “Bunjevac movement” in Szabadka and Baja. The sheriff suggested the minister ask the Bishop of Kalocsa to remove a religious instructor named Kuluncsich from the town, as he had been guilty of agitating for the teaching of the Bunjevac tongue in schools, and publishing dangerous articles in the journal *Neven*.⁵⁷

Far-fetched as this may seem today, the demand expressed repeatedly over decades for more education in “the Bunjevac language” was neither ridiculous nor impossible, for there were Bunjevci teachers who were up to the job.⁵⁸ The argument was that just as Serbs write according to their speech and Croats according to theirs, so the Bunjevci should maintain their own. At the time the Bunjevci had a calendar, and number of journals published in their dialect. In addition to *Neven*, they could read *Bunjevac*, the *Bunjevačke i šokačke novine*, and the *Bunjevačka i šokačka vila* in their own dialect. These last two were established by Bishop Antunovich of Kalocsa, a Bunjevac who had been born near Baja. In 1882, just six years before his death, Antunovich published a programme for the Bunjevci to resist assimilation and maintain a separate and unique identity amongst other South Slavs.⁵⁹ Antunovich was subsequently described as the founder of Bunjevac

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁷ Letter of 6 Sept. 1902 in Gábor G. Kemény, ed., *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában*, 7 vols. (Budapest 1952–1999), vol. III, 527–528. On education in the region, see György Dudás, *Az oktatásügy története Bács-Bodrog vármegyében* (Zenta 1903).

⁵⁸ On the struggle for education for Bunjevci in Hungary, see Mijo Mandić, *Borba Bunjevaca za svoj jezik u osnovnim školama* (Belgrade 1938). There was a long tradition in the Monarchy of writing in local dialects. See the imperial addresses to the peasantry and socrage documents collected during Empress Maria Theresa’s reign, drafted in the local dialects, some of which have been identified as Bunjevac, in István Udvari, ed., *A Mária Terézia-féle úrbérrendezés forrásai magyarországi délszláv népek nyelvén*, 2 vols. (Nyíregyháza 2003), esp. vol. II, *Bács vármegyei szerb és bunjevac jobbágyok úrbéri bevallásai*.

⁵⁹ Antunović, *Razprava o podunavskih i potisanskih Bunjevcih i Šokcih u pogledu narodnom, vjerskom, umnom, građanskom i gospodarskom* (Vienna 1882); and the critical review by The Editor (Iván Bátori), “Razprava”, *Bunjevac*, Zombor, 18 Aug. 1882. On Antunovich, see the biography, with Antunovich’s personal correspondence: Matija Evetović, *Život i rad Biskupa Ivana Antunovića narodnog preporoditelja* (Subotica 1935).

literature by a Hungarian encyclopaedia.⁶⁰ The culmination of Antunovich's efforts came after his death. In 1894 a *Hungarian-Bunjevác (Croat-Serb) Dictionary* was published, implicitly claiming a common Serbo-Croat language of which Bunjevác was a dialect.⁶¹

Despite the authorities' attention, *Neven* kept publishing criticism of the Hungarian government. Within a year the author of an article on "the nationalities question in parliament" had been sentenced to six months in prison and fined 200 crowns for denigrating the Hungarian nation and agitating against officials.⁶² To resist such abuses, some Bunjevci joined forces with other South Slavs in organizations such as the Serbian-Bunjevci Agitation Committee of the Social Democratic Party, which also raised the suspicion of authorities ever fearful of pan-Slavic activities.⁶³ Precisely because of the pressure put on them, a Hungarian social democratic paper warned in 1913 that the country's South Slavs were turning towards Serbia.⁶⁴

With the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, and rising fears of South Slav unity, leaders amongst the Bunjevci were placed under police surveillance, as were other South Slav leaders in the Habsburg Monarchy. But none were treated more severely than the Orthodox Serbs, particularly following the joyful reception some local Serbs gave to Serbian troops who entered the Monarchy after the failure of the Austro-Hungarian attack of 1914.⁶⁵

In the period just before, during, and immediately after the First World War the Bunjevci were more fully integrated into the ideology of South-Slav unity. What had been unremarkable in the past came to be unacceptable. Croats, such as the Croatian politician Stjepan Radić, had al-

⁶⁰ *Révai Nagy Lexikona*, vol. IV (Budapest 1912), s.v. Bunyevácok.

⁶¹ Ambrus Sárcevic, *Magyar-bunyevác (horvát-szerb) szótár* (Szabadka 1894).

⁶² Letter of 3 July 1903, *ibid.* 528–529.

⁶³ See docs. in Kemény, ed., *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez*, vol. VI, pp. I, 174, 393–395.

⁶⁴ György I. Kalmár, *Szociáldemokrácia, nemzeti és nemzetiségi kérdés Magyarországon (1900–1914)* (Budapest 1976), 194–195.

⁶⁵ For Hungarian govt. reactions, see docs. in Kemény, ed., *Iratok*, vol. VII, 1914–1916 (Budapest 1999), 48–70; and in *Count Stephen Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary: Letters (1914–1918)*, ed. and transl. C. de Bussy (New York 1991), 8–9, 50–51, and 168–174. On abuse of Serbs and other S. Slavs (incl. Bunjevci) during the war, see Andrej Mitrović, *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918* (London 2007), 63–68; cf. Jonathan E. Gumz, *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918* (Cambridge 2009), *passim*; Henry Baerlein, *The Birth of Yugoslavia*, 2 vols. (London 1922), vol. I, 248ff; and a Hungarian account of one of the massacres, Ferenc Pollmann, "A szerbekkel szembeni osztrák-magyar atrocitások az első világháború kezdetén. Sabác, 1914. augusztus 17.", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 122: 3 (Sept. 2009), 715–730.

ways declared Bunjevci were Croats.⁶⁶ But this separateness, and conflicting views on who the Bunjevci were, came to be seen as irrelevant towards the end of the Great War, as stress was laid on the unity which would lead to a unified South Slav state.⁶⁷ The Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijić objected to Hungarian representations of the Bunjevci and other South Slavs, particularly in census data, declaring:

Foreign ethnographers, unaware that the Bunjevci, Šokci, Dalmatians or Illyrians in official statistics are Serbo-Croats, unaware of the lack of veracity and the distortion of Hungarian statistics, have composed yet more variegated maps on which the great mass of Serbo-Croats has not been taken into consideration, particularly in northern Bačka and Baranja.⁶⁸

That this was the official South Slav line is indicated by the fact that a prominent Croatian Yugoslavist, Ante Trumbić, had used almost identical words in a letter to the Foreign Office in London, in which he put the number of Bunjevci in Hungary at roughly 70,000.⁶⁹

At the end of the First World War, some representatives of the Bunjevci declared their desire to join Serbia in the new South Slav Kingdom. Most of the lands inhabited by Bunjevci were separated from Hungary and

⁶⁶ Stjepan Radić, *Moderna kolonizacija i Slaveni* (Zagreb 1904), 228; and see the Hungarian notice of the Croatian use of “Croats of Bacska” as a definition of Bunjevci in “Horváth földrajz a nép számára”, *Földrajzi Közlemények* 18: 2 (1890), 71–80 (79). Cf. Đorđe Popović-Daničar, *Bački Bunjevci i Šokci* (Belgrade 1907).

⁶⁷ The idea of South Slav unity was repeated before and during the war by scholars in England, some of whom mentioned Bunjevci, such as B.C. Wallis, “The Slavs of Southern Hungary”, *Geographical Review* 6: 4 (Oct. 1918), 341–353 – Wallis called Bunjevci “Roman Catholic Serbs”, 341; R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London 1911), *passim*; and id. “The Problem of Revision and the Slav World”, *The Slavonic and East European Review* 12: 34 (July 1933), 24–35 (27). Seton-Watson called Bunjevci Croats, q.v. his “Memorandum”, May 1930, in *R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence 1906–1941*, 2 vols. (London 1976), vol. II, 193–200 (198); cf. Baerlein, *Birth of Yugoslavia*, vol. I, 90–93, placing Bunjevci closer to Serbs.

⁶⁸ Jovan Cvijić, “La frontière septentrionale des Jugoslaves” (Paris 1919), repr. es “Severna granica južnih Slovena”, in vol. 3 of his collected works, *Govori i članci*, ed. R. Lukić et al. (Belgrade 1991), 315–27 (324). This view was taken up by Baerlein, *Birth of Yugoslavia*, vol. I, 90 and 92.

⁶⁹ Report from Trumbić to Rbt. Cecil, FO, 18 Oct. 1918, in Anita L. P. Burdett, ed., *The Historical Boundaries between Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia: Documents and maps, 1815–1945*, 2 vols. (London 1995), vol. I, 503–517. For a nuanced view of various Croatian positions, see George Grlica, “Trumbić’s Policy and Croatian National Interests from 1914 to the Beginning of 1918”, *Journal of Croatian Studies* 14–15 (1973–74), 74–112.

given to the nascent Yugoslavia.⁷⁰ But the establishment of the new state and the victory of the ideology of South Slav unity did not end the debate in Yugoslavia. In broad terms, Croat scholars claimed that Bunjevci were Croatian, whereas Serbian sources tended to plump for the Yugoslav, or the Catholic Serbian description. Bunjevci themselves could and did choose between three, the Yugoslav, the Croat, or the Catholic Serbian identity.⁷¹

Hungarian views of the Bunjevci in the inter-war period

For the Bunjevci left in Hungary, things were quite different. Hungarians' nightmares of Slavic unity had become reality. Parts of Southern Hungary were occupied by the Serbian Army, and a swathe of Hungary was awarded to the nascent South Slav Kingdom. The reasoning for the dismemberment of old Hungary in the Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920) was national self-determination underpinned by a conviction on the part of the peace makers in Paris that in the past Hungary had abused its minorities.

In 1919, as it became clear that the future peace treaty would append two-thirds of Hungarian territory to neighbouring states, the Hungarian public expressed outrage and denial. In some cases, there were serious doubts that minorities truly wanted to leave the Hungarian motherland.⁷² A story, widely reported in the press that year, claimed that Bunjevci wanted

⁷⁰ See docs. in Drago Njegovan, ed., *Prisajedinjenje Srema, Banata, Bačke i Baranje Srbiji 1918. Dokumenti i prilozii*, 2nd rev. ed. (Novi Sad 2001), 20, 33–34, 39–41; Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević, eds., *Jugoslavija 1918–1988. Tematska zbirka dokumenata*, 2nd rev. ed. (Belgrade 1988), 127; and Ferdo Šišić, ed., *Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914.–1919.* (Zagreb 1920), 168. Cf. Jovan Grčić, “Bunjevci i Srpsko Novosadsko Narodno Pozorište”, *Književni sever* (1927), 141–145; Veco Dulić, “Učešće Bunjevaca u prisajedinjenju Vojvodine Srbiji”, *Književni sever* 5: 2 (1 Feb. 1929), 73–74; Toma Milenković, “Adalékok a Szerb-Bunyevec Agitációs Bizottságnak a nemzeti kérdésre vonatkozó álláspontjához (1918 közepétől 1919. április 13-ig)”, in S. Gábor and F. Mucsi, eds., *A magyarországi tanácsköztársaság 50. évfordulója* (Budapest 1970), 144–165; László Kővágó, *A magyarországi délszlávok, 1918–1919* (Budapest 1964), 72–98; Károly Orcsik, “Federáció vagy központosítás: választás előtt a születő délszláv állam”, *Magyarországi Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok* 20: 1–2 (2008), 123–130 (128); and Miklós Miskolczi, “Szabadkából Subotica – egy különleges megszállás története”, *Népszava*, 10–11 Nov. 2007.

⁷¹ Examples of work done in Yugoslavia at the time on Bunjevci, are Rudolf Horvat, *Hrvati u Bačkoj* (Osijek 1922); Alba M. Kuntić, *Bunjevac – Bunjevcima i o Bunjevcima* (Subotica 1930); Milivoje V. Knežević, ed., *O Bunjevcima* (Subotica 1930); Jovan Erdeljeanović, *O poreklu Bunjevaca* (Belgrade 1930); Petar Pekić, *Povijest Hrvata u Vojvodini od najstarijih vremena do 1929. godine* (Zagreb 1930).

⁷² In addition to trusting in Bunjevci, many Hungarians doubted that Slovaks and Ruthenes had any real demand to leave Hungary.

to remain in Hungary. An ultra-patriotic author confusedly wrote in her diary “The Bunjevats swear to stick to their fatherland and so do the Catholic Serbians.”⁷³ Yet the fledgling South Slav state was granted lands home to a majority of Bunjevci, including the town of Szabadka, now Subotica.

After the First World War Hungarian governments were sensitive to criticism of the state’s treatment of national minorities, who had declined from 45.5 percent of the population in pre-WWI Hungary, to 7.9 percent in rump Hungary in 1930. Authorities continued to be suspicious of minorities especially those whose kin states had received formerly Hungarian lands. Moreover, Hungarian authorities made the case that pan-Slavism posed a threat to European peace.⁷⁴ South Slavs were suspect on both counts. As if in reaction to such fears, claims were again made about the faithfulness of the Bunjevci to Hungary. One book described the Bunjevci of Baja, which remained in rump Hungary, as resisting Serbian seduction and remaining true to their Hungarian homeland. In this account, only a few bad apples, the worst of Baja’s society, were attracted to South Slav agitators.⁷⁵

To counter foreign criticism, Hungarian laws regarding minorities, particularly educational regulations, were liberalized. In practice, however, the policy remained one of assimilation or expulsion.⁷⁶ Educational policies were specifically geared to this end. So, the educational regulations of 1923 introduced three types of school for communities where at least forty children belonging to a national minority lived, and where parents asked for education in the minority language. In this case, in theory, parents were free to choose one of three type of schools: Type A, with education in the minority tongue, except for the lesson on Hungarian; Type B, with education in the hard sciences in the minority language, and in the humanities and arithmetic in Hungarian; and Type C, where all lessons were in Hungarian, except for the lesson on the minority language. In practice, the ministry often ignored parents’ requests, and when they responded they

⁷³ Cecile Tormay, *An Outlaw’s Diary* (Hungarian 1920; English 1923; and Hawthorne, CA 1968), 171; one such report, “A bunyevácok a magyarok mellett”, *Számos* (Szatmár-Németi), 5 Mar. 1919, p. 1.

⁷⁴ E.g. László Ruttkay, “Panslavism and Hungary”, *The Hungarian Quarterly* 2: 2 (Winter, 1936/37), 241–248; and Horthy’s memorandum to Hitler, Aug. 1936, in *The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy*, eds. M. Szinai and L. Szűcs (Budapest 1965), 83–90.

⁷⁵ Lehel Knézy, *Baja a forradalom és a szerb megszállás alatt* (Baja 1940; repr. 2009).

⁷⁶ See G. C. Paikert, “Hungary’s National Minority Policies, 1920–1945”, *American Slavic and East European Review* 12: 2 (Apr. 1953), 201–218; Loránt Tilkovszky, *Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon a 20. században* (Budapest 1998), 43–54; and on Hungarianization of names, Mihály Kőhegyi and Zsuzsa Merk, “Szláv nevek magyarosítása Baján (1895–1945)”, in Á. Fejér et al., eds., *Magyarok és szlávok* (Szeged 1993), 363–376.

overwhelmingly provided type C schools — so that some 90 percent of the schools attended by Slovaks, South Slavs and Romanians in Hungary were of type C.⁷⁷ Such discrimination was used in the early 1920s by Yugoslav state agents, who encouraged South Slav communities in Hungary to move to the new Yugoslav state.⁷⁸

In 1924, to assess the situation amongst the South Slav minorities, the Hungarian Prime Minister's office delegated an official named József Margittai to visit South Slav communities throughout the country. Margittai's first trip was to three towns near Budapest, Érd, Százhalombatta, and Ercsi, where he planned to assess conditions amongst the Serbs and Bunjevci to see how widespread the demand to emigrate to Yugoslavia was.⁷⁹ As it turns out, Margittai meant to see what could be done to save the Bunjevci of Érd and Ercsi for Hungary. By contrast, he visited the Serbian community of Százhalombatta, which he regarded as the source of agitation, to see how many Serbs were leaving, and how much land would come available for trustworthy ethnic Hungarian farmers from the lost lands who had chosen not to live in Yugoslavia.

In Érd, Margittai found that the Bunjevci (whom he also referred to as Illyrians) called themselves Serbs, spoke the Bunjevac dialect, and made up 28 percent of the town's population (45% were Hungarians, 27% German). Margittai found that only two families had opted to move to Yugoslavia, and amongst the remaining Bunjevci South Slav agitation was practically non-existent. Church services were held every second week in Bunjevac, and Margittai advised that the "Illyrians" ought to be placated with religious education in their own language, but (perversely) suggested authorities should wait to introduce this education until the Bunjevci's irritation with the new cantor, who spoke only Hungarian, subsided; for they had had the temerity to approach the Bishop in Székesfehérvár with a request for a new cantor merely because the Hungarian one mispronounced Bunjevac words and sounded silly. Furthermore, suggested Margittai, while the school was currently only in Hungarian, classes in "Illyrian writing" and religion might be offered in the Bunjevac tongue (i.e. Type C schooling) without harm, for the Bunjevci of Érd showed a willingness to become

⁷⁷ Tilkovszky, *Nemzetiségi politika*, 46.

⁷⁸ On this agitation, see the memoirs of Milan Glibonjski, *Pécs szerb megszállása egy szerb újságíró szemével: Milan Glibonjski visszaemlékezései*, ed. and transl. Á. Hornyák (Pécs 2006).

⁷⁹ Margittai's report of 25 July 1924 and Ministry's decision to delegate him of 29 July, in Hungarian National Archives (OL), Prime Minister's papers (ME), K 28 96cs. 157t., Kisebbség-délszláv iratok 1925–1944.

Hungarian, as witnessed by the high percentage of marriages between them and Hungarians.⁸⁰

In Ercsi, there were just 704 Bunjevci out of the village's total population of 8,477. Here the Bunjevci clearly wanted education in their own tongue; 41 of them had sent a petition to the Minister of Education saying as much. Moreover, there was some tension with Hungarian Catholics, who always took second place behind the Bunjevci in religious processions, and who had to suffer through religious services in Bunjevac. In Ercsi, Margittai found, there was agitation to move to Yugoslavia. Some eight Bunjevci farmers had actually converted to Orthodoxy and moved, but "most of them were disappointed and returned."⁸¹ Elsewhere, Margittai found that a "respectable" Bunjevac farmer had threatened to break his son's neck if he dared to marry a Hungarian girl. But in Margittai's judgement, the Bunjevci were well on their way to assimilation to the Hungarians, and so granting them a few hours of education in their own language could not hurt, for they would become Hungarian in any case; conversely, if their wishes were denied they might resist assimilation.⁸²

Everywhere Margittai and his successors went, they found the Bunjevci faithful to Hungary, and well on the way to assimilating to the Hungarian nation. Margittai's optimism might have been undermined by certain findings; but when it came to the Bunjevci his negative comments were always leavened by some positive note. He admitted of Felsőszentiván, a village that had been in the Serbian zone of occupation after the war, that "no intention to emigrate to Yugoslavia can be observed amongst the Bunjevci, though they did not behave the best during the occupation."⁸³ Even Margittai must have been discouraged when some Bunjevci from Tököl sent a threatening letter to Prime Minister Bethlen after the Bunjevci there were denied education in their language. Also discouraging were reports of agitation, and a petition for Bunjevci education, coming from Dusnok, in the south, where some 2,648 of the village's 3,172 inhabitants spoke the Bunjevac language, but where education had been solely in Hungarian for the past 38 years. Margittai quickly ascertained that the people of the village were faithful to Hungary. Those who had signed the petition were denounced as unpatriotic by others in the town council meeting. Margittai concluded: "The Bunjevac-speaking inhabitants of the community are honourable, upstanding, patriotic people, who would never have taken it into their minds to mention a change in the language of education if they

⁸⁰ Report of 13 Dec. 1924, *ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.* pp. 17–24.

⁸² Report of 17 Jan. 1925, *ibid.* pp. 27, 28.

⁸³ Report on visit to Baranya, Oct. 1929, *ibid.*

had not been agitated.” For Dusnok, Margittai concluded, three masses a month, and sermons in the language were sufficient.⁸⁴ In Tököl, the Ministry of Education told the Prime Minister, agitation had come from “external influences.”⁸⁵

Though Margittai found all to be well, articles in journals from Yugoslavia at the time (specifically from Croatia and Serbia) mention Hungarian state abuse of Bunjevci, notably in Katymár and Bácsbodrog. Hungarian authorities in Budapest asked for evidence to refute these Yugoslav claims. Not surprisingly, when the very local authorities who were accused of committing these abuses were asked to investigate, they declared these reports baseless.⁸⁶

The treatment of Bunjevci by Margittai seems remarkable when compared with his treatment of other minorities. Hungary’s miniscule Croatian minority was discussed by Margittai, but entirely separately from the Bunjevci. While the Bunjevci were to be kept at all costs, the emphasis with Croats was whether they were willing to assimilate, or whether they wished to move to Yugoslavia — and either solution was fine.⁸⁷ As to Serbs, the question was not if, but how soon they would leave the country. The Prime Minister himself expressly instructed the Interior Ministry not to stop the Serbs of Beremend from leaving Hungary.⁸⁸ By contrast, Bunjevci who had opted for Yugoslavia, but were dissatisfied with conditions there, were allowed to return to Hungary. Yet the Prime Minister’s office advised a police captain that Serbs who had left Hungary should not be allowed to return, but should be discreetly stopped through a thorough application of the rules regulating the settlement of foreigners in Hungary.⁸⁹

Elsewhere in Hungary, there continued to be confusion in the public about the Bunjevci’s identity. Like Margittai, other Hungarian experts contrasted the Bunjevci with Serbs, and declared that the Bunjevci had always been faithful to the Hungarian state. Most encyclopaedias maintained the claim that the Bunjevci were Catholic Serbs. But some claimed that the Bunjevci were not Slavs at all, but were the original denizens of the Balkans (Illyrians in the original sense) who had been Slavicized in language — but

⁸⁴ Report of 27 Nov. 1924, doc. no. K28-1926-157-2799, *ibid.*

⁸⁵ Letter of 23 May 1925, *ibid.*

⁸⁶ Reports in *Ozbor* on 15 Sept. 1927, and *Dnevník* on 24 Feb. 1930, *ibid.*

⁸⁷ Margittai’s report of 20 Sept. 1929, *ibid.*

⁸⁸ Letter of 5 Nov. 1927, *ibid.* Also see report of 4 Nov. 1930 in Imre Ódor, ed., *Nemzetiségi ügyek dokumentumai Baranyában 1923–1938* (Pécs 2001), 14.

⁸⁹ Letter from the PM’s office to a police captain, signed Diószeghy, Dec. 1924, OL ME K 28 96cs. 157t., Kisebbség-délszláv iratok 1925–1944; and OL ME K28 96cs. 157t. doc. of 6 Oct. 1930.

not race — by Croats and Serbs over time, and so could most easily be turned into Hungarians.⁹⁰ And as war came, some Hungarian sources began to describe the Bunjevci as a sub-group of Croats. All of these descriptions, however, shared the view that the Bunjevci might easily be absorbed into the body of the Hungarian nation.⁹¹ It should be stressed again that the Bunjevci were clearly recognized by the Hungarian state as a separate South Slav minority prior to the Second World War.

While we do not have time to take a long view now at representations of the Bunjevci across the border in Yugoslavia, a few words are in order. Debate was carried on in numerous studies about the true ethnicity of the Bunjevci (Croat, Serb, or just Yugoslav). Suggestively, Croatian ethnic parties did garner some Bunjevci votes.⁹² Yet this people living on formerly Hungarian lands who had been categorized as Catholic Serbs in the past, seemed most ideally fit for an overarching Yugoslav identity. Some studies published in Yugoslavia did break new ground in the on-going debate on the Bunjevci. But it was also at this time that the first Yugoslav lexicon, *The Serbo-Croato-Slovene National Encyclopaedia*, gave an entry on the Bunjevci that was, word for word, a copy of a Hungarian encyclopaedia entry from 1912, down to the point of mentioning that the Bunjevci had always been loyal to Hungarians.⁹³

⁹⁰ Jenő Mezernich, *Bunjevácok (Tanulmány)* (Budapest 1938), 12; Unyi, *Sokácok-bunjevácok*, 14. This bizarre idea, which appeared first in a Franciscan work in 1798 (cit. Unyi), goes against the most basic knowledge of human nature by assuming these people never genetically mixed with Slavs, or that Slavs in the Balkans were racially pure, or that some original essential genetic nature can be found for human groups. Another version assigns Vlach origins to Bunjevci: Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, history, politics* (Ithaca, NY 1984), 53. Banac gives no sources for this claim, and no explanation whatever.

⁹¹ That the Bunjevci were listed in the past in Hungarian censuses is openly acknowledged in the Hungarian Academy's report advising Parliament that the Bunjevci are Croats. See Dobos and Tóth, "A magyarországi bunjevácokról".

⁹² Banac, *National Question*, 349; Mark Biondich, "The Historical Legacy: The evolution of interwar Yugoslav politics, 1918–1941", in L. J. Cohen and J. Dragović-Soso, eds., *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New perspectives on Yugoslavia's disintegration* (West Lafayette, IA 2008), 43–54; and election data for 28 Nov. 1920 in Petranović and Zečević, eds., *Jugoslavija 1918–1988*, 158. It is dubious to assume newspapers reflect public opinion, but worth recording that Bunjevci press positions to Croatia did follow regime changes. See Krešimir Bušić, "Odjeci uspostave Banovine Hrvatske u hrvatsko-bunjevačkoj javnosti", *Društvena istraživanja* 4–5 (2005), 719–741.

⁹³ *Narodna enciklopedija srpsko-hrvatsko-slovenačka*, vol. I (Zagreb 1925), s.v. Bunjevci. The original text, in Hungarian, is in *Révai Nagy Lexikona* (1912).

The benefit of being Bunjevci

The verbatim repetition of Bunjevci fidelity to the Hungarian state by the Yugoslav encyclopaedia should not be seen as simple plagiarism. Instead, it represents the essence of the wedding of enlightenment confidence in the immutability of social and historical facts with belief in the eternal nature and unity of ethnic (or racial) character. The Yugoslav encyclopaedia repeated the facts, because they had been established by Hungarian encyclopaedists. One of those facts was that the Bunjevci were faithful to the Hungarian state ideal. Unlike Croats or Serbs, Bunjevci who struggled against Hungarian domination were aberrations to the rule that Bunjevci character was predominately and eternally pro-Hungarian. Because it was pro-Hungarian, the Bunjevci were susceptible to assimilation to the Hungarian majority (in this, the narrative of Yugoslav and Hungarian encyclopaedias agree).

From the Hungarian point of view, the Bunjevci served as proof of the decency of Hungary's treatment of patriotic minorities (those deserving to be called Hungarian), and demonstrated the injustice of accusations that the Hungarian state abused minorities prior to the First World War. The positive image of a minority satisfied with and faithful to the Hungarian state is maintained regardless of any circumstantial evidence to the contrary arising from the behaviour of individual Bunjevci, precisely because this positive stereotype served to confirm Hungarian decency and uphold a positive national self-image. In this view, there may have been a few bad apples amongst the Bunjevci (as there are amongst Hungarians), but the majority were solidly pro-Hungarian. Contrariwise, pro-Hungarian sentiments expressed over time by individual Serbs were seen as an aberration to the rule of the Serbians' perfidy, and their anti-Hungarian sentiments.⁹⁴

But it is important here not to lose sight of the implications for Bunjevci living inside and out of Hungary. Those in Yugoslavia had the benefit, not shared by Hungarians and other non-South Slavs in that country, of being viewed as members of the South Slav nations who constituted the state's very *raison d'être*. They benefited from their perceived role as unifiers of the country in the declaration of unification from Subotica, and were not harmed by the view that they had been the victims of extreme Magyarization which had caused many of them to lose their ethnic consciousness and support the (alien) Hungarian state.⁹⁵

The Bunjevci in Hungary also had it good. Unlike other minorities, they were perceived as supporting the Hungarian state, as being by nature

⁹⁴ This view was so prevalent that it was even picked up by John Reed, *War in Eastern Europe* (London 1916, repr. 1994), 45.

⁹⁵ E.g. Stefan Ilkić, "Bunjevci i mađjarizacija", *Književni sever* (1927), 125–40; Vasa Stajić, *Mađjarizacija preporod Bunjevacu* (Sremski Karlovci 1935).

and inclination true to Hungary. In distinction to Serbs or Croats, the Bunjevci were to be cherished, to be discouraged from leaving their motherland Hungary, and to be helped along the way to full absorption into the loving body of the Hungarian nation surrounding them. At the very least, the authorities treated them with far less suspicion and far more tolerance than they did other South Slavs. It seems fair to imagine that some Bunjevci enjoyed and appreciated the benefits of being perceived as faithful to the Hungarian state. There were, in short, benefits to being Bunjevci — for the majority, and the minority alike.

Afterword

The enormous atrocities of the Second World War were based upon ethnic stereotypes and encyclopaedic knowledge writ large. Through the most awful bloodletting, faith often played the most clear guide to the Axis Powers in determining ethnic belonging, and thereby who was to be spared, and who to be killed.⁹⁶ Authorities in Croatia, categorized as an Axis ally, could play the decisive role in determining that the Bunjevci were Croats. German sources followed their lead. The Hitler Youth journal, appropriately called *Will and Power*, reported that the Bunjevci were Croats.⁹⁷

In 1941, as an ally of Nazi Germany, Hungary re-occupied some of the lands lost to Yugoslavia in 1920, including places with large numbers of Bunjevci. In accordance with Axis policy, Hungarian authorities broke centuries of tradition to categorize the Bunjevci as Croats.⁹⁸ Under Yugoslav rule for the previous two decades, the Bunjevci had been exposed to the best of Croatian and Serbian literature and culture. For these people, if not for the Bunjevci of rump Hungary, the minority education offered now by the Hungarian state was not adequate. A Bunjevac official from Szabadka (Subotica) reported to the Prime Minister's office in Budapest that the textbooks being used were inadequate and teachers under-qualified. He suggested that books should be imported from Croatia, and that the teaching staff from Yugoslav days should be re-hired. The laconic reply

⁹⁶ See Mark Biondich, "Religion and Nation in Wartime Croatia: Reflections on the Ustaša policy of forced religious conversions, 1941–1942", *Slavonic and East European Review* 83: 1 (Jan. 2005), 71–116.

⁹⁷ *Wille und Macht* 9: 1–12 (1941), 134.

⁹⁸ There was some resistance to the change. In 1945, with the Germans being driven out of Hungary, a prominent geographer wrote of the Bunjevci that "they are often included among the Croatians." Pál Rónai, *Atlas of Central Europe* (Balatonfüred 1945; facs. ed. Budapest 1993), s.v. "The Croatians", 134.

from Budapest was that textbooks for the Bunjevci had been published and were of adequate quality, as some of them had been written by Bunjevci.⁹⁹

At the end of the war, with the communist take-over, the potential for a revival of Bunjevci identity was overridden as communist officials categorized the Bunjevci as Croats. Thus, ironically, Communism and Fascism, two powers that attacked traditional religion, used faith to determine the Bunjevci's ethnic belonging. The Bunjevci remained Croats until the break-up of Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁰

In 1990, as a foretaste of things to come, a new dictionary of the Bunjevci's dialect was published in Serbia.¹⁰¹ The re-appearance of the Bunjevci in Vojvodina (N. Serbia) in the Yugoslav census of 1991 coincided — not by chance — with the war in Croatia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This was not a good time to be a Serb in Croatia, or a Croat in Serbia. In the census of 1991 the number of Croats living in Serbia fell in direct proportion to the number of people who then declared that they were Bunjevci. The Croatian government claimed that the government of Serbia had revived the category of Bunjevci on the 1991 census to reduce the number of Croats living in Serbia. As to individual motivations for declaring Bunjevci identity, there were ample reasons for denizens of Serbia to veil Croatian identity during the war. However, the conflict between Serbian and Croatian forces has long-since stopped and relations between the two states have normalized, yet Bunjevci continue to claim a separate identity on Serbian censuses, and have gained official recognition as one of Serbia's minority groups, despite the ongoing objections of the Croatian government.

Throughout the communist period the Bunjevci of Hungary could express their separate identity only through folklore, reading circles, and dance groups.¹⁰² In the communist period, the Bunjevci of Hungary had to

⁹⁹ Letter from Mityó Szkenderovics to Pál Balla of the PM's office and reply, 1944, OL ME K28 96cs. 157t.

¹⁰⁰ E.g. "Bunjevci, ime nekih hrvatskih naselja...", *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, vol. 2 (Zagreb 1956), s.v. Bunjevci, 304; Balint Vujkov, *Hrvatske narodne pripovjetke i bunjevačke* (Novi Sad 1953); Rikard Pavelić, *Bunjevci* (Zagreb 1973); and *Opća enciklopedija*, vol. 1 (Zagreb 1977), s.v. Bunjevci, 731.

¹⁰¹ Marko Peić, Grgo Bačlija, and Dragoljub Petrović, eds., *Rečnik bačkih Bunjevaca* (Novi Sad 1990). Also see description of Hungarian influences on the dialect: Ágnes Kacziba, "A bácskai bunyevácok szótárának magyar elemei", in K. Bibok, I. Ferincz, and I. H. Tóth, eds., *Ötvenéves a szegedi szlavisztika* (Szeged 1999), 71–79.

¹⁰² Academic discussion of the Bunjevci in Hungary ever since has been largely restricted to dreary descriptions of singing, spinning, and weaving, based on research from a century past. E.g.: Mária Kiss, "A Baja környéki délszlávok (bunyevácok) szokásformái", in János Barth, ed., *Dunatáji találkozás: A Bács-Kiskun megyei nemzetiségkutató konferencia (Baja 1991. április 27.) előadásai* (Kecskemét 1992), 115–149.

choose between Croatian, “Serbo-Croatian,” or the vague and dissatisfying “other South Slav” identities. The traditional Hungarian view of the Bunjevci, from the long centuries before the Second World War when the Bunjevci had been regarded as separate from Serbs and Croats, was simply erased. The official line throughout the communist period in Hungary was that the Bunjevci were Croats of a special sort.¹⁰³ It should be noted that Bunjevci spokesmen demanded this. But minority representatives were — and could only be — committed communists, and followed the party’s line on South Slav identity.

The ideological position was reflected everywhere, with the Bunjevci keeping their position as an upstanding people. They were described as outstanding socialists, highly represented amongst anti-fascist partisans.¹⁰⁴ In one account, a fellow from Baja is described as a martyr to communism, killed while helping crush the 1956 “counterrevolution” in Budapest.¹⁰⁵

A researcher looking into Hungarian ethnic data might find the sudden disappearance of Bunjevci from the categories of published data disturbing, and may wonder if this people were another victim of genocide during the Second World War. In fact, their disappearance merely reflects their official re-categorization as Croats or “other South Slavs.”¹⁰⁶ A representative of Hungary’s statistical office explained the changes in ethnic categories in census data thus: “The nationality alliances, and thus the South Slav one as well, wanted their data to be in accord with the political power of the day.”¹⁰⁷

Still, a shadow of the Bunjevci’s former identity as Catholic Serbs remained in the communist period, as some Bunjevci were categorized as Rascian-Croats (Hun. rác-horvát). These Rascian-Croats were said to live in Bática, Dusnok, Érd, Ercsi and Tököl, precisely the places identified as

¹⁰³ E.g. Mihály Mándics, *A magyarországi bunyevác-horvátok története/ Povijest bunjevčih Hrvata u Madjarskoj* (Kecskemét 1989).

¹⁰⁴ Dobos and Tóth, “A magyarországi bunyevácokról”, 6.

¹⁰⁵ Biography of Miklós Jurinovic in Ferenc Bársony, Sándor Békevári and Sándor Eszík, eds., *A Magyar munkásmozgalom Bács-Kiskun megyei harcászai (életrajzgyűjtemény)* (Kecskemét 1969), 50, also see bios pp. 38–39, 81, and 105.

¹⁰⁶ On “other South Slavs,” and Bunjevci categorization as Croats in Hungarian census data, see Daniló Urosevics, *A magyarországi délszlávok története* (Budapest 1969), 13–27.

¹⁰⁷ In Hungarian: “A Nemzetiségi szövetségek – így a délszláv is – a mindenkori politikai érdekeinek megfelelően szerette volna viszontlátni népének adatait.” Letter from Orbán Nagy, 5 Feb. 1993, cited by Dobos and Tóth, “A magyarországi bunyevácokról”, 10, n. 23.

Bunjevac towns by Margittai prior to the Second World War.¹⁰⁸ To be perfectly clear, as we have seen, Rascian is a synonym for Serb in Hungarian; thus Rascian-Croat is a pseudo-scientific rendering of Serbo-Croat. This category made sense in light of Serbo-Croatian ideology in Yugoslavia. It also rang true in Hungary, a nation where language is one of the prime markers of national identity. In Hungary at the time Serbian and Croatian minority schools taught children the “Serbo-Croat” language. Finally, it seems likely that the Rascian-Croat name was a way to deal with the identity of a people who thought of themselves, and who had always been depicted before, as Catholic Serbs.

The break-up of Yugoslavia and the collapse of Yugoslav identity had its effects on the South Slavs of Hungary as well. Serbo-Croat schools were separated into Serbian and Croatian ones. The appearance of Bunjevci in Serbia was followed by the demand by some Bunjevci in Hungary for official recognition of their separate identity, which has been repeatedly denied by state authorities, based on academic reports which oddly neglect the Bunjevci’s status as a recognized minority in pre-WWII Hungary.¹⁰⁹

In all three states, Croatia, Hungary and Serbia, the determination of who Bunjevci are (Croats, or simply Bunjevci) is couched in academic language, drafted by ethnographers and historians, supposedly based on scientifically sound proofs of identity. The overall tone today is not far removed from encyclopaedias of yore. The seriousness of these categorizations and academic discussions give a scientific mask to something trivial and very personal — the identity of individuals. In all three of these states there are individual Bunjevci who strenuously claim they are Croats, and are recognized as such. In two states, Serbia and Hungary, there are also Bunjevci who

¹⁰⁸ Rascian-Croats – see György Sarosácz, “Magyarország délszláv nemzetiségei”, in G. Ortutay, ed., *Népi kultúra – Népi társadalom: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Néprajzi Kutató Csoportjának évkönyve VII.* (Budapest 1973), 369–386 (370); id., “A magyarországi horvátok etnikus jegyei”, in Á. Fejér et al., eds., *Magyarok és szlávok* (Szeged 1993), 306–320 (309); and László Kővágó, *Nemzetiségek a mai Magyarországon* (Budapest 1981), 49. The term has not yet died, see Antun Mujčić, ed., *Danica ili Kalendar za bunjevačke, šokačke i racke Hrvate koji žive u Mađarskoj 2000.* (Baja 2000); and Zsivkó Gorjánác, “Röviden a bácskai bunyevác-, rác- és sokác-horvátokról”, in L. Kupa, ed., *Tájak, tájegységek, etnikai kisebbségek Közép-Európában* (Pécs 2007), 130–135.

¹⁰⁹ Given the position of the Bunjevci in Hungary in the inter-war era, documented above, the following statement in the Hungarian Academy’s report wants revising: “However, there can be no doubt that... through their Roman Catholic faith, the Croatian nation already successfully integrated this ethnic group in the 19th–20th century...” (in Hungarian: “Kétségtelen azonban, hogy... a római katolikus vallás révén kötődő népcsoportot a 19–20. századra, ... már a horvát nemzet sikeresen integrálta.”) Dobos and Tóth, “A magyarországi bunyevácokról”, 4.

claim a separate identity from Croats. However, in only one of these states, Serbia, is the wish of these individual Bunjevci to be recognized simply as Bunjevci (more-or-less) respected.¹¹⁰ In Serbia, it seems entirely possible that a social scientist might find three siblings in a Bunjevci village who separately claim Croatian, Bunjevac, and Yugoslav identities. These claims are likely to change, depending on preference at the time asked. In Croatia, the siblings could only reasonably expect recognition if they claimed Croatian or Yugoslav identities, and may indeed have no desire for a non-Croatian Bunjevci identity (which holds no benefits in Croatia). In Hungary, where the Yugoslav identity dissolved along with the Yugoslav state, the academy and parliament have determined that, regardless of individual wishes, the Bunjevci are Croats.

Who a minority is depends not on the actions of individuals, but how the majority, and most importantly those in authority, see it. But as political systems change, so may majority views of minorities. The history of the Bunjevci demonstrates that sometimes the minority can play a formative role in the development of majority stereotypes, while at other times the minority is unable to have any effect on majority views. Minority identity is depicted by majority officials as iron hard. But majority definitions of Bunjevci identity have demonstrably changed over the past. For individual Bunjevci, the quicksilver of identity has been used to escape prejudice, and to take a position indifferent to conflicts between majority identities.

For decades the Bunjevci identity all but disappeared, as it was comfortably folded into other identities. For many — perhaps most — Bunjevci today, a Croatian identity is comfortable, and is undeniably right. But this does not mean that the revival of a separate Bunjevci identity today is necessarily artificial, or that those who claim it are necessarily wrong. There is a historic identity of Bunjevci separateness — from both Serbs and Croats — on which to build. The revival of the Bunjevci identity suggests nothing more or less than that where it is asserted, people from the majority and minority alike find it plausible and useful. For many people today, as in the past, there are definite benefits in being Bunjevci.

*UDC 323.15:323.17](497.11 Vojvodina)(091)
316.347 Bunjevci*

¹¹⁰ The Serbian position and data on Bunjevci is given by Vojislav Stanovčić, “Forging Unity out of Diversities”, in S. G. Markovich, E. B. Weaver, and V. Pavlović, eds., *Problems of Identities in the Balkans* (Belgrade 2006), 55–94 (83–84 and 87–88).

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Serbian Landowners in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia The Case of Bogdan Dundjerski

Abstract: Originally from Herzegovina, the Dundjerski family moved to south Hungary, present-day Serbia's province of Vojvodina, in the seventeenth century. From the 1820s the family's progress was marked by the enlargement of their landed property. In the early twentieth century the family owned or rented about 26,473 ha of land in Vojvodina. Bogdan Dundjerski (1860–1943), the third generation landowner, was brought up in a mixture of different traditions including the ethic of Serb highlanders of Herzegovina, central-European middle classes and Hungarian nobility. A wealthy landowner, Serb patriot and benefactor, whose political role in the Second World War remains controversial, described himself as: Serb, Christian Orthodox, landowner.

Keywords: Dundjerski family, landowners, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbia, Vojvodina, Bačka, social transition, world wars

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, besides a strong sense of belonging to a nation, a significant role in the life of the Serbs in Vojvodina, a former duchy within the Habsburg realm, was played by a sense of belonging to a particular social group, where national affiliations were not necessarily prominent. From the 1820s, in the process of gradual modernization, Serb craftsmen, merchants, priests, civil servants, persons of various professions and wealthy farmers began to invest in the education of their children, thereby creating opportunities for their social advancement. Village schools, where Serb children acquired basic literacy and knowledge, were of particular importance. The Gymnasium in Sremski Karlovci (the seat of the Serbian Metropolitan) and the Gymnasium in Novi Sad, the largest Serbian city and cultural centre in the 1860s (known as the “Serbian Athens”), as well as the secondary schools in Vrbas and Pozsony (Bratislava), were the usual destinations of Serbian students. They commonly continued their education in Budapest, Vienna or Munich. By the 1850s and 1860s there had emerged in Vojvodina a distinct social group of Serbs possessing all characteristics of a prosperous central-European upper bourgeois class.¹

¹ See Traian Stoianovich, *A Study in Balkan Civilization* (Knopf, 1967), Serb. ed. *Balkanska civilizacija* (Belgrade 1995); Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford University Press, 1997), Serb. ed. *Imaginarni Balkan* (Belgrade 2006); Michael Mit-

In the early stages of the modernization process, their basic values were not much different from the moral norms of patriarchal rural communities guiding their attitude towards family, religion and work. Frugality, modesty and dedication to work were the most valued qualities. An important feature of members of this class was their openness to new knowledge and readiness to take risks and to learn more. From the 1850s the motto of the Dundjerski family was: "Where you have lost, there you will most easily find!" Great landowners were among the first to adjust to the new political and social landscape. They embraced the values of the growing middle class, they purchased houses in towns and embarked upon industrial enterprise, but they did not give up their land — they kept and further expanded their possessions.² The social model the Serb landowners in Vojvodina strived for was the lifestyle of the Hungarian nobility, still mostly beyond their reach in the early twentieth century.³ This was visible from their approach to leisure: apart from their houses in the countryside and in towns, they tended to purchase lavish mansions where they spent most of their free time with their family and friends. Leisure was reserved for women and children, while men often invited potential business partners and their families to their houses.⁴ They also owned horse farms, fishponds, hunting grounds.

After Vojvodina became part of Serbia and the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in late 1918 (renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929), the great landowners in Vojvodina largely kept their old

teraureur, *Historisch-antropologisch Familienforschung*, Serb. ed. *Kad je Adam kopao a Eva prela. Istorijsko-antropološki ogledi iz prošlosti evropske porodice* (Belgrade 2001); Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815–1941* (Belgrade: Clio, 2004); Stevan K. Pawlovich, *A History of the Balkans 1804–1945* (Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), Serb. ed. Belgrade 2004.

² The Dundjerski family also owned a savings bank, and in the interwar period they were founders or majority owners of: *Ikarus*, aircraft factory, Zemun; Engines factory, Rakovica; *Orient*, printing house, Novi Sad; *Grafika*, art printing house; *Kulpin*, canned food factory; *Kamendin*, serum factory; two breweries and ice plants; three hemp processing factories; carpets factory; denatured alcohol factory; several flour mills; textile factories. They gave founders and presidents of Novi Sad Stock Exchange and Novi Sad Fair; owners of several horse farms and fishponds, breeders of thoroughbred cattle etc.

³ Petar Rokai, Zoltan Djere and Aleksandar Kasaš, *Istorija Madjara [A History of Hungarians]* (Belgrade: Clio, 2002).

⁴ They had servants in their town houses (usually in Novi Sad), and in country and summer houses. Those wealthier among them also had houses in Budapest. Housekeepers oversaw the functioning of the household and supervised subordinate servants. There were also gardeners, coachmen and various other servants who were hired as needed. Domestic servants were paid in cash and food, while factory workers, beside their wages, received some of the manufactured goods.



Mansion (Castle) of Bogdan Dundjerski
near Bečej (photo Vesna Dimitrijević)



Chapel of Bogdan Dundjerski
(photo Vesna Dimitrijević)



Bogdan Dundjerski (1860–1943)
as a young man (ROMS)



Icon by Uroš Predić
Chapel of Bogdan Dundjerski
(photo Vesna Dimitrijević)

lifestyle. The Vovodina citizens-landowners (they cannot be considered as being either gentry or nobility) could not find a matching social class in the rest of Serbia, whose pre-1918 rural structure was predominantly marked by small landholdings. The most similar social group were wealthy Belgrade industrialists, including several foreigners, who had to adjust their position to the new situation. In the interwar period, this was the social basis for frequent marriages between girls from Vojvodina's wealthy landowning families and Belgrade industrialists or Hungarian nobles.

The citizens-landowners, whose landed property was diminished by the agrarian reform of 1921, gradually transformed into landowners-merchants-industrialists. In the absence of a stable and unified market in the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia, more successful members of this class managed to maintain their position by creating small economic areas which functioned through rolling capital and raw materials from one area of economic activity into another. The surplus for sale came either from agricultural production, or from industrial production, depending on the market price and demand. All this required an enormous amount of work and dedication; otherwise, the family would have lost its position.

The government policy was aimed at protecting small landholdings and securing an existential minimum for the poorest population.⁵ The peasant-warrior tradition had secured the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's dominant position in the Balkans, the position it made official by participating in the creation of the Little Entente (1920/1) and the Balkan Pact (1934). Although the member countries of the two alliances never achieved an adequate level of economic and military cooperation, which was the only way in which they could strengthen their position in international relations, the alliances provided a sense of balance and strength, perhaps greater than it was in reality.

Great landowners and industrialists, who were few in the country, could not kick off production and pull the country out of the economic crisis and general poverty. Even the most successful had trouble keeping their heads above water. The survival of banks depended on the success of industrial companies, and the companies depended on favourable bank loans. Economic interests of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were in contradiction to its political orientation. Huge pressure on landowners and industrialists threatened to ruin the most productive social class and leave the country without its economic elite.

⁵ Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije* [History of Yugoslavia 1918–1978] (Belgrade: Nolit, 1980); Ljubodrag Dimić, *Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918–1941* [Cultural Policy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918–1941] (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996).

The economic elite of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not ruined by bad laws, underdevelopment, economic crisis or international relations, even though all of that had its negative effects. The biggest seism experienced by Vojvodina's landowners-merchants-industrialists was being separated from their land. Landed property was the most stable point of the economy: the industrialists and merchants who did not rely on their own landed property were facing great risks in the conditions they could neither predict nor control. By being separated from their land, they lost not only their economic security, but also the mainstay of the family and the patriarchal moral which was the basis of civil ethic among the Serbs in Vojvodina. All this led to decadency and a feeling that an individual, in the given circumstances, was unable to achieve the desired results with his own work, which was visible for the generation which grew up in the interwar period. An industrial upsurge could be felt in the late 1930s, but the entry of Yugoslavia into the Second World War marked the end of an era and, with it, its economic elite.

Bogdan Dundjerski as a politician

On St George's Day 1921 a huge popular assembly was held in the centre of Stari Bečej in Bačka, where the citizens voted for the name "Great Serbia" and against the name "Yugoslavia".⁶ Various associations, especially the Sokol,⁷ advocated the name Yugoslavia, which was utterly alien to people like Bogdan Dundjerski, his friend Uroš Predić, a distinguished Realist painter, and other friends of the Dundjerski family. In 1904 Predić writes to Ilarion Ruvarac about what the word "Yugoslav" means to him, and says that it is just a concept which originated in the mind of Ljudevit Gaj, once much used and now exhumed.⁸

It is hard to find a man who was as apolitical as Bogdan Dundjerski and yet so politically active. He twice represented the Serbs from the "southern parts", i.e. the Bačka area of Vojvodina, in the Hungarian Diet,

⁶ Istorijски arhiv Senta [Historical Archives of Senta], Odeljenje za arhivistiku grada Bečeja [Bečej Town Archival Department], Zbirka rukopisa [Manuscript Collection], Nedeljko Stojković, "Saznanja o društveno-političkom životu u Bečeju između dva rata dobijena kroz izučavanje arhivske gradje" [Insights into social-political life in Bečej between two world wars gained by archival research], 5.

⁷ The Sokol organization was a manifestation of the Slavic idea which, through sports associations, recruited members regardless of religion, social status and nationality guided by the liberal slogan of the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity.

⁸ Arhiv Srpske akademije i nauka i umetnosti (ASANU) Belgrade [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], no. 5304, Uroš Predić to Ilarion Ruvarac, 5 August 1904.

first within Austria-Hungary, from 1910 to 1918, and then under Hungarian occupation, from February 1942 until his death in 1943. Bogdan Dundjerski did not take part in parliamentary debates, nor did he write or make statements for the press, but the press wrote about him. Dundjerski's political activity stemmed from his traditional understanding of patriotism and national duties. As an enlightened patriot, he continuously supported Serbian schools and the Serbian Orthodox Church, as key institution of the Serbs in southern Hungary. Dundjerski sought to ensure that as many landholdings as possible in Serb-inhabited areas were in the "Serbian hands". During the Great War, he relied on his reputation and, in his capacity as member of parliament, visited the imprisoned Serbs, took care that they have food, that their rights be protected and their families informed of where they were. It was his patriotic duty in both world wars, and he did not thought it humiliating to plead with Hungarian authorities for passes and permits to enter a jail where he had heard a Serb was imprisoned.

What he did not understand and thought was completely opposite to his actions, was the activity of the Partisan communist forces during the Second World War. Dundjerski was apprehensive about Tito's Partisans and the ideology of communism. Being conservative and traditional in his thinking, Dundjerski regarded these ideas as being deeply wrong and dangerous, and as coming from idlers, bums and spoiled intellectuals from wealthy families. Their actions simply meant more work for him, more killings and arrests of Serbs that he was unable to prevent. He did not perceive himself as being an exploiter of the poor; after all, he decided to bequeath his property to the poor Serbian children. Dundjerski believed that an educated and cultured person should have a strong sense of responsibility towards his own society and nation. From that perspective, he understood Soviet-led communism as an aggressive ideology, robbery, and inevitably leading to the loss of national identity.

In spite of his heart-felt patriotic attitude and important humanitarian initiatives, after the First World War Dundjerski came to be perceived as a *madjaron* (pro-Hungarian), and after the communist takeover at the end of the Second World War was condemned as "enemy of the people and traitor". In his first will (1918) Bogdan Dundjerski explained his decision to bequeath his estate to the Serbian children: "I was raised and educated in the Christian Orthodox tradition of my people, and besides, I am loyal to my beloved homeland, and thus I believe that I shall best repay my debt to the grace of God, and the love of my parents, by the loyalty to my homeland, and the devotion to my Holy Orthodox Church, and my beloved Serbian Orthodox people..."⁹

⁹ Aleksandar Kasaš, "Testament Bogdana Dundjerskog iz 1918", *Krovovi* 39/40 (Sremski Karlovci 1997), 81.

In his second will (1940), Dundjerski dared to state that there had been something more than the expropriation of his land that hurt and embittered him: “especially because people of dubious character besmirched me before our authorities as a *madjaron* and anti-government element, and as such, I was placed and for months kept under police surveillance by the strict order of higher political authorities, probably because, as a member of the Hungarian Diet, I had with much success protected our element that the enemy force came down on with the intention of destroying our nation [...] I mention all this simply in order to leave a trace of how they treated me and what attitude the factors in charge took towards me.”¹⁰ However, we have found no evidence to confirm or deny Dundjerski’s claim that he had been placed under police surveillance in the interwar period. Whatever the case was, this statement reveals how he perceived his own position in the social and political system of interwar Yugoslavia.

In April 1941, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and their allies dismembered the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In a coordinated onslaught against Serbia, joined by Fascist Hungary and Bulgaria, Hungary annexed the Bačka region of Serbian Vojvodina, including Novi Sad, Srbobran, Bečej and other places where Bogdan Dundjerski had considerable landholdings. At the session of the Hungarian Diet of 5 February 1942, Prime Minister Bárdossy proposed that deputies from the annexed “Southern Part” i.e. parts of Serbian Vojvodina annexed to Fascist Hungary, also be summoned to parliament.¹¹ Milan L. Popović, a publicist, and Bogdan Dundjerski, a distinguished landowner, were put on a special train to Budapest to attend the ceremony of their inauguration as deputies of the Hungarian Diet held on 9 February.¹² Some members of the Dundjerski family had been killed without trial upon the entry of Hungarian troops in the town of Srbobran, and he probably felt ill at ease at the ceremony.

In Milan L. Popović’s letter to Dundjerski of 27 March the same year, Popović, addressing Dundjerski as “highly esteemed and dear Uncle Bogdan”, informs him that he managed to obtain information about Szeged prison from the state prosecutor, Dr. Vladimir Ekert.¹³ Popović tried to obtain permission for Dundjerski and himself to visit imprisoned Serbs, if there were any. Permission was not granted, since the prison was under military control, but Dr. Ekert informed him that there were arrested per-

¹⁰ Bečej, Gradski muzej [Town Museum], The will of Bogdan Dundjerski of 1940, 2.

¹¹ *Nova pošta* II/25, 7 February 1942, 3.

¹² *Nova pošta* II/26, 8 February 1942, 3.

¹³ Rukopisno odeljenje Matice srpske (ROMS) Novi Sad [Manuscript Department of Matica srpska], inv. no. 13841.

sons “from this territory”.¹⁴ The prosecutor was convinced that Dundjerski and Popović should have no trouble visiting the prisoners in Szeged and informed them that there were Serbs in the camps in Vac and Budapest as well. The same day Popović sent a cable asking permission from military authorities to visit Szeged prison, and asked Dundjerski to set the date for the two of them to leave for Szeged together. That same day Popović visited the villages of Žabalj and Čurug and obtained the Hungarian district governor’s written permission for relatives to visit the property of their parents. “You can imagine how much joy there is among the people. I promised them I would come again on the first day of Easter”.¹⁵

Dundjerski was already in his eighties, and his actions were certainly not motivated by the prospect of political gain or personal promotion. Despite the danger to his own reputation under harsh Hungarian occupation, he acted in consistence with his beliefs. In late February, Dundjerski and Popović asked permission from the minister of internal affairs to visit Titel, Žabalj and Čurug, explaining that they, as members of parliament, wanted to be in direct contact with citizens. They were also granted permission by the Bačka county governor, Dr. Deak, and the dates set for their visit were: 3, 4 and 5 March.¹⁶ On 3 March 1942, Popović gave a speech to the villagers gathered in the hall of the Serbian Orthodox church in Titel, reminding them of the ordeal their ancestors had gone through to defend from the Ottomans the land they now worked and to turn it into fertile fields. He advised them to stay calm and not to let themselves be deceived by provocations from either Moscow or London, and to show to the relevant state authorities that they belonged to a hard-working, conscientious and constructive peasant class whose first concern was their home, wellbeing, country and Christian faith.¹⁷ The gist of Popović’s conciliatory philosophy is condensed in the following words: “The more people and male heads survive the world war, the more our [Serbian] people can expect from the ongoing world conflict.”¹⁸ After the service, the first to be held in a long time in the previously shut down local Serbian church, Dundjerski and Popović talked with the farmers about their daily problems. *Nova Pošta* gave no details of these talks, but this was one part of the visit which was extremely important for the members of parliament. On 4 and 5 March they visited Žabalj and Čurug. Dundjerski himself did not give a speech at any of these

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ *Nova pošta*, II/44, 1 March 1942, 2.

¹⁷ *Nova pošta*, II/46, 4 March 1942, 3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

meetings. A day after his return to Bečej, Dundjerski set off for Budapest to attend the parliament session. What the press did not write about and the two members of parliament did not forget was: the search for arrested Serbs in prisons and camps, the reopening of Serbian Orthodox churches, the restoration of property to the families of the killed Serbs. Dundjerski was always restrained, in contrast to Popović, a fiery speaker. Many Serbs were executed without trial in Hungarian army and police raids. Some believed that one should not remain silent over it and that any cooperation with the Hungarians, who had committed such crimes, was unpardonable. *Slobodna Vojvodina* (Free Vojvodina), the organ of the communist-led People's Liberation Committee for Vojvodina, branded Milan L. Popović as the most shameful traitor of the Serbian people: "The London government [in exile] condemned him to death. The people had condemned him much earlier. It is certain that the biggest traitor of the Serbs of Bačka, Milan Laži¹⁹ Popović, will not live to see the end of this war."²⁰ The same article claimed that Popović had visited the prison at Srbobran where locals and the imprisoned from other places were being executed in the most brutal manner. The victims were mainly of Serbian nationality. Although Popović did not speak of this prison in public, *Slobodna Vojvodina* accused him of spreading rumours "through his agents" that there was no torture in Srbobran prison".²¹ Irinej Ćirić, Aleksandar Moč and Bogdan Dundjerski did not fare much better, on account of their collaboration with the Hungarian occupying authorities.

A history of conflict between Serbs and Hungarians had left a strong imprint on the mentality of the Serbs in these areas. The proclamation of Serbian Vojvodina (Serbian Duchy) in southern Hungary, within the Habsburg realm, in 1848, came as a response to Hungarian nationalism which deprived Serbs of their rights. The conflict between Hungarians and Serbs, in particular the epic battle of Szenttamás (Srbobran) in 1848, had left a deep mark in the history of the Serbs of Bačka.²² The Serbian losses had been enormous, but they gradually resumed their lives after the revolutionary revolts were crushed. The Serbian troops that entered Srbobran

¹⁹ The initial L., standing for his father's name, was used to make an abusive play on words and call Popović a liar (Laži).

²⁰ *Slobodna Vojvodina* (organ of the Provincial People's Liberation Committee for Vojvodina), no. 1 (November 1942), 12–13.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² The town was originally called Szenttamás or Sentomaš. It was renamed Srbobran (1919), in honour of the Serbian soldiers who had come from Serbia to help the population's defence against the Hungarian military in 1848/9, who, upon seizing the town, killed the majority of the Serbian civilian population.

at the end of the First World War were joyfully welcomed by the Serbian population, the Hungarian provoked no conflicts, and they both became citizens of another state. When Hungarian troops occupied the town at the beginning of the Second World War, there was no resistance; the population surrendered their town peacefully. However, there ensued a Hungarian disproportionate, large-scale retribution. Most Serb civilians were killed in April 1941. In May the same year, "reactionary circles in Bačka" sent an epistle to Admiral Horthy in which they expressed their loyalty to the Hungarian state, and their readiness to serve it loyally.²³ *Slobodna Vojvodina* commented: "This epistle is signed by the very people who had bossed around in Yugoslavia for twenty years and were a mainstay of various regimes responsible for the collapse of our country."²⁴ According to *Slobodna Vojvodina*, some of the villagers who had fled during the massacre of Serbs in Šajkaška, "came across Horthy's gendarmes and, to save their lives, opened fire and killed two or three of their tormentors".²⁵ *Nova Pošta* condemned the killing, but that did not mean anything to the Hungarian authorities. Large-scale massacres against Serbs continued in January 1942.

Dundjerski was certainly aware of how dangerous it was at that point to accept a seat in the Hungarian Diet, but he obviously believed that it was the only way for him to be able to do something for his persecuted compatriots. In 1943, a second list of "enemies of the people and traitors" made public by communist *Slobodna Vojvodina* contained his name.²⁶ Uroš Predić, a famous Serbian painter and Dundjerski's closest friend, in a letter he wrote in 1948 commented that it would have fared badly with Dundjerski had he survived the war.²⁷ Dundjerski's young friend, Milan L. Popović, gave a speech at his funeral: "With no particular political line, no acting on impulse, no oratorical eloquence, Bogdan Dundjerski was a political man who despised quick success and cheap popularity".²⁸ Dundjerski strove to be a worthy successor of the great Serb benefactors such as Count Sava Tekelija (1761–1842) and Marija Trandafil (1816–1883), to be remembered by his people as a good Serb and patriot. Instead, he was proclaimed enemy of the people and traitor. Dundjerski was not a talented politician, or orator, he did not represent or defend any particular political agenda; rather, he was

²³ *Slobodna Vojvodina* 2–3 (Vrbas, March–April 1943), 1–4.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Slobodna Vojvodina* 4 (Parage in Bačka, 1943), 15–16.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 16.

²⁷ Vesna Dimitrijević, "Uroš Predić i Bogdan Dundjerski: Priča o prijateljstvu", *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju* 12/1–3 (2005), 185–193.

²⁸ *Nova pošta* III/246 (Ujvidek), 4 November 1943, 4–5.

a great patriot and proud to be Serb. He respected the law and tried to live and work within the given institutional framework.

Estates of Bogdan Dundjerski

Bogdan Dundjerski was attached to the land more than any of Gedeon Dundjerski's grandchildren. He managed his estate in an exemplary way and worked hard until the end of his life. Travelling around the world, he learnt and gained new knowledge. He turned his farm (*salaš*) with some forty buildings, a big and a small mansion, and a chapel, into his private kingdom.²⁹ The terrace of the big mansion (popularly known as castle) still offers a view of the endless plains of Bačka. Bogdan Dundjerski planned to leave everything he had created as an undivided estate after his death, but he did not succeed. From a redistribution document it cannot be seen how big his estate was in 1906, but in his first will of 1918 he states that he owns a total of 733.187 ha.³⁰ According to the data supplied by Toša Iskruljev in 1931,³¹ Bogdan Dundjerski owned 748.15 ha of prime farmland in the Stari Bečej area, but about half was taken away for agrarian reform purposes. In his second will (1940), Bogdan Dundjerski states that 207.756ha of his land was seized in the Srbobran area, which tallies with the data from the Archives of Yugoslavia.³² The same archival fund contains a document according to which 175.527 ha of Dundjerski's land were seized in the Stari Bečej district.³³ From a letter Dundjerski wrote in 1922, one can see that, to him, the ownership of land was a matter of patriotism, national identity, even of the survival of the Serbian people and the Serbian Orthodox Church.³⁴ Dundjerski was a law-abiding man and wanted to ensure that his business was safe and legal. His estate was a mirror of him as a person. He believed that the Serbs would lose their identity should their landholdings

²⁹ Gradski muzej Bečej [Bečej Town Museum], The will of Bogdan Dundjerski of 1940; A. Kasaš, "Kome je Bogdan Dundjerski, veleposednik starobečejski i srbobranski ostavio svoje imanje?" [To whom did Bogdan Dundjerski, a landowner of Stari Bečej and Srbobran leave his estate?], *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju* 55 (1997), 169–182.

³⁰ Kasaš, "Testament", 81.

³¹ Toša Iskruljev, "Kroz naš južni Banat" [Through our South Banat], *Jugoslavenski dnevnik*, 19 March 1931, 1.

³² Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ) [Archives of Yugoslavia], Belgrade, Ministarstvo agrarne reforme Kraljevine Jugoslavije (MARKJ) [Ministry for Agrarian Reform of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], Fund 96, Folder 35/92.

³³ AJ, MARKJ, Fund 96, Folder 35/93.

³⁴ ROMS, Pisma [Letters], no. 13844, Bogdan Dundjerski to Irinej Ćirić, Bečej, 29 August 1922.

pass into the hands of “people of different faiths”, first of all Hungarians. By purchasing land from poor Serbs or rich Hungarians he tried to secure the survival of Serbs in Bačka. On the face of it, such attitude may be interpreted as nationalistic, but in the political context of the age, it was a politically defensive and socially acceptable form of patriotism. On Dundjerski’s estate worked many poor Serbs, Hungarians and Jews, and they were all treated fairly. Dundjerski was held in esteem by respectable citizens, both Hungarians and Serbs, and it remained so until his death.

Describing the estate on which he began to build a chapel, Bogdan Dundjerski said: “This land, now the most fertile crop fields, once all was in the Serbian hands, but over time Serbs sold their land and farms (e.g. 30 years ago there were twelve Stakić farmsteads in my neighbourhood, and now there is not a single one) and people of different faiths settled, mostly Hungarians. With much effort and labour I managed to buy a large complex from the people of different faith and to fulfil my one-time dreams: what used to be ours must be ours again!”³⁵ Until the Unification of 1918 Bogdan Dundjerski did not have to modify his views. With the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, however, new rules were established and he could not understand their logic. His problems began with the agrarian reform of 1919 and stayed on until the end of his life. Even so, Dundjerski managed to leave a magnificent legacy to posterity.

Bogdan Dundjerski’s will dated 23rd November 1918, drawn up after the Serbian army entered Bečej and a day before the unconditional unification of Vojvodina with Serbia was solemnly proclaimed, shows not only how much land he owned, but also how emotional he was about it.³⁶ The will opens with the usual phrase: “I am the exclusive owner of my [landed] estate, which I am entitled to dispose of freely...”³⁷ The following year the big estate became subject to agrarian reform. Dundjerski tried to prevent its parcellation. When he exhausted all possibilities, he turned to the Serbian bishop of Bačka, Irinej Ćirić, whom he addressed as his spiritual father.³⁸ He made a copy of the letter for himself. The copy is unsigned, but Dundjerski later added a double-underlined comment: “there was *no reply whatsoever* to this letter!”

Bogdan Dundjerski bequeathed his entire estate with buildings for the education of poor Christian Orthodox Serbs. He named Metropolitan of Sremski Karlovci the president of the board of trustees and the Bishop of

³⁵ ROMS, Pisma, inv. no. 13842, Bogdan Dundjerski to Irinej Ćirić, Bečej, undated.

³⁶ Kasaš, “Testament”, 81–84.

³⁷ Ibid. 81.

³⁸ ROMS, Pisma, inv. no. 13844, Bogdan Dundjerski to Irinej Ćirić, Bečej, 29 August 1922.

Bačka its vice-president. Dundjerski believed that the metropolitan was his natural ally in his struggle to preserve the estate. He claimed that the new authorities were more considerate towards the Catholic than the Orthodox landholdings, but that both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches failed to protect their interests in the face of the agrarian reform. Bishop Irinej Ćirić was unable to help, and probably did not know what to reply to this desperate letter. Bogdan Dundjerski perceived this as betrayal, and distrust crept into his life and he completely withdrew from public life. He became preoccupied with his unusual ideas: after he had a chapel built, he began building a mansion; he wanted to leave something to the future generations of “patriotic Serbs”. According to Dundjerski,³⁹ the land which had been seized from him was distributed to the poor, and out of 404 families to whom the land was allotted only 121 were Serbian, as opposed to 283 Hungarian. Some families immediately leased out the land to rich farmers, and to “Hungarian”, those from whom he had purchased that land legally and with the money he had earned himself. He kept repeating in despair: “My land, which I kept as the apple of my eye, which I worked with the most modern tools and techniques and in the most rational manner, and which I so perfected that I can freely say it was one of the best in the whole district, that land of mine, which I loved and looked after like the mother looks after her child, is being leased out at so low rates to Hungarian farmers, and now they slouch over my labour and my sweat...”⁴⁰ Dundjerski claimed that “Jews and others”⁴¹ came to him and offered to return his former property, without asking any money in advance, but only after the transfer was officially carried through. Such arrangements would have been a semi-official opportunity for him to regain possession of his land, but to Bogdan Dundjerski they looked like a fraud in which he did not want to take part. He was too conservative and too proud for that. This might have been a challenge that suited the temperament of his uncle, Lazar Dundjerski, but not his own. In 1920, the seized land was put under prohibition of transfer and encumbrance. Dundjerski understood it as an act that “literally threw him out into the street”.⁴² No one in the Dundjerski family had ever experienced anything like that: to pay taxes and all imaginable dues regularly, to pay workers’ wages regularly, and still remain without land, and all that in times of peace. During the hardships of 1848 and the First World War, people had been killed, their homes and crops destroyed, but once the ordeal

³⁹ ROMS, Pisma, inv. no. 13842, Bogdan Dundjerski to Irinej Ćirić, Bečej, undated.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ ROMS, Pisma, inv. no. 13844, Bogdan Dundjerski to Irinej Ćirić, Bečej, 29 August 1922.

⁴² ROMS, Pisma, inv. no. 13842, Bogdan Dundjerski to Irinej Ćirić, undated.

ended, they returned to their devastated homes and fields and were able to start a new life on their property.

Although Dundjerski had thoroughbred horses and livestock on the estate, a seed nursery, a fishpond and other required elements, he did not succeed in retaining the land maximum. Neither the church Dundjerski was building, nor the foundation he wanted to establish, seemed of any interest to anyone in the local and central government. Although injured and shaken, Dundjerski was not a bitter opponent of the agrarian reform. At first he accepted that the needs of the Yugoslav state were above the needs of an individual. But, the more he struggled to preserve his estate, the more his position became insecure. Dundjerski experienced all the negative effects of bad legislations at first hand. A portion of his estate was even returned to him, although he did not ask for it.⁴³ When he had the land ploughed and sown, it was re-seized before he could reap the harvest. Compensation for expropriated land was generally paid irregularly or not at all, while the people who depended on land, as he did, were facing great economic uncertainty. Bogdan Dundjerski ends both wills (of 1918 and 1940) with the following words: "I commend my soul to the mercy of God, and my mortal body, may it be committed to that piece of land on which I lived honestly and worked hard". The issue of the minorities in the context of agrarian reform, until the peace treaties were signed, was used as an excuse for excluding the poor peasants from minority groups from land redistribution.⁴⁴ The explanation was that only the citizens of the Kingdom of SCS could be beneficiaries of the land reform. After 1920, "it was openly admitted that members of the national minorities, such as the interested Hungarians in St. Bečej, cannot be included as agrarian beneficiaries because of the national objectives of the agrarian reform."⁴⁵ The above-quoted statements of Bogdan Dundjerski are in stark contradiction to these claims. Dundjerski, overwhelmed by suspicion, tended to exaggerate and sometimes his statements sounded paranoid, but in his lists of the parcels of his estate, he was meticulous, he paid attention to every detail. His claims about the new Yugoslav authorities "loving" Hungarians or Catholics "more" were inaccurate, but it would have been unusual for him to make a mistake about the number of parcels and their users. He listed very precisely how his estate was parcelled and redistributed — mostly to poor peasants of Hungarian origin. According to the census of 1928, there were no Hungarian leaseholders of

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Nikola L. Gaćeša, "Agrarna reforma u Starom Bečeju 1918–1941" [Agrarian Reform in Stari Bečej], *Istraživanja* 19 (Novi Sad 2008), 46.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

the parcels.⁴⁶ The possibility that all Hungarian peasants had sold the parcels does not seem likely. The land was mainly allotted to local volunteers veterans. Unlike Dundjerski, other landowners did not care who worked their expropriated land.

Bogdan Dundjerski seems to have forgotten that his uncle Lazar Dundjerski, as a boy, had “ploughed the corn field, a shoe on one foot and an *opanak*⁴⁷ on the other”.⁴⁸ Bogdan Dundjerski’s father, Aleksandar Dundjerski, spent most of his time in the heath of Sirig, breeding sheep and oxen, and owing to that he had purchased the properties in the vicinity of Bečej which Bogdan inherited.⁴⁹ Bogdan Dundjerski respected his parents, but could not hide contempt for “ignorant newcomers”. Landowners were going through their drama, and poor peasants through theirs. The former warriors, liberators, torn between feelings of self-importance and misery, rambled from one farmstead to another, from barns to stables, to return to their shabby cottages, waiting for the definitive solution of their status in the parcels they held by lease. The drama continued and did not end before the outbreak of the Second World War.

His estate and his castle, Bogdan Dundjerski left by his will for the free education of the poor talented students in agronomic sciences. Everything was included: accommodation, food, school fees, teachers’ salaries, the maintenance of the estate, and students’ allowances. Wealthy students were supposed to pay school fees. The school should have borne the inscription: “Bogdan Dundjerski Foundation”. After the Second World War and the communist takeover, the castle was converted into a hotel, named “Fantast” after one of the horses from Bogdan Dundjerski’s stables, and the estate was nationalized.

*UDC 3 16.343-058.32:929]Dundjerski, Bogdan
94:341.3](497.11:439) 1941/1944”*

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⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Serbian peasant footwear.

⁴⁸ “Autobiography of Lazar Dundjerski”, manuscript, private collection; Aleksandar Kasaš, “Zapisi Lazara Dundjerskog o svom životu i sticanju porodičnog imetka” [Lazar Dundjerski’s notes on his life and the acquisition of family fortune], *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju* 51 (1995), 213–223.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

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From Ankara to Bled Marshal Tito's Visit to Greece (June 1954) and the Formation of the Balkan Alliance

Abstract: Tito's visit to Greece contributed to the Balkan Pact's transformation into a military alliance. Despite the establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav diplomatic relations in 1953, the Soviet Union made no political move towards normalizing bilateral relations. For security reasons Tito visited Athens (June 1954) to promote Yugoslavia's military cooperation with Greece and Turkey without ruling out Yugoslavia's accession to NATO. But the Soviet leadership, fearing Yugoslavia's involvement in western defence mechanisms, sent the message to Belgrade that it was ready to recognise Stalin's blunders towards Yugoslavia. Thus, Tito applied a policy of equidistance between East and West and refused to link up the Balkan Alliance with NATO.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Greece, Balkan Pact, NATO, Turkey, Soviet Union, Tito's visit to Athens, Bulgarian attitude

The Balkan Pact of 1953–54 has been thoroughly studied in international historiography and most of its aspects have been clarified.¹ Little attention, however, has been paid to Tito's visit to Greece, which had a

¹ For a first approach see John Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle. Birth and decline of an alliance across ideological boundaries* (The Hague & Paris: Mouton, 1968); Hans Hartl, *Der "einige" und "unabhängige" Balkan* (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1977), 51–65; Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu (Odnosi s velikim silama 1948–1955)* (Zagreb: ČGP Delo, Globus, 1988), 488–511; Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955. Jugoslovensko približavanje Nato-u* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), 76–89 and 141–154; David R. Stone, "The Balkan Pact and American Policy, 1950–1955", *Eastern European Quarterly* 28/3 (September 1994), 393–407; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Στα σύνορα των κόσμων. Η Ελλάδα και ο Ψυχρός Πόλεμος 1952–1967* [Greece and the Cold War. Frontline state 1952–1967] (Athens: Patakis, 2009), 96–114; Dora Gota, "Από την Άγκυρα στο Bled: Τα Βαλκανικά Σύμφωνα του 1953–54 μεταξύ Ελλάδας, Τουρκίας και Γιουγκοσλαβίας" [From Ankara to Bled. The Balkan agreements of 1953–54 between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia], *Greek Historical Association, 28th Congress* (25–27 May 2007), *Proceedings* (Thessaloniki 2008), 274–279; Christos Tsardanidis, "Η Ελλάδα και το Βαλκανικό Σύμφωνο", *Η ελληνική κοινωνία κατά την πρώτη μεταπολεμική περίοδο (1945–1967)* [Greece and the Balkan Pact], in *Greek society in the first post-war period (1945–1967)* (Athens: Institut Sakis Karagiorgas, 1994), 210–222. Also, it is worth noting the publication of Yugoslav diplomatic and military documents in *Balkanski Pakt. Ugovor o prijateljstvu i saradnji (Ankara, 28. februar 1953) i Ugovor o savezu, političkoj saradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći (Bled, 9. avgust 1954) između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije, Kraljevine Grčke i Republike Turske. Zbornik dokumenata iz Arhiva Vojnoistorijskog*

significant effect on the Balkan Pact's final transformation into a military alliance. The purpose of this paper is to examine Tito's visit to Greece in the framework of bilateral Greek-Yugoslav relations and in a broader inter-Balkan and international context as well.

The normalization of the Greek-Yugoslav relations in 1950–51 had paved the way for closer contacts between the two countries.² For Belgrade and Athens security matters were of paramount importance, since it had been made clear that Tito's breach with Stalin was not a mere episode. Yugoslavia turned out to be the main victim of the financial and psychological war, waged by the countries of the Soviet bloc, and its survival depended on American economic and military aid.³ After the normalization of Greek-Yugoslav relations Greece pushed ahead with a plan for a military alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey aiming at the formation of a common front for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea from Soviet expansion. Yugoslavia turned down the Greek proposal, calculating that such a thing was not necessary since it pursued a peaceful policy, while, on the other hand, its joining a military alliance system with western countries might prompt the Soviet Union to launch a military strike against it. In the Yugoslav strategy the maintenance of economic and cultural relations with western countries took precedence over military issues.

Once Greece and Turkey had joined NATO at the Lisbon summit conference in February 1952, the issue of military cooperation between the two new NATO members and Yugoslavia was raised during bilateral Greek-Turkish discussions, but Athens and Ankara did not make any decision on that matter. The possibility of an alliance between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia perturbed Italy. Rome was worried that such an alliance would upgrade Yugoslavia's role in the region and reinforce Tito's negotiating position on the open issue of Trieste.⁴

instituta, Arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova i Arhiva Josipa Broza Tita 1952–1960, ed. Milan Terzić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 2005).

² On the normalization of Greek-Yugoslav relations see Spyridon Sfetas, “Η εξομάλυνση των ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικών πολιτικών σχέσεων 1950/51”, *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 12–13 (2001–2), 191–207.

³ On the likelihood of a Soviet military attack against Yugoslavia see Peter Vukmar, “The possibility of a Soviet military attack against Yugoslavia in British archival documents (1948–1953)”, *Tokovi istorije* 1–2 (2009), 163–176.

⁴ On the Trieste dispute in the framework of Yugoslavia's relations with the West see Dragan Bogetić, “Odnosi Jugoslavije sa Zapadom i Tršćansko pitanje (1948–1954)”, *Istorija 20. veka* 1 (1994), 122–138; Glenda Sluga, *The problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border. Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New York: State University Press, 2001).

In 1952 Greece and Yugoslavia established a series of contacts aiming at the achievement of a bilateral cooperation on defence issues. After the sweeping victory of *Ellinikos Synagermos* in the parliamentary elections (November 1952) and the formation of a stable majority government, Alexandros Papagos, the new prime minister, tried to boost the Greek-Yugoslav relations. He knew, as a former military officer, that a possible downfall of Yugoslavia would be an imminent threat for Greece. When Yugoslav military delegates revisited Athens in December 1952, they were welcomed by King Pavlos and prime minister Papagos himself. Discussions between the Greek and the Yugoslav officers were focused on military plans to form a common defence front in case of an attack by states of the Soviet block.⁵ This time the Yugoslav delegation disclosed its intentions to speed up the procedures towards reaching a military agreement, which had not been made clear during its previous visit to Greece in September.⁶ The continuation of the Korean War and its implications on the Balkans, the danger of a new front in the Balkans as well as the political and economic benefits from a trilateral military agreement between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia may have been the main reasons that led Belgrade to back out of its initial position. The Greek government asked the United States for consultations in order to ensure that a military alliance with Yugoslavia would be compatible with its obligations towards NATO.⁷

But Italy opposed to any rapprochement between Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey before the settlement of the Trieste question. Alcide De Gasperi, the Italian prime minister, hastily visited Athens on 8 January 1953 and sent the message that "until the Trieste question has been settled, Greece can count on Italy for the Mediterranean defence in the context of a 'Mediterranean Pact'."⁸ Italy also rejected the Turkish position that cooperation between Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Italy would lead to the settlement of the Trieste question, warning that the Italian army would never fight on the Yugoslav army's side if the Trieste question was still in abeyance. When De Gasperi got the information that Fuad Köprülü, the Turkish foreign minister, planned to visit Belgrade, he characterized his visit as premature.⁹

⁵ See *Balkanski pakt*, ed. Terzić, 182–243.

⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954* [hereafter FRUS], vol. VIII, *Eastern Europe–Soviet Union–Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. William Z. Slany (Washington 1988), 600–601, no. 314, The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, Athens, December 31, 1952.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, 491–492.

⁹ See Bogetić, *Jugoslavija*, 80.

Taking the Italian objections into consideration, Washington carved out its policy in view of the forthcoming negotiations between Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey:

The United States favour maximum possible progress on contingent military planning between Turkey and Yugoslavia and Greece and Yugoslavia, although we consider that there should be no commitment of forces at this time. Such commitment should of course be subject to governmental decisions in light of all circumstances and in consultations with NATO allies as appropriate.¹⁰

Yugoslavia's admission to NATO was not a matter of urgency in the United States, since it was a long-lasting process and required the approval of other NATO members. England and France espoused the American position. Turkish as well as Greek diplomacy followed their allies' guidelines. During his visit to Belgrade (20–26 January 1953), Fuad Köprülü made clear to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović, that a tripartite military agreement should come up as the final outcome of a procedure that would lead to Yugoslavia's admission to NATO; however, he did not set any timetable.¹¹ As an alternative, Nuri Bigri, the Turkish deputy foreign minister, suggested the signing of a political treaty of friendship and cooperation without any military terms, so that it could pave the way for a military alliance.¹² Showing flexibility, Tito accepted the proposals for the signing of a tripartite treaty of friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece without any military obligations. From his point of view, such an agreement would satisfy public opinion in Yugoslavia and would have positive effects on the psychological propaganda war against the Soviets.¹³

Returning from Belgrade, Köprülü visited Athens (26–30 January 1953) and informed Papagos and Stefanos Stefanopoulos, the Greek foreign minister, about his new initiative regarding the treaty of friendship and cooperation. The Greek side agreed on promoting such an initiative. In his visit to Yugoslavia (3–7 February 1953), Stefanopoulos officially announced the Greek position: tripartite negotiations for the signing of a political

¹⁰ See FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 610, no. 318, The Counselor of Embassy in Turkey (Roontree) to the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) at Istanbul, Ankara, January 16, 1953. Suggested line to take with Foreign Minister Koprulu upon Yugoslavia.

¹¹ See Terzić, *Balkanski pakt*, 247.

¹² *Ibid.*, 248.

¹³ FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 613, no. 320, The Ambassador in Greece (Peurofory) to the Department of State, Athens, January 28, 1953. Discussion between the American ambassador and Köprülü during his short stay in Athens on his return from Belgrade. Köprülü presented the proposal for a tripartite friendship treaty as Tito's idea. However, it was Turkey's initiative.

treaty and continuation of discussions in order to reach the conclusion of a military treaty.¹⁴ Immediately after that, a tripartite military conference was held in Ankara (17–20 February 1953), while on 20 February 1953 summit talks between the foreign ministers of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey were conducted in Athens. On 28 February 1953 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Ankara by the foreign minister of Greece, Stefanos Stefanopoulos, Turkey, Fuad Köprülü, and Yugoslavia, Koča Popović. The terms of the treaty provided mutual efforts of the Signatories to maintain peace and to examine in common security issues, extension of cooperation in economic, technical and cultural matters, and peaceful settlement of differences. Greece and Turkey would maintain their rights and obligations towards NATO, while the General Staffs of the three countries would cooperate to make suggestions to their governments on security and defence issues and to coordinate the decision-making.¹⁵

For the Yugoslav leadership it was self-evident that NATO would support Yugoslavia if the country was under attack. Visiting Great Britain in March 1953, Tito discussed Balkan and European security issues with Winston Churchill and Antony Eden. Tito pointed out that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia would not only trigger regional war but could also turn into a global conflict; he asked for western military support for Yugoslavia and explained the reasons he was opposing Yugoslavia's accession to NATO. The British leaders pledged military aid in case of a threat to Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and revealed a plan for the transformation of the Balkan Pact into a Mediterranean Pact with Italy's participation, after the settlement of the Trieste question.¹⁶

The Balkan Pact was ratified by the three countries (on 28 March 1953 by the Greek and Yugoslav Parliament and on 18 May 1953 by the Turkish parliament) and on 24 June Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey published a declaration on common strategy in facing the new political and military challenges. The first conference of the foreign ministers was held in Athens from 7 to 11 July 1953. Stefanopoulos, Köprülü and Popović decided to establish a Permanent Secretariat, they stressed the peaceful policy

¹⁴ See Tsardanidis, "Η Ελλάδα και το Βαλκανικό Σύμφωνο", 219–220.

¹⁵ See *Balkanski pakt*, ed. Terzić, 311–313.

¹⁶ Djordje Borozan, "Jugoslovensko-britanski razgovori u Beogradu 1953. i Londonu 1953. godine", *Istorija XX veka* 21 (1997), 113–127. Early in 1953 the Soviets were, indeed, elaborating Tito's assassination either in Belgrade or at the Yugoslav embassy in London during the Yugoslav leader's visit to London. Regarding this issue see relevant document at: wilsoncenter.org/index, *Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collection: Yugoslavia in the Cold War. Stalin's Plan to Assassinate Tito (01/01/1953)*. After Stalin's death the plan was abandoned and Tito safely returned from London.

of their countries towards neighbouring states, mainly as far as Albania's territorial integrity was concerned, and entrusted the General Staffs of their countries with the study of conditions for a tripartite military cooperation. The first military conference, after the signing of the Balkan Pact, had already taken place in Athens (3–13 June 1953).

Greece attached great importance to a military alliance with Yugoslavia, but it avoided challenging Italy and fulfilled its obligations towards NATO. During the Trieste crisis in September–October 1953 Greece took a neutral stance.¹⁷ The Greek–American agreement of 12 October 1953 on the installation of American military bases on Greek soil upgraded Greece's importance within NATO and gave Athens a strategic advantage against Ankara in promoting western policies in the Balkans.¹⁸

The basic reason for signing the Balkan Pact had been the Soviet threat. The “friendship attack policy” towards the West, initiated by Nikita Khrushchev after Stalin's death (5/3/1953), the re-establishment of the Soviet–Yugoslav diplomatic relations in June 1953, the execution of Lavrenti Beriya, the powerful head of the Soviet secret police, in December 1953 and the Soviet Union's diplomatic support of Yugoslavia during the Trieste crisis in September–October 1953 temporarily created in Belgrade the impression that the Soviet threat had been eliminated. Nevertheless, since Khrushchev had not undertaken any substantial initiative for the fully-fledged normalization of the Soviet–Yugoslav relations and there was no evidence that he would cope with Stalin's closer comrades, Tito abided by the Balkan Pact and the three countries' General Staffs started negotiations (10–20 November 1953 in Belgrade, 24 March – 1 April 1954 in Ankara). They elaborated preliminary plans to form a military alliance. It was generally agreed that, if Bulgaria launched an attack against Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would automatically engage in the conflict, since they shared a common frontier with Bulgaria. Should Yugoslavia be attacked by Romania

¹⁷ In September 1953 Papagos visited Rome. On 8 October 1953 Britain and the US announced to Yugoslavia that they were going to cede the city of Trieste and zone A to Italy. Tito opposed to it and asked the Security Council to intervene. See Dora Gota, “Αλληλεπιδράσεις στους διπλωματικούς χειρισμούς του ζητήματος της Τεργέστης και των Βαλκανικών συμφωνιών του 1953–1954” [Interactions in the diplomatic management of the Trieste issue and the Balkan agreements of 1953–54], *Greek Historical Association, 29th Congress* (16–18 May 2008), *Proceedings* (Thessaloniki 2009), 372–373. The Papagos government took a neutral attitude.

¹⁸ On the Greek–American Agreement of 12 October 1953 see Ioannis Stefanidis, *Ασύμμετροι εταίροι. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και η Ελλάδα στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο 1953–1961* [Asymmetric Partners. United States and Greece in the Cold War 1953–1961] (Athens: Patakis, 2005), 199–243.

or Hungary or invaded by armed groups, Greece's and Turkey's attitude needed to be clarified.

The military alliance with Yugoslavia was regarded as a basic security matter by the Papagos government. Despite the Greek-American agreement on military bases, ground forces were expected to play a decisive role in case of war in the Balkans. In this respect, the Yugoslav army's contribution was indispensable. The Papagos government was alarmed when the Milovan Djilas case came up early in 1954. Djilas accused the Yugoslav leaders of undermining the economic system of workers' self-management due to the Communist Party and the state's pervasive influence; he called for less bureaucracy and more democracy and criticized the luxurious life of his comrades. In January 1954 Djilas was expelled from the Central Committee.¹⁹ The Djilas case was (mistakenly) understood by the Papagos government as Soviet machination against Yugoslavia. In the light of these events, Athens considered that procedures for a military alliance with Yugoslavia had to be accelerated.²⁰ Nevertheless, Washington did not share Athens' anxiety. America considered the Djilas case as an indication of western liberalism's influence on Yugoslavia, without any grave implications for Yugoslavia's foreign policy, which was balanced between the East and the West.

The United States had suggested that Athens should not be hasty in concluding a military treaty with Yugoslavia under the current circumstances, since the Trieste question had not yet been settled.²¹ However, the Papagos government ignored the American reservations when it became known that during Tito's visit to Ankara, in mid April 1954, the Yugoslav leader had discussed the transformation of the Ankara Treaty into a formal military alliance with the Turkish government without informing Athens which was merely asked for its approval.²² Greece expressed its discontent, considering that it had been pushed aside on an issue on which the Greek leaders believed that they should have been consulted.²³ In order to create

¹⁹ With a series of articles in the *Borba* daily (11/11/1953 – 7/1/1954) and a lengthy article entitled "Anatomy of Moral" in *Nova Misao* journal (January 1954) Djilas discussed the failure of so-called workers' self-management and the emergence of a new red class in Yugoslavia. Also, in an article in *Komunist* in the autumn of 1953, he expressed his doubts that the Soviet Union would ever reach real Socialism. See Slobodan Stanković, *Titos Erbe* (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1981), 89–110.

²⁰ FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 639–640, no. 336, The Ambassador to Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State, Athens, February 13, 1954, Top Secret.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 640–642, no. 337, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, Washington, February 16, 1954. Top Secret.

²² See *To Vima*, 16 April 1954.

²³ See *To Vima*, 17 April 1954.

a climate of confidence between Athens and Ankara, Fuad Köprülü immediately informed the Greek ambassador in Ankara, Ioannis Kallergis, that during the Turkish-Yugoslav negotiations the two countries had expressed only their desire to reinforce their common efforts to transform the Ankara Treaty into a military alliance; at the same time the Turkish embassy in Athens gave similar assurances to the ministry of foreign affairs' secretary Alexis Kyrou.²⁴ It is evident from the proceedings (13/4/1954) of the discussions between Tito, the president of Turkey, Celâl Bayar, the Turkish prime minister, Adnan Menderes, and the Turkish foreign minister Fuad Köprülü, that the transformation of the Ankara Treaty into a military alliance was marginally treated.²⁵ The Greek reaction came after Popović's public statement on 15 April in Ankara about the transformation of the Ankara Treaty into a military alliance. Nevertheless, after Kallergis' intervention a special reference to the Greek role was included in the communiqué that was released by Turkey and Yugoslavia on 16 April 1954.

During the discussions that were conducted in a spirit of absolute cordiality, which is indicative of the friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey, every issue — general and specific — of common interest was debated thoroughly. The necessary acquiescence of Greece, which is a valuable Signatory of the Ankara Treaty, has always been taken into account...

In that respect, the tripartite Ankara Treaty is of major significance and it is essential to upgrade its value and its effectiveness day by day...

This Treaty was concluded in a spirit of alliance and every action related to its implementation is taken towards this direction. As a result, the time has come for its transformation to a formal alliance, which depends only on the circumstances now.²⁶

The Turkish press commented on "Greek mistrust", although Greece's suspicions had been dispelled after Turkey's official explanations and Popović's statement in Constantinople that the transformation of the Balkan Pact into a military alliance would take its final shape during Marshal Tito's visit to Greece and that Turkey's opinion could be requested, if new circumstances called for it.²⁷ There was a latent antagonism between Greece and Turkey regarding each country's importance within NATO. Greece had recognized Turkey's leading role on issues regarding the Middle East and it claimed the right to have the initiative on Balkan issues. The Papagos government believed that the Greek-American agreement of 12 October 1953 had increased the importance of Greece's role. Nonetheless, after Khrushchev's

²⁴ See *To Vima*, 18 April 1954.

²⁵ See *Balkanski pakt*, ed. Terzić, 630–635.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 639.

²⁷ See *To Vima*, 20 April 1954.

statement that the Soviet Union had no territorial differences with Turkey, Athens considered that Bulgaria and the Soviet Union constituted a greater threat for Greece and Yugoslavia.

In view of Tito's visit to Athens, Yugoslavia's ministry of foreign affairs drew up a special memorandum regarding several important issues which, apart from the main question of the military alliance, could be brought into discussion. Such issues, relating to Greek-Yugoslav relations, were the free zone of Thessaloniki, the "Macedonian minority" in Greece, the problem of the monks in the Serbian monastery of Chilandar and the proposal of a Greek deputy, Matsas, for the establishment of a Balkan Consultative Assembly.²⁸

Regarding the free zone of Thessaloniki Yugoslavia claimed the right to choose the workmen for loading and unloading merchandise from ships. Yugoslavia had the right to choose only workers who were employed within the zone. The Greek side considered that any ship entering the zone was subject to Greek legislation. Since Greece's territorial integrity within the zone was recognized by Yugoslavia, Athens considered that only Greece had the right to hire the workmen for loading and unloading ships.²⁹ The establishment of a Balkan Consultative Assembly, patterned after the Scandinavian model, was Matsas' proposal. The latter was a member of the Greek parliament from Papagos' party and chairman of the movement for Europe's unification. The problem was, according to the Yugoslav government's evaluation of the proposal, the political character attributed to the suggested Balkan Consultative Assembly. Matsas envisaged an enlarged Balkan Consultative Assembly with the participation of Bulgaria, Albania and Romania. These countries would be represented by political anticommunist emigration, not by deputies of their formal Parliaments. The Balkan Consultative Assembly's main purpose was to wrest Bulgaria, Albania and Romania away from the Soviet orbit. Although the Balkan Consultative Assembly was formally a non-governmental organization, its political anti-Soviet propaganda would cause strong reactions in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania with the real danger of undermining Yugoslavia's efforts to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union. Taking these parameters into consideration, Yugoslavia had to request some clarifications regarding the character and objectives of the Balkan Consultative Assembly.³⁰ As far as

²⁸ Belgrade, Arhiv Predsednika Republike (APR) [Archive of the President of the Republic], Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR) [Office of the President of the Republic] I-2/3, Put Josipa Broza Tita u Grčku [Josip Broz Tito's visit to Greece], 2-6/6/1954. Materijal za političke razgovore.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

the Serbian monastery of Chilandar was concerned, Yugoslavia should demand the increase of the number of Serbian monks in order to prevent its "Hellenization".³¹ Finally, the problem of the Macedonian minority took a central position in the Memorandum. A special mention was made to its non-recognition by the Greek government, to the regime of "terrorism" in Northern Greece, to the emigration wave of the Slavomacedonians to Australia, to the Greek Legislative Act, introduced in August 1953, concerning the colonization of Greek borderlands and property confiscation of the Aegeans who participated in the Civil War and abandoned Greece. The Greek consulate in Skopje was accused of espionage and obstructionism in issuing visas to Slavomacedonian businessmen.³² Greek authorities were blamed for rejecting Yugoslavia's request for the repatriation of Macedonians from Greece that had found shelter in Yugoslavia as political refugees (23,000). A diplomatic incident that occurred on the 2nd of August 1953, anniversary of Ilinden, was also mentioned. The Greek consul, Iraklidis, left the National Museum in protest due to the presentation of a map which included the Greek region of Macedonia within the borders of Yugoslav Macedonia, where the Ilinden uprising took place. The Greek ambassador in Belgrade, Spyros Kapetanidis, submitted a diplomatic note to the Yugoslav ministry of foreign affairs regarding this map. The Yugoslav memorandum did warn of the negative consequences for Greek-Yugoslav relations which could ensue from the circulation of the journal *Glas na Egejcite* [The Voice of the Aegeans] by "Aegean" refugees in Skopje. With its incendiary articles against Greece and America, the above magazine sapped Yugoslavia's foreign policy towards Greece because: 1) it provided the Greek side with arguments to accuse the People's Republic of Macedonia of undermining the Balkan Pact; 2) it sabotaged the Yugoslav government's efforts to claim better conditions for Macedonians living in Greece; 3) it helped Greece justify its measures to assimilate the Macedonian population. Thus, the replacement of the editorial board was considered to be imperative. Last but not least, the Memorandum suggested that the Macedonia minority issue would be settled by promoting bilateral cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia and that the Yugoslav delegation had to raise this question during Tito's visit to Greece. Yugoslavia should explicitly reject any territorial claims on Greece and accept the current borderline as definitive,

but on condition that the Greek government, in a spirit of understanding and friendship, will provide members of the Macedonian minority with the usual minority rights (right to use their mother tongue in public and in court, education in the Macedonian language in primary and secondary

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

schools, lifting of discriminatory policies and repatriation of refugees from Aegean Macedonia living in Yugoslavia) ... Even if neither side raises the problem during the forthcoming discussions, we will stick to our position. That is mainly to make possible the repatriation of refugees from Greek Macedonia and to thwart the implementation of the colonization law.³³

It is evident that Yugoslavia linked up the inviolability of the Greek-Yugoslav border with the recognition of Macedonian minority by Greek government. Tito did not intend to broach the Macedonian issue during his forthcoming visit to Greece, due to the delicate nature of the Greek-Yugoslav relations. Since it was impossible for Papagos to raise an issue that did not exist from the Greek point of view, it was certain that the Macedonian question would be overlooked during the discussions. It had been already discussed. The map of Greater Macedonia during the celebrations of Ilinden's anniversary on the 2nd of August 1953 and the Greek Legislative Act regarding the borderland colonization in August 1953 had given both sides the opportunity to exchange their views on this matter. The Yugoslav side connected the law on colonization with Papagos' visit to Rome and the supposedly pro-Italian Greek attitude towards the Trieste problem. Concerning the Greek "Legislative Act for borderland colonization and support to its population", the opinion of Yugoslavia's Legal Council made clear that the act was not discriminatory since it affected all Greek citizens. Besides, Yugoslavia could not interfere in Greece's internal affairs.³⁴ Regarding the map of Greater Macedonia in the Museum of the Liberation Struggle, Yugoslavia's ministry of foreign affairs explained that the map depicted merely the areas where the battles of 1903 were fought; it was a map of historical importance and a museum exhibit.³⁵

The Papagos government bypassed Italy's objections to Tito's visit. Stefanos Stefanopoulos made clear to the Italian embassy in Athens that the Balkan Pact had no anti-Italian spearhead and it would reinforce Balkan defence and NATO's strategy as well. Italy had no reason to speak out against the Balkan Alliance, since it had already accepted the Balkan Pact that aimed at the formation of an alliance. He denied any connection of the envisaged Balkan Alliance with the Trieste problem, pointing out that Italy and Yugoslavia had enough time to settle the Trieste problem until the formation of the alliance. The Greek foreign minister concluded that Greece,

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See Kostas Katsanos, *Το Μακεδονικό και η Γιουγκοσλαβία. Πλήρη τα απόρρητα γιουγκοσλαβικά έγγραφα 1950-1967* [The Macedonian question and Yugoslavia. Classified Yugoslav documents 1950-1967] (Thessaloniki: Association of Macedonian Studies, 2009), 90-91.

³⁵ Ibid., 92.

Turkey and Yugoslavia would keep NATO's Council informed regarding their decisions.³⁶

On 2 June Tito sailed into Piraeus on the Yugoslav yacht "Galeb", accompanied by Popović. When the Yugoslav yacht entered Greek territorial waters, it was escorted by the Greek destroyers "Aetos" and "Panther". "Galeb" sailed along the coast of Corfu and when it approached the island of Vido where a Serbian military cemetery is located, Tito cast a wreath in the sea with the inscription "For World War I heroes". When Tito and Popović disembarked in Piraeus, they were welcomed by prime minister Papagos, King Pavlos and others.³⁷

On 3 June Greek-Yugoslav discussions began at the ministry of foreign affairs. The Greek side was represented by Papagos, Stefanopoulos, Alexis Kyrou, the secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, Christos Kapetanidis, the Greek ambassador in Belgrade, and G. Christopoulos, the head of Balkan affairs at the foreign ministry. Yugoslavia was represented by Tito, Popović, Radoš Jovanović, the Yugoslav ambassador in Athens, and Djura Ninčić, Popović's advisor.

Papagos characterized Tito's visit as proof of Greek-Yugoslav friendship and the Yugoslav leader's strong personality as the best symbol of Yugoslavia's willingness to fight for freedom and independence on the Greek people's side. He pointed out that Moscow's imperialistic plans still existed, since the Russians had never renounced their objective to conquer the civilized world, they had only modified their methods and tactics for domestic policy reasons. Thus, the evolution of the Balkan Pact into an alliance constituted a historical step forward, as he himself had underscored the necessity of an alliance between Greece and Yugoslavia in 1950-51.³⁸ The Greek prime minister rejected that there was any connection between the Balkan Alliance and the Trieste problem, on which the Greek government kept a neutral stance and desired the best solution; however Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia would not be hostages of this issue. After these general remarks, Papagos came to more substantial issues, regarding the functioning of the Balkan Alliance. He suggested the establishment of an experts' committee to carve out the alliance on the basis of the following principles. 1) A local conflict can quickly grow into a regional one. 2) An attack against one country is considered to be an attack against the other two. An enemy state is the one that launches an attack no matter whether it is Hungary, Romania,

³⁶ *To Vima*, 2 June 1954.

³⁷ *To Vima*, 3 June 1954.

³⁸ APR-KPR, I-2/3, Zabeleška o razgovorima Predsednika Republike s Pretsednikom grčke vlade, maršalom Papagosom, vodjenim u Atini 3.VI.1954, u prostorijama grčkog Ministarstva inostranih poslova u 17 časova.

Bulgaria or the Soviet Union attacking from the Black Sea or the Caucasus. The experts' committee would assess whether there would be a distinction between cases where the attacking country had a common border with the three allies, where the common defence policy should automatically be applied, and cases where there were no common borders. In case there were common borders, there would be some automatic response mechanisms, and it is understandable that the three countries should follow the situation and take the necessary measures, such as mobilisation and concentration of troops. It is a task for the experts to prepare a common defence plan until the next foreign ministers' conference. In the second case, that the allied states had no common borders with the attacking state, a regulation could be adopted similar to Article 5 of the NATO treaty. 3) The relations between the Balkan Alliance and NATO or the European Defence Community [the European army that was being considered, a French-German plan that did not yield any results, S.S.], had to be specified. In his conclusion, Papagos proposed the establishment of a Balkan Consultative Assembly, according to the Scandinavian model. Each country could send a delegation of 15 to 20 members of their national parliaments. The purpose of this assembly would be to examine thoroughly all issues of common interest not only for the governments, but also for the peoples.³⁹

Tito expressed his satisfaction at meeting Papagos in person and sharing his views. He was pleased to accept Papagos' suggestion for the Balkan Alliance defence system's automatism that should be activated without any hesitation. He also denied any connection between the Balkan Alliance and the Trieste problem and rejected, as unrealistic, any allegation that Yugoslavia was attempting to exploit the Balkan Alliance in order to strengthen its position on the Trieste problem. His visit to Athens did not aim at the direct signing of a military agreement, but at promoting the alliance case, that would be undertaken by experts from the three countries. He agreed with Papagos that there were external threats and for this reason a tripartite military cooperation agreement, as well as a Balkan Consultative Assembly,

³⁹ Ibid. Article 5 of NATO's Charter defines that "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

were necessary. He admitted that the Soviet policy had not undergone any radical change and that it exploited western countries' weaknesses. The Soviet-Yugoslav relations had not been normalized yet and for this reason Tito stressed the need of a Balkan Alliance:

We consented to their initiatives to normalize our relations. However, there was not any serious step taken by their side, although we reestablished our diplomatic relations last year. Not only is there no progress in the normalization process, but they have not taken any serious action to bring our relations to the level they should be between countries of a different system. Soviet-Yugoslav relations are a miniature of the Soviet Union's policy towards the world. Soviet policy should not hypnotize us and I agree that we must stay alert – they have changed their tactics but their purpose is still the same. Meanwhile, I repeat that our three countries must form this alliance, even if changes occur. Anyone who has good intentions should not fear our alliance.⁴⁰

Commenting on the political conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern countries after Stalin's death, Tito characterized them as unstable and fluid. Regarding the European Defence Community, the Yugoslav leader pointed out that his country had a positive attitude towards it, although he believed that it would be a mistake if this new organization had exclusively military responsibilities, without developing any mechanism that could help European countries overcome their economic difficulties.⁴¹ However, he stated that Yugoslavia, despite its positive attitude towards the European Defence Community, did not desire accession to NATO for the time being:

That does not mean we do not recognize NATO's positive role. We do not wish to join this organization for specific reasons, but this does not mean that there should not be cooperation with NATO. Such cooperation can take many forms, without any obligation for Yugoslavia to join this organization. There can be a different way of cooperation, either directly between Yugoslavia and NATO or through the Balkan Alliance. Yugoslavia is a member of this defence system. Thus, our attitude towards NATO has not changed, and that also means that we would discuss our accession to NATO, if the threat increases and becomes imminent.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid. The main reason for the establishment of a western European defensive army was to prevent Germany from forming an independent military force. Essentially it was going to be a common French-German military. The signing of the agreement for the establishment of the European Defence Community took place in Paris on 27 May 1952. The establishing members were France, Western Germany and the BENELUX countries. However, it was a stillborn establishing act. On 30 August 1954 the French parliament rejected the agreement for the establishment of the European Defence Community, with 319 votes against and 163 votes for.

⁴² Ibid.

Stefanopoulos agreed with Papagos' and Tito's positions. He stressed that the Balkan alliance was not directed against Italy and he accused Rome of making a political mistake by pretending that Yugoslavia was using the Balkan alliance for its own purposes. He made an interesting statement concerning the delicate issue of the Balkan alliance's relations with NATO:

Yugoslavia does not desire to join NATO for its own political reasons. We and Turkey are members of NATO and we have specific responsibilities towards NATO. Article 8 of NATO's Charter forbids its members to undertake any obligation that contravenes NATO's purposes. We support our view that our alliance complies with NATO's aims ... We consider that our alliance is an important deterrent force and for this reason any decision should be taken unanimously. It is a fact that Italy misinterprets our alliance. However, NATO is not a supranational union; it is a union of sovereign states. We have announced that we are willing to submit our agreement to NATO's Council. The Balkan Alliance's ties with NATO must be examined. NATO is a major force. Not only do European countries participate in it, but also America and Canada with their vast economic potential. It is important that the Balkan Alliance can count on NATO.⁴³

The Greek foreign minister stressed the importance of the European Defence Community and hinted at the likelihood of Yugoslavia's accession to western European institutions. Announcing the ending of the conference, Papagos and Tito pointed out that they had reached an agreement on all the basic issues and that the foreign ministers, in cooperation with the Turkish ambassador in Athens, could elaborate the core of the agreement and prepare a mutual communiqué.

It was evident that the Balkan Military Alliance should have three keystones, according to Papagos: 1) in case of Bulgarian attack against Greece, Yugoslavia or Turkey, the defensive mechanism of the allied countries would be automatically activated, since the three countries shared common borders with Bulgaria; 2) in case of Romanian or Hungarian attack against Yugoslavia or of Soviet attack against Turkey, a stipulation in the spirit of Article 5 of NATO's Charter should be activated, meaning that the other parties of the Balkan Alliance would take action to support the attacked state, including the use of military force; 3) the Balkan Military Alliance should be linked up with NATO. Practically, this meant that NATO as a body would assist Yugoslavia in case of Soviet attack, while Yugoslavia would take on the responsibility of supporting other NATO states, except Greece and Turkey, against a Soviet attack.

The following day, June 4th, the Greek and Yugoslav foreign ministers met the Turkish Ambassador in Athens. The purpose of the meeting was to elaborate a mutual communiqué that had already been drafted by

⁴³ Ibid.

Alexis Kyrou and Koča Popović. The contentious point was a phrase stating that the Alliance “will be established” (*sera établi*) by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the next annual conference in Belgrade. Taraj, the Turkish ambassador, anticipating Italian reactions, suggested the replacement of the expression “will be established” by the phrase “will be examined” (*examiné*). In his view, it was inappropriate to take the formation of an alliance for granted, before the Trieste issue was settled and the relations between Yugoslavia and NATO were clarified.⁴⁴ In their response, Stefanopoulos and Kyrou emphasized the ambivalence of the term “established” and argued that it could be interpreted in a broader sense. “Establishment” did not necessarily mean the “signing” of the Alliance Treaty, but the completion of the procedures. The relations between Yugoslavia and NATO should be regulated after the Trieste issue was settled. Stefanopoulos compared Yugoslavia’s position within the Balkan Alliance with that of West Germany within the European Defence Community and insisted that the experts’ committee should have finished their work by the next meeting of foreign ministers.⁴⁵ The Turkish ambassador needed some time to consult his government, before announcing his approval of the communiqué.⁴⁶

The next meeting of foreign ministers was scheduled for July 1954. By setting a timetable for the formation of the Balkan Alliance, Greece and Yugoslavia exerted pressure on Italy to speed up the negotiations to settle the Trieste issue. If the Turkish proposal was adopted, Koča Popović believed that Italy would keep stalling the settlement of the Trieste issue.

The following day, 5 June, Stefanopoulos and Popović with their staff examined bilateral issues. The Yugoslav minister raised the question of Yugoslav industrial products exports to Greece, the foundation of a Balkan Institute, the Balkan Consultative Assembly, the free zone of Thessaloniki and the monastery of Chilandar.⁴⁷ Stefanopoulos responded that 1) he would inform the Federation of Greek Industries about the imports of Yugoslav products by Greece; 2) both governments should define the matters the Balkan Consultative Assembly had to tackle; 3) the aims of the Balkan Institute should be clear. This question had already been raised by Popović during his discussions with Köprülü on 17 April. The latter envisaged the Balkan Institute as a “think-tank” that would carry out scientific research on

⁴⁴ APR-KPR I-2/3. Zabeleška sa sastanka održanog u grčkom Ministarstva inostranih poslova 4.VI.1954 u 11 časova radi izrade kominikea o boravku Pretsednika Republike u Grčkoj.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ APR-KPR I-2/3. Zabeleška o sastanku održanom u Ministarstvu inostranih poslova Grčke 5.VI.1954 god. u 11 časova.

substantial issues the Balkan countries were facing. As a historian, Köprülü had accepted Popović's proposal; 4) As regards the free zone of Thessaloniki, Stefanopoulos shared Popović's view that Yugoslav officials entrusted with administrative duties in the zone would be exempted from taxes and tariffs. However, they were not entitled to select the workers within the zone, according to the Greek legislation. Popović did not object; 5) As regards the monastery of Chilandar, Stefanopoulos accepted Yugoslavia's request for the numerical increase of Serbian monks and the maintenance of the monastery's historic monuments and relics.⁴⁸

Popović avoided broaching the issue of the Macedonian minority in Greece. When Kyrou referred to the corrosive role of the journal *The Voice of the Aegeans* that undermined the efforts of both countries to boost Greek-Yugoslav relations, Popović tried to play down the matter, by distancing himself from this journal, but he admitted that its publications had had a negative effect on the Greek-Yugoslav relations and revealed that the Yugoslav government planned to change the editorial board.⁴⁹

Kyrou sounded out Popović on Yugoslavia's attitude towards the Cyprus question, in case Greece decided to bring the issue to the UN. He explained that Greece aimed at the internationalization of the Cyprus question without giving to this political motion any anti-British character, moreover it wanted to stress that the Cyprus question had been left in abeyance and affected the relations of the two UN member-states. Kyrou pointed out that Turkey had not expressed its official position yet, and despite the negative comments in the Turkish press, Greece did not expect that Turkey would speak out against the internationalization of the Cyprus question. Nevertheless, Greece would stick to its decision in spite of Turkey's attitude. Popović responded that Yugoslavia would carve out its policy when Greece raised the question, but he stated in advance that the principle of self-determination was the keystone of Yugoslavia's foreign policy.⁵⁰

Should Turkey not accept the formula "establishment" for the Balkan Alliance, Kyrou pointed out that the paragraph referring to Turkey's consensus would be omitted and the communiqué would reflect only the Greek and the Yugoslav position. But during the discussions the Turkish ambassador contacted the delegations, stating that his government had accepted the text of the communiqué as it had been drafted by Kyrou and Popović. Thus, they agreed that each country would set up a committee of three to four experts (legal advisors, military officers, diplomats) to draft the final text

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

of the Military Agreement.⁵¹ In his response to Kyrou's and Stefanopoulos' questions regarding the Balkan Military Alliance's relations with NATO, Popović argued that this was not a priority issue, since the three countries had the necessary forces to repel an attack. The West would provide material support irrespective of Yugoslavia's relations with NATO. Stefanopoulos agreed and emphasized that the Council of NATO would be kept informed about the forthcoming signing of the Military Alliance Treaty.⁵² The text of the communiqué was as follows:

At the invitation of the King of Greece, President Josip Broz Tito arrived in Athens on 2 June 1954 for an official visit, escorted by Mr. Koča Popović, minister of foreign affairs. During the discussions that Marshal Tito had with prime minister Alexandros Papagos and foreign minister Mr. S. Stefanopoulos the international situation was thoroughly examined in the light of recent events.

These discussions, conducted in a warm atmosphere, demonstrated once more the close friendship between Yugoslavia and Greece and proved the consensus of their opinions on all the issues that were examined.

The examination of specific issues of common interest for both countries proved harmonious bilateral relations and made clear their willingness to stabilize them. We expressed our desire to extend our constructive cooperation on a political, economic and cultural level. It was concluded that the progress made to this day on an economic level is very satisfactory and that the spirit of sincere and complete cooperation, on which our relations are based, justifies our optimism for a fruitful future.

Major international problems were examined with consideration of their effect on both countries' interests and on peacekeeping in Europe. It was admitted that the current international situation prompted the members of the tripartite Ankara Agreement to stay alert. It required their close and systematic cooperation.

In the belief of all Signatories of the Ankara Agreement it is the first step to a closer and more effective cooperation. Moving precisely towards this direction both governments, in absolute accordance with the Turkish government, agreed to complete the Tripartite Agreement by forming an official alliance, in order to stabilize peace in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. For this purpose we decided that the alliance should be established (*sera établie*) by the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the forthcoming annual conference in Belgrade.

Desiring to extend the popular basis of the tripartite Ankara Agreement, both governments also agreed, following Marshal Papagos' proposal, to establish a Tripartite Consultative Assembly, consisting of equal numbers of Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav members of the Parliaments. It will convene in the three capitals by rotation.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

The Turkish government has been kept informed through its Ambassador about the abovementioned discussions and has expressed its complete approval.⁵³

Comparing Ankara's communiqué to Athens' communiqué, it is obvious that the latter was stronger and more comprehensive. Papagos' government wanted to play the leading role in the formation of the Balkan Alliance, indicating that Greece superseded Turkey in Balkan affairs within NATO.

On 5 June Popović held a press conference for Greek and foreign journalists at the Yugoslav embassy. He distanced the Trieste problem from the signing of the Balkan Alliance and expressed his belief that there was no difference between announcing the signing of the agreement and its actual signing during the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers without Yugoslavia's accession into NATO being necessary.⁵⁴ Concerning the Macedonian issue, he stated that it was no impediment for the development of excellent relations between the two countries. Regarding the Greek government's intention to internationalize the Cyprus problem he pointed out that Yugoslavia would specify its position when Greece made its appeal to the UN, however he made it clear that the principles of self-determination and emancipation were underlying Yugoslavia's foreign policy.⁵⁵

Tito's visit to Greece was welcomed by the western press (with Italy's reservation), but it was criticized, as expected, by eastern European press and radio stations. They treated it as an attempt to implement the new American strategy of linking up the Balkan Alliance with the European Defence community and to NATO.⁵⁶ Hatching a conspiracy theory they connected Tito's visit to Ankara and Athens with Adenauer's previous visit to Greece and Turkey; on its broadcast of 7 June Sofia's radio station suggested that the Balkan Military Alliance aimed at the formation of a great anti-Soviet bloc with the participation of Hitler's renewed army in West Germany and Franco's executioners of the Spanish people. Yugoslavia's haste to forge the Military Alliance before the solution of the Trieste problem did not reflect Belgrade's will to maintain good relations with the Balkan states. "The Balkan Military Alliance will become a weapon to exacerbate the tension in this area of the world and to stifle the people's struggle for peace and true international security."⁵⁷ On the occasion of Tito's visit to Greece, the Bul-

⁵³ *To Vima*, 6 June 1954.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ APR-KPR I-2/3. Pregled pisanja inostranih agencija i štampe od 30. maja do 5. juna o poseti druga predsednika Grčkoj i o balkanskom savezu.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

garian press reported that citizens were arrested by the police in Athens.⁵⁸ It referred to a small group of pro-Soviet communists who regarded Tito as a traitor of socialism and held him responsible for the defeat of the Democratic Army.

From the Greek side, Tito's visit to Athens was a diplomatic success. The Balkan Alliance project was put forward there. The Yugoslav side made concessions on bilateral issues, such as the free zone of Thessaloniki. Besides, neither the "Macedonian minority" issue nor the lifting of the Legislation Act had been raised. Popović understood that the journal *The Voice of the Aegeans* with its anti-Greek and anti-American articles undermined Yugoslav foreign policy and in a short time its publication was banned.⁵⁹ Further, he assured Greece that Yugoslavia would support Cypriot self-determination. Tito dispelled all Greek suspicions that Yugoslavia had territorial claims on Greece. He visited the Acropolis, he entertained the Greek opposition leaders in Megaro Maximou (the prime minister's residence in Athens), he gifted horses to the Greek Royal family and he inspected the Greek fleet in Salamina accompanied by King Pavlos. The Greek press distanced the Trieste problem from the Balkan Pact, pointing out that they were completely different issues.

Does Italy consider that it could ever go to war with Yugoslavia over Trieste? But our Allies and their Allies are never going to allow this war to break out for many reasons and for one vital one. Trieste is under international supervision. And any violation of this status would mean a war against those who guarantee the order in this unsafe region ... Diplomacy is easy, when it is exercised on the banks of the Thames or the Potomac. But here we have the Danube and the Evros. And Marshal Papagos pointed this out in one of his recent interviews regarding the purposes of the Balkan Alliance: in order to be fruitful, the Alliance must be equally interested in both the Danube and the Evros.⁶⁰

Tito returned to Yugoslavia via Thessaloniki. Accompanied by King Pavlos he sailed on the cruiser "Elli" to Thessaloniki, where he was welcomed by the minister of Northern Greece and the authorities of the city. He laid a wreath at the Serbian cemetery in honour of those who had fallen during the First World War, and he attended the military parade at Sedes airport. Obviously, with these symbolic actions Tito aimed at demonstrat-

⁵⁸ *Rabotničko delo*, 2 June 1954.

⁵⁹ See Iakovos Mihailidis, "Οικοδομώντας το παρελθόν. Σλαβομακεδόνες πολιτικοί πρόσφυγες στη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας: Μια πρώτη προσέγγιση" [Building up the past. Slavomacedonian political refugees. A first approach.], *Istor* 13 (2002), 118.

⁶⁰ *Kathimerini*, 6 June 1954.

ing that the planned Balkan Alliance followed past Greek-Serbian alliances' tradition, since it turned against their "common enemy", Bulgaria. The newspaper *Ellinikos Vorras* (Greek North) hastened to characterize Tito as a *hajduk*-fighter who continued the traditional Greek-Serbian friendship.

Greece has never fought against Serbia, since the emancipation of both nations. On the contrary, these two nations have always fought side by side, when there was a struggle for freedom. In Pirot there are hundreds of Greek soldiers' tombs, who fell during the struggle for Serbia's liberation, and in Thessaloniki rest Serbian soldiers, who fought side by side with their Greek brothers to dam the German-Bulgarian torrent during World War I ... Yugoslav peoples were too proud to open the gates through which Hitler's armies would fire on us. And they revolted. The *hajduks'* descendants, the Greeks' fellow-soldiers during World War I, marched to Belgrade and overthrew the dishonest men and the traitors. And the Yugoslavs held our hand and walked with us to Golgotha ... Marshal Tito, a popular hero, has also been a *hajduk*, who slept many times with a rifle in his arms, before entering the Presidential Residence in Belgrade. And when he was convinced that the Kremlin's communism was the greatest betrayal for the workers and peasants and a pretence for the imposition of Russian imperialism, he acted according to the moral and material interests of Yugoslavia: he applied to the sincere friends of his country, among which Greece has been the longest and the best tested.⁶¹

Tito was never a *hajduk* but a partisan. The *hajduk* tradition was claimed by the Serbians *chetniks* of Draža Mihajlović during the Second World War. The military coup of 27 March 1941 had been hatched by the Serbian military rather than the "Yugoslav peoples" as a whole, and it was celebrated only by the Serbs. Tito had no intention of selling out communism. However, under those new conditions it was important to create an impression that Tito's Yugoslavia was continuing the tradition of the Greek-Serbian alliance, despite any ideological differences. Tito sent the same message. He left Thessaloniki and returned to Belgrade by train via Skopje, obviously suggesting that Greece and Yugoslavia constituted a common defence space. Delivering a speech in Skopje, on 7 June, Tito explained the reasons for his visit to Greece:

I know what you are interested in. You would like to know something about the success of our visit, of our mission. And you know most of it having read about it in the daily press. As far as I am concerned, I may emphasize once more all that has been made known and published — and that is that our mission has been a success. We went to friendly Greece to prepare the way for the completion of an undertaking which has been our goal for several years and we have succeeded in this. The Greek people and their leading officials had the same target and were waiting impatiently for

⁶¹ *Ellinikos Vorras*, 6 June 1954.

this day to come when the road of our cooperation was to be determined more precisely, the way in which our security was to be protected, for our freedom and peaceful development.⁶²

In such circumstances it did not make sense for Tito to raise the Macedonian issue. Nine years earlier, in October 1945, in a speech delivered in Skopje Tito had stood up for the “Macedonian people’s” right to be united.⁶³ Speaking at a similar rally in Belgrade, Tito justified the Balkan Alliance with the imminent danger to Yugoslavia’s security:

One would wonder, well, you say every day that the danger of war is gradually decreasing, that the war danger has passed. It is not true that it has passed, but it is less than it was, and tomorrow it will be lesser, and I do not believe at all that it is near. However, this does not mean that we have not undertaken all possible measures in order to be able to prevent any possible danger, by our unity, by our readiness to defend our independence, our freedom and our integrity.⁶⁴

On 10 June 1954 Belgrade’s Federal Parliament ratified the results of Tito’s visit to Athens.

The forthcoming formation of the Balkan Alliance caused alarm in Moscow, since the likelihood of Yugoslavia’s accession to NATO could no longer be excluded. The re-establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav diplomatic relations had not been followed by any substantial Soviet initiative for the normalization of the relations. Therefore Tito was still suspicious of Khrushchev. The Soviets were willing to prevent Yugoslavia’s accession to NATO. The opening of Greek-Bulgarian negotiations on resetting the borderline in 1953 was undoubtedly part of the Soviet strategy to involve Bulgaria more into Balkan affairs in the aftermath of the Ankara Treaty. Vâlko Červrenkov, Bulgaria’s prime minister and secretary general of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was invited to Moscow in early June 1953. The Soviet leadership requested Bulgaria to pursue a dynamic Balkan policy and mainly to normalize its relations with Yugoslavia as a capitalistic state,⁶⁵ that is, practically to accept the Yugoslav road to socialism (workers’ self-management). In the

⁶² *Borba*, 8 June 1954.

⁶³ Spyridon Sfetas, *Η διαμόρφωση της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη διαδικασία* [The configuration of the Slavomacedonian identity. A painful procedure] (Thessaloniki: Vaniias, 2003), 202–203.

⁶⁴ *Borba*, 8 June 1954.

⁶⁵ Evgenia Kalinova & Iskra Baeva, *Bâlgarskite prehodi 1939–2002* (Sofia: Paradigma, 2002), 199. On Bulgaria’s attitude towards the 1953–1958 Soviet-Yugoslavian rapprochement see Evgenia Kalinova, “Bâlgarija i sâvetskoto-jugoslavskoto ‘sblizavane’ 1953–1958 g.”, in *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961*, ed. Slobodan Selinić (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 118–137.

second half of 1953 diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were re-established and commercial transactions started. Besides, Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations were re-established on 22 May 1954 at the level of *chargé d'affaires* instead of ambassadors, due to Bulgaria's reluctance to pay off the war reparations it owed to Greece.⁶⁶

The re-establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav, Bulgarian-Yugoslav and Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations did not prevent Athens and Belgrade from promoting the negotiations to transform the Balkan Pact into a military alliance. Tito's visit to Athens perturbed both Sofia and Moscow. Trying to frustrate Yugoslavia's accession to NATO, Khrushchev thought it was advisable to send a message to Belgrade that Moscow had no aggressive plans against Yugoslavia. On 17 June 1954 *Rabotničesko Delo*, the official Bulgarian newspaper, published an article with the title "The Bulgarian people have always favoured peace and good relations with the neighbours". It emphasized Bulgaria's efforts to normalize its relations with Greece and Yugoslavia and confirmed that Bulgaria applied a peaceful policy.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria is maintaining multilateral friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other People's Republics. Regarding the capitalist countries Bulgaria's policy is based on the principle that social system differences should not be an obstacle to peaceful relations among the peoples. Bulgaria is widening actual cooperation with these countries on the basis of mutual interests and respect for their national independence and sovereignty. Bulgaria's foreign policy efforts aim at consolidating peace in the Balkans. Bulgaria genuinely wishes to re-establish relations of good neighbourliness with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. On the 9th of September, in his opening speech for the 9th anniversary of the people's uprising, Comrade Váiko Červrenkov stated that our people's government wishes to settle all the outstanding questions with its neighbours — Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. We do not have any aggressive plans against anyone. We do not want to impose our social system on anyone. We want to have good relations with them and we are willing, on the principle of mutual respect, to discuss the settlement of disputed issues, to wipe out any misunderstanding and to re-establish relations of good neighbourliness. The past has proved that our country's initiative for peace was absolutely

⁶⁶ See the Greek-Bulgarian declaration in Paris regarding the reestablishment of Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations, in V. Kontis *et al.*, eds., *Σοβιετική Ένωση και Βαλκάνια στις δεκατίες 1950 και 1960. Συλλογή εγγράφων* [Soviet Union and the Balkans in 1950–1960. A collection of documents] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2003), 16–18. On the diplomatic background, see Georgi Daskalov, *Bálgarija i Gárcija. Ot razrivakám pomirenie 1944–1964* (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2003), 228–249.

realistic and that all efforts to mitigate tensions and to restore good relations with our neighbours have led to positive results...⁶⁷

The article highlighted the re-establishment of Bulgarian-Yugoslav and Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations and concluded:

Ideological differences cannot be an obstacle for communication between peoples. Our people appreciate the contribution of every nation, big or small, to our global cultural treasure. Extensive cultural exchanges among countries could reveal the potential for a direct acquaintance with every nation's achievements and it could, consequently, lead to putting aside all misunderstanding and distrust. The People's Republic of Bulgaria supports, and will continue to support, such contacts with all countries on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect. Our country will do everything that depends on it to consolidate peace in the Balkans; it is convinced that the consolidation of peace in this part of Europe constitutes a substantial contribution to the efforts of mankind to consolidate peace worldwide. Our country will keep trying to seek the settlement of all disputes and it will keep working on the reestablishment of relations of good neighbourliness with Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece.⁶⁸

The article surprised diplomatic circles. It was the first time that Bulgaria, contrary to its former attitude, neither referred to the Balkan Pact nor spoke out against it.⁶⁹ As the Yugoslav ambassador in Sofia Mita Miljković found out, the article had been written by the Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs Minčo Nejšev, who also confirmed that the article had been approved by Červrenkov and could be considered as a keystone of Bulgaria's foreign policy.⁷⁰ There was no doubt that Bulgaria was acting by Soviet command. The "de-Stalinization" in Bulgaria had already begun. At the Sixth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (18/2 – 3/3/1954) Červrenkov had lost his position as the party's general secretary, but he kept his position as prime minister. The new first secretary Todor Živkov, nominated by Khrushchev, had not yet asserted himself within the party and until 1956 he played a marginal role in Červrenkov's shade. Bulgaria was worrying that Yugoslavia would soon raise the Macedonian issue, as it had done in 1944–48, i.e. that it would demand the secession of the Bulgarian part of Macedonia and its annexation to the "People's Republic of Macedonia" in exchange for the

⁶⁷ "Bălgarskijat narod stoj tvărdo za mir i dobri otnošeniija sâs svojite sâsedi", *Rabotničesko delo*, 17 June 1954.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ On Bulgaria's general attitude towards the Balkan Pact see Jordan Baev, "Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact (1953–1954)", in *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije*, ed. Selinić, 587–601.

⁷⁰ Mita Miljković, *Burne diplomatske godine. Iz sofijskog dnevnika 1953–1956* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1995), 116.

western outlands (Caribrod and Bossilevgrad). Nejščev had expressed these fears to Konstantinos Tranos, Greece's chargé d'affaires in Sofia.⁷¹

On 26 June, a few days after the article was published, the Soviet Union's ambassador delivered a letter from Khrushchev to Tito. Although the letter's content was not made public at that time, it could be concluded from Tito's and other Yugoslav officials' statements that Khrushchev expressed the Soviet Union's willingness to normalize bilateral relations with Yugoslavia, recognising Stalin's mistakes in 1948.⁷² Khrushchev's letter of 22 June 1954 has recently been published and it confirms that the Soviet leader stressed the need for the normalization of bilateral Soviet-Yugoslav relations after Beriya's execution and Djilas' removal.⁷³ The Soviet Union's conciliatory and peaceful attitude was perceived by Belgrade as a noticeable decrease of the Soviet threat and it undoubtedly affected Yugoslavia's attitude towards the Balkan Alliance in particular and towards the West in general. For Washington the Balkan Alliance had to be linked up with NATO⁷⁴ and its formation should coincide with the settlement of the Trieste dispute.⁷⁵ Yugoslavia separated the two issues and was reluctant to undertake any obligation towards NATO. This became clear during the expert committee's sitting in Athens (28 June – 5 July 1954), when the Yugoslav delegation objected to the Greek draft for the alliance. The preamble of the Greek draft provided that the treaty of alliance would constitute a basic factor for order and stability and that the measures which would be taken, in compliance with the United Nations Charter, would reinforce collective security. Close tripartite cooperation and cooperation with other states as well would contribute to the maintenance of international security. Article 1 referred to the necessity of strengthening collective security according to provisions of the UN Charter. Article 2 provided that the Contracting Parties should reinforce

⁷¹ Ibid., 119. After Tito's rift with Stalin Bulgaria denied the existence of Macedonian minority on its soil and opposed the creation of a Macedonian nation of anti-Bulgarian basis. See Spyridon Sfetas, *To Μακεδονικό και η Βουλγαρία. Πλήρη τα απόρρητα βουλγαρικά έγγραφα 1950–1967* [The Macedonian question and Bulgaria. Classified Bulgarian documents 1950–1967] (Thessaloniki: Association of Macedonian Studies, 2009).

⁷² See Bogetić, *Jugoslavija*, 148–149.

⁷³ See <http://www.wilsoncenter.org./index>. *Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive, Collection: Yugoslavia in the Cold War. Letter from Khrushchev to Josip Broz Tito (06/22/1954)*.

⁷⁴ FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 661–662, No. 349, The Secretary of the State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, July 8, 1954, Top Secret.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 659–660, no. 348, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, Washington, July 2, 1954, Top Secret.

their defence system, individually or collectively, and grant mutual assistance. Article 3 provided that any armed aggression against one or several of them should be considered as an aggression against all the Contracting Parties which had the right to defend themselves individually or collectively. Article 4 provided that in case Greece and Turkey were forced to take measures to meet their obligations towards NATO according to Article 5 of the Charter, Yugoslavia was bound to take proportionate measures in consultation with Greece and Turkey. Article 7 provided that the Contracting Parties were obliged to monitor the international situation and in the event of a grave deterioration to take preventive measures, proportional to the threat to their political independence and territorial sovereignty, in order to secure their mutual interests. Article 10 provided close cooperation of the Contracting Parties with international organizations which had been entrusted with the consolidation of peace and international security.⁷⁶

With their remarks the Yugoslav experts aimed at attributing an intra-Balkan character to the Balkan Alliance and loosening the links between the Balkan Alliance and NATO as far as Yugoslavia's obligations towards NATO members were concerned. They noticed that the preamble of the Greek draft made no reference to the issues of territorial integrity, independence and common security of the Balkan Alliance's member states. Article 2 was essentially accepted. In Article 4 the Yugoslav experts discerned Yugoslavia's equation with Greece and Turkey as regards their obligations towards NATO. Their thesis was that any specification of Yugoslavia's obligations to NATO should be avoided. Article 7 was considered to exceed the limits of defensive alliance and Article 10 was also labelled as a clause for cooperation between Yugoslavia and NATO.⁷⁷

Therefore, three trends emerged. Greece was striving to link up the Balkan Alliance with NATO and to involve Yugoslavia in its defence mechanisms, Yugoslavia was trying to separate the Balkan Alliance from NATO and to confine its obligations only to the Balkans, while Turkey, primarily interested in Middle East issues, did not rush for the formation of the Balkan Alliance, combining the latter with the settlement of the Trieste problem.

The "Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Support" that was signed on 9 August 1954 at Bled (Slovenia) by foreign ministers Koča Popović, Stefanos Stefanopoulos and Fuad Köprülü, balanced the Greek and the Yugoslav position. Article 2 provided that any

⁷⁶ APR-KPR 1-2/3. Ugovor o Savezu, političkoj saradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći. Grčki Projekat.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

armed aggression against one or several of the Contracting Parties, at any part of their territories, “*shall be considered as an aggression against all the Contracting Parties, which, in consequence, exercising the right of legitimate collective defence recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, shall individually or collectively render assistance to the Party or Parties attacked, undertaking in common accord and immediately all measures, including the use of armed force, which they shall deem necessary for efficacious defence*”. Article 6 provided that “*in the event of a grave deterioration of the international situation, and especially in the areas where such deterioration could have a negative effect, direct or indirect, upon security in their area, the Contracting Parties shall consult each other with a view to examining the situation and determining their attitude. ... In the event of an armed aggression against a country toward which one or several of the Contracting Parties should at any moment of the signing of the present Treaty have undertaken obligations of mutual assistance, the Contracting Parties will consult each other on the measures to be taken, in conformity with the aims of the United Nations, to meet the situation that would have thus been created in their area. It is understood that consultation provided for under this Article could also include an urgent meeting of the Permanent Council*”. Article 10 provided that “*provisions of the present Treaty do not affect, and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any way, the rights and obligations that arise for Greece and Turkey from the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949*”. A Permanent Council was established, consisting of the foreign ministers and other members of the governments of the Contracting Parties. It would be convened regularly twice a year. The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties should continue their joint work. The Treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years. If none of the Contracting Parties should cancel it one year before its terms had expired, the Treaty should be considered as tacitly prolonged for another year and so forth until cancelled by one of the Contracting Parties.⁷⁸

The Treaty had a narrow Balkan framework and Yugoslavia undertook no clear obligations towards NATO. It was not definitely obliged to provide military assistance to any NATO member that could be attacked, apart from Greece and Turkey; however, it was self-evident that NATO would collectively support Yugoslavia in case of emergency. It was obvious that Yugoslavia wanted to avoid involvement in NATO's defensive mechanisms and subordination to American military command. Yugoslavia's

⁷⁸ See the text of the Treaty in *Documents on American Foreign Policy 1954*, ed. Peter V. Curl, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers (New York 1955), 186–190.

closer relations with NATO would mar the process of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement and could be a threat to the country's communist regime.⁷⁹

With Soviet support for Yugoslavia, the Trieste dispute was basically settled in October 1954 through a Memorandum of Understanding, but the Balkan Pact proved to be stillborn. With the exacerbation of the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey in 1955 and the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in 1955–56, the Balkan Pact lost its practical significance. In May–June 1955 Khrushchev visited Belgrade, accompanied by prime minister Bulganin. He recognized the Yugoslav way to socialism (Declaration of Belgrade) and promised financial aid. Khrushchev intended to bring Yugoslavia back to the Soviet sphere of influence and to generate its accession into the Warsaw Pact. It was not coincidental that Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade took place immediately after the establishment of the Warsaw Pact. In April 1956 the Cominform was dissolved and in June 1956 Tito visited Moscow. With the Declaration of Moscow, Khrushchev recognised once again Yugoslavia's way to socialism.⁸⁰ However, Yugoslavia's foreign policy was based on the principle of equal distance from the East and Tito became leader of the non-aligned movement.

In 1956–58 there was new friction in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, mainly because of the Hungarian issue. In April 1957 at Soviet prodding Romanian prime minister Chivu Stoica submitted a proposal to the Balkan governments for a Balkan Conference in order to discuss issues of economic cooperation and collective security. With this political motion the Soviet leader aimed at further weakening the Balkan Pact, since Khrushchev had not yet ruled out the likelihood of Yugoslavia's reliance on NATO. Nevertheless, the Soviet-Yugoslav relations were soon warmed up again because of Yugoslavia's decision to support Soviet positions on international issues. Showing flexibility, Tito supported the Soviet position on the German issue and he condemned China's adventurism and the American spy war against the Soviet Union. Thus, another noticeable rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow took place in 1961–62.

These new circumstances weakened the military cooperation between Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The Permanent Council convened only once (28/2 – 3/3/1955) and focused on the establishment of the Balkan Consultative Assembly which, nevertheless, never met. The Permanent Council met by rotation in Belgrade (1954), in Ankara (1955), in Athens (1956) and

⁷⁹ On general NATO-Yugoslav relations see Bojan Dimitrijević, *Jugoslavija i NATO* (Belgrade: Vojska, 2003).

⁸⁰ On this initial phase of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations normalization see Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, comradeship, confrontation, 1953–1957* (London: Routledge, Taylor & France Group, 2011).

again in Belgrade (1957), but without any results. The Balkan Institute was not created. Suggestions to organize common military exercises, to establish a common Balkan Chamber of Commerce and to collaborate in nuclear research remained unfulfilled. The Balkan Pact was practically devitalized, although no party denounced it.

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Serbs as Threat The Extreme Negative Portrayal of the Serb “Minority” in Albanian-language Newspapers in Kosovo

Abstract: Through perpetuating negative stereotypes and rigid dichotomous identities, the media play a significant part in sustaining conflict dynamics in Kosovo. Examining their discourse in terms of ideological production and representations is crucial in order to understand the power relations between the majority and the minority, the identity politics involved in sustaining them, and the intractability of the conflict. In an effort to provide a deeper understanding of the intractable conflict in Kosovo, and the role of the media in protracting it, this study uses critical discourse analysis to examine articles related to issues affecting the Serb community, published in Albanian-language print media. The master narrative that comes out of the analysis is that of “threat” — the threat that Kosovo Albanians continue to face from Serbs and Serbia; a threat that is portrayed as historical and constant. The discourse further strengthens the conflict dynamics of opposition, polarization and even hatred. This master narrative implies that Serbs are enemies, to be feared, contested, fought against; conflict is thus the normal state of affairs. The study also looks at the implications of media discourse for reconciliation efforts and the prospects of the Serb minority in Kosovo society, arguing that when the Other is presented as dangerous and threatening, fear of the Other and a desire to eliminate the threat, physically and symbolically, become perceived as a “natural” response, and thus constitute a significant conflict-sustaining dynamic.

Keywords: Serbs, Serbia, Kosovo, Albanian media, critical discourse analysis, power relations, discrimination, master narrative, intractable conflict

Following the power shift in Kosovo in June 1999, the Albanian population, which had been the demographic majority in the province up until then but without political and governing power throughout the 1990s, gained control and political power and became the ruling majority, while the Serb population lost power and was physically and symbolically excluded from Kosovo society, forced into displacement, and became the subjugated and marginalized minority.

As the struggle for power between two dominant groups formed the crux of the conflict, this profound change in power relations, between majority and minority, remains one of the most essential dynamics sustaining this conflict. The situation, which is sometimes termed “post-conflict”, because of a formal lack of organized, overt and violent expressions of conflict, still exemplifies characteristics of protracted and intractable conflict.

Through perpetuating negative stereotypes and rigid dichotomous identities, the media play a significant part in sustaining conflict dynamics

in Kosovo. Thus, examining their discourse in terms of ideological production and representations is crucial in order to understand the power relations between the majority and the minority, the identity politics involved in sustaining them, and the intractability of the conflict.

Kosovo Albanian politicians are often heard proclaiming that Kosovo is not a second Albanian state in the Balkans, but a multi-ethnic society, where minority rights are respected, and where the Serb minority is free, even encouraged to integrate. However, they either ignore the mass-scale segregation of the Serb community, the general societal antagonism toward the minority, the poor human rights record and appalling living conditions, or attribute it to self-isolation, the negative influence of the Serbian central government in Belgrade, and the refusal of the Kosovo Serbs to accept what is often labelled “the new reality,” which implies the unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 that changed power relations in deeply divided Kosovo society. Hence, Kosovo society remains segregated, polarized, and the same dynamics that fuelled the 1998–99 conflict and post-conflict expulsions of Serbs and other non-Albanians are present.

In an effort to provide a deeper understanding of the intractable interethnic conflict in Kosovo, and the role of the media in protracting it, this study uses critical discourse analysis to examine articles related to issues affecting the Serb community, published in Albanian-language print media.

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND ISSUES OF IDENTITY

The conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo has been portrayed, and understood locally, as traditional, inevitable, natural and irreconcilable. Yet, even though the conflict between these two groups has a lengthy tradition, some would say dating back several centuries, it is imperative to stress that primordial hatred and “genetic” predispositions toward aggression are not the causes of the conflict.¹ Folger, Stutman and Poole (2002, 3) remind us that intolerance and aggression surface, become accentuated and perpetuated once the conflict starts, contributing to its persistence, intensity and violence, while the underlying causes are more complex, involving economic, political and symbolic interests and issues.

Nevertheless, the interethnic conflict in Kosovo can indeed be considered deep-rooted (Burton 1987), protracted (Azar 1983; Azar 1990) and

¹ See e.g. D. T. Bataković 1992, 1998, 2006 and 2008; I. Berisha 1993; D. Bogdanović 1985; A. N. Dragnich & S. Todorovich 1984; T. Judah 2000; H. Kaleshi 1973; R. Kaplan 1993; O. Karabeg 2000; M. Krasniqi 1996; B. Krstić 1994, 2004; A. Logoreci 1984; N. Malcolm 1998; S. Maliqi 1998; J. Pettifer 2001; P. Shoup 1984; S. Skendi 1967; M. Vickers 1998.

intractable (Bar-Tal 1998; Coleman 2003; Ellis 2006) because it involves highly polarized groups who view themselves as oppressed and victimized, while seeing the Other as the exclusive and absolute cause of their oppression and victimization, and because it has persisted over generations as particularly resistant to resolution. The relationship between the Serbs and Albanians has five typical features of intractable conflict, namely power shifts and imbalances, identity processes (Coleman 2003) wherein the *Other* is constructed as the villain and the enemy — the historical enemy (Zdravković 2005), forced interdependence, extreme emotional processes, and everyday trauma and victimization.

Ethnic conflicts are not only about material resources, but involve profound identity issues, wherein each group constitutes its own identity in relation, difference and opposition to the Other. The process of crafting ethnic identities that would appear constant and immutable necessitates the internalization, naturalization and stabilization of difference from the Other as an oppositional anchor (Ellis 1999). Kelman (1999) terms this “negative identity”, wherein the conflictual relationship with the “Other” is incorporated into the groups’ respective identities. He explains (p. 558.) that

The exclusiveness of each group’s national identity is embedded in a pattern of *negative interdependence* of the two identities [...]. This negative interdependence of the two identities is further exacerbated by the fact that each side perceives the other as a *source of its own negative identity elements*.

Constituting one’s identity as a Serb or Albanian thus implies not only asserting difference from the Other, but also complete and absolute opposition. These identity dynamics are a crucial part of intractable conflict; they are least amenable to negotiation, resolution and transformation, as they are continuously reinforced and strengthened, through public and vernacular discursive practices. In such a way ethnic conflicts become perceived as revolving around incompatible identity issues, and feelings of being endangered — both symbolically and physically.

The dialectics of opposition are accompanied by other forms of interdependence, such as geographical, cultural, and economic. Even though they profoundly dislike each other, the Serbs and the Albanians have no opportunity to extract themselves from the mutual relationship. Due to the fact of living on the same land and claiming the same territory, their lives are inextricably intertwined.

In spite of this forceful inter-reliance, the relationship in question is characterized by lack of contact between the groups; the resultant stereotypes and misinformation not only lead to a negative view of the Other, but also to intense negative emotions — self-righteousness, rage, indignation, and most notably victimization. Both Serbs and Albanians carry a myriad of negative and extreme emotions linked to the Other, which are a powerful

impediment to resolution — the Other is often viewed as less than human, and thus groups continue a pattern of aggression and defensiveness.

Violence and aggression perpetrated by members of one's own group are justified as a legitimate response to injustice, discrimination and humiliation by the Other and thus the cycle of revenge and counter-revenge perpetuates itself, leading not only to severe and enduring psychological trauma, but inevitably to inter-generational trauma, chronic health problems and a reduced living capacity (Bar-Tal 1998). The conflict and the hostile relationship with the Other become embedded in the ordinary discourse and lifestyle of the people. The everyday trauma is translated into a victim identity, which is subsequently given historical proportions (Zdravković-Zonta 2009); this in turn serves as a justification for all misdeeds, and also serves to posit the conflict in fixed binary oppositions of absolute victim versus absolute villain (Hawes 2004). The conceptualization of the conflict as a continuous struggle against oppression by the Other sustains and perpetuates it, making it indeed intractable and impervious to resolution (Bataković 1998; Mertus 1999).

THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO: A SHORT OVERVIEW

Because of its lengthy and protracted nature it is difficult to pinpoint the start of the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. Furthermore, because of the vastly divergent versions of history that each group holds to be the Truth, it is difficult to present a unified overview of the situation. Nevertheless, the most recent episode in the conflict can be said to have started in 1990 when, after years filled with tension and mutual accusations of discrimination between the Serbs and Albanians, the then-president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, altered the constitutional status of the two provinces within Serbia — Vojvodina and Kosovo, curtailing their autonomy. This was the turning point, when the statistical minority, the Serbs, became the ruling majority in Kosovo.² Many new laws were passed, which provided the basis

² Census statistics are not very reliable, and both Serbs and Albanian politicians and scholars have used vastly different numbers to support their divergent claims and accuse the other of manipulation. In 1981 the Kosovo Albanians participated in the last census; the total population of the province was given as 1.58 million, of whom 1.22 million or 77.4 % were Albanians and 236,526 or 14.9 % were Serbs and Montenegrins. In 1991 the Albanians boycotted the census, and their numbers were thus estimated as being 1.6 million or 82.2 % of a total population of 1.97 million, of whom 215,346 or 10.9 % were Serbs and Montenegrins. Albanians disagree and claim that the number was higher, while some competent Serbian experts (e.g. M. Radovanović) claim it was significantly lower, 1.35 million due to high emigration in the 1980s. Statistics from tables of Census Data, 1948–1991 from Mertus 1999; and also in Judah 2002. Original source: *Jugo-*

for discrimination³ against Albanians, who were excluded from the public sector, civil service and managerial jobs.

In July 1990, Kosovo Albanians declared Kosovo a republic, independent from Serbia but still part of Yugoslavia; they created a whole simulated government structure, holding elections for parliament and president.⁴ In September 1991 Kosovo Albanians, disregarding Serbs and non-Albanian population of the southern province of Serbia, declared the completely independent 'Republic of Kosova' with Ibrahim Rugova as president, rejected by EU and recognized only by Albania (Vickers 1998). New Albanian parallel institutions were set up in Kosovo to make up for the effective loss of health care and educational facilities.⁵

After several years of following the 'passive resistance' policy without any success in terms of international recognition, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), comprising solely ethnic Albanians, started armed resistance. Supported by funds from the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora (Judah 2000), with training camps in neighbouring Albania, the Albanian guerrilla (KLA) was operational by 1996; yet, they intensified significantly their operations in 1997, and open armed conflict with the Serb police forces, accompanied by numerous crimes against both Albanian and Serbian civilian population, started.

As tens of thousands of Albanian civilians became displaced due to the confrontation between Serb and Kosovo Albanian forces, Western

slavija 1918–1988, statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1992. godinu (1992), 62–63, cited in Vučković and Nikolić 1996, 108–109. According to the 2008 estimate of the Statistical Office of Kosovo the number of habitual residents in Kosovo is 2.1 million, of which 92% are Albanians, while other ethnic groups make up 8%. See http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36&Itemid=26 (last accessed on January 20, 2010).

³ In response to Albanian separatism, the police force was rapidly purged, making it in essence a Serb-controlled force with other ethnic groups, including some local Albanians, represented. Public companies which had operated under the aegis of the provincial government were taken over by their Serbian counterparts. Doctors and medical staff of Albanian descent, still boycotting the new Serbian constitution, were dismissed. Cultural institutions were closed or merged with their Serbian counterparts, while the most dramatic application of the new measures came in the field of education – the Serbian curriculum was imposed on Albanian students, and Albanian teachers rejected this measure, which led to dismissals, as well as the restrictions of the number of children who could be taught in Albanian language. See Judah 2000.

⁴ The Serbian authorities did not try to arrest the organizers, so that Albanians were left to hold their election. For more detail see Judah 2000.

⁵ Albanians organized a parallel education system, and set up schools in private homes. The students were taught in Albanian language, and their diplomas had the seal of the 'Independent Republic of Kosovo'. See Kostovicova 1997 and 2002.

opinion began to change from viewing the situation in Kosovo as an internal issue, to perceiving it as a case where intervention was necessary.⁶ The use of force against Serbia emerged as a possible solution to the problem.⁷ The international community set up status talks in Rambouillet, France in February 1999; after intense and prolonged negotiations the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the draft agreement, as their demand for a referendum for independence was worded in, while the Serbian delegation did not sign, because the agreement authorized a de facto occupation by NATO troops of the whole of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro).⁸

Subsequently, NATO started severe bombing of Serbia, without a legal endorsement of UN Security Council, on March 24, 1999; the NATO bombing lasted 78 days.⁹ Serbia capitulated on June 3, and NATO suspended the bombing on June 10.¹⁰ The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which sanctioned the entry of NATO-led troops into Kosovo (KFOR), and set up the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the governing body,¹¹ promising “substantial autonomy” for the UN-administered province, while guaranteeing sovereignty of the FR Yugoslavia.¹²

⁶ After intense military threats by NATO, in October of 1998, Milošević agreed to a ceasefire. The Serbian military and police began to withdraw, while two thousand monitors came to Kosovo under the auspices of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. The displaced began coming down from the hills and moved into shelter for the winter. However, as the Serb forces pulled back, the KLA followed in their wake, reoccupying positions. The confrontations between the Albanian KLA and the Serbian forces thus continued, as well as the effect on civilians. See Judah 2000.

⁷ For examination of the discourse of the Clinton Administration and US Congress over US policy toward the crisis in Kosovo, see Paris 2002.

⁸ Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 23 February 1999. Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force; see also Chomsky 2000; Cohen 2000; Gowan 1999; Johnstone 2002.

⁹ The bombing of Serbia was intense, as more than 60% of its targets were what is called dual use, that is to say they had both military and civilian uses, including factories, oil refineries and depots, roads, bridges, railways, electricity and communication facilities.

¹⁰ For an account of the NATO bombings, see also Ignatieff 2002; Daalder & O’Hanlon 2001; Chesterman 2002. Parenti 2002.

¹¹ Its role was to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (UNMIK press release, 21 September 1999).

¹² However, one of the tasks of UNMIK was to organize, before ‘a final settlement’, elections to ‘provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government,

During the bombing, as claimed by the NATO sources almost 850,000 Kosovo Albanians became refugees in Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania¹³ or were internally displaced in Kosovo.¹⁴ Within days of the cessation of the bombing, after the entry of NATO troops into Kosovo (KFOR) and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces, the refugees came streaming back.¹⁵ KLA leaders took control of the province and formed a government, which was later integrated with UNMIK into a Joint Interim Administrative Structure.¹⁶ Simultaneously, a campaign of systematic prosecution and violence, as well as massive usurpation of properties (Tawil 2009), forced nearly 250,000 of Kosovo Serbs and non-Albanians to become internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Serbia and Montenegro,¹⁷ or to move into ethnically homogeneous enclaves within Kosovo and become internal IDPs (IIDPs).¹⁸ According to UNHCR data from December 1999, since June

pending a political settlement'. Despite the fact that the 1244 UNSC Resolution guaranteed that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was given almost all attributes of statehood under UNMIK administration (such as borders, customs, new currency, travel documents and id cards); for all intents and purposes Kosovo was run as an entity almost completely independent of Serbia, with *de facto*, but not *de jure*, independence.

¹³ For a critical perspective on the NATO bombing, see Chomsky 2000.

¹⁴ See UNHCR, Refugees, vol. 3, no. 116 (1999), 11.

¹⁵ According to UNHCR, 808,913 out of a total of 848,100 were back.

¹⁶ The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) had legislative and executive authority in Kosovo. Over the years, UNMIK gradually transferred its competencies and authorities to local Kosovo institutions, called Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), until the February 2008 declaration of independence and the promulgation of the Kosovo Constitution in June of 2008. UNMIK is still present, but is no longer the administering civil authority, its scope limited to monitoring. Following the promulgation of the constitution, other internationally-sponsored mechanisms were set up in Kosovo, such as the International Civilian Office (ICO) and its representative, and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). KFOR is still present, in order to maintain security, but is gradually decreasing its numbers.

¹⁷ By November 1999, the Yugoslav Red Cross had registered some 247,391 people, mostly Serbs and Roma, but not only, as displaced. See UNHCR/OSCE, "Overview of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo", 3 November 1999. During the March 2004 riots another 4,100 persons, mostly Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, were forcibly displaced. See Human Rights Watch (2004), July 2004, vol. 16, no. 6, Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/index.htm>, last accessed November 20, 2009; see also Amnesty International 2000.

¹⁸ Only a handful of Serbs remained in big urban and previously thriving multiethnic centres with dozens of thousands of Serb inhabitants such as Prizren, Peć, and Priština; they had to be guarded by KFOR troops and on rare occasions when they ventured out, had to be escorted. IDPs from the Prizren area joined Serbs who remained in Štrpce. In

1999 246,000 persons (at least 205,000 Serbs, as well as additional 45,000 Roma, Montenegrins and Gorani) were expelled by the Albanian extremists into central Serbia and Montenegro. Today, out of the pre-1999 war non-Albanian population in Kosovo, roughly 60% of Kosovo Serbs, 66% of Kosovo Roma and 70 % of Gorani are living as displaced persons in central Serbia, with a symbolic return rate below 2% in twelve post-1999 war years.¹⁹

KFOR troops, deployed to ensure peace and security, understood their mission as being solely to protect Kosovo Albanians, and thus in the beginning did little or nothing to prevent the violence against the Serbs,²⁰ which was tolerated as justifiable revenge. More than 150 Serb Orthodox churches, including medieval ones were burned and destroyed.²¹ Several hundred Serbs were killed in the months immediately following the entry of NATO troops in Kosovo,²² and more than 1,300 were kidnapped.²³ In the enclaves and in the receding urban ghettos, the Serbs soon had to be guarded by KFOR troops, had limited freedom of movement and no access to public services.²⁴ In December 1999, the

Gnjilane and Orahovac small Serb-inhabited ghettos were formed, while Velika Hoča became an enclave. Gračanica and the surrounding villages also became enclaves. The Ibar River became a dividing line between the Serbs in the northern part of Mitrovica, and the Albanians in the southern part previously cleansed of Serbs. See Amnesty International, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo): Update from the field, January 2000, at <https://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/002/2000/en/07344afe-dfcd-11dd-8e17-69926d493233/eur700022000en.pdf> (last accessed November 20, 2009).

¹⁹ For more detail, see Bataković 2006, 2007a, 2007b, and 2008.

²⁰ Amnesty International, Kosovo: KFOR must act now to curb violence against ethnic minorities, 13 January 2000.

²¹ More on destruction of Serbian churches in Kosovo in *Crucified Kosovo* 1999.

²² Albanians were being killed too during this time; some were branded “Serb collaborators,” but many were victimized because crime flourished extravagantly in the lawless environment, where weapons were ubiquitous, the KLA was still armed, and there was no rule of law. See Amnesty International, 2000.

²³ Amnesty International, Kosovo: Six months on, climate of violence and fear flies in the face of UN mission, 23 December 1999, at <https://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/136/1999/en/1e3cf8ca-8675-48a5-a026-d581e2c233e2/eur701361999en.pdf>; see also Fisk 1999.

²⁴ According to the November 1999 joint report by UNHCR and OSCE, non-Albanians faced: A climate of violence and impunity, as well as widespread discrimination, harassment and intimidation directed at non-Albanians. The combination of security concerns, restricted movement, lack of access to public services (especially education, medical/health care and pensions) are the determining factors in the departure of Serbs, primarily, and other non-Albanian groups from Kosovo to date. See UNHCR/OSCE, “Overview of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo”, 3 November 1999.

Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in a report that despite the efforts of UNMIK and KFOR “the level and nature of the violence in Kosovo, especially against vulnerable minorities, remains unacceptable”.²⁵

After June 1999, there are no Serbs left in public, administrative and governmental institutions; Serbs are systematically excluded from the political, social, and economic power centres, being fired on ethnic basis from hospitals to mines.²⁶ The situation of the Serb community in Kosovo has remained the same for the past ten years — plagued by continuous human rights violations, isolation from the Albanian-dominated Kosovo society, and problems with basic living conditions. The Serb community has been denied civil and political rights, such as the right to life, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the right to use one’s own language. In the field of social, economic and cultural rights they are denied, among others, the right to education, to health care and the right to participate in cultural life.²⁷

In response, in order to secure the very survival of the Kosovo Serbs, the Serbian government set up a so-called “parallel” system, operating in Serb-majority areas and enclaves, providing public services otherwise inaccessible for the Serb community — in health, education, and administration. As human rights reports have continued to show over the years, Kosovo “remains one of the most segregated places in Europe, with thousands of displaced persons still in camps, and many ‘ethnically pure’ towns

²⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. no. S/1999/1250, 23 December 1999, p. 24.

²⁶ In order to satisfy conditions for attaining status (the so-called “standards for status” package), there have been some half-hearted attempts on the part of Kosovo Albanians to include token Serbs into Kosovo institutions, including two ministers (of Social Welfare and Labour, and of Communities and Returns). However, since the majority of Serbs do not participate in the Kosovo-wide elections, the Kosovo Serb community does not consider these politicians their true representatives. These efforts are a far cry from genuine political power and participation in state institutions and government.

²⁷ U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights report: Kosovo, February 2009, at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119462.htm> (last accessed January 20, 2010); Ombudsperson, Eighth Annual Report 2007–2008, July 2008, at <http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/?cid=2,74> (last accessed November 20, 2009); Minority Rights Group International, *Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule*, July 2006, at <http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-in-kosovo-under-international-rule.html> (last accessed November 20, 2009).

and villages.”²⁸ It faces major problems related to minority communities,²⁹ such as “cases of politically and ethnically motivated violence; societal antipathy against the Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church; lack of progress in returning internally displaced persons to their homes;³⁰ societal violence, abuse, and discrimination against minority communities.”³¹ The predicament of the Serb minority in Kosovo stems from systematic discrimination, which has been institutionalized on different levels in favour of Kosovo Albanians.

MEDIA DISCOURSE AND CONFLICT

Discrimination and conflict are governed by ideologies³² and the inherent polarization between Us and Them,³³ which are expressed through discourse (Van Dijk 2000) — both public and vernacular. In order to understand conflict-sustaining dynamics and the power relations underlying them, it is necessary to look at patterns of representing the Other in discourse.³⁴ As

²⁸ Minority Rights Group International, *Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule*, July 2006, at <http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-in-kosovo-under-international-rule.html> (last accessed November 20, 2009).

²⁹ See reports of the Kosovo Ombudsperson office at <http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/> (last accessed November 20, 2009).

³⁰ According to UNHCR, by June 2007, out of a total of around 250,000 IDPs only 7,000 returned. It is important to note, however, that this figure includes all non-Albanian IDPs, that most of the returnees are in fact Roma, and that UNHCR does not record returnees who have subsequently left Kosovo. The general trend is for Serbs to leave Kosovo. See Bataković, ed. 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Minority Rights Group International 2009.

³¹ U.S. Department of State, February 2009.

³² Ideologies are general, abstract, shared social beliefs that underlie social representations, function as identity self-schemas, and form the basis for knowledge and cognition; they are essential in the management of thinking and interaction, particularly for social group relations, such as those of domination and conflict. See Van Dijk 2000.

³³ Polarization is a structural characteristic of ideologies, and is embodied in the opposition between Us and Them. In ethnic conflicts, such as the one in Kosovo, the process of identity formation is even more polarized, because it has to sustain the conflict dynamics, and is based on ideologies that identify the in-group positively, while ascribing extreme negative characteristics to the out-group and anchoring self-identification in radical opposition (Kelman 1999).

³⁴ Following Van Dijk (1989), I understand discourse “both as a specific form of language use, and as a specific form of social interaction, interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation.” I also use the notion of text in the sense of written discourse. As Foucault (1980) argues, discourse is a mode of political and ideological

Fiske (1993) reminds, the power to represent is real power — employing representation to produce “otherness” and the Other as different, and at times inferior, means exercising the “power of representation” over those being produced as others.

The media, as one of the main ideological institutions or Ideological Apparatus (Althusser 1984), is necessary for the effective reproduction and implementation of ideologies. Through public discourse, the media play a vital role in shaping identity, supplying information and images through which we understand ourselves and others, forming public consciousness, and influencing public policy (Fowler 1991; Kellner 1995; Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992; Parenti 1986; Robinson 2000; Weimann 2000). Adhering to the basic dynamics of how ideologies function in order to be useful for maintaining power relations, the media produce and reproduce positive in-group and negative out-group images (Hall 1982 and 1985) which contribute to the process of group identity formation (social, ethnic and national) (Anderson 1991; Bhabha 1990; Bruner 2002; Clay 1996).

A) Media and identities in war and peace

a) Media and minorities

One of the more enduring findings in communication research concerns the propensity of the news media to reflect dominant social attitudes and to reinforce the distribution of social and political power in society (Croteau & Hoynes 1997; Davis 1990; Gamson et al. 1992). This finding has been especially prominent in studies that look at the portrayal of minorities (Campbell 1995; Entman 1990; Van Dijk 1988), which show that the media usually have two ways of dealing with minority groups — they ignore them, unless they are perceived as a threat, in which case they discredit them (Avraham, Wolfsfeld & Aburaiya 2000). As media give priority to powerful people and groups, because of their social, political, economic and cultural power and influence (Van Dijk 1996), low status groups, such as minorities, usually are considered newsworthy only when they are associated with some form of deviance (Wolfsfeld 1997). The consequence is that the existing social and political gaps between the majority and minority are reinforced and amplified.

According to Wolfsfeld (1997), media coverage of minorities in conditions of political and identity conflicts, is composed of four major characteristics:

practice, which establishes, sustains and changes power relations, as well as the groups between which these power relations operate.

- (1) a negative context and focus on disorder events, such as disasters, perversions, crime, violence, riots, extremism, subversion, or threats to the public order;
- (2) attributing to members of the minority group set motifs and similar traits — exotic, strange, different, and irrational — through extensive use of prejudices, generalizations, and stereotypes;
- (3) holding members of the minority group responsible for their own fate and presenting them as being incapable of changing their present reality and;
- (4) the social, economic, and political developments regarding the minority group are covered superficially, without mention of the background, reasons, or context that lead up to them.

All of these characteristics are essential in facilitating and perpetuating conflict.

b) Media as facilitators of conflict

In conflict, as Galtung (1968) argues, media are responsible for what he calls “cultural violence” — an invisible form of violence, maintained by cultural institutions. The media can serve to justify, and even incite direct violence,³⁵ while disseminating discrimination and sustaining “structural violence”, which involves social inequality, repression and power imbalance, and is manifested in different kinds of social injustices, repressive institutions and institutionalized prejudice. As such, media have the power to influence conflict, but also peace. As Bratić (2008) says, “media become a venue that can give life to the artefacts of conflict and the ideas for peace”.

In intractable and prolonged conflict, the role of the media is essential also because in such situations there is most often no direct communication between rival groups. Rather, such communication is restricted to and passes mostly through mass media (Anastasious 2002) — as an impersonal exchange of destructive messages and stereotypes, through what, in time, become standardized, mutual accusations, characterizations, self-victimization, and a rhetoric based on one-sided, skewed, and nationalist assumptions. In such situations, the media discourse of each side seems to mirror that of the other, because the frameworks reproduced are identical. Also, because the frameworks emphasize negative characteristics of the Other, as

³⁵ In terms of ethnic conflict, many studies focusing on the media involvement in the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia show the dangerous impact of the media in disseminating hate messages and their role in mass scale violence. See Des Forges 1999; Kirschke 1996; Metzl 1997; Buric 2000; Sadkovich 1998; Thompson 1999; Taylor and Kent 2000; Kurspahić 2003.

the 'enemy' of the nation, they additionally hinder the establishing of direct communicative contact.

The rhetoric disseminated through the mass media not only thrives under conditions of protracted and intractable conflict, but it also generates an effective, general uniformity of thought within the group, precipitated around the major axis of the dispute (Ellul 1973; Orwell 1949). Indeed, many media theorists have argued that the very structure of the mass media tends to facilitate the establishment of generalized stereotypes (McLuhan 1964; Meyrowitz 1985), and thus the stereotypical patterns of nationalism are congruous with the way the media function (Anastasious 2002). As Wolfsfeld (2001) emphasizes, "the media tend to have an obsessive interest in threats and violence." In times of conflict, the media disseminate images that help to clearly distinguish between Us and Them, strengthen in-group cohesiveness, and maintain constant opposition to the out-group, through extreme negative portrayals and characterizations (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon 2005; Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig 2002; Van Dijk 1989; Hammond & Herman 2000; Herring 2000; Iyengar 1988; Taylor 2000; Vincent 2000).

c) Media for peace and reconciliation

Apart from their prominent role in war-building, the media also have the potential to positively influence conflict contexts, by transforming negative stereotypes and reducing prejudice (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2004; Darby & MacGinty 2003; Lynch 2005; Wolfsfeld 2004). Just as they can disseminate messages that incite hatred and fuel conflict, so they have the ability to deliver messages of peace and contribute to conflict resolution (Howard, Rolt & Verhoeven 2003; Price & Thompson 2002; Wolfsfeld 2004). If the symbolic environment is impacted by the messages of peace-oriented media, it can be conducive to the cultural transformation of violence. This requires though not only peace-oriented media production, but also a thorough change in attitudes and perceptions, as well as the integration of such efforts into other social institutions and processes (Bratich 2008). Just as pro-war propaganda cannot single-handedly cause conflicts, the peace-oriented media cannot single-handedly end them.

Despite this positive potential, in Kosovo both Albanian and Serbian media³⁶ have for years played a fundamental role in producing and

³⁶ While there are Serb media in Kosovo, they are mostly commercial, entertainment-oriented radio broadcasters, and the Serb community relies overwhelmingly on media from Serbia for its news and information. See <http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,26,813> (last accessed November 20, 2009). The most-watched television station by the Serb population is RTS, Serbia's state broadcaster, while the most popular dailies are Bel-

reproducing conflict ideologies through discourse that is characterized by extreme stereotypes of the Other, prejudiced language, justifications of violence against the Other, and validations of power imbalances and discriminatory practices.³⁷

B) Media landscape in Kosovo: Institutions, discourse and practice

a) Albanian-language media in Kosovo

From 1990 until 1999, there was only one television station in Kosovo, broadcasting mostly in Serbian, except a daily half-hour news show in Albanian.³⁸ After the Serbian authorities withdrew in June 1999 and UNMIK arrived, the local Kosovo Albanian media proliferated.³⁹ Between 1999 and 2006, the international community invested an estimated 36 million euro into media assistance.⁴⁰

grade-based *Vječernje novosti*, *Blic*, *Kurir*, *Press* and *Glas javnosti*. See Balkan Insight, Belgrade media keep Kosovo Serbs in the dark, September 2006, at http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/opinions.php?yyyy=2006&mm=09&nav_id=37019 (last accessed November 20, 2009). Few local media outlets produce their own news and information programs, but instead transmit reports from Belgrade-based media, and thus neglect news from the whole of Kosovo. Kosovo Public TV provides little genuine program in Serbian. The reliance on Belgrade dailies for information increases and strengthens the sense of insecurity and isolation of Kosovo Serbs, as the Serbian media in general emphasize negative stereotypes about the Kosovo Albanians, strengthening conflict dynamics. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005.

³⁷ Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Report on Written Media in Kosovo, August-October 2006, at <http://www.yihr.org/uploads/reports/eng/18.pdf> (last accessed November 20, 2009); Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Journalists Can Do It, 2005, at <http://www.yihr.org/uploads/publications/eng/8.pdf> (last accessed November 20, 2009); OSCE, The State of Media Freedom in Kosovo: Observations and Recommendations, July 2006, at http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2006/07/19767_en.pdf (last accessed November 20, 2009); OSCE (2004), Human Rights Challenges following the March Riots, at http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2004/05/2939_en.pdf (last accessed January 20, 2010).

³⁸ For early development of Kosovo Albanian media, see Judah 2000.

³⁹ There are over 100 electronic media outlets; around 90 are radio stations, while more than 22 are television broadcasters. There are 3 Kosovo-wide TV broadcasters – the government-funded *RTK* and two commercial TV stations. *RTK* has approximately 10% of its programming time in 4 minority languages. The media reflect the mainly-Albanian ethnic composition, as almost two-thirds operate in the Albanian language, while the rest use Serbian or are multi-lingual.

⁴⁰ OSCE, July 2006.

There are eight daily Albanian-language newspapers, with an estimated total circulation of 30,000 copies, as well as five weeklies and a number of other periodicals.⁴¹ In terms of journalism quality, the low budget, very limited profit, and lack of professional education and training, spells low quality and little or no editorial independence. According to media monitoring reports,⁴² there are basic errors in journalistic practices,⁴³ and professional standards are not high; in general, the media in Kosovo strive towards sensationalist and shallow information.

In addition, journalism mainly serves a specific party or group.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Albanian-language media in Kosovo can be considered “national” media, in that they help create the Kosovo Albanian nation, sustaining the “imagined community” (Anderson 2001). Following Gellner (1983), it could be said that the media present the Kosovo Albanian nation as absolute, sacred and mono-ethnic, militant in its concept of defense and its means of freedom, and in conflictual juxtaposition with the Other, the “enemy” — the Serbs.

According to agencies and organizations that monitor media coverage related to minorities,⁴⁵ the Albanian-language print media in general tend to “create a dichotomy between OUR [Albanian] side, which is better and constructive, and THEIR [Serbian] side, which is bad and destructive” and “take part in the radicalization of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo.”⁴⁶

⁴¹ There is only one bilingual Albanian-Serbian language newspaper, the weekly *M Magazine*. The bi-weekly *Gradjanski glasnik* is published in Serbian but has a mixed office, the publisher being Albanian and the editor Serbian.

⁴² OSCE, July 2006.

⁴³ Such as citing only one source of information, not separating news from commentary, and relying mostly on the statements of public officials to create stories.

⁴⁴ Government and party advertising is the life-blood of Kosovo newspapers, which struggle to make money given poor copy sales and a relatively underdeveloped advertising sector. See Balkan Insight, BIRN Show Triggers Row on Freedom of Speech in Kosovo, June 2009, at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/analysis/20169/?tpl=297> (last accessed January 20, 2010); see also KIPRED, Monitoring of media during the election campaign in Kosovo, February 2008 http://www.kipred.net/site/documents/eng_media.pdf (last accessed January 20, 2010).

⁴⁵ Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005; OSCE, July 2006.

⁴⁶ Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006.

b) Critical discourse analysis of conflict-sustaining ideologies

In order to examine closely the representations of the Serb minority⁴⁷ in Albanian-language newspapers, I have chosen critical discourse analysis (CDA), because as Van Dijk suggests, it provides a thorough systematic account of the levels, structures, units and strategies of text, as well as a detailed analysis of the many properties of context, which is necessary in order to analyze the discursive expression and reproduction of ideologies (Van Dijk 1997; Duranti & Goodwin 1992; Ellis 1998; Huckin 1992; Potter, Edwards & Wetherell 1993; Tannen 1981). As media production reflects, and is linked to, the dominant ideological and economic forces in society, I consider CDA a particularly suitable form of analysis, because it provides the theoretical and methodological context that can articulate explicitly the relationship between ideologies, language practices and the socio-political world (Fairclough 1992). It allows not only to distinguish discourse practices that contribute to the production and reproduction of dominant ideologies, but also to the perpetuation of stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, even violence, and thus intractable-conflict dynamics (Van Dijk 1998).

This study looks at articles dealing with Serb-related issues from Albanian-language newspapers in Kosovo: *Koha Ditore*, *Kosova Sot*, *Express*, *Zëri*, *Epoka e Re*, *Lajm*, *Bota Sot* and *InfoPress*, from March 1st to May 31st, 2009.⁴⁸ Using the daily UNMIK media monitoring service,⁴⁹ I selected all

⁴⁷ The choice of focusing only on the Serbian community is guided by several reasons. First, even though the conflict in Kosovo affected, and still affects all non-Albanian ethnic groups, the conflict itself was not, and is not between Albanians and all other non-Albanian groups, but between Albanians and Serbs. Thus, in terms of intractable conflict dynamics the main issue is the relationship between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority. It is important to note that while the Serb community is discussed in this article, this minority, as every community, is not homogeneous in terms of political inclinations, identity and responses to policies or developments; there are regional, local, political and identity differences, often profound, within the community. Yet they share the same predicament, of being the minority in an ethnic state, and at the same time, they are “homogenized” by the Albanian-language media. Moreover, in the months analyzed here, there were only 5 articles related to other minorities.

⁴⁸ I chose to include all Albanian-language daily newspapers in order to analyze a broad range of media outlets and look for possible differences and divergences. However, the analysis shows that even though there are significant differences between newspapers in reporting about local politics, there is consensus and coherence on reporting about Serb-related issues in the three months analyzed, and a lack of divergent perspectives and voices. In other words, nationalism cuts across party lines.

⁴⁹ UNMIK media monitoring service provides daily reviews and translations of Albanian-language media in Kosovo and Serbian-language media in Serbia; the reports provide full lists of headlines and articles and translations of selected articles, focusing on main events, political developments and issues pertaining to Albanian-Serb relations.

articles that dealt with or mentioned Serbs and issues pertinent to the Serb minority, including articles that are related to Serbia and the government in Belgrade. I chose to include the latter category of articles for two main reasons. First, the Serbian population, treated as minority in Kosovo is perceived as being inextricably linked with Belgrade and Serbia,⁵⁰ and very often Albanian language media do not make a distinction.⁵¹ Second, the Serbian government in Belgrade is most often cited as speaking for the Serb community in Kosovo, and thus the community is for the most part identified with the Serbian government and Serbia in general.

The following analysis examines the discourse of Albanian-language newspapers concerning Serbs, looking at master narratives (Hackett & Zhao 1994), framing (Goffman 1974), discursive strategies (Donati 1992), such as rhetorical devices (compare and contrast, hyperbole and euphemism), and lexicalization (Van Dijk 1997; 2000). Following van Dijk, I assert that epistemically it is not the truth value of ideologies, but their cognitive and social role, i.e. their effectiveness and usefulness, that is important in power relations of domination and discrimination. Therefore, my intention in the analysis is not to ascertain or discuss the truth value of the media discourse, but rather to investigate what kinds of representations are dominant and how the ideologies produced and reproduced function in terms of conflict dynamics and socio-political implications.

c) Threat as master narrative

Master narratives are analytic reference frameworks that are used to categorize and analyze events and processes related to various issue or areas, such as “world order”, “security”, “humanitarian”, etc. When repeated frequently and/or authenticated and acknowledged by multiple public authorities like state institutions, community leaders, government officials or intellectual authority these dominant scripts become the “Truth”. Since they privilege certain interpretations, while marginalizing others (Foucault 1978), they

⁵⁰ According to media monitoring reports Albanian-language media focus on the strong and persistent attachment of the Kosovo Serb community to the government in Belgrade. Politicians from Serbia regularly receive a lot of negative coverage; they are usually featured using nicknames and reminders of what the Serbian regime did in Kosovo in the 1990s. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005; OSCE, July 2006.

⁵¹ An illustrative example is the coverage of an incident on March 24, where Kosovo Police stopped Serbian government officials coming from Belgrade, at the border crossing, denying them entry. Albanian language media reported the incident with headlines such as “Kosovo: Forbidden land for Serbs” (*InfoPress*); *Bota Sot* ran an article entitled “You don’t step anymore in Kosovo,” and argued that “Serbs will not be allowed entry into Kosovo anymore.”

serve as legitimization strategies in maintaining hegemonic power relations (Bamberg 2005), affecting, like ideologies, thinking and behaviour (Jameson 1984).

The master narrative that comes out of the analysis of the articles in the three months selected is that of “threat” — the threat that Kosovo Albanians continue to face from Kosovo Serbs and the rest of Serbia; a threat that is portrayed as historical and constant. This master narrative implies that Serbs are enemies, to be feared, contested, fought against; conflict is thus the normal state of affairs.

The master narrative of the Other as threat is common in intractable conflict, and it serves to motivate group members to strengthen their negative beliefs about the Other, making thus the master narrative itself even more resistant to change and transformation (Hackett & Zhao 1994). The conflict is hence perceived not only as an individual physical threat, but as metaphysically threatening the entire imagined community. The fight against the Other surpasses personal struggle, and takes on historical, traditional and heroic proportions. The master narrative of threat is revealed through two main interpretative news frames — “threat to state” and “threat to security”.

d) Frames

Frames are ideological shapings of discourse, “drawing on well-established social orientations, attitudes, values and other group beliefs” (Donati 1992). They relate to specific themes that are linked to a given issue, or master narrative. Public issues are framed by mentioning certain relevant topics and subtopics, while ignoring others. Huckin (2002) calls the latter “significant silences” and underscores the power of silence to affect communication and perceptions; such silences are a common feature of news discourse (Reese & Buckalew 1995) and other forms of public discourse.⁵²

The two main frames that come out of this analysis — the Threat to State and the Threat to Security — are characterized further by topics and sub-topics, which conform to Van Dijk’s “ideological square” of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Van Dijk demonstrates that topics are selected according to how favourable they are for the in-group, and therefore negative for the out-group; they are derived from an event model, which in this case is “conflict”. In the articles analyzed, the Al-

⁵² As Van Dijk notes (1986, 178), “the ideological nature of discourse in general, and of news discourse in particular, is often defined by the unsaid. Information that could (or should) have been given is selectively left out.”

banian-language media select topics that embody the four moves that Van Dijk (2000) suggests are basic in ideological discourse about the Other:

- 1) Express/emphasize information that is ‘positive’ about us.
- 2) Express/emphasize information that is ‘negative’ about them.
- 3) Suppress/de-emphasize information that is ‘positive’ about them.
- 4) Suppress/de-emphasize information that is ‘negative’ about us.

According to the results of this analysis, the Threat to State frame has two main topics — denying statehood, and disrupting institutional order and hindering economic progress, while the Threat to Security frame has three key topics — extremism, criminal activities, and war crimes and human rights violations.

The Threat to State Frame(s)

The Threat to State Frame 1: Denying statehood

Articles that fall under this topic concern the dispute over the status of Kosovo, its declaration of independence and its territorial integrity,⁵³ and use language that presents the dispute as a “fierce” conflict, even “war”:

“Kosovo and Serbia to have fierce clash at the Hague” (*Epoka e Re*, April 15)

“Kosovo and Serbia start confrontation of arguments in Hague” (*Zëri*, April 16)

“The war at the Hague starts” (*Epoka e Re*, April 17)

And the Kosovo Albanians as being on the defensive against Serbia’s attacks:⁵⁴

“Kosovo ready to defend independence in Hague” (*Epoka e Re*, April 16)

“Declaration for the protection of independence handed over” (*Bota Sot*, April 16)

“History and legality of independence are defended” (*Koha Ditore*, April 20)

⁵³ As Serb government officials continue to claim that the February 2008 declaration of independence is illegal, and that Kosovo is still a part of Serbia, the case is being debated at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Both sides presented their arguments in April 2009.

⁵⁴ The same kind of language, presenting the dispute as a “harsh battle”, was used to describe the events at the Islamic Conference in May 2009: “A harsh battle for Kosovo in Damask” (*Koha Ditore*, May 25); “In Damask, Kosovo and Serbia fight for resolution” (*Zëri*, May 25).

Articles also frame the dispute as a competition, keeping “score” of wins and losses:⁵⁵

“Editorial: Albanian diplomacy beats Serbia” (*Kosova Sot*, May 26)

... Kosovo should thank Albania for the success achieved at the summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. Even though Serbia “wholeheartedly” lobbied against the approved resolution, the Conference came out with a very favorable position on Kosovo.

This topic also comprises numerous Albanian articles that report the frequent statements of Belgrade officials regarding the territorial belonging of Kosovo to Serbia:

“Tadić in Kosovo: “This is Serbia” (*Koha Ditore*, April 18)

Prime Minister Taçi has set some conditions to allow Serbia’s President to visit Kosovo, and among them he insisted that Tadić should not make any political statement in contradiction to Kosovo’s Constitution. However, Tadić has not refrained from political announcements and in his statement he said that he considered Kosovo as a part of Serbia. “My message today is a message of peace, peace for Serbs and Albanians who live in Kosovo, in our Serbia. Without peace we cannot secure decent living. Without faith in peace we cannot live normal lives,” said Tadić.

The statement of the Serbian President, on the occasion of the Orthodox Easter, caused great indignation, and the newspapers reported it not only as a violation of Kosovo’s sovereignty,⁵⁶ but also as a typical characteristic of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as in the following example from *Epoka e Re* (April 18):

At the church, Tadić “privately” attacks Kosovo and this reminds us of the role of the Serbian Church against Kosovo.

Significantly, the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is one of the main Serb institutions in Kosovo, and one of the most prominent representatives of the interests of the Serb community, is presented here (and elsewhere) as being against the independence of Kosovo; the implication is that it is not part of Kosovo, and its population. Further, the statements of Belgrade officials⁵⁷ regarding the unsettled status of Kosovo appear frequently, such as:

“Ivanović: Kosovo status is a “transitional status” (*Zëri*, May 18)

The State Secretary in the so-called Ministry for Kosovo in Serbia’s government, Oliver Ivanović, considers Kosovo’s status as a transitional status.

⁵⁵ “We believe in the triumph of Kosovo over Serbia” (*Bota Sot*, April 17).

⁵⁶ “Tadic violates Kosovo sovereignty” (*Bota Sot*, April 18).

⁵⁷ It is common practice in Albanian-language newspapers to use “so-called” when referring to officials of the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, thus underlining the position of the media toward the institutions representing the Serbs in Kosovo.

“While some Kosovo Albanians and some countries with influence in the world are calling the status finally solved, we consider it transitional status. And it can only be final when the appropriate solution can be found in an agreement that the authorities in Serbia and its people accept,” said Ivanović.

Particularly the Serb-controlled north of Kosovo is presented as a threat to the Albanian-dominated Kosovo:

“AAK: State of Kosovo at risk from divided Mitrovica” (*Koha Ditore*, March 15)

The party’s deputy leader Blerim Shala said at the convention that the divided town of Mitrovica is threatening the state of Kosovo. “Mitrovica has remained stuck in its fate as a divided town, without whose unification there can be no territorial integrity for Kosovo. The freedom of Kosovo is only partial as long as Mitrovica remains divided. With such a Mitrovica, the state of Kosovo is at risk,” Shala was quoted as saying.

and its sovereignty:⁵⁸

“Rexhepi: Sovereignty is threatened in the north” (*Koha Ditore*, March 23)

The north of Kosovo is considered one of the main problems for Kosovo, and for the Kosovo Albanians (and also many international representatives) is associated with “radical”, “extremist”, “criminal” and even “terrorist” activities.

The Threat to State Frame 2: Disrupting institutional order

The Serbs in Kosovo are seen as contesting the Kosovo state and disrupting its institutional order through the presence of Serbian institutions, called “parallel structures”:

“Salihaj: Acceptance of the Serb parallel structures destroys the sovereignty” (*Bota Sot*, March 23)

These “structures” are described as violating Kosovo’s laws and “sabotaging the statehood of Kosovo”, as in the following excerpt:

“EULEX and UNMIK have contacts with parallel structures” (*Koha Ditore*, March 20)

⁵⁸ In the years since 1999 there have been many suggestions regarding the division of Kosovo, coming both from some Serb officials and analysts and international actors, according to which the Ibar river, a *de facto* border now, should be instituted as a *de jure* division line, and the north of Kosovo remaining within Serbia. However, Serbs living south of the river Ibar have always been strongly against that plan, and this is one of the few points where they agree with Kosovo Albanians, who decisively contest such a division.

Representatives of EULEX and UNMIK have admitted openly that they have regular contacts with Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, adding that they don't legitimize their presence. The dialogue international officials have with Serb leaders, who refuse and are sabotaging the statehood of Kosovo, EULEX and UNMIK evaluate as having contact with leaders of the community, which have the aim to find pragmatically solutions for different issues.

The illegitimacy of these institutions (although legal since 1999 in terms of being democratically elected), is emphasized repeatedly, while their purpose and reason, namely to provide services that are otherwise unavailable to the Serb community, are neither mentioned nor explained. Through the frequent use of words such as “illegitimate,” and “parallel”, the institutions operating in the Serb-inhabited enclaves, which deal primarily with health care, education, welfare, and municipal government, are presented in a negative light and associated with illegality and illegal activities. They are also presented as purely political, and with the sole purpose of opposing the Kosovo state, and even associated with terrorism:

“Parallel structures, elements of terrorism” (*Bota Sot*, March 31)

Also, by referring to institutions such as medical centres, schools, cultural houses, community centres and municipal services as “structures”, they are mystified and their function — taking care of the basic needs of the Serb community — is obscured and distorted. The close link that is presented between the “parallel structures” and Belgrade adds to this obfuscation, through the use of language that connotes a sort of deviance:

“Serbia ‘feeds’ parallel structures in Kosovo” (*Lajm*, March 6)

In certain articles, the “parallel structures” are blamed for damaging the interests of the Serb community⁵⁹ in Kosovo, through promoting segregation:

“Parallel structures prevent integration of Serbs” (*Lajm*, May 15)

and significantly, because of Belgrade's influence:

“ICO and Government meet with Serbs to discuss various problems” (*Zëri*, April 4)

Here, the Kosovo government official is quoted as saying that a part of the Serbs is “an obstacle for integration” while another part of the Serbs are under “Belgrade's direct influence”, which is “impeding the integration [of Serbs] in political and institutional life”. The negative influence of “Belgrade” is a common theme in the articles analyzed, voiced both by Kosovo Albanian politicians and international representatives and organizations.

⁵⁹ “Serbs looking for jobs threatened by parallel structures” (*Koha Ditore*, May 26).

In the articles analyzed, neither the role of the Kosovo Albanian institutions in preventing and hindering such integration, nor the difficulties that Serbs face in living in Kosovo is mentioned; divergent viewpoints are not presented, and thus the complex problems of this minority community are simplified and attributed to self-segregation and Belgrade's intentional policy of "undermining the independence of Kosovo".

The Serbian community is presented as continuously and stubbornly opposing all institutions of the Kosovo state:

"Serbs ignore constitutional court" (*InfoPress*, April 7)

"Kosovo Serbs ignore Constitution Day" (*Zëri*, April 10)

The "refusal" to participate in and accept Kosovo institutions is not placed in a context that would shed light on the various and multifaceted reasons behind such policies, but rather the implication is that it is sheer obstinacy:

The Threat to State Frame 3: Draining the state of its resources

Another theme that comes under the topic of Threat to the State portrays the Serbs as draining the self-proclaimed Kosovo state, because of their non-compliance and opposition to its institutions. Three particular cases are prominent in this theme during the months analyzed: suspended Serb police officers, non-payment of electricity bills, and decentralization of Serb-majority areas. In all three cases, the newspapers focus on the detrimental consequences for the Kosovo, particularly economic:

"Three million for 300 Serb police officers" (*Infopress*, May 15)

"Serbs owe 120 million to KEK" (*Kosova Sot*, May 12)

"Decentralisation costs us € 30 million" (*Kosova Sot*, May 4)

The Serb community is presented as draining the Kosovo budget and hindering economic progress:

"Maliqi: The lesson from Sillovo" (*Express*, March 9)

The Sillovo incident is perhaps an introduction into a series of incidents involving the Serb minority on the eve of the United Nations Security Council session. The Government of Kosovo should wage a clear and efficient campaign proving that the incident had nothing to do with minority rights, but that it is an issue of unpaid electricity debts and an unprecedented usurpation of the limited energy resource in Kosovo.

This opinion piece not only refutes that the issue is a violation of minority rights, but undercuts the importance of the protests, by implying their falsity and a sort of conspiracy against the Kosovo state. This mirrors the official stance of the Kosovo government on the issue of disconnections of

Serb villages, and the protests that inevitably follow. The “debt” of the Serb community in Kosovo to KEK is a recurrent theme in the months analyzed, and thus the word is used frequently.

“Thaçi: There is no discrimination in Silovo, the energy has to be paid” (*Lajm*, March 11)

“21 police officers injured in a Serb protest” (*Koha Ditore*, May 12)

21 members of Kosovo Police were injured in a protest of local Serbs along the Gjilane-Bujanovac road. Serbs, still deprived of basic human rights, jobless and discriminated on ethnic basis were protesting their disconnection from the power supply for failure to settle their debts to KEK. KEK said that the villages inhabited mainly by the Serb community owe over €150 million in unpaid bills and insisted that the disconnection was not done on an ethnic basis.

This complex and long-standing problem, which has been plaguing the Serb community living in the enclaves for many years,⁶⁰ as well as the Kosovo Albanian population and everyone living in Kosovo, is simplified, and placed in the context of “conflict”; significantly, the fact that a sizable part of the Kosovo Albanian population does not pay electricity bills, including some official institutions,⁶¹ is not mentioned either.

It is important to note that in the articles analyzed, only Kosovo Albanian officials are cited, while the Serbs who are affected by the lack of electricity are not quoted; thus, their voice is not heard and their problems are viewed only through the perspective of the Kosovo Albanian officials.

⁶⁰ All of Kosovo is affected by the problem of electricity supply, and that power cuts do not affect only Serb-inhabited areas, but the entire territory and population. Second, it is also important to remember that many Kosovo Albanians do not pay for electricity either (see for example, UNDP 2006). In fact, the non-payment of electricity bills to KEK is a Kosovo-wide problem, and there are also public institutions which do not pay for their electricity; see U.S. Department of State, February 2009. Another factor affecting the issue with electricity cuts is that Serb enclaves are in rural areas, which throughout Kosovo receive less electricity than urban areas. The difference in electricity supply between rural and urban areas can be hours, but sometimes also days; to give an example, while in Priština there are 2 hour electricity cuts each 4 hours, in the Serb enclave of Gračanica there are 8 hour electricity cuts per 12 hours, and often even more. The general Kosovo problem of power cuts and non-payment of electricity bills is further exacerbated because the Serb population openly refuses to pay electricity bills to KEK, the Kosovo Energy Corporation; for years, the Serb community has been demanding that another provider, the Serbian electricity company, as the rightful owner of all Kosovo electricity sources, be allowed to operate in Serb areas, but that has never been allowed by the Albanians. Every so often, Albanian-controlled KEK disconnects completely the power supply to a certain Serb-inhabited village, and protests inevitably arise after a few days of no electricity whatsoever.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, February 2009.

The Threat to Security Frame(s)

The articles that correspond to the Threat to Security frame suggest that Serbs, and the Serbian government, threaten the security of the Kosovo “state”, through extremist behaviour and attitudes, criminal activities, and war crimes and human rights violations.

In the following example, the Threat to Security frame is directly stated:

“Krasniqi: Belgrade is guilty” (*Epoka e Re*, March 11)

... Kosovo Assembly Chairman Jakup Krasniqi said ... “Belgrade is being led by a policy of boycott and non-recognition, a policy that wants to produce destabilization and insecurity in Kosovo, and not a policy that wants to build new relations.”

The Threat to Security Frame 1: Extremism

This topic presents Kosovo Serbs, and Serbs in general, as being extremist in attitude and behaviour; the emphasis is on violence, such as protests, riots and similar, as “typical” of Serbs, particularly those in the north of Kosovo. Frequently, words such as “extremists” and “violent” are used to characterize Serbs and their actions:⁶²

“EULEX as UNMIK, embraces the Serb extremists” (*Bota Sot*, March 3)

“Serb extremists fire weapons” (*Bota Sot*, March 24)

“Thaçi says Government does not surrender to extremists in Mitrovica” (*Zëri*, April 30)

“Serbs want violence, continue with explosions” (*Bota Sot*, April 30)

“We will not surrender before extremists” (*Bota Sot*, April 30)

One of the cases that illustrate this topic, and that received prominent status and much media attention in the articles analyzed, is the conflict over the reconstruction of several Albanian houses in the north of Kosovo:

“Shots against the reconstruction of Albanian houses” (*Koha Ditore*, April 26)

Serb protesters fired shots during their attempts to impede the reconstruction of Albanian houses in Kroi i Vitakut in northern Mitrovica on Saturday.

The juxtaposition here, as in the following article, is between Albanians who are “carrying out the humanitarian project of rebuilding homes” and Serbs who respond with violence.

⁶² One of the articles analyzed even compares Serbs to the Taliban: “Buzhala: Moderate Serb Taliban” (*Express*, March 11).

“Work to resume today at ‘Kroi i Vitakut’, Police and KFOR on standby” (*Zëri*, April 27)

While carrying out the humanitarian project of rebuilding homes of Albanians in Kroi i Vitakut in the northern part of Mitrovica, Serbs have responded with firing guns on Friday and Saturday. ... President Fatmir Sejdiu evaluated these incidents in Kroi i Vitakut as orchestrated by Serb leaders. He also said that no one can prevent the work in the north of the country or in other territories of Kosovo.

The articles analyzed, as in the following example, emphasize “intolerance” and extremely violent behaviour:

“Attack with hand grenades on EULEX and KFOR” (*Koha Ditore*, April 28)

The confrontation between Serb citizens and security forces in the tense north erupted again on Monday, with at least two hand grenades being thrown at EULEX and KFOR peacekeepers. These incidents, which are caused by the intolerance of Serbs toward the rebuilding of five Albanian houses in Kroi i Vitakut, included shots from guns, but did not claim any victims.

Some articles invoke the threat frame explicitly, using strong wording, lacking verifiable data to create powerful images of Serb violence and aggression:

“Life under Serb snipers” (*Lajm*, April 28)

“With bullets against return” (*Lajm*, April 28)

“War status in Mitrovica, Serbs under arms!” (*Bota Sot*, April 28)

“Belgrade”, i.e. the Serbian government, is represented as being responsible, and as endorsing, or “silently blessing,” allegedly Serb-organized violence in Kosovo:

“Belgrade, the major causer of disorder in the north” (*Lajm*, May 7)

“International presence hesitates to mention Belgrade’s role” (*Koha Ditore*, May 14)

Representatives of the international community that work in the region have stated that the violence by Kosovo Serbs in the northern part of the country and in the Anamorava region transpired with the silent blessing of Belgrade. While senior U.S. diplomats directly point the finger at Serbian authorities and local extremist leaders for the recent events, the international presence in Kosovo is showing more restraint. “Belgrade’s influence on Kosovo Serbs is evident. We all know this and this is not a secret,” an international official told the paper, under the condition of anonymity.

The government in Belgrade is further accused of “inducing” violence:⁶³

⁶³ Both Kosovo Albanian politicians and international actors are cited, linking the violent behaviour and attitudes of Kosovo Serbs with the Serbian government in Belgrade:

“Pristina accuses Belgrade for incidents in the north” (*Zëri*, April 29)

After Monday’s incident in Mitrovica north when 100 local Serbs tried to stop rebuilding five houses in Kroi i Vitakut by using violence and shooting, the situation yesterday was calmer. However, in the surrounding area unidentified individuals have stoned two EULEX vehicles, but except for material damages, there were no injuries. Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu accused on Tuesday official Belgrade for inducing Kosovo Serbs to cause incidents in Mitrovica north, therefore he requested from the international community to make pressure on Serbia in order to stop the conflicts. “Last incidents in the north are caused by people dictated directly by Belgrade,” he said.

The Threat to Security Frame 2: Criminal activities

In this second topic in the Threat to Security frame the articles emphasize the connection between Kosovo Serbs, particularly those living in the north, but not only, and criminal activities, such as smuggling and trafficking.

“Border with Serbia, an open ‘door’ to smuggling” (*Bota Sot*, May 12)

Belgrade is also blamed for the criminal activities of Kosovo Serbs. The Serbian government is accused of “smuggling crime into Kosovo”:

“Assembly Speaker Krasniqi accuses the UN” (*Express*, March 8)

Kosovo Assembly Speaker Jakup Krasniqi has (...) said there could be no technical dialogue with Serbia as long as the latter does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state and as long as it keeps smuggling crime into Kosovo.

Frequently, the articles state, lacking verifiable data, that encouraging criminal activities is in the interest of the Serbs and the Serbian government in order to destabilize the Kosovo state.

“Serbia continues trafficking of arms in Kosovo” (*Bota Sot*, March 10)

This article repeats old stereotypes about the “Serbian terrorist system in Kosovo” and Serbian nationalism, linked with Serbian police crimes spanning more than a century, into the present day. Apart from being labelled as uncooperative in encouraging Kosovo Serbs to integrate, the Republic of Serbia is also portrayed as “[encouraging] and [supporting] illegal and criminal structures”:

“U.S. calls on Belgrade to stop northern leaders” (*Koha Ditore*, May 11)

The U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade Cameron Munther said that in the northern part of Kosovo irresponsible Serb leaders are producing violence and constitute a danger for their safety and the safety of others. Munther called on Belgrade to stop these irresponsible leaders.

“I am talking about people living in Mitrovica and your government knows who they are. These are people that incite violence; they are a threat to their safety and the safety of others. This is not the way to solve problems,” Munther was quoted as saying.

“Disagreements at the UN, UNMIK stays in the game” (*Koha Ditore*, March 24)

Kosovo Foreign Minister Skënder Hyseni ... enumerated the actions of the Kosovo government to improve the living conditions in the regions with minority communities, especially the Serb Community. “I will have to say that, after all, the Republic of Serbia was not at all helpful in this regard, because it continued the encouragement and support of illegal and criminal structures in the north,” Hyseni said, emphasizing that illegality in this part of the country is openly encouraged by Belgrade.

Consistently, it is the Serbs in north Kosovo who are most often linked with lawlessness and criminal activities; in fact, the north is often referred to as a “haven for smugglers” and a lawless territory:

“Thaçi: The law will be extended to the whole territory of the country” (*Koha Ditore*, March 12)

Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi told Voice of America radio that the north will not be a haven for smugglers and the rule of law will be extended throughout the country. “Integration is the only road, the future of Mitrovica is the future of Kosovo, there will not be a place for the smugglers that are still operating in Mitrovica,” he was quoted as saying.

In the following example, *Koha Ditore* reports the words of President Sejdiu, who uses extreme verbs, such as “inseminate” and “induce” and nouns such as “violence”, “anarchy”, “chaotic state” and “political and economic crime” to paint an extremely negative image of northern Kosovo Serbs:

“Sejdiu: Mitrovica and the northern part are facing structures that inseminate crime” (*Koha Ditore*, March 25)

Sejdiu expressed his concern that even ten years after those events, Mitrovica and northern Kosovo, are facing structures that inseminate political and economic crime in order to keep this part of the country in a chaotic state. “Those who induce violence and anarchy will not stop us from this journey, as they did not manage to eliminate us ten years ago,” he said.

The statement of President Sejdiu, as reported here, directly accuses the Serbs of trying to “eliminate” the Kosovo Albanians ten years ago, which is part of the following topic, concerning war crimes and human rights violations.

The Threat to Security Frame 3: War crimes and human rights violations

While the articles in this topic are mostly related to crimes committed before or during 1999, although not exclusively, they are important for the present image of the Serb minority, because they serve to reiterate and confirm the link between the Serbs and extreme aggression; such articles are a constant reminder of Serbs as enemies. Media-monitoring reports also

note that the war is still present in the print media, with an emphasis on commemorations, witness testimonies and missing persons, but focusing exclusively on Albanians, while ignoring facts about the sufferings of people from other ethnic groups.⁶⁴ The articles tend to bring back war-like reaction, using inflammatory wartime rhetoric in describing alleged “Serbian crimes”, “Serbian terrorism” and similar issues. The Albanian media constantly remind the public about Serb war crimes and atrocities, focusing on the Serbs as exclusive culprits for the war, particularly during periods of remembrance and anniversaries of massacres and the NATO bombings.⁶⁵ In many of the articles analyzed there is an emphasis on the responsibility of the Serbs in committing “genocide” in Kosovo, wherein the claim is treated as a well-established and indisputable fact.

“Sejdiu: Mitrovica and the northern part are facing structures that inseminate crime” (*Koha Ditore*, March 25)

Speaking in memory of the two martyrs killed that day by Serb forces, Sejdiu said that unfortunately no political leader in Serbia, not even those that assess themselves as democrats and pro-westerners, have had the courage to apologize to Kosovo’s population about the open genocide.

The words “genocide” and “Holocaust” appear frequently in the Albanian articles analyzed:

“The air strikes stopped the Serb genocide” (*Bota Sot*, March 25)

“Thaçi: Years 1998–99 resembled a new Holocaust” (*Koha Ditore*, March 25)

This is a common and rhetorically effective strategy for creating authoritative victim narratives⁶⁶ and clearly delineating between victims, i.e. Albanians, and villains, i.e. Serbs;⁶⁷ it is very functional, because, as Doerr explains, the “genocide provides metaphorical language and a framework to express absolute domination, victimization, and unbearable suffering” (Doerr 2000).

In the articles analyzed there is often an emphasis on the “planned”, “organized”, and “systematic” character of Serb war crimes:

“Sejdiu: Albanians were systematic victims of the Serb state” (*Lajm*, March 31)

⁶⁴ Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005; OSCE, July 2006.

⁶⁵ Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005.

⁶⁶ See e.g. Schiffrin 2002.

⁶⁷ It is by no means unique, since, as Moeller (2001) suggests, various groups use the Jewish experience to construct their own victim identities.

Further, the responsibility for war crimes is placed not only on the Serbian political elite of the 1990s, but also Serbian state representatives preceding and succeeding Milošević:

“Two decades of Serb crimes in Kosovo” (*Bota Sot*, March 10)

“Sejdiu: Serb massacres of Albanians were planned” (*Koha Ditore*, March 31)

President Fatmir Sejdiu met with survivors of Bogujevc, Durig and Llugali massacres at his residence yesterday. Sejdiu said that Slobodan Milosevic is not the only one responsible for the crimes committed against Albanians. “Tragedies faced by these families, as well as many other families in Kosovo, prove that Serb violence toward Albanian civilians was not only done by Milosevic’s regime, but was planned for a long time and was committed in an organized systematic manner by the Serbian state,” he said.

The significance of articles such as this one is that they remind the public of the war crimes committed during the conflict, reaffirming the victim identity of the Kosovo Albanians and continually strengthening the image of Serbs as “the enemy,” thus making reconciliation efforts quite difficult. Further, such statements and articles make claims about the long-term, systematic, and organized policy of crimes against Kosovo Albanians, presenting the conflict as historical and perpetual, but ignoring the whole historical context regarding shifting power realities and choosing facts selectively. The implication is that the conflict is fuelled by the hatred that Serbs and the Serbian state have for Kosovo Albanians and the consequent destructive policies. Here, the master narrative of Threat implies a threat to the very existence of the Kosovo Albanian population, and the Threat to Security frame is amplified into a threat to survival. Several articles report statements by Kosovo Albanian politicians who emphasize precisely this point, and portray the conflict as a struggle for survival and “existence”:

“The President and the Government deny media reports on KLA abuse camps” (*Koha Ditore*, April 11)

... President Fatmir Sejdiu said the KLA’s fight was righteous and was a fight for the existence of Albanians...

The implication is that the goal of the Serbs is to eliminate the Albanians. This adds another dimension to the conflict – of perpetual and inherent hatred and opposition.

In such and similar articles, which present only the Kosovo Albanian view, the Kosovo Serb minority is either not included, or their viewpoint is ridiculed and portrayed as “propaganda”. Similarly, accusations against Kosovo Albanians of committing war crimes are labelled as “propaganda”:

“The President and the Government deny media reports on KLA abuse camps” (*Koha Ditore*, April 11)

While commemorations of significant nation-building events and their coverage in the media are an important aspect of national identity and cohesion, the articles that report on commemorations and quote Kosovo government officials do not serve to further reconciliation efforts or create cohesion between all of Kosovo's communities, but rather to deepen the victim-villain dichotomy, strengthen the negative image of the Serbs as perpetrators, and reaffirm the Kosovo Albanian understanding of the conflict as the Truth. They are instrumental in strengthening negative stereotypes, polarized identities and perpetuating the conflict.

Rhetorical devices — compare and contrast, hyperboles and euphemisms

Another instrumental polarization strategy includes rhetorical devices, such as contrasts and comparisons, and hyperboles and euphemisms; according to Van Dijk (2000) these rhetorical devices are especially powerful and effective, because they provide intense connotations, and accentuate positive information while mitigating negative information about the in-group.

Compare and contrast

Comparison and contrast as rhetorical, as well as mental, features are primary and indispensable in constructing one's ethnic identity, particularly in situations of conflict; hence, this rhetorical device is present throughout discourse. Further, as Savarese (2000) notes, press coverage tends to be based on dichotomous frameworks, which emphasize opposites and construct contrasting categories, such hero/anti-hero, friend/enemy, etc.:

“Albanians work, Serbs protest” (*Lajm*, May 6)

“Serbs of Mitrovica protest” (*Express*, May 22)

Over 100 Serbs in the northern part of Mitrovica did the opposite of what the Albanians in Pristina did for the US Vice President, Joseph Biden. The Serbs in Mitrovica gathered to protest against his visit in Kosovo, while evaluating his state, America, as “the biggest enemy of Serbs and Serbia.”

Because of identity dynamics in intractable conflict, it is not necessary for the Albanian-language newspapers to directly state the contrast, because the contrast is already, and always, implied. As Hall (1985) notes, “positively marked terms ‘signify’ because of their position in relation to what is absent, unmarked, the unspoken, the unsayable. Meaning is relational within an ideological system of presences and absences.” The contrast is between aggressive and peaceful behaviour, and between attack and defence:

“Ready for peace, but also for defence” (*Kosova Sot*, March 27)

The blame for the conflict is directly attributed to the Serbs, who are portrayed as having “induced” the “war”, and as being ready and willing to do so again.

The profound contrast between the Serbs and the Albanians is also mirrored in representations of leaders and institutions. As we have seen, the Serb institutions operating in enclaves are called “parallel structures” and are associated with “illegitimacy”, “illegality” and even “terrorism”, while the leaders of the Serb government are portrayed as “manipulating”, and “threatening”.

For example, in the following excerpt, Serbia and its institutions, both past and present, are negatively evaluated as “not [having] a feeling of compassion to solve [missing persons] issues” and as thus limiting the Kosovo institutions.⁶⁸ On the other hand, Kosovo Albanian leaders are presented as cooperative, extending a hand of peace toward the Serbs, encouraging integration and coexistence.

Hyperboles and euphemisms

Hyperboles are used to emphasize information that is positive for the Kosovo Albanians, and negative for the Serbs, while euphemisms are used for information that is negative for the Kosovo Albanians and positive for the Serbs. The master narrative of Serbs as Threat is based on hyperbolizing the negative stereotypes and the perceived difference between the two groups involved; the use of hyperboles is a consequence of the perceived immense distance and difference, as well as the very polarized, black-and-white view that predominates, precluding any middle ground or ambiguity (Dujzings 2000). As Savarese (2000) points out, the press frequently uses these rhetorical devices to “dramatize” events.

Thus, in the analyzed articles of the Kosovo Albanian press, and as seen in the above-cited examples, the Serbs are always linked with extremely negative characterizations, such as “uncooperative”, “manipulative”, “aggressive”, “extremist”, and even “terrorist”, while the crimes committed by the Serbs are termed “genocide” and even “Holocaust”.

Hyperboles that accentuate positive characteristics of the Kosovo Albanians are particularly frequent in articles concerning the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its leaders, against the Serbs. In the following example, the battle of Adem Jashari, the “Legendary Commander” of the Albanian KLA guerrilla and the first and most celebrated “martyr for the nation” (Di Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers 2006), against the Serbs, is termed “heroic” and a “sublime sacrifice for the Albanian nation”:

⁶⁸ “Lack of humanity in Serbia” (*Express*, April 28).

“Traditional “KLA epopee” manifestation has started” (*Koha Ditore*, March 6)

“The legendary commander and the Jasharis, as well as others, have been a unique example of sacrifice and strong resistance of Albanians for freedom and independence,” said Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi said that their sacrifice was sublime for the Albanian nation. “Today is the great day, a day of remembrance of pride for all of us. The sacrifice of Commander Adem Jashari and all other Jasharis was a message for unification, sacrifice, freedom, democratic order and for the independent, sovereign state of Kosovo,” said Thaçi.

The events in the village of Prekaze in March 1998 are glorified and hyperbolized as being a “message for unification, sacrifice, freedom, democratic order and for the independent, sovereign state of Kosovo.”⁶⁹ Through implicit and explicit contrast the armed struggle against the enemy, i.e. the Serbs, is cast as the ultimate patriotic deed. In a society, already extremely polarized, segregated, and always ripe with inter-ethnic tensions, this kind of rhetoric serves to solidify opposition, even hatred toward the Other, and legitimize violence.

On the other hand, euphemisms are used for violence against Kosovo Serbs. A case in point is the reporting about the anniversary of the March 2004 anti-Serb pogrom:⁷⁰

⁶⁹ In March 1998 the Serbian police forces surrounded the Jashari family compound in the village of Prekaze, in the Drenica valley, and after Adem Jashari, one of the leaders of the Albanian guerrilla (KLA), responsible for frequent killings of Serbian officials and civilians, refused to surrender and let the civilians leave the compound, Jashari was killed and most of his family, including women and children, were killed. See Judah 2000. Adem Jashari became the most prominent “martyr for the nation” or “martyr for freedom”; subsequently, each victim from the ranks of the KLA became a martyr, and is commemorated as such. In Kosovo Adem Jashari, considered by the Kosovo Serbs as a brutal anti-Serb terrorist leader, became the most commemorated Albanian commander, as there are many streets, buildings, schools, public institutions, and monuments dedicated to him in Albanian-dominated Kosovo.

⁷⁰ During the Albanian-organized anti-Serb riots, which erupted on March 17, and lasted until March 18, 2004 in at least 33 places around Kosovo and involved around 51,000 people, 19 persons were killed, while 954 were wounded, including more than 120 UNMIK police officers and KFOR soldiers that confronted Albanian extremists, as well as 58 KPS officers. The violence left 4,100 persons in Serb-inhabited areas displaced, mostly Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, but also dozens of Albanians from Northern Mitrovica. The Albanian rioters burned and destroyed 550 homes, along with 27 Serb Orthodox churches and monasteries, including UNESCO protected the medieval Serb cathedral church of the Mother of God of Ljeviška in Prizren, dating from 1307. An additional 182 homes and two other Serb Orthodox churches or monasteries were seriously damaged. The March pogrom in 2004 is considered the most serious setback since 1999 in creating a multiethnic Kosovo with democratic institutions, where hu-

“The March 2004 events will not be repeated, says Government”
(*Koha Ditore*, March 18)

On the fifth anniversary of the March 2004 events the Government of Kosovo committed itself to ensuring that such acts are never repeated. In a press release issued yesterday, the government repeated its solidarity with all of those who were affected during those unfortunate events.

The March anti-Serb riots, turned into pogrom, are termed “events”⁷¹ and “unfortunate events,” while the severe violence that was perpetrated is called “such acts,” without explicit mention of what exactly happened or any qualification of it; the victims, and the perpetrators, are also not named. Further, in the articles analyzed, the Serb views and interpretations of the March 2004 riots, often characterized in the Serbian press with strong words, such as “pogrom”,⁷² is labelled as “propaganda”:

“Serbs captives of their propaganda” (*Lajm*, March 18)

Here both hyperbole and euphemism are present as rhetorical devices, since the riots are referred to euphemistically as “events” while the Serbs are presented as “captives” of the memory. Thus, the rhetorical devices work to mitigate the severity of the violence committed against the Serbian minority during that time, and to avoid invoking responsibility and accountability.

Lexicalization

Lexicalization, or the language used to emphasize positive information about the in-group and negative information about the out-group, is essential in perceiving the Other, and thus the conflict, in negative and deterministic ways (Van Dijk 2000). The language used to describe Serbs reinforces the master narrative of Serbs as Threat, within the two frames, the Threat to State and Threat to Security. As we have seen in the previous sections, the

man and minority rights are respected. See Human Rights Watch 2004; International Crisis Group 2004; Amnesty International 2004; *Kosovo and Metohija* 2004; Bataković 2007b.

⁷¹ *Zëri* (March 18): “Government commits that events of 2004 never be repeated;” *Kosova Sot* (March 18): “The events of March 2004, one dark episode.” In this article, it is interesting to note that the March 2004 riots and anti-Serb pogrom are considered the only “dark episode” in the post-1999 history of Kosovo.

⁷² See e.g., *Beta* (March 17): “Bogdanović: March Pogrom the biggest failure of the international community”; RTS (March 17): “Serbian Orthodox Church: March pogrom was continuation of bombing”; Tanjug (March 17): “[Russian] Patriarch Kiril: Wounds of March pogrom in Kosovo have not healed”, and “OSCE presents documentary film on pogrom of Serbs”; Tanjug (March 18): “Jeremić: March violence was pogrom of civilians”, and “Fifth anniversary of violence of Albanians against Serbs in Kosovo”.

Serb population is negatively associated with extreme and disturbing words such as “genocide,” “Holocaust,” “war,” “murder,” and “massacre”:

“Serb genocide” (*Infopress*, April 28)

“PD: Tadić’s statement – an undeclared war with Kosovo” (*Koha Ditore*, April 20)

The Party of Justice said on Sunday that Serbian President Boris Tadić’s statement in Decan [the Serbian monastery of Visoki Dečani] on Sunday triggered bitter feelings among the population of Kosovo. The statement comes on the 10th anniversary of the murder and massacre of thousands of Albanians, crimes for which the Serbian state has never apologized. PD leader Ferid Agani told a press conference that Tadić’s visit implies that the war between Kosovo and Serbia has not ended, but now continues in a different form.

“violence”:

“Violence against blackout” (*Express*, May 12)

“insecurity”:

“Krasniqi: Serbia is exporting insecurity to Kosovo” (*Kosova Sot*, March 20)

deceitfulness:

“Matoshi: Don’t trust them dear [US vice-president Joseph] Biden” (*Koha Ditore*, May 20)

“danger”:

“Danger from Mitrovica” (*Express*, April 22)

“force”:

“Serbs try to prevent by force construction process in ‘Kroi i Vitakut’” (*Infopress*, April 28)

“radical” attitudes:

“The ultimatum of the radical Mihajlovic” (*Koha Ditore*, May 4)

“extremist” behaviour:

“EULEX as UNMIK, embraces the Serb extremists” (*Bota Sot*, March 3)

“Serb extremists fire weapons” (*Bota Sot*, March 24)

and “terrorism”:

“10 years for unrestrained non-human from a terrorist state” (*Bota Sot*, April 25)

Belgrade is accused of “manipulating” Serbs in Kosovo:

“Belgrade continues to manipulate Serbs” (*InfoPress*, May 11)

having “destructive policies”:

“Thaçi against destructive policies of Serbia” (*Lajm*, May 15)

and being “guilty” and “responsible” for various problems:

“Krasniqi: Belgrade is guilty” (*Epoka e Re*, March 11)

“animosity”:

“Kosovo-Serbia: animosity continues” (*Kosova Sot*, May 15)

“battle”:

“Kosovo wins the battle of IMF” (*Koha Ditore*, May 5)

After a long battle, Kosovo triumphed against Serbia’s lobbying campaign against a blockage of the voting process of Kosovo membership in IMF.

The word “against” appears frequently in the articles analyzed — Serbs against Kosovo Albanians (as in the case of war crimes), the Kosovo (against its independence and progress), democratic institutions (not paying electricity bills and not participating in institutions and elections), order (protesting), as well as humanitarian values (reconstruction of Albanian houses):

“Sejdiu: Serbs are against human rights” (*Bota Sot*, April 25)

The Serbs are associated with opposition:

“Albanians announce rebuilding, Serbs blockade” (*Lajm*, April 23)

and “refusal”:

“Teki Dervishi: Serb refusal, Albanian loyalty” (*Bota Sot*, April 2)

Yet another aspect of lexicalization are labels that denote ethnicity, which are “of primary potency” (Singh 1999) and are thus salient and powerful, preventing alternative classification. The labels applied to the Serbs are not only stereotypes, reflecting strong prejudices, but have come to be seen as integral characteristics of the population itself – they have become cultural models (Gee 1996). The very word “Serb” carries extremely negative associations and evaluations, and is distinguished clearly, in the articles analyzed, from “Kosovo”, “Kosovar” and “Albanian”. Also in the examples above, we have seen that the label “Serb” is applied in general to the entire Serb population, in Kosovo and Serbia, and is used also to refer to Serbian government officials; thus, policies of the Serbian government are interpreted as “Serb” and negative characteristics attributed to the entire population.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RECONCILIATION

The analysis in the previous section demonstrates several important findings and confirms Wolfsfeld's (1997) above-indicated four major characteristics of media coverage of minorities. Even though there are significant differences between newspapers in reporting about local politics, there is consensus and coherence on reporting about Serb-related issues in the three months analyzed, and a lack of divergent perspectives and voices. In other words, nationalism cuts across party lines.

Negative portrayals and extreme polarization

During the months analyzed a rather notable is an absence of positive information about the Serb community, and a lack of positive portrayals thereof; the image that is created, on various levels of text and through diverse discursive strategies, is entirely negative. The master narrative of Serbs as a Threat is reinforced through two main frames — the Threat to State and the Threat to Security frame. Within these frames, the topic selection, conforming to Van Dijk's "ideological square" of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, is characterized by an emphasis on negative information on, and portrayals of, the Serbs.

Through rhetorical devices — compare and contrast, and hyperboles and euphemisms — the difference, opposition and extreme polarization between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs is stressed and amplified, while through lexicalization the Serbs are presented in stereotypically negative ways, as dangerous, antagonistic, aggressive and inhumane. This is congruent with the findings of media monitoring reports, which stress that there is a disproportionate emphasis on "radical elements" within the Serb community,⁷³ which can "create panic within the majority of Kosovo's population and increase their mistrust towards the Serbian minority".⁷⁴

The emphasis is on ethnic belonging and ethnic identity as primary; all articles analyzed accentuate that as the defining feature. Even when problems affect all citizens, or are common Kosovo-wide issues, the context is "ethnicized", and presented as a "Serb issue", as in the case of electricity

⁷³ According to media monitoring reports the Albanian media often use inappropriate, derogatory and inflammatory language in relation to the incidents caused by the Serb community, or issues related to problems facing the Serb community; sometimes such language can be considered hate speech; several media outlets are known for the use language that incites ethnic hatred, particularly the dailies *Bota Sot* and *Epoka e Re*. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006.

⁷⁴ OSCE, July 2006.

debts. Through labels of primary potency, the reporting stays confined by ethnic identity.

The term “Serb” itself carries extremely negative associations and evaluations, and is distinguished clearly, in the articles analyzed, from “Kosovo”, “Kosovar” and “Albanian”, which points to the symbolic exclusion of Serbs from Kosovo society, and reflects their physical separation and segregation.

Voice and privilege

The exclusion is reflected also in terms of voice, as the Kosovo Serb community, for the most part, is not given a voice in the articles analyzed. Mostly Serb government officials from Belgrade are quoted as speaking on behalf of the Kosovo Serbs, yet their statements are negatively evaluated or discredited as propaganda.⁷⁵ Furthermore, international representatives and organizations are cited as speaking for and about the Serbs.⁷⁶ Kosovo Albanian government officials are most frequently cited in articles concerning Serb issues, and their statements serve to reinforce the master narrative of Serbs as a major threat.

In rare instances when Kosovo Serbs are quoted, they either are labelled “radical” and “extremist”, and thus discredited, or they are several Serbs who participate in Kosovo institutions, or Serbs that criticize the government in Belgrade. In the latter two cases, the media do make a distinction between the Kosovo Serb community and the Serbian government, and give voice to such criticism; this conforms to Van Dijk’s “ideological square” in that it highlights negative information about the Other.⁷⁷ According to media monitoring reports,⁷⁸ Albanian media in general give more attention to those politicians and representatives of Kosovo Serbs who are working with the Kosovo institutions, and are perceived as being “moderate”; their

⁷⁵ The most cited officials of Serbia are President Boris Tadić, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Goran Bogdanović and State Secretary for Kosovo and Metohija Oliver Ivanović.

⁷⁶ “Local Serbs soften their position vis-à-vis Ahtisaari Package” (*Koha Ditore*, March 14).

⁷⁷ “Dejan Jankovic: I report only to the Kosovo police” (*Koha Ditore*, March 20).

While official Belgrade has stated that the Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police Dejan Jankovic will only receive orders and report to EULEX and UNMIK, Jankovic himself, via a phone conversation, said that he takes order and reports only to the Director of the Kosovo Police. Jankovic on Friday denied Belgrade statements. “I work for the Kosovo Police and take orders and report to the Director of the Kosovo Police,” said Jankovic for *Koha Ditore*.

⁷⁸ OSCE, July 2006; Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006.

purpose is to strengthen the impression that progress is being made toward the integration of the Serb community.

However, articles citing Serbs who are not Kosovo or Serb government officials or political figures, but Kosovo Serb community representatives or citizens are rare during the three month period analyzed.⁷⁹ There is a profound absence of “everyday” voices of Serbs living in Kosovo, and it is the various “officials”, whether Serbian, Albanian or international, who speak on their behalf. There is also differential treatment of the different voices, as the perspectives of Kosovo Albanian officials tend to be privileged.

This points to a further problem revealed in the analysis of articles during the three month period, related to “significant silences”.

Significant silences

As Huckin (2002) demonstrates, “significant silences” or “manipulative silences” deliberately conceal relevant information. The defining characteristics of such silences are intentionality and advantage — certain subjects are intentionally omitted in a way that is advantageous to the writer/speaker through topic selection and framing. In Van Dijk’s “ideological square” silences refer to information that is negative for the in-group and positive for the out-group.

In the analysis above, there is silence about issues that portray the Serbs in a positive light; stories that would contribute to a better understanding of the living conditions of the Serb minority in Kosovo are absent. There is also no coverage of discriminatory practices against the Serb minority and the problems they face in trying to remain in Kosovo. A case in point is the portrayal of the “parallel structures” which are mystified and demonized, without explanations as to the reasons for their existence and functions.

Silences are also pronounced in relation to violence committed against Serbs, as in the case of the anniversary of the March 2004 riots. This conforms to OSCE’s finding that Kosovar Albanian media have shown tendencies to downplay stories when Serbs have been victims of possible ethnically-motivated crimes.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ This conforms to findings cited in media monitoring reports, which stress that there is silence when it comes to providing reports about the everyday life of minorities, reflecting their living conditions, opportunities and perspectives, and ordinary citizens and members of the community are rarely cited. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006; Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2005; OSCE, July 2006.

⁸⁰ OSCE, July 2006.

Reproducing dominant ideologies

The issues of voice and representation reveal a general problem related to Albanian-language print (and other) media that organizations and analysts working in Kosovo have noted as concerning;⁸¹ namely, the media, for the most part, simply reproduce official discourse, citing government officials and politicians — Albanian, Serbian and international, reporting their statements as facts, without providing context, counterarguments, doing investigative work or debating issues.⁸² The discourse further strengthens the conflict dynamics of opposition, polarization and even hatred. As Wolfsfeld has shown, this is a common feature of media discourse in divided societies, particularly when there are no shared media outlets; in such instances further polarization is almost inevitable.

Consequences of media discourse and the master narrative of Serbs as Threat

There are several major implications of the media discourse that centres on the master narrative of Serbs as Threat. Not only does the master narrative preclude counter-narratives, or alternative voices, but represses circumstances and explanations that highlight the imbalance in power relations. By emphasizing that Serbs are a threat, the Albanians are presented as having to constantly defend their territory, state, institutions, their very identity and indeed their survival. When the Other is presented as dangerous and threatening, fear of the Other and a desire to eliminate the threat, physically and symbolically, become perceived as a “natural” response, and thus constitute a significant conflict-sustaining dynamic. When the Other is perceived as the enemy, then defence against that Other becomes not just acceptable, but necessary. Media content that creates fear, such as a focus on past atrocities and the history of ethnic hatred, as exemplified in the articles analyzed, creates the foundation for violent action, labelled as “self-defence” (Frohardt & Temin 2003).

Other means of eliminating the perceived threat can be hindering the return process through institutional blocks and red-tape, impeding integration and maintaining segregation through the perpetuation of negative stereotypes and images and a perpetually hostile environment. One of the most common arguments, as we have seen also in the above-cited articles, that Kosovo Albanians, and also many international actors, claim is that

⁸¹ USAID 2004.

⁸² It is interesting to note that while discourse concerning internal politics is vastly divergent in the newspapers examined, as all of them are owned and supported by different political parties, the analysis shows that the discourse regarding the Serbian minority converges and is strikingly uniform.

Serbs are not willing to integrate into Kosovo society, and that their isolation is self-imposed.⁸³ Thus, while the problem of the integration of the remaining Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo (roughly 200,000 Kosovo Serbs are still displaced in central Serbia) is much more complex, the issue is misrepresented and the Serbs are blamed entirely for their predicament; meanwhile the Kosovo Albanian leadership and the dominant Albanian community are relieved of all responsibility.

It can be argued that the negative Serb identity is a symbolic manifestation of the desire to eliminate the perceived Threat; such an identity serves to sustain an atmosphere of hostility toward the Serbs, and an environment where Serbs do not feel safe or even part of Kosovo society. As we have seen in the analysis above, the terms “Serbs” and “Kosovo” are juxtaposed, presented as dichotomous, and Serbs are portrayed purely as a problem for Kosovo society. Such representations reinforce societal, as well as symbolic, exclusion. As Said has shown, misconceptions of the Other extend beyond representations, serving to justify dominance of one group over another (Said 1978). When discourse that constructs a stigmatized Other, through representational practices demonstrated above, and that causes violence, either cultural, structural or direct, goes uncontested, and defamation and stigmatizing practices are reproduced, they contribute to maintaining the systems of domination and subordination. Various human rights reports consistently point to “societal antipathy against Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church”, “societal violence, abuse, and discrimination” against the Serb minority, “cases of politically and ethnically motivated violence” against Serbs and “lack of progress in returning internally displaced persons to their homes.”⁸⁴

The predicament of the Serb minority in Kosovo stems from systematic discrimination, which has been institutionalized on different levels in favour of Kosovo Albanians,⁸⁵ and the existence of profoundly different at-

⁸³ According to UNDP’s Early Warning Report, Kosovo Albanians see the influence of Belgrade and the lack of readiness of Kosovo Serbs to be integrated into Kosovo society as the two most significant factors that continue to affect interethnic relations. Meanwhile, for Kosovo Serbs the two major factors aggravating interethnic relations are the attitude of Kosovo Albanian leaders and insufficient efforts to integration the Serbs into Kosovo society. See UNDP 2009.

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, February 2009.

⁸⁵ It can be argued that the predicament of the Serb community is induced by the state structure itself. According to Gurr (1993), the majority of states are multi-ethnic. However, there are differences between liberal-democratic multi-ethnic states, where belonging is based on citizenship, and ethnic states, where it is based on ethnic affiliation and belonging to the dominant ethnic group. The ethnic state is the homeland of only one of the multiple ethnic groups and serves the national goals of only one ethnic

titudes between Serbs, rejectin Albanian Kosovo statehood and Albanians toward the symbols and values of the state, and the ethnic conflict itself.⁸⁶ A sweeping and significant gap exists between the Serb and Albanian publics, as well as leadership, in understanding the conflict, its causes, the course of its development, and significantly, the desirable status solution. Serbs and Albanians are fundamentally divided on issues of historical rights, narratives of conflict, assigning blame for the conflict, and its solutions.

The discriminatory policies against the Kosovo Serbs are grounded in the support of the Kosovo Albanian population, and are a lived, daily experience. The rationale for these discriminatory policies and for their support among the Kosovo Albanian public can be found in part in media representations.

The analysis of the newspaper articles in the Albanian media during the three month period points to the conclusion that the professed goals of multi-ethnicity and equality for all citizens is simply being paid lip service, while there is a lack of genuine commitment to reconciliation and the peace process.⁸⁷

As media are an integral part of society, and as they cannot single-handedly enact or influence change, serious and long-term change will only be possible if the Serbs living in Kosovo are considered truly equal citizens, with the right to life, freedom, and equality.

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group to the exclusion of the other ethno-national groups, regardless of their citizenship status. In such a state, the state itself sides with one ethnic group in determining tangible and intangible resources, such as political power, wealth and identity, and state symbols represent the dominant group. See Maynes 1993; Rouhana 1997.

⁸⁶ On the level of state character and symbols, the Kosovo identity is not available to the Serb community, because its meaning is intertwined with the Albanianess of the state, and because there is an emphasis on the profound difference, and irreconcilable contrast, between Kosovar [i.e. Albanian] and Serb. This leaves the Serbs in Kosovo in an ambiguous situation – while they claim Kosovo as their homeland, the current socio-political and cultural set up of the Albanian-dominated Kosovo impedes, indeed precludes, integration, and favours their exclusion.

⁸⁷ As Wolfsfeld (2004) shows, when government and elite groups reduce the obstacles blocking a minority's integration into the social mainstream, the change in the political environment will also be reflected in news coverage. Otherwise, when the ruling social forces inhibit minority integration by placing obstacles in its path, such as discrimination, denial of its culture, overemphasizing data on crime rates among group members, and similar, the negative treatment of minority groups is likely to remain, or even grow.

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REVIEWS

ALEXEI LIDOV, *HIEROTOPY. SPATIAL ICONS AND IMAGE-PARADIGMS IN BYZANTINE CULTURE*.

MOSCOW 2009, pp. 351.

(with an English summary, black-and-white and colour illustrations, a glossary, and an index)

Reviewed by Danica Popović*

For the Byzantinological and medievalist community, Alexei Lidov hardly needs an introduction. An art historian and theorist, the founder and director of the Research Centre for Eastern Christian Culture in Moscow (since 1991), a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Arts (since 2007), Lidov is a prolific scholar widely published outside Russia, and a captivating lecturer whose presence at leading universities in Europe (Sorbonne, Oxford, Cambridge) and the USA (Princeton, Harvard, Columbia) unfailingly elicits great attention from the academic community. Over the last two decades Lidov has been an influential presence in the field of medieval studies as the driving force and moving spirit of ground-breaking projects, both in terms of research topics and, especially, methodology. These projects, broadly devoted to the foundations and key phenomena of medieval visual culture, have been realized through a series of international conferences held at regular intervals in Moscow since 1991. The research results have been published in extensive thematic volumes conceptually framed and edited by Lidov. Their fresh and innovative quality is obvious from their very titles: *Jerusalem in Russian Culture* (1994 and 2005); *The Eastern*

Christian Church. Liturgy and Art (1994); *The Miracle-Working Icon in Byzantium and Old Rus'* (1996); *The Ikonostasis. Origins – Evolution – Symbolism* (2000); *Eastern Christian Relics* (2003); *Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Space in Byzantium and Medieval Russia* (2006); *New Jerusalem: The Translation of Sacred Spaces in Christian Culture* (2006); *Spatial Icons. Performativity in Byzantium and Medieval Russia* (2011). Apart from an undeniable scholarly breakthrough that they have made, the Moscow conferences have greatly contributed to a vigorous and productive intellectual dialogue between different scholarly milieus such as Western Europe, North America, Japan, Russia and other Slavic countries, Serbia included.

Serbia owes a particular debt of gratitude to Alexei Lidov. His energetic support to the preservation of the heavily endangered Serbian heritage in Kosovo and Metohija, immediately threatened in a period between the beginning of the 1999 war and the 2004 March Pogrom, will certainly be remembered. Lidov considered this commitment a matter of professional and personal ethics, and stood up for his

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values in his various capacities and on a variety of occasions: he was active “on the ground”, as a UNESCO envoy, addressed the general public through the media, took part in a number of Russian and international conferences and forums. A lasting achievement of his committed effort is the lavishly illustrated, bilingual English/Russian book *Kosovo. Orthodox Heritage and Contemporary Catastrophe*, published in Moscow in 2007. In addition to the instructive preface on the *cultural genocide* committed in present times and “in the presence of authorities”, it contains a list of the completely destroyed or damaged Serbian heritage, and an exhaustive catalogue of all Orthodox Christian churches in Kosovo and Metohija.

The book presented here holds a special place in Alexei Lidov’s work. It assembles ten studies published between 2001 and 2008, whose common denominator and core concern is *hierotopy*, the study of sacred space — its manifestations, formation mechanisms, functions and reception. So, hierotopy is the study of one of central phenomena of medieval culture in general, and its visual aspect in particular. It should be noted right away that the book is so much more than a mere collection of articles brought together under one title. Even the reader familiar with Lidov’s work cannot help being at least a little surprised by its sophisticated conception and programmatic integrity. Namely, what we find there is a theoretically well-grounded and, it deserves a special emphasis, factually corroborated explication of the author’s basic methodological premises, which have crystallized over the past two decades. For this purpose, Lidov introduces several new concepts into scholarly discourse, as well as a new pertinent vocabulary. It should be emphasized that these innovations are not an end unto themselves. On the contrary, they result from a patient and steadfast quest for a suitable method for interpreting such an important and multilayered phe-

nomenon as sacred space. In all that, Lidov, rather than discarding the methods and results of traditional disciplines such as the history of art, architecture or religion, archaeology and many others, simply points to their limitations or, more precisely, their inability to recognize all layers of meaning present in some of the phenomena of visual culture. Consequently, in his view, one of the major problems encountered in studies focused on sacred space is the lack of appropriate and precise terminology.

Hierotopy is both the central concept and the broadest research framework of this book. The basic premises of the new method are expounded in the introductory chapter, “Hierotopy: The creation of sacred spaces as a form of creativity and subject of cultural history” (pp. 11–38), and in the concluding study, “Images-paradigms as a new notion of visual culture: A hierotopic approach to art history” (pp. 293–305). Lidov defines hierotopy both as the making of sacred spaces seen as a distinctive form of human creativity and, at the same time, as a field of historical studies concerned with discovering and analyzing some products of that creativity. This particular kind of creativity is deeply rooted in human nature and constitutes a form of man’s knowledge of himself as a spiritual being, while the purposely created sacred places are spaces intended for human communication with the transcendent. Pointing to the fact that *sacred space* has often been an object of attention in human sciences in recent times, but as a rule from narrow specialist perspectives, Lidov highlights the few “integrated” approaches in order to highlight the distinctiveness and functionality of the hierotopic method. This method, Lidov argues, cannot be reduced to the concept of synthesis of the arts, very influential in art theory and practice in the age of modernism, including such remarkably profound and original achievements as that of Pavel Florensky,

who looked at the sacred space of an Orthodox Christian church as a “synthesis of the arts” and emphasized the essential “aesthetic” quality of all components of the liturgy. Lidov draws a clear distinction between his own concept of *hierotopy* and that of *hierophany* as conceived of by Mircea Eliade, his famous predecessor in the study of the phenomenon of sacredness. While hierophany is the revelation of the divine in a certain place or space, which thereby assumes sacred qualities and becomes marked off from the profane, hierotopy is the form of human creativity which lastingly materializes the memory of a hierophany.

Lidov uses two more important concepts as helpful *instrumenta studiorum*. One of them is the *spatial icon*, which he describes as an image endowed with iconic qualities and existing not only as a flat plane but emanating into the space as a “vision”, bonding the image and the viewer together in an essential way. The image functions in reality as a constantly changing and pulsating iconic space and dynamic structure. It integrates a variety of elements: the rite and its participants, the light, the scent, the sound. Lidov makes the observation, as perceptive as it is accurate, that the concept of the Byzantine *spatial icon* finds its typological analogies in modern art forms such as performances and multimedia installations. The other concept used by Lidov is the *icon-paradigm*, a sort of icon-idea, which, although incorporating a wide range of literary and symbolic associations, cannot be reduced to a mental construct and is not an illustration of a text. It has neither an established iconography nor a fixed and definitive form, but it does belong into visual culture, it is visible and recognizable, and, in a sense, functions as a metaphor. In Lidov’s view, it is this “hieroplastic” perception of the world — based on contemplation with the “mind’s eye” and on visually shaped spiritual contents

— that the Byzantines saw as trustworthy confirmation of the divine presence.

Lidov further explicates his theoretical premises, outlined here only briefly, using concrete examples. This aspect of Lidov’s work demonstrates his vast erudition and knowledge of medieval culture, both Eastern and Western Christian, as shown by the broad chronological and geographical span that his considerations are based upon. Given the framework of his concerns — sacredness and the sphere of the miraculous — it comes as no surprise to see that miracle-working icons and relics, a widely popular research topic over the last twenty years, are the focus of his attention.

The concepts of *hierotopy* and *spatial icons* are particularly exhaustively elaborated in the chapter “Spatial icons: The miraculous performance of the Hodegetria of Constantinople” (pp. 36–69). Based on the written sources, Lidov offers a new interpretation of the well-known rite known as the “Tuesday miracle”. Namely, every Tuesday, on the square in front of the monastery of Hodegon, the miracle-working double-sided icon of the Virgin Hodegetria and the Crucifixion would “fly” into the air, marking out a distinctive iconic space created as much by the icon and elements such as the light, smells and sounds, as by the participants in the event. Lidov’s well-argued interpretation suggests that the ritual re-enacted the failed siege of Constantinople in 626, through the recurring iconic presence of the Virgin, the city’s miracle-working protectress. The Constantinopolitan miracle-working icons are the focus of yet another chapter, “The miraculous icons of Hagia Sophia: The emperor as creator of sacred space” (pp. 163–209). Apart from bringing new and significant observations on the original system of images around the Imperial Door at Hagia Sophia, Lidov proposes a convincing reconstruction of the remarkably complex and studied programme

realized through icons and relics, which integrated into a single sacred space not only different parts of the Great Church but also the Great Palace. Offering the arguments in support of his view that the architect of the “project” was the sagacious and theologically highly learned emperor Leo VI, Lidov opens the very important but little-studied question of the identity of the creators of sacred spaces in the Byzantine world.

The relationship between icons and relics, and their function, is a topic Lidov addresses, from different perspectives, in a few more studies. Thus, “The Theotokos of the Pharos: The imperial church-reliquary as the Constantinopolitan Holy Sepulchre” (pp. 71–109), offers a convincing interpretation of the programme of the palatine chapel of the Byzantine emperors, which enshrined the most precious relics of the Christian world, as an expression of the belief that the Virgin of the Pharos was the Constantinopolitan Holy Sepulchre and an emulation, in miniature, of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. Lidov’s interpretation, which continues the recent string of versatile studies on relics, strongly supports the assumption that, in the Christian tradition, the Virgin of the Pharos was a powerful *topos* and the prototype of every subsequent *cappella palatina*, from the most famous one, the Sainte-Chapelle in Paris, to its echoes in the Slavic world, Serbia included. Some emphases in the programme of the Constantinopolitan palatine chapel have led Lidov to venture a step further and revisit yet another, currently very appealing, research topic: Mandyliion and Keramion. His study “The Mandyliion and Keramion: An iconic image of the sacred space” (pp. 111–135) puts forth the well-argued assumption that the two images of Christ were suspended in the central bay of the Virgin of the Pharos, thus creating a mystical space where the miraculous presence of the not-made-by-hand icons corresponded to the miraculous conversion of

bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. In that way, the icon and the Eucharist were integrated in a single spatial “image” of paramount sacredness. The study “Holy Face–Holy Scripture–Holy Gate: An image-paradigm of the ‘blessed city’ in Christian hierotopy” (pp. 137–162) addresses a related topic. The Saviour’s not-made-by-hand image, traditionally believed to have been set up in a niche above the gate of Edessa by the emperor Abgar himself, was a relic of the highest order and as such had an apotropaic function, as had Christ’s autograph letter to Abgar. These relics, in a particular space, elicited in the minds of the contemporaries the recognizable image-paradigm of the “blessed” city of Edessa.

Lidov examines the concept of image-paradigm and the intricate mechanism of its creation in his remarkably multidimensional study “The katapetasma of Hagia Sophia: Byzantine installations and the image-paradigm of the temple veil” (pp. 211–225). Embarking on a topic which has escaped the attention of researchers, he scrupulously studies the phenomenon of altar curtains from the sources and on a quite broad sample. Noteworthy is his attempt to reconstruct the katapetasma of Hagia Sophia, its original appearance and significance, and its role in the entire design of the sanctuary. Drawing attention to the sources that liken the katapetasma of the Great Church to the curtain of the Jewish temple, Lidov concludes that it was the central component of a *spatial icon*, a sort of “installation” and a part of a carefully built system which included liturgical vessels and textiles, crosses, votive crowns etc. The structure of the *spatial icon* was dynamic or, to use another of Lidov’s favourite terms, it was *performative* in character.

Art historians concerned with iconography and iconology will certainly find the study “The Priesthood of the Virgin: An image-paradigm of Byzantine iconography” (pp. 227–259) particularly interest-

ing. The subject is highly complex and delicate, even more so as the idea of the Virgin's priesthood in Byzantine theology was never dogmatically articulated. Lidov's pioneering research brings into relation hymnographic and homiletic patterns with visual metaphors for the Virgin, arriving at the conclusion that some pieces of the Virgin's garment echo the priest's vestments. His attention especially focuses on the Virgin's "liturgical handkerchief", associating it with the Eucharistic sacrifice. It appears that the image of the priesthood of the Virgin is an excellent demonstration of the effectiveness of Lidov's method. The image is not amenable to interpretation from particular perspectives, as an illustration of a text or theological teaching, but only from the perspective of its totality, as an image-idea or *image-paradigm*. Lidov uses the same conceptual apparatus to interpret a miracle which is still perpetuated in Christian tradition in his study on "The Holy Fire: Hierotopic and art-historical aspects of the creation of 'New Jerusalem's' (pp. 261–291). The miracle of the Holy Fire, which comes down upon the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem on Holy Saturdays, is traditionally believed to be the proof of the reality of the resurrection and future life in the Kingdom of Heaven. This has endowed the Holy Fire with the status of a precious relic, distributed across the Christian world for centuries. Lidov offers a detailed analysis of some architectural elements, above all the *kouvouklion* or aedicule over the tomb of the Lord, and the shape of the lamps for distributing the fire, and suggests that they produced multiple echoes in new contexts — in processional crosses, paschal candlesticks, funerary lanterns etc. An essential aspect of such replication of a hallowed form was the "transfer of sacredness" or, more precisely, the shaping of "New Jerusalem's" in local environments. Therefore, Lidov sees the Holy Fire, and with good reason, as a powerful and enduring paradigm of Christian

visual culture and a convincing example of hierotopic mechanisms in constructing sacred expanses.

What the actual reach and effectiveness of hierotopy as a new and still developing scholarly method will be on the whole and in the long run, only time will tell. There is no doubt that some of the views and propositions put forth in this book will be subject to further discussion and verification. Yet, if we are to judge by the response to the conferences Lidov organized and to the volumes he edited, it seems safe to say that the hierotopic approach has already proved highly inspiring in the field of visual culture and humanities, producing very interesting outcomes and, in some cases, genuine breakthroughs.

It may seem a paradox, but the hierotopic method gives best results when used by rigorous and disciplined scholars whose interpretations are based strictly on factual evidence: documentary sources and material remains. This is the strategy that Lidov himself consistently pursues, even when addressing the most intricate and controversial issues, or when looking at a problem from an unexpected and unconventional angle. Consequently, he cannot be responsible for the occasional superficially imitative and irresponsible use of the openness and broad associative potentials of the hierotopic method. What Alexei Lidov, occasionally challenged by "traditionalists" and "positivists" within his own scholarly community, has proposed is exactly the opposite: a consistent, intellectually strong and eruditely grounded method, which so far has proved remarkably helpful in understanding the central phenomena of medieval culture. Finally, Lidov has shown in the best possible way how useful and beneficial a shift in scholarly perspective can be. Or, as Lidov likes to put it — scholarship always benefits from our being able to ask the old and well-known sources new questions.

PHILIP J. COHEN, *SERBIA'S SECRET WAR: PROPAGANDA AND THE DECEIT OF HISTORY*. TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1996, pp. 264.

Reviewed by Miroslav Svirčević*

The wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991–99) have inspired a considerable body of scholarly and popular history writings in the West, which, sadly, also includes a number of pseudo-scholarly publications, not infrequently swaying on the verge of ugliest war and racist propaganda, while setting themselves an ambitious and pretentious goal: to provide a “scholarly” explanation and unravel the real causes of the bloody disintegration of the common state of the South Slavs. As if following a well-trodden path, all these “scholarly” interpretations of the causes of the gory Yugoslav drama may be reduced to three propagandistic stereotypes: (1) cultural inferiority of the Serbian nation to the civilized nations, particularly manifest in its tendency to nurture various historical myths; (2) its centuries-long aspiration to dominate the neighbouring nations, notably Croat, Bosniak, Albanian and Montenegrin; and (3) its almost natural predisposition to all forms of totalitarian systems and political ideologies, notably Fascism and anti-Semitism.

One of such publications, *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*, was written by a medical doctor, Philip J. Cohen, and published in 1996 with the academic backing of the series editor, a Croat-American scholar Stjepan G. Meštrović, and the author of the Foreword, a Harvard professor, David Riesman, now deceased. Liking the book's author to Erich Fromm, Meštrović announced it as a refreshing contribution to contemporary world historiography, and for its scholarly refutation of the clichéd views of, and “Serbian propaganda myths” about, Serbia and the Serbian nation's antifascist role in the Second World War.

Even a cursory reading of Cohen's book, which heavily draws on the Croatian pamphlet of Tomislav Vuković (alias Ljubica Štefan) and Edo Bojović *Pregled srpskog antisemitizma* (An overview of Serbian anti-Semitism, Zagreb 1992) reveals quite clearly that it is just another obscure piece of ideological denigration (such as, for example, Croat-American sociologist Branimir Anzulović's *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, 1999, or Noel Malcolm's *Kosovo: A Short History*, 1998) inspired by just as clear political objectives. In fact, the Cohen's book teems with forgeries, half-truths, incompetent use of historical sources, overstrained theses and ill-intended inferences. It is so inconsistent that it does not even take a careful reader to notice its many contradictions and as many distortions of historical fact in virtually all chapters. If we add that Cohen, advertently or inadvertently, fails to mention and analyze some major historical phenomena, i.e. completely overlooks the broader European context, its real purpose does not seem too difficult to figure out. And its real purpose is to criminalize the modern history of Serbia, on the one hand, and to relativize the horrible crimes of the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* or NDH) against the Serbs, Jews and Roma, which took lives of hundreds of thousands of victims, on the other.¹ In other words,

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¹ There is an extensive and scholarly reliable literature on the genocide perpetrated by the Croatian Ustasas against Serbs, Jews and Roma. Among serious Croatian historians, the most important contributions were written by V. Novak, *Magnum Crimen*.

Cohen's book has been published with the intention to present the modern history of Serbia as the history of crime, to equate the Serbian national idea with Hitler's racist theory of Arian superiority (in this case, of the Serbian nation to other nations), to marginalize and even obliterate the Serbian contribution to antifascism, and to present Serbia, with her purported pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist predilections, as the source of all evil in the Balkans. Moreover, the book offers a symmetrical portrayal of the clerico-fascist Independent State of Croatia and occupied "Nedić's Serbia", ascribing to the collaborationist Serbian government, compared to other Balkan and even European countries, a little short of the leading role in carrying out the Holocaust.² Cohen goes even further and presents the annihilation of Jews

and their tragic fate in occupied Serbia in the light of what he sees as the historical continuity of aggressive Serbian nationalism and anti-Semitism threatening not only its neighbours but also world peace.

Cohen's book creates the impression that during the Second World War the Serbs were Hitler's allies and Jewish foes, whereas the Croats (and Bosnian Muslims) sided with the Allies and protected Jews against pogrom. Cohen argues that the Serbs have been successful in concealing the facts about their real role in the Second World War, presenting themselves as its main victim, as the only participant in the anti-Hitler struggle and the only friend of Jews in the Balkans. Through skilful manipulation and propaganda, Cohen claims, the Serbs have succeeded in imposing their own perception of the Second World War to others, and contemporary historiography has sadly succumbed to it en masse. Only recently, with the discovery of "new" sources, and with new readings of the available literature (mostly well-known products of Yugoslav Communist historiography, books from Croatian and US historiographies, and the memoirs of some of Ljotić's associates) has the picture emerged of Serbia's ideological and technical collaboration with the Nazi occupation forces, radically changing the earlier historical conclusions as regards the Serbs. This is what Cohen seeks to emphasize and this is why he chooses to title his book *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*.

The bottom line of Cohen's book is that Serbia was not an ally of the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War, but a satellite of the Axis powers, and the one with the highest level of ideological and technical collaborative involvement in carrying out the genocidal policy towards the Jews and all other non-Serb nations that did not fit into the long-devised plan for creating "Greater Serbia". In support of his thesis, Cohen

Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb 1948); F. Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i NDH* (Zagreb: Liber-Školska knjiga, 1977); B. Krizman, *Pavelić i Ustaše* (Zagreb: Globus, 1978). For a broader context with a chapter on Croatia, see J. Steinberg, *All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-1945* (London and New York: Ruthledge, 1990); V. Dedijer, *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican. The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs during World War II* (Buffalo & New York: Prometheus Books, and Freiburg, Germany: Ahriman Verlag, 1992). For a detailed analysis, see Edmond Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941-1945. A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres*, transl. from the French by Louis Perkins (Chicago: The Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1962). Cf. an overview in D. T. Bataković, "Le génocide dans l'État indépendant croate (1941-1945)", *Hérodote* 67 (Paris 1992), 70-80; Marco Aurelio Rivelli, *Un genocidio occulte. Etat Indépendant de Croatie 1941-1945* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1999).

² Cf. M. Koljanin, "Holocaust Research in Yugoslavia", in *Israeli-Serbian Academic Exchange in Holocaust Research: Collection of papers from the academic conference, Jerusalem-Yad Vashem 2006* (Belgrade 2008), 283.

dwells on occupied Serbia's collaborationist government of General Milan Nedić, describing him as openly sympathetic to Nazi Germany even as the pre-war army and navy minister. General Nedić, Cohen argues, was Hitler's most loyal ally in the Balkans, especially in consistently carrying out the Holocaust and anti-Masonic policy. In order to achieve its criminal goal, the Nedić government set up an entire system of "genocidal institutions" and military units on the model of Nazi Germany, all under a single chain of command: Serbian State Guard, Serbian Gendarmerie (taken over from the collapsed Kingdom of Yugoslavia), Belgrade City Special Police and Dimitrije Ljotić's Serbian Volunteer Corps. Furthermore, the pro-Western royalist Chetniks of Colonel Dragoljub Mihailović, the first anti-Nazi guerrilla movement in occupied Europe, are described by Cohen as an ally of the Axis powers. This, added to his entire misrepresentation of Serbian modern as well as contemporary history, is meant to substantiate his thesis that the participation of Serbs on the side of the Allies is just another myth, so typical of the Serbian frame of mind. Unlike the Serbs, Cohen goes on to say, the Croats pursued an altogether different policy. They allegedly were the only pro-Western nation in Yugoslavia, politically oriented towards West-European democracies. This orientation of theirs was confirmed by their purportedly massive participation in Josip Broz Tito's communist Partisan forces which bravely fought both against the Germans and Mihailović's Chetniks.³

³ After Stalin's Red Army entered Serbia and Yugoslavia in 1944, Mihailović, abandoned by the Allies, was caught by Tito's communists and tried in a sham-trial in 1946. Mihailović, however, was considered a genuine anti-Nazi hero and praised as such in Washington, London and Paris: "Tout cela ne peut tout de même effacer les

There is no doubt even at this point that we are dealing with a pile of deliberate falsifications and that they should not at all be seen as a harmless adventure of an amateur historian. Cohen, obviously aware himself that his fabrications do not tally with historical fact, opens his book with a "theoretical explanation" for the Serbian collaboration during the Second World War. He tries to prove that Serbia's entire (ideological, political and technical) collaboration with the Axis powers had deep roots and that "Serbian fascism" and "anti-Semitism" rely on a long tradition of Serbian expansionism and intolerance of the Jews and all other nations opposing Greater Serbian hegemony.

According to Cohen's distorted Croatian-nationalist inspired interpretation, it was in fact Serbs who invented fascism, long before Hitler. Its origin can be traced as far back as the First Serbian Insurrection of 1804 and, forty years later, in Ilija Garašanin's *Načertanije* (1844), we can see it take its clearly recognizable shape. This fascism was fertile soil

magnifiques pages d'heroïsme qu'ont écrites les tchetniks au prix de leur sang. Les Alliés eux-mêmes ont reconnu que leur action en retardant l'arrivée des renforts allemands a joué un rôle importante dans les succès de la campagne d'Afrique. Les messages adressés par les généraux Auchinleck, Eisenhower, etc., en témoignent. Le général Mihalovitch fut même, le 2 février 1943, décoré de la Croix de Guerre avec palme par le général de Gaulle. Par la suite les tchetniks sauvèrent des centaines d'aviateurs alliés. Ils peuvent enfin être considérés comme les libérateurs d'une grande partie de la Serbie." (*Le Monde*, Paris, 12 June 1946) Quoted from D. T. Bataković, "Le nettoyage ethnique sous la loupe de l'historien. Une lecture du livre de M. Grmek, M. Gjidara, N. Simac, 'Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe' (Paris: Fayard, 1993, 340 p.)", *Raison garder* 10-11 (Lausanne 1996), 11-25.

for anti-Semitism and, thus, the Serbs, throughout their modern history, systematically discriminated against Jews, through legislation, through ideological and religious propaganda and through political actions. This racist and religious intolerance culminated, Cohen argues, during the Second World War, in the consistent implementation by the collaborationist Nedić government of measures conducive to the Holocaust. To corroborate his assertions, Cohen cites the Nazi concentration camp at Sajmište, near Belgrade (set up in the territory of the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia and run by the Nazi forces), and the anti-Masonic exhibition held in Belgrade, emphasizing Serbia's alleged responsibility for these destructive anti-civilisation measures.

An unbiased reader, however, can see instantly that Cohen's interpretation is based on clumsily and malevolently assembled falsifications, half-truths and metaphysical assumptions. According to him, the Serbs were the originators of Fascism, more than a century before Hitler or Mussolini, and on top of it, during their insurrection against foreign rule in 1804. Does that mean that the great German historian Leopold von Ranke got it all wrong while writing his famous, and smoothly readable, history of the First Serbian Insurrection? Having identified all processes, events and constants he thought of as being universally human, Ranke shaped an account of Karageorge's short-lived state and called it a history of the Serbian revolution, whereby he sought to emphasize its importance not only for Serbian, but also for Balkan and European history. It began as a local revolt and gradually grew into the struggle for national liberation and for the restoration of independence, thus setting an example for other conquered Christians, notably the Greeks, whose insurrection, famously and un-

controversially known as the Greek War of Independence, began in 1821.⁴

Cohen's fabrications about the *Načertanije* are even more malignant. From what this physician writes about the first Serbian national programme, it seems justified to ask if he has ever read it all. He claims that Garašanin devised this Serbian fascist project, which amounts to annexing to Serbia all the lands populated by "Bulgarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bosniaks, Hungarians and Croats", using the goriest of methods — ruthless liquidation and expulsion. Two things need to be borne in mind here: (1) Fascism as a totalitarian social movement with distinctive ideological tenets is not the product of the nineteenth but of the twentieth century; its emergence was related to the severe economic crisis, the collapse of democratic constitutionalism and the efforts to break up the system of collective security established by the 1919 Versailles Treaty, in the aftermath of the First World War, which is why it arose in the revisionist countries frustrated with the outcome of the war; consequently, the *Načertanije* could not even theoretically be the source of Fascism, let alone genocide; (2) the *Načertanije*, an unpublicized foreign policy draft, drawn up jointly with Polish agents in the Balkans, actually an abridged version of Polish policy proposals, approved by Paris and London officials, was aimed to bring Serbia closer to France and Great Britain as a future Piedmont of the Balkan Slavs. Drafted in the age of national awakening fermenting across pre-revolutionary Europe, the *Načertanije* was similar to other national programmes all over the Balkans, which

⁴ L. Ranke, *Die Serbische Revolution* (1829) = *The History of Servia and the Servian Revolution, with a Sketch of the Insurrection in Bosnia*, transl. from the German by Mrs Alexandra Kerr (London, 1853).

makes its interpretation as a manifesto of “Serbian fascism” and “Greater-Serbian hegemonism” not only inaccurate but also malignant; the contents of the *Načertanije* was heavily influenced by a Czech, František Zách, an agent of the Polish émigré circles in Paris headed by Count Adam Czartoryski.⁵ The *Načertanije* contains nothing of what Cohen insinuates, especially not the wide array of cruellest methods for its accomplishment, including executions and deportations of non-Serbs. The only accurate thing is that Garašanin marked out all Ottoman-held regions he thought of as being Serbian and that therefore they should gradually join an enlarged Principality of Serbia: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo [northern Albania], and, if possible in a distant future, the regions of Srem, Banat and Bačka (in present-day Serbia’s province of Vojvodina); the *Načertanije* did not discuss the Serbo-Croat relations, because Garašanin did not expect as rapid disintegration of the Habsburg Empire as Count Czartoryski tended to believe.⁶

It should be noted that the neighbouring peoples drew up similar programmes, as Dimitrije Djordjević observed more than twenty years ago in a text on the role of historicism in the proc-

ess of nation- and state-building in the nineteenth-century Balkans.⁷ A similar political programme originated among the Greeks (*Megali Idea*), and in Bulgaria, where the programmes of several political parties advocated a territorially expanded (“San-Stefano”) Bulgaria, and among the Albanians under the leadership of the Frasheri brothers, at the time of the Albanian League (1878), conceived of as the renewal of the pan-Albanian tribal alliance of feudal times. All subsequent Albanian movements drew on the tenets of the Albanian League in their aspiration to unite into a single Albanian state all areas which once had been within the boundaries of four Ottoman *vilayets*, (Scutari, Kosovo, Monastir and Ioannina) with roughly 44 percent of Albanian population.⁸

As we can see, the *Načertanije* was in no way a phenomenon that could be seen as exclusive to Serbian history; it was just one of many political programmes emerging at the time of nascent European nations and Romantic fascination with the idea of restoring the glory of idealized medieval states. It did involve Serbia’s territorial expansion (as all similar programmes did), but its underlying principles were quite legitimate at the time. The interpretation of Garašanin’s programme as a “fascist manifesto” is utterly inaccurate and tendentious.⁹

⁵ D. Stranjaković, “Kako je postalo Garašaninovo Načertanije”, *Spomenik XCI* (Belgrade: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, 1939), 63–113; V. Začek, “Češko i poljsko učešće u postanku Garašaninova ‘Načertanija’ (1844)”, *Historijski zbornik XVI* (Zagreb 1963), 35–56.

⁶ D. T. Bataković, “Ilija Garašanin’s Načertanije: A Reassessment”, *Balcanica XXV-1* (Belgrade 1994), 157–183, with an English translation of Serbia’s foreign policy *Draft (Načertanije)*. Cf. also a relevant scholarly biography of Garašanin: David Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bismarck* (Boulder & New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), with a chapter on the *Načertanije* on pp. 42–61.

⁷ D. Djordjević, “Uloga istoricizma u formiranju balkanskih nacionalnih država u devetnaestom veku”, *Ogledi iz balkanske istorije* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1989), 87–103.

⁸ D. T. Bataković, “The Serbo-Albanian Conflict: an Historical Perspective”, in G. Dujizings, D. Janjić, Sh. Maliqi, eds., *Kosovo/a. Confrontation or Coexistence* (Nijmegen 1998), 1–14.

⁹ The Polish representatives to Garašanin pointed out the following: “Les Serbes ont encore cet avantage que c’est un peuple pu-

Cohen's next grand deception is his thesis that anti-Semitism is deeply rooted in Serbia. As we have seen, Cohen claims that Jews have been systematically discriminated throughout Serbia's modern history. At closer examination, however, historical facts once again suggest a malevolent and unfounded thesis. In corroboration of his thesis, Cohen cites two laws from the period of the Constitutionalist or Defenders of the Constitution (1842–58), re-enacted under Prince Michael (Mihailo); the ideological-religious sermons of bishop Nikolaj Velimirović; and, finally, the political ideology of Dimitrije Ljotić and his organization, *Zbor*.

It is a fact that there were laws imposing restrictions on the Jews in Serbia in some spheres of life. However, there also are some very important facts in connection with these laws which the author completely overlooks, either deliberately or out of ignorance. It is true that a law of 1844 imposed occupational restrictions and restrictions on the ownership of real property outside Belgrade, and it is also true that a law of 1856 banned the newly-arrived Jewish immigrants from permanent residency in Serbia. These restrictive laws were abolished by Prince Miloš in 1859, and re-enacted during the second reign of Prince Michael in 1861. After some time, mostly under pressure from great powers and the Pan-Jewish Alliance, the government permitted the

Jewish immigrants to stay permanently or those who had been banished to return.¹⁰ What is important about these laws is the general and local historical context in which they arose. Namely, they arose under the regime of the Constitutionalist in the middle of the nineteenth century, when anti-Semitism raged all over Europe and even America. In some wealthier and much better organized parts of the world (e.g. the German states, the Habsburg Monarchy or the Russian empire), the Jews were subject to much harsher restrictions and discrimination than they were in the Principality of Serbia. The most restrictive measures are observable in the German lands, and as early as the eighteenth century. The Austrian Empress Maria Theresa expelled almost all Jews from Prague in 1744. Thirty years later, in 1774, she sponsored another wave of expulsion, this time of the Jews from Moravia and Bohemia.¹¹ In 1816 almost the entire Jewish population of Lübeck was expelled. In the second half of the nineteenth century, after the unification of Germany, some markedly discriminatory laws were enacted restricting Jewish educational and occupational freedom. They were greatly influenced by the Jews-are-our-misfortune policy of Heinrich von Treitschke. Anti-Semitism flourished in other European countries as well: in 1716 they were expelled from Brussels, in 1775 from Warsaw. Leonard Dinerstein credibly elucidates the phenomenon of anti-Semitism in America from the earliest settler colonies to modern times. It gained momentum after the Civil War and, in the early twentieth century, as-

rement démocratique; pas de noblesse et de clergé riches et corrompus, l'intelligence qu'accompagne ordinairement l'aisance donne droit et moyen d'arriver à tout. Dans toutes les combinaisons la nationalité serbe doit être aidée, encouragée, car elle sera un membre excessivement utile et important pour la civilisation." Quoted from S. Champonnois, "L. Bystrzonowaski, L'Hôtel Lambert et la diplomatie française dans les Balkans 1840–1849", in *Actes du Colloque Franco-Yougoslave* (Ljubljana: Centre culturel Charles Nodier, 1987), 56.

¹⁰ M. Koljanin, *Jevreji i antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2008), 164.

¹¹ W. A. Iggers, *The Jews from Bohemia and Moravia. A historical reader* (Wayne State University Press, 1993), 27–43.

sumed a form of real racism.¹² Finally, the Great Depression of 1929 gave rise to an anti-Jewish hysteria, targeted especially at Wall Street bankers, who were accused of having caused the economic and financial crisis. According to *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, American anti-Semitism has been the most serious of all in the Western world, occasionally assuming terrifying forms.¹³ As for the Principality of Serbia in the Balkan context, its attitude towards the Jews was similar to that of Bulgaria (after 1878) and, to an extent, Greece. The position of Jews was much worse in the Principality of Wallachia, where they were subjected to mass persecution and expulsion. The absence of aggressive outbursts of anti-Semitism in Serbia suggests that the laws, rather than being a manifestation a racist attitude, were meant as protection of Serbian merchants and craftsmen from competition. The Jews in Serbia were actually in a better position than in many European countries of the period. Using Serbia's few restrictive laws at a time when the Jews were overtly and harshly discriminated and persecuted across Europe to accuse her of deeply-rooted racially motivated anti-Semitism is plainly malicious. As for Serbian bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, confined by the Nazis in 1941 and sent to Dachau concentration camp, along with the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, patriarch Gavriilo Dožić, Cohen's interpretation of the bishop's case is also exaggerated. Bishop Velimirović is certainly among the most prominent twentieth-century Orthodox theologians, whose work also included philosophical and literary essays and poetry. Some of his writings, published after his death without his written permission,

do contain certain anti-Semitic excesses.¹⁴ Even so, bishop Velimirović obviously was not blinded by racist hatred. His attitude towards the Jewish people should be interpreted in the context of the fact that the interpretative framework of his perception of history was biblical tradition. His work shows an evolution from dogmatic criticism of Judaism to mild anti-Judaism, though in the general context of criticizing Europe's dwindling liberalism and materialism.¹⁵ He believed that such a markedly non-Christian spiritual climate would lead Europe into a new disaster and wars, which eventually turned out to be true. However, that the bishop did not harbour racist hatred, he proved it by his actions. During the Second World War, risking his own life, bishop Nikolaj Velimirović saved a Jewish girl, Ela Nejhaus from Trstenik, and her mother, from certain death.¹⁶ Had the bishop been anti-Semitic would not he fared better with the Nazi German authorities? Would he have been sent to Dachau? The bishop's humanity has been testified to by an Israeli citizen, Samuel Aviatar. At a conference devoted to bishop Velimirović in 2003, in his essay "Sons of Serbia and sons of Israel", Aviatar said: "Nazi Satan knew all too well why

¹⁴ E.g. bishop Velimirović's philosophical contemplation on biblical themes (*Kroz tamnički prozor*), written in the Nazi concentration camp, was published four decades later although the manuscript bore his hand-written remark: "Not to be published."

¹⁵ M. Koljanin, "Odnos Srpske crkve prema Jevrejima i 'jevrejskom pitanju' (1918–1941)", *Srpska teologija u dvadesetom veku. Istraživački problemi i rezultati* (2010), 103–104.

¹⁶ As testified by Ela Trifunović (nee Najhaus) herself in her letter kept at the Archives of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade.

¹² L. Dinerstein, *Antisemitism in America* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 58.

¹³ *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, "Anti-Semitism in USA 1776–1970", vol. 3 (2008).

he imprisoned him. He imprisoned him for being a man of God. For refusing to renounce God." Finally, there are, in the history of the Christian faith and Church, theologians, much greater and more influential than bishop Velimirović, who left behind more strongly anti-Semitic writings. One of them is none other than the originator of the Reformation, Martin Luther. His writings were so permeated with anti-Semitism that the Nazis did not fail to exploit the fact and quote the excerpts. And yet, it has never occurred to anyone to denounce Martin Luther as anti-Semitic and to call for the abolition of his church in the Protestant countries across Europe. What follows is that any evaluation of bishop Velimirović's spiritual legacy should use the same, or at least similar, criteria.

Finally, Ljotić's Zbor was created in the mid-1930s, which is to say at the time it was a European-wide "trend". After the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, similar political movements, which obligatorily professed anti-Semitism, began to burgeon all over Europe, and their totalitarian tenets further eroded democratic constitutionalism on the continent. They found an echo in the Balkans as well, usually as caricatured local plagiarisms: the Arrow Cross in Hungary, the Iron Guard in Romania, the VMRO in Bulgaria, or the Ustasha movement in Croatia, are only the most prominent representatives of the Balkan version of Fascism and Nazism. Ljotić's Zbor belongs into this group, but it was not as extreme as the Croatian Ustasha, the Hungarian Arrow Cross or the Bulgarian VMRO. Unlike the Ustasha movement, for example, which was exclusively Croat and based on the ideology of the so-called Croatian "State Right" combining clericalism and extreme nationalism, Zbor was a Yugoslav movement with a corporatist ideology, replicating the patterns of the *Action française*. Even though it had

never been able to attract mass membership, Cohen writes about it at length, as if it had played a central political role in Yugoslavia. Cohen's book creates the impression that Ljotić was the most influential political figure in Serbia at the time. Ljotić ran for parliament twice, in 1935 and 1938, and suffered a heavy defeat both times. In the 1935 elections he won less than one percent (0.84), and in 1938, about one percent of the electorate. These figures strongly suggest that Cohen's attention paid to a marginal political group has ulterior motives.

Cohen also goes at great length: (1) to present occupied Serbia (1941-44) as the most hideous of all satellites of Hitler's Germany, the one who sought to rely on the Nazi occupation forces to accomplish its ideal of "Greater Serbia" and to exterminate its Jews; and (2) to present the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland as a fascist and collaborationist movement. In this case too, Cohen's arguments are unconvincing and easily refutable.

The first fact that requires emphasis is that Serbia in 1941-44 was a military-administrative area under German occupation. This means that it was not a state in the strict sense of the word; it was a remnant of the dismembered Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with insufficiently clear borders, constitutional status and capacity for establishing international relations. In those unfortunate times, the unlawful acts of Nazi Germany reduced Serbia to its pre-1912 frontiers, with the Banat nominally within its borders but beyond the reach of its institutions (effective power was exercised by the local Germans, *Volk-deutsche*, who formed the SS Prinz Eugen Division). What is also to be noted is the fact that the Germans wielded ultimate political power in Serbia. Of course, to exercise it effectively, they needed cooperation of the local political and military factors. The powers of the Nedić government were restricted to administrative

and technical matters; which means that it was not authorized to make political decisions of prime importance. It was subordinate to the Administrative Headquarters of the German Military Command. Thus it had to provide all assistance to the occupation authorities in carrying out anti-Semitic, anti-Masonic and anti-Resistance measures (against the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and the Communists) to maintain “peace and order”. Research carried out by Walter Manoschek, Christopher Browning and Menachem Shelach has shown that the policy of extermination of the Jews and Freemasons, conceived and articulated in the capital of the Third Reich, was the exclusive responsibility of the representatives of Nazi Germany in occupied Serbia. This means, then, that the domestic collaborationist administration had no say in the matter; its responsibility was to provide “technical assistance” in its implementation.¹⁷ In that sense, the Sajmište concentration camp and the 1941 anti-Masonic exhibition were elements of a global Nazi policy which was carried out in all countries under German occupation, Serbia included.

Responsible for the horrendous crimes committed against the Jewish and other populations (Serb and Roma) in Serbia were: Felix Benzler, Plenipotentiary of the German Foreign Ministry in Serbia; Harald Turner, head of the Military Administration in Serbia; Wilhelm Fuchs, SS Oberführer, head of the Einsatzgruppe in Serbia; Paul Bader, Plenipotentiary Com-

manding General in Serbia; and Franz Neuhausen, General Plenipotentiary for economic affairs in Serbia (there was a special commissariat managing the immovable property of Serbia's Jews) — the “five kings of Serbia”, as Browning calls them. These high-ranking officials of the Third Reich in Belgrade, Browning stresses, hardly ever agreed among themselves. But they did on the issue of setting up a camp for Serbia's Jews.¹⁸ It should be noted that the Sajmište camp was located on the left bank of the Sava, i.e. on the soil of the clerico-fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Therefore, Benzler had turned to the Reich's embassy in Zagreb and the NDH authorities asking permission to use Sajmište as a transit camp for the deported Jewish women and children. The Croatian authorities granted his request with the proviso that: (1) the camp should be guarded by Germans and not by Serbs, and that (2) the camp should be supplied from Serbia and not the NDH.¹⁹

At Sajmište, which operated as an SS-managed camp from October 1941 until July 1944, several thousand Jews, Serbs and Roma were brutally murdered. It should be noted that an airtight vehicle for mass carbon-monoxide poisoning was in use between mid-March and May 1942.²⁰ The vehicle was then transferred to Riga to continue fulfilling its horrendous purpose. This method of mass murder was also in use in the Chelmno concentration

¹⁷ W. Manoschek, “‘Gehst mit Juden erschossen?’. Die Vernichtung der Juden in Serbien”, in H. Heer and K. Naumann, eds., *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941–1944* (Hamburg 1995), 39; Ch. Browning, “The Final Solution in Serbia. The Semlin Judenlager: A Case Study”, *Yad Vashem Studies XV* (Jerusalem 1983), 55–90; M. Shelach, “Sajmište – An Extermination Camp in Serbia”, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2: 2* (1987), 243–260.

¹⁸ Ch. Browning, *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 70.

¹⁹ Browning, “The Final Solution in Serbia”, 58.

²⁰ For more detail see M. Koljanin, *Nemački logor na Beogradskom sajmištu 1941–1944* (Belgrade, ISI 1992); Browning, *Fateful Months*; Browning, “The Final Solution in Serbia”; Shelach, “Sajmište.”

camp in Poland and in the occupied parts of the USSR.

As part of the Nazi anti-Masonic policy, the anti-Masonic exhibition mounted in Belgrade in 1941 was targeted at the Jews, Freemasons and Communists. It was organized under the patronage of the occupation authorities, and the collaborationist Nedić government was under an obligation to stage it and to publicize it, including the issuance of postage stamps for the occasion.²¹ Far from being a Serbian invention, such anti-Masonic campaigns were being launched in other European countries where Nazi Germany installed puppet regimes. For example, in August 1940 the Vichy regime of General Petain enacted a law authorizing the police to persecute and arrest Freemasons as enemies of France, and an anti-Masonic exhibition mounted later that year toured the entire country. And once again, it has never occurred to anyone to accuse France and the French en bloc of anti-Semitism and anti-Freemasonry.

Based on all the historically founded counterarguments quoted above, one can only re-emphasize that there had never been organized and state-sponsored, racially and religiously based anti-Semitism in Serbia, and that Serbia and the Serbs, as a prominent ally of the anti-Axis coalition, made a significant contribution to the struggle against Nazism and Fascism during the Second World War. Serbs demonstrated it by their mass participation in the antifascist struggle, either within General Mihailović's Yugoslav Army in the Homeland or within Josip Broz Tito's pro-Communist Partisan forces. It is also a fact that Serbs in occupied Serbia risked their own lives trying to save the lives of their Jewish fellow citizens. Until now, there have been 125 such cases in Ser-

bia recorded in the database of the Yad Vashem memorial centre, even though, according to Jaša Almuli, such noble efforts were much more numerous.²² Many rescuers (or their descendants) have been awarded Yad Vashem's honour of the Righteous among the Nations. What is important to emphasize is, that of all new countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, Serbia has the largest number of the "Righteous". And why is it important? Because Cohen claims that the Jews, in contrast to Serbia where they have always been persecuted and felt unsafe, have found home and safety in Croatia, with the exception of the NDH period. Historical fact, however, shows the presence in Croatia, as an integral part of the Habsburg Monarchy, of organized anti-Semitism, which occasionally assumed extreme forms of racist and religious hatred. By act of the Croatian Diet of 1609, the Roman Catholic Church was the only recognized church in Croatia and Slavonia, which had far-reaching implications for the position of other religious communities, especially the Orthodox Christian and Judaic. The act remained in force for decades. Domestic merchants frequently organized strong anti-Jewish protests, probably in a bid to protect themselves against competition, but more often than not these protests involved physical assaults on Jews. For example, the anti-Semitic demonstrations organized by the association of Zagreb (Agram) merchants in 1838/9, were accompanied by the demolition of Jewish shops and the beating of Jews, and followed by the demand that they all be expelled from Zagreb.²³ Similar

²¹ M. Koljanin, "Antisemitski stereotipi i propaganda u Srbiji 1941-1942", *Istorija 20. veka* 1 (2003), 83-119.

²² J. Almuli, *Stradanje i spasavanje srpskih Jevreja* (Belgrade 2010), 109; M. Fogel, M. Ristović and M. Koljanin, *Righteous among the Nations - Serbia* (Belgrade: Jewish Community in Zemun, 2010), 6-7.

²³ Koljanin, *Antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, 117-118.

demands could be heard in other Croatian towns, most prominently in Karlovac and Varaždin,²⁴ and they resurfaced during the revolutionary events of 1848/9; for example, in early 1848, the town council of Slavenska Požega passed an ordinance on the expulsion of all Jews except for a single “deserving” family, but the ordinance was not endorsed by the district authorities and the Ban, Josip Jelačić.²⁵ Animosity towards the Jews was fuelled by the profoundly anti-Semitic ideology of the Croatian state right ideology shaped by Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik in the 1860s, but it was not until Josip Frank replaced Starčević in the 1890s that anti-Semitism practically became a legitimate political ideology, which found its promoters among intellectual circles and Roman Catholic clergymen.²⁶ It was manifested in written form, such as newspaper articles, brochures and vilifying tracts, which were so abundant that Ivo Goldstein finds it justified to describe them as an organized anti-Semitic campaign.²⁷ In the early twentieth century, public life in Croatia was permeated with anti-Semitism, and its most vocal promoters were the Radić brothers and their Croatian Peasant Party. Stjepan Radić’s anti-Jewish rants in the Croatian Diet in 1916 are a well-known fact, and so is his advice to the electorate: “For God’s sake, do not destroy [Jewish property]! Why would you destroy what is yours? To rob the Jews is not enough, they

should be skinned off!”²⁸ Those were the words of an indisputable political leader in a country Cohen describes as the safest place for Jews, for their lives and their property. Croatian anti-Semitism continued into interwar Yugoslavia, but it took monstrous proportions in the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War, where Jews, Serbs, Roma and other “non-Arian” races were outlawed.²⁹ A number of racist laws were enacted, providing “legal” definitions of “Jews” and “Gypsies” (Racial Affiliation Act).³⁰ The implementation of these laws was clarified by the *Poglavnik* of the NDH, Ante Pavelić, in his interview for the *Berliner Bersen Zeitung* of 5 May 1941: “...the Jewish question will be radically resolved and, in accordance with the racial and economic views, the country will also be cleansed of Freemasons.”³¹ It follows from all this that Cohen is either poorly acquainted with Croatian history and the history of anti-Semitism in the Balkans or very biased.

Cohen’s book exhibits all features of a racist vilification with clear political goals: to discredit and criminalize Serbia’s modern history, to present the Serbian national idea as criminal, to accuse the Serbs of being naturally anti-Semitic and predis-

²⁴ I. Goldstein, “Antisemitizam u Hrvatskoj. Korijeni, pojava i razvoj antisemitizma u Hrvatskoj”, in *Antisemitizam, holokaust, antišajizam* (Zagreb 1996), 14.

²⁵ Koljanin, *Antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, 118.

²⁶ M. Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije* (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1973), 197.

²⁷ Goldstein, “Antisemitizam u Hrvatskoj”, 17.

²⁸ Koljanin, *Antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, 135.

²⁹ Cf. a Jewish Holocaust survivor’s recently published testimony about the genocide against Jews and Serbs, slaughtered in hundreds of thousands in the largest Croatian Ustasha concentration camp, Jasenovac: Cadik I. Danon Braco, *The Smell of Human Flesh. A Witness of the Holocaust. Memories of Jasenovac* (Belgrade: Dosije, 2006).

³⁰ “Ustaša”. *Dokumenti o ustaškom pokretu* (Zagreb: Zagrebačka stvarnost, 1995), 160–161.

³¹ A. Pavelić, “Židovsko će se pitanje radikalno riješiti”, in “Ustaša”. *Dokumenti o ustaškom pokretu*, 171.

posed to fascist and any other totalitarian ideology, and to relativize the crimes of the Independent State of Croatia. That this book, published in the 1990s, was to serve propaganda and revisionist purposes may be seen from the fact that there soon followed its translated editions in Zagreb and Sarajevo, while the author was awarded a medal for merit by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, known not only as the architect of the ethnic cleansing of Croatia of its Serbian population, but also for markedly anti-Semitic views in his programmatic

book *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti*,³² and for publicly stating that he was happy that his wife was neither Jewish nor Serbian. Cohen's purportedly scholarly approach to Serbia's history proves to be just another of many failed attempts to falsify the past in order to accommodate some narrow nationalist or immediate political goals.

³² Franjo Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti. Rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zločinja* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1990).

JAŠA ALMULI, *STRADANJE I SPASAVANJE SRPSKIH JEVIJEJA*
[SUFFERING AND RESCUE OF SERBIAN JEWS]. BELGRADE: ZAVOD ZA UDŽBENIKE I
NASTAVNA SREDSTVA, 2010, pp. 392.

Reviewed by Veljko Stanić*

The book of the renowned journalist and publicist Jaša Almulj re-examines the tragic fate of the Jewish community in Serbia during the Second World War. A result of the author's twenty years of research into the Holocaust in Yugoslavia, it belongs to the field of microhistory studies, but it also looks at the Jewish question in occupied Serbia in the overall context of the Holocaust.

Almulj, born in 1918, comes from a Belgrade Jewish family himself. Under Nazi invasion in April 1941, the young man managed to leave Belgrade, but was arrested in Montenegro and transferred to a prison in Italy. After the war, he pursued a career in journalism. He was a distinguished political commentator, news agency editor and foreign correspondent for Yugoslav newspapers, notably from South America and the United States.

The research Almulj, as a privileged interlocutor of Jewish Holocaust survivors, has been carrying out over the last two decades has considerably improved our knowledge and resulted in several important publications, such as *Jevrejke*

govore [Jewish women speaking], *Živi i mrtvi* [The living and the dead], and *Jevreji i Srbi u Jasenovcu* [Jews and Serbs in Jasenovac], the latter being a collection of sixteen testimonies of the former prisoners of Jasenovac, the largest extermination camp in what had been the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, managed by the Croatian Ustasha regime in the Independent State of Croatia 1941–1945.

The book presented here is organized into three main parts. The first offers an account of the persecution of Jews in Serbia by the Gestapo after the Kingdom of Yugoslavia collapsed and Serbia was occupied by German troops and put under a system of military administration. The second part reveals a less known aspect of the occupation period: the rescue of Jews under Nazi threat. Finally, the third part revisits some controversial issues of the Jewish question in Serbia. Apart from doing his own research, Almulj underlines the importance of widely recognized

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studies in this field, such as Christopher Browning's "The Final Solution in Serbia" (*Yad Vashem Studies* XV, Jerusalem 1983), Milan Koljanin's *Nemački logor na beogradskom Sajmištu 1941–1944* (The German concentration camp at Sajmište in Belgrade 1941–1944 [Belgrade 1992]), Menachem Schelach's contributions to the *Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust* etc.

The Jewish ordeal (1941–1945) in Yugoslavia after its dismemberment in April 1941 falls among the most brutal experiences of the Second World War: 67,248 dead, or 81.76 percent of the entire Jewish population of the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia. While the Jews in the so-called Independent State of Croatia, proclaimed in Zagreb on 10 April 1941, were subjected, together with Serbs and Roma, to the genocide planned and carried out by the Croatian Nazi regime, the Ustasha — some 33,000 Jews, or 80 percent, perished — the Jews in Serbia came under the direct control of the Nazi German authorities.

The first noteworthy feature of Almuli's book is the chronology of the extermination of Serbia's Jews in 1941/2. About 14,500 (88%) Jews from the parts of Serbia under German occupation and the Banat (administered by the local *Volksdeutsche*) were killed at the hands of the occupying force. The author insists on the phased unfolding of the process and on German supreme command in it. Barely arrived in Belgrade in April 1941, the Germans ordered the registration of all Belgrade Jews. More than 9,000 Jews (of a total of 10,500) were subjected to forced labour. The so-called *Regulations* decreed by the German occupation authorities on 31 May contained discriminatory measures targeted at Jews and Roma. Three months later, on 25 August 1941, arrests began. Thousands of Jews were sent to Nazi camp "Topovske šupe" in Belgrade. By December 1941, about five thousand Jewish men interned in this

camp had been executed by Gestapo firing squads on several locations around Belgrade, notably at Jajinci. In early December 1941, Germans set up another camp in Belgrade (formally on the soil of the Independent State of Croatia, on the left bank of the Sava river) — Staro Sajmište or *Judenlager Semlin* — where Jewish women and children, as well as patients of the Belgrade Jewish Hospital were confined. Between March and May 1942, in a secret Gestapo-led operation, more than 7,000 of them were suffocated with exhaust gases fed into a truck (*Gaswagen*).

Almuli rightly points out that the extermination of the Jews in Serbia took place at the beginning of the "Final Solution" in Europe, and ascribes exclusive responsibility to the Gestapo: arrests, internments and executions. Collaborators from the ranks of the quisling Nedić government played an auxiliary and secondary role. In the case of Staro Sajmište, for example, the collaborationist regime was responsible for supplying food and heat to the camp, while the personnel structure of the camp and executions were led by the occupying authorities.

The second part of the book returns to several key questions concerning the destiny of the Jews in German-occupied Serbia, including the question of rescue and civil disobedience. Almuli presents forty-one personal stories reconstructed in detail. Relying on various sources, including personal testimonies, memoirs, correspondence and archival documents, the author relates the untold story of rescue networks in occupied Serbia. His approach opens a panoramic view of social history and reveals an unjustly forgotten complex phenomenon. It encompasses all categories of the Jewish population, intellectuals, physicians, teachers, merchants, craftsmen. Rescue mechanisms varied from one case to another, ranging from hideouts in Belgrade and escape routes

out of the country to, more frequently, shelter found in the Serbian countryside. Almuli explains that the system depended both on Jewish circles themselves and on Serbs. The assistance provided by Serbs naturally relied on pre-war connections and relationships, which, according to Almuli, shows that the Jewish population was highly integrated in Serbian society. In most cases, Jewish women and children found shelter in Serbian villages. The farmers were not always aware of their identity, but took them in as though they had been members of their own families. In order to elucidate more profoundly the nature of these networks of Jews and Serbs, Almuli takes a glimpse into a more remote past of the Jews in Serbia. In the manner of a well-informed researcher, he offers an overview of the lives of several illustrious figures of Jewish origin in Serbian society, whether prominent intellectual figures or soldiers fighting in the Serbian Army during the Great War or as members of the antifascist Resistance movement in the Second World War.

An unflinching well documented analysis of the phenomenon which is the focus of the author's attention is pursued in the third part of the book, which looks at its important aspects, such as the routes of escape from Belgrade or the methods of forging identity documents and disguise. Furthermore, the author revisits the role of the collaborationist Nedić government in the persecution of the Jews in occupied Serbia, stressing once more their indirect involvement. In other words, Almuli claims that the documentary sources substantiate the conclusion that the genocide against the Jews in occupied Serbia was fully planned, controlled and led by the occupation authorities. The nature of this involvement has, however, been largely misrepresented. The resulting distorted interpretation was widely exploited for propaganda purposes in Tudjman's Croatia in the 1990s. Almuli offers a crit-

ical reassessment of this political propaganda, including some journalistic work of Ante Knežević and Marko Attila Hoare in Great Britain, which base their vilification of Serbia and Serbs on purported Serbian anti-Semitism and the destruction of the Jewish population in Belgrade in 1941/2. In this perspective, Almuli also casts a new light on the relationship between Jews and the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland led by Colonel Dragoljub Mihailović. He insists on the existence of various factions within Mihailović's royalist Resistance movement and, consequently, on the existence of various attitudes towards the Jews. He also draws attention to the presence of some Jews in the ranks of Mihailović's forces, and cites Mihailović's *Order* of April 1944 banning anti-Semitism and condemning violence against the Jews.

A precious collection of personal oral histories, Almuli's book is also an intimate history of the Jewish community in Serbia. The richness and complexity of the information obtained and its thorough documentation make this book an indispensable source for any research into the Holocaust, but also into the history of the Jewish community in Serbia.

SÎNZIANA PEDA, *ISTORIE ȘI MEMORIE ÎN COMUNITĂȚILE CEHILOR DIN CLISURA DUNĂRII*
[HISTORY AND MEMORY: CZECHS IN THE DANUBE GORGE].

UNIVERSITATEA BABEȘ-BOLYAI CLUJ-NAPOCA, INSTITUTUL DE ISTORIE ORALĂ,
CLUJ-NAPOCA: ARGONAUT, 2010, pp. 326.

*Reviewed by Aleksandra Djurić-Milovanović**

Contemporary research into small ethnic communities highlights several elements important to understanding the strategies of their identity building. Being small in number, these communities often lack elites of their own capable of channelling identity construction “from the inside”. As a result, public and scholarly discourse about them is shaped “from the outside”, which is a process that either does not involve the internal perspective, the voices of the communities in question, or does not do it appropriately. The study by the Romanian anthropologist Sînziana Preda presents the Czech ethnic community in the Danube Gorge in the Romanian part of Banat from the perspective of oral history. Her use of oral history in reconstructing the community’s collective identity shows that a community’s orally transmitted memory plays an important role in identity construction. The study is based on field research carried out among the Czech communities whose population of about 3,800 is concentrated in Caraș-Severin County in the southwest of Romania. Apart from the introduction, the book includes five chapters, a conclusion, an extensive bibliography and indexes. The introduction, devoted to the concept of memory as the source for creating a community’s microhistory, seeks to elucidate less-known elements of their tradition, culture and customs. Preda lays emphasis on collective memory which is not static but dynamic and reconstructive, and which is not focused on pursuing the truth but rather seeks to embed the identity of a group in the past. The research covers six Czech settlements in the southwest of the Romanian Banat, Sfânta

Elena, Bigăr, Gârnic, Eibenthal, Ravenska and Șumița, with their two hundred years long history. Although surrounded by the Romanian majority and a Serbian minority population, their inhabitants have preserved their language, religion and culture. The name *Pemii*, used to designate the Czechs in these settlements, originated among the Banat Germans, who called the Czechs “Böhmen”, which gave rise to the appellation “Bemi”, i.e. “Pemi”. According to the author, *small histories* are as important as *big histories* in preserving the identity and cohesion of a community. Thus, we can speak of “parallel histories”: one that underscores the origin of the Czechs and the settlement of their “glorious ancestors”, and another that forms part of the history of the Romanian people and of the region presently populated by Czechs.

The first chapter, “The Memory, an alternative discourse of history”, highlights the significance of the oral histories of individuals as a testimony about various events and experiences. Oral history appears as an alternative to “classical” history. Furthermore, based on oral history, on the traditions about founding and establishing settlements, the first chapter describes the migration of the Czechs from one part of the Habsburg Empire, Bohemia, to another, the Banat, during the first half of the nineteenth century. Colonizing the previously uninhabited areas of the Danube Gorge (between 1823 and 1828), the Czechs established the so-called colonies or enclaves, which have been “functioning

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in accordance with their own unwritten rules” until the present. The population mostly worked in mines, which would become one of their identity markers. The author notes that all traditions about the founding of their settlements are accompanied by a discourse on sacrifice emphasizing the role of heroic ancestors. The heroes of the Czech *Pemi* are the mythical ancestors who sacrificed themselves in a distant past in order to lay the foundation of the communities that have largely survived to this day. These heroes, rarely mentioned in documentary sources, live in the memory of their descendants, who thus symbolically demonstrate the awareness of their ethnic identity and origin. The second chapter, “Turbulent history of the new existence”, deals with the settlements established by the Czechs in the Romanian part of the Banat and the historical and cultural context in which the colonists built their churches and schools and organized their life in mountain villages. The Roman Catholic religion and Czech language played a major role in keeping the community together, which, along with strongly supported endogamy, prevented their assimilation by the Romanian majority population. The author notes that the available data concerning the Czechs in the late nineteenth century are scarce and fragmentary, and largely demographic and administrative in nature. The history of the Czech community in Romania during the twentieth century was marked by repatriation. After the Second World War, a large number of them chose to return to Czechoslovakia, which considerably reduced the Czech community. The image of communism in the discourse of the interviewed community members, and parallelisms between “then” and “now”, show an intertwining with their experience of their present life and their position in Romanian society. The most prominent feature of their perception of the communist past is an affirma-

tive attitude towards the communist social policy, particularly as regards the mining industry, which was the source of jobs for a good part of the Czech population. The third chapter, “The images and discourses: Autobiographical examples”, is devoted to the life stories of the interviewed community members. Personal stories are intertwined with historical events to which they testify from their own perspective. A qualitative analysis of the interviews shows how a community constructs its identity and alterity, using, among other things, autobiographical accounts. Through an analysis of “microculture”, the fourth chapter, “Culture, tradition and oral history”, highlights the understanding and transmission of oral tradition in present times. Relying on the interviews, the author arrives at the conclusion that there is a strong interest in finding out about their ethnic origin, as well as a desire to preserve the tradition and culture as they once were. Some customs long extinguished in the Czech Republic have thus survived in these isolated mountain villages in Romania. The preservation and revival of tradition through festivals plays an important role in the Czech community, acting as a “place of memory”, where reminiscences are shared and revived. The fifth chapter, “Regained or restored identity”, deals with contacts and relations between the Romanian Czech community and their mother country, as well as with their relations with other ethnic communities in the multiethnic and multi-confessional part of the Romanian Banat. In her conclusion, Preda points out that the disintegration of the Czech community in the Danube Gorge is not an isolated phenomenon but rather a result of the changes within the traditional social environment of an autochthonous rural area. Socio-economic changes in Romanian society have brought about migration from rural to urban areas, resulting in a more rapid assimilation of minority

communities. In the case of the Czech community, the pace of the processes of assimilation and acculturation has been rather slow due to the isolated location of their settlements, but also to the Roman Catholic religion. However, the isolation has prevented neither their emigration to the Czech Republic over the past few decades nor their marriages with members of the majority population. The life stories of the interviewees presented in the study reveal how they see themselves in relation to others and their perception of the past at the present moment. Apart from fieldwork, the data collecting process included archival research, as well as consulting relevant historiographical, folkloristic, dialectological, ethnological and anthro-

pological considerations, which considerably enhanced the study, placing it into an interdisciplinary framework. The strong point of the study resides in the exemplary presentation of personal biographies, through which members of this small ethnic community articulate the complex relationship between tradition and modernity. Apart from supplying numerous examples, the book offers an important analysis of the continued existence and development of an ethnic community in the diaspora, which makes it a very useful contribution to research in the field of humanities and social sciences in general, but also a helpful research model applicable to other neighbouring ethnic groups in the Romanian Banat, such as Serbs.

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